ADA Title II Claims Against State Courts Require Disability-Based Exclusion Allegations to Pierce Sovereign Immunity; Adverse Judicial Rulings Are Not ADA Discrimination

Introduction

In Hilda T. Kennedy v. The New Jersey Court System (Third Circuit, Feb. 6, 2026) (not precedential), the pro se appellant, Hilda Kennedy, sued the State of New Jersey Judiciary (captioned as the “New Jersey Court System”) alleging disability-based discrimination during four state-court matters in Atlantic County. She sought compensatory damages and injunctive/declaratory relief, invoking Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and (initially) the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, later reframing her amended pleading to include constitutional theories “through the non-compliance of ADA Title II” and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The central appellate issues distilled by the Third Circuit were narrow: (1) whether Kennedy stated a viable First Amendment retaliation claim attributable to the Judiciary, and (2) whether she plausibly pled a Title II ADA claim sufficient to move past the threshold inquiry that precedes any claim-by-claim abrogation analysis under state sovereign immunity doctrine.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal with prejudice. It held:

  • The retaliation claim failed because Kennedy did not plausibly allege retaliatory conduct by the Judiciary or causation linking any protected activity to retaliation, as required by George v. Rehiel. To the extent she challenged actions/rulings by state judges, those claims were barred by judicial immunity under Stump v. Sparkman, and to the extent she attributed those actions to the court system or employees, the Judiciary is an arm of the State entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
  • The ADA Title II claim failed at the threshold: Kennedy did not plausibly allege that she was excluded from, denied the benefits of, or discriminated against in a public entity’s services “by reason of” disability as required by Geness v. Admin. Office of Pa. Courts. Her allegations were largely conclusory or amounted to disagreement with adverse state-court rulings, which the panel emphasized are not transformed into ADA violations by labeling them “non-compliance.” Because she failed to plead a viable Title II claim, the New Jersey Judiciary remained immune.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Pleading standards and appellate limits

  • Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly: The court applied the plausibility requirement, rejecting conclusory assertions untethered to concrete facts. ADA and retaliation claims failed not because such claims are categorically unavailable, but because the complaint did not plead facts supporting the required elements.
  • Erickson v. Pardus and Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.: The panel reiterated liberal construction for pro se pleadings, while stressing that pro se litigants remain bound by procedural rules and substantive pleading requirements.
  • Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Dominick D'Andrea, Inc. and M.S. ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist.: These cases framed the court’s refusal to entertain new claims/defendants raised for the first time on appeal and the forfeiture of arguments not raised in the opening brief.
  • Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att'y Gen.: Cited for plenary review standards on Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) dismissals.

Retaliation elements and immunities

  • George v. Rehiel: Supplied the three-element test for First Amendment retaliation, with the opinion focusing on the missing “retaliation” and “causation” elements in Kennedy’s allegations.
  • Stump v. Sparkman: The backbone of the judicial immunity holding—judges are immune for judicial acts even if erroneous, excessive, or malicious, absent “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” This precedent foreclosed any attempt to repackage adverse rulings (fee waiver denials, dismissals, stays) as actionable retaliation.
  • Gallas v. Supreme Ct.: Extended functional immunity to “judicial employees” acting as intermediaries or functioning as an arm of the court, reinforcing that litigants cannot evade judicial immunity by naming staff or the system.
  • Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc. and Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman: These cases anchored the Eleventh Amendment analysis: when an entity is an “arm of the state,” it is presumptively immune unless immunity is abrogated by Congress or waived by the State. The opinion treated the unified New Jersey Judiciary as such an arm.

State-court review limits (contextual background)

  • D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman and Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co.: Although the appeal centered on the amended complaint’s surviving theories, the panel noted the litigation’s posture— the District Court previously applied Rooker-Feldman to bar ADA claims tied to concluded state cases. The citations underscore a recurring boundary: federal district courts are not appellate tribunals for state-court judgments.

ADA Title II, access to courts, and sovereign immunity

  • Tennessee v. Lane: Confirmed Title II’s applicability to cases implicating the fundamental right of access to courts. The opinion used Lane to acknowledge that state judiciaries can fall within Title II’s reach.
  • United States v. Georgia: Provided the abrogation framework: Title II abrogates sovereign immunity at least “insofar as” the challenged conduct actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring a claim-by-claim analysis. The Third Circuit effectively stopped at the gateway step because Kennedy did not plead a viable Title II claim.
  • Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n: Supplied the “first step” threshold inquiry—whether “any aspect” of the alleged conduct forms the basis for a Title II claim. The opinion held Kennedy did not clear this bar.
  • Geness v. Admin. Office of Pa. Courts: Supplied the four elements of a Title II claim and the expansive definition of “service, program, or activity.” Critically, despite the breadth of what counts as a “service,” Kennedy still had to plead exclusion/denial/discrimination “by reason of” disability, which she did not.
  • Durham v. Kelley: Clarified that compensatory damages under the ADA require intentional discrimination under a deliberate indifference standard. The opinion invoked Durham to highlight that conclusory accusations cannot support damages.

Legal Reasoning

1) Retaliation: a missing factual bridge from lawsuits to adverse action

The panel assumed arguendo that Kennedy’s filings could constitute protected activity, but found the complaint lacked facts showing the Judiciary “responded with retaliation” or that protected activity “caused the retaliation” under George v. Rehiel. The opinion emphasized an intuitive point that often proves dispositive in access-to-courts disputes: allegations that one “lost motions” or faced procedural barriers do not, without more, plausibly show retaliatory motive or a retaliatory act by an entity defendant—particularly where the plaintiff continued to litigate.

The immunity holdings then operated as an independent barrier. If the alleged “retaliation” consists of judges’ rulings, Stump v. Sparkman blocks damages claims. If the alleged wrongdoing is reattributed to staff or “the system,” Gallas v. Supreme Ct. extends functional immunity to court personnel acting in a judicial capacity, and Eleventh Amendment principles (via Fitchik and Pennhurst) protect the state judiciary itself.

2) ADA Title II: breadth of “services” does not eliminate the need to plead disability-based exclusion

The opinion’s core ADA holding is practical: Title II is broad enough to encompass court operations and accommodations (Tennessee v. Lane; Geness), but a plaintiff must still plead facts showing that denial/exclusion/discrimination occurred “by reason of” disability (Geness), and that damages require deliberate indifference (Durham).

Kennedy alleged she requested “extra assistance” and asked the judge to “speak slowly, loudly, and clearly,” and complained generally that the Judiciary lacked disability-services infrastructure and tools (assistive listening systems, Braille materials). The panel treated these as either (a) too vague to infer denial of meaningful access, or (b) unlinked to any plausible inference that she was treated adversely because of disability. The opinion also drew a firm line between disability discrimination and merits-based or procedural decisions: adverse rulings (dismissals, stay denials, fee waiver denials) are not themselves ADA violations absent factual allegations connecting those decisions to disability-based discrimination.

3) Sovereign immunity: the court never reaches abrogation without a viable Title II claim

The panel acknowledged that Eleventh Amendment immunity is “not absolute” for Title II claims, citing United States v. Georgia. But it applied Bowers to require a threshold showing that the alleged conduct even states a Title II claim. Because Kennedy’s allegations did not meet Title II’s elements, the abrogation inquiry did not meaningfully proceed: without plausible disability discrimination, there is no basis to hold that Congress validly abrogated immunity for this defendant on these allegations.

Impact

Although “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the opinion is instructive in three recurring litigation patterns:

  1. Pleading discipline in ADA court-access cases: Plaintiffs must allege specific barriers, requested accommodations, the entity’s response/denial, and facts supporting that the denial was “by reason of” disability—and, for damages, facts supporting deliberate indifference. Vague references to missing “ADA measures” or comparisons to universities’ disability offices will not suffice.
  2. Doctrinal boundary between discrimination and adjudication: The decision reinforces that the ADA is not a vehicle to relitigate state-court outcomes. Disagreement with rulings is conceptually distinct from discrimination; the complaint must connect disability to differential treatment or denial of meaningful access, not merely to dissatisfaction with results.
  3. Immunity as a structural shield for courts and court actors: Judicial immunity (Stump, Gallas) and state sovereign immunity (Fitchik, Pennhurst) remain formidable. Even where Title II can abrogate immunity (United States v. Georgia), courts may dispose of cases at the threshold if the pleading does not establish a Title II violation in the first instance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Title II of the ADA: A federal law requiring public entities (including state courts) to provide qualified individuals with disabilities equal access to services and to avoid discrimination “by reason of” disability.
  • “By reason of” disability: The disability must be the reason (at least a motivating reason) for the exclusion/denial/discriminatory treatment. It is not enough that the plaintiff has a disability and also experienced an adverse event.
  • Deliberate indifference (ADA damages): A heightened fault standard for compensatory damages—generally requiring facts suggesting the entity knew of a substantial risk of ADA harm and failed to act appropriately.
  • Eleventh Amendment (state sovereign) immunity: States and their “arms” (such as unified state court systems) are generally immune from suit in federal court. Immunity can be waived by the state or abrogated by Congress in limited circumstances.
  • Abrogation under United States v. Georgia: Title II can overcome state immunity on a claim-by-claim basis at least where the alleged conduct also violates the Fourteenth Amendment. But courts often first ask whether the complaint even states a Title II claim.
  • Judicial immunity: Judges (and sometimes court staff performing judicial functions) cannot be sued for money damages for judicial acts, even if alleged to be wrong or malicious, unless performed in clear absence of jurisdiction.
  • Rooker-Feldman doctrine: Federal district courts cannot function as appellate courts reviewing state-court judgments; challenges to state judgments generally must proceed through state appeals and, if applicable, the U.S. Supreme Court.

Conclusion

Kennedy underscores that ADA Title II claims against a state judiciary—while possible in principle under Tennessee v. Lane and the abrogation framework of United States v. Georgia—require concrete, nonconclusory allegations that the plaintiff was denied meaningful access to court services “by reason of” disability as articulated in Geness. The opinion also reinforces that adverse judicial rulings are not, without more, actionable as ADA discrimination, and that judicial and sovereign immunities remain powerful constraints when litigants attempt to convert litigation outcomes into federal civil-rights damages actions.