ADA “Qualified Individual” Rule: Illegal Marijuana Use (and Failure to Complete a Required Drug Test) Defeats the Prima Facie Case

Precedents Cited

Docket management and discretion

• Young v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2004): Cited for the abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing case-management decisions. It frames the appellate posture as deferential on procedural rulings.
• Smith v. Psychiatric Sols., Inc., 750 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2014): Reinforces that district courts have “unquestionable authority to control their own dockets” and broad discretion in managing proceedings—supporting the court’s rejection of Bellamy’s procedural complaints.

Due process standard

• Lapaix v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 605 F.3d 1138 (11th Cir. 2010): Provides de novo review of constitutional due process claims, while still concluding no due process violation occurred because the procedures available were adequate.

Multiple summary judgment motions

• Fernandez v. Bankers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 559 (11th Cir. 1990): Used to confirm that multiple summary judgment motions are permissible, particularly when the district court’s scheduling approach and the progress of discovery justify a renewed or later dispositive motion. This directly defeats the argument that C2 needed leave of court to file a second motion.

No hearing required on summary judgment

• Smith v. Sch. Bd. of Orange Cnty., 487 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2007) and Helmich v. Kennedy, 796 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1983): Establish that district courts are not required to hold a hearing before ruling on summary judgment.
• Moore v. State of Fla., 703 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1983): Clarifies that the “opportunity to be heard” under Rule 56 is satisfied when a party has the opportunity to submit written materials opposing summary judgment.
• Sun River Energy, Inc. v. Nelson, 800 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2015): Cited as persuasive authority for the proposition that full briefing is sufficient for due process; an oral/evidentiary hearing is not required.

Summary judgment standards and appellate review

• Ismael v. Roundtree, 161 F.4th 752 (11th Cir. 2025): Confirms de novo review of summary judgment.
• Dunlap v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 629 (11th Cir. 1988): Supports the point that even unopposed summary judgment motions require merits review.
• Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2013): Allows affirmance on any adequate ground supported by the record, enabling the panel to affirm on the “qualified individual” element even if other elements were disputed.

ADA framework

• Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2000): Supplies the ADA prima facie elements (disabled, qualified, and discriminated against because of disability) and anchors the panel’s decision to resolve the case on the “qualified individual” requirement.
• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): Provides the burden-shifting structure applied to the ADA claim: prima facie case, legitimate non-discriminatory reason, and pretext.

What a district court must review on an unopposed motion

• United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099 (11th Cir. 2004): Cited to explain that the district court need not scour the whole record sua sponte; it must ensure the motion is supported by evidence and indicate it addressed the merits.

Legal Reasoning

1. Procedural challenges failed under deferential standards. The court treated the filing of a second summary judgment motion as consistent with the Federal Rules and Fernandez, especially given the scheduling order’s invitation to litigate exhaustion early and merits later. It also held Rule 56 placed the burden on Bellamy to respond within the default and local-rule timeline; the district court waited beyond the response period before ruling. Finally, no hearing was required; the “right to be heard” was satisfied by the opportunity to file written opposition under Moore.
2. The merits turned on the prima facie “qualified individual” element. Applying Earl within the McDonnell Douglas framework, the panel affirmed because Bellamy could not satisfy step one. The court adopted the regulatory definition of “qualified individual” (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)) and treated C2’s drug-free requirement as a job-related requirement.
3. Illegal drug use (as known to the employer) made Bellamy unqualified. The panel emphasized: (a) marijuana remains illegal under federal law (21 U.S.C. §§ 802, 812, & 844); (b) it is illegal under Florida law without a medical marijuana card (Fla. Stat. § 381.986); and (c) C2 had additional compliance obligations under the Drug-Free Workplace Act (41 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8106). Against that legal backdrop, the court credited record evidence that Bellamy told C2 in writing she used marijuana in Florida without a license and did not complete the drug test that might have clarified her status. Because “not using illegal drugs” was treated as a job requirement, she was not a qualified individual and could not establish a prima facie ADA claim.
4. The court avoided deeper disputes once the prima facie case failed. Relying on Earl, the panel stated it need not reach the other prima facie elements (disability and causation) once qualification failed—an approach that narrows ADA litigation to threshold employability requirements where legally mandated policies are involved.

Impact

• ADA claims and cannabis use: The decision reinforces a consequential boundary: where an employer has a drug-free requirement tied to federal illegality and/or federal funding compliance, an applicant’s disclosed illegal marijuana use can defeat the “qualified individual” element at the prima facie stage—before pretext analysis.
• Grant-funded and regulated employers: By highlighting the Drug-Free Workplace Act, the opinion strengthens employers’ ability—especially federal contractors/grantees—to frame drug-free rules as job-related requirements rather than discretionary preferences.
• Pre-employment testing logistics: The employer’s reliance on failure to complete a mandatory drug test is validated as a legitimate basis to rescind an offer; applicants bear practical responsibility to comply with stated deadlines. The reasoning suggests that last-minute scheduling issues will not easily create an ADA triable issue when the employer applies a consistent policy.
• Procedure in summary judgment practice: The opinion reiterates that litigants must comply with Rule 56 response timelines; courts may rule without hearings; and multiple summary judgment motions are permissible when case scheduling and discovery progression justify them.
• Persuasive (not precedential) weight: Because the decision is “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” its formal precedential effect is limited, but its reasoning may still be cited persuasively where local rules allow and where similar fact patterns arise.