ADA “Qualified Individual” at the Time of Termination and No Per Se “100% Healed” Liability Without a Companywide Policy

Introduction

In Craige Robinson v. Mountaire Farms of North Carolina Corp. (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2026) (unpublished), the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for an employer that terminated a chicken-processing plant supervisor after his FMLA leave expired and his medical restrictions prevented him from performing the job’s physical demands.

The plaintiff, Craige Robinson, worked as a “rehang supervisor,” a role involving extensive walking/standing on a production floor and occasional lifting and other physical activity. After being shot at a non-work event, Robinson returned with significant restrictions (including limited standing/walking, mandatory rest breaks, no use of the left arm, and minimal lifting/pushing/pulling with the right arm). Mountaire engaged in an ADA “interactive process” but concluded it could not accommodate the restrictions in the supervisor role and that no vacant positions matched his restrictions. It terminated his employment. Robinson sued under the ADA for wrongful termination, failure to accommodate, and an asserted per se violation based on an alleged “100% healed” return-to-work policy.

The appeal presented two central issues: (1) whether Robinson was a “qualified individual” under the ADA at the time of termination, and (2) whether Mountaire maintained a policy requiring full medical clearance in a manner that constitutes a per se ADA violation.

Note: The opinion is unpublished and “not binding precedent in this circuit,” but it illustrates how the Fourth Circuit applies established ADA standards to restriction-heavy return-to-work disputes.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed. It held:

  • Robinson could not perform the essential functions of the rehang supervisor job (and no suitable vacant job existed) given his restrictions; therefore he was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA, which defeated both his wrongful termination and failure-to-accommodate claims.
  • Robinson failed to prove a companywide “100% healed” policy. Mountaire’s discovery admissions concerned Robinson’s particular restrictions and job demands, and the record showed Mountaire sometimes permitted employees to return with restrictions and provided accommodations when essential functions could still be performed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

W.C. Eng., Inc. v. Rummel, Klepper & Kahl, LLP, 934 F.3d 398 (4th Cir. 2019)

The court cited W.C. Eng., Inc. for the standard of review and summary-judgment lens: de novo review, applying the same standards as the district court, and viewing facts in the nonmovant’s favor. This framing mattered because Robinson’s appeal largely contested how the record should be interpreted; the court emphasized that even under that favorable view, Robinson’s own testimony and medical restrictions foreclosed a triable dispute on the “qualified individual” element.

Jessup v. Barnes Grp., Inc., 23 F.4th 360 (4th Cir. 2022)

Jessup supplied the doctrinal anchor: both ADA wrongful termination and failure-to-accommodate claims require the plaintiff to be a “qualified individual.” The panel used Jessup to collapse the two claims into a shared threshold inquiry—if Robinson could not perform essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, both claims fail as a matter of law.

Ross v. Ind. State Tchr.'s Ass'n Tr., 159 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 1998)

Although a Seventh Circuit case, Ross was cited for a timing principle: the “qualified individual” inquiry focuses on “the time of the employment decision.” That foreclosed any argument that Robinson might become qualified later after additional healing. The question was whether, at termination, he could perform essential functions with reasonable accommodation.

Legal Reasoning

  1. “Qualified individual” as a gatekeeper. The ADA defines a “qualified individual” as someone who can perform the job’s essential functions “with or without reasonable accommodation.” The court treated this as dispositive. It compared:
    • The job’s physical reality (Robinson spent about 75–80% of time walking the lines, with no chair on the floor, and the environment required frequent standing/walking and occasional physical exertion),
    • Against the medical restrictions (sedentary work; standing/walking limited to one to four hours per day; mandatory sitting 15 minutes every hour; no use of left arm; minimal right-arm exertion; no ladders).
    On that record, the court concluded Robinson could not perform the essential functions of his position.
  2. Interactive process evidence did not create qualification. The opinion notes Mountaire engaged in “back and forth” with Robinson and his doctors. But an interactive process, by itself, does not substitute for the statutory requirement that the employee be able to perform essential functions with a reasonable accommodation. Where restrictions eliminate essential functions (here, extensive standing/walking and physical supervisory floor presence), the process may end in a lawful conclusion that no reasonable accommodation exists.
  3. No per se “100% healed” policy shown. Robinson’s per se theory depended on proving Mountaire maintained a policy requiring employees to be fully cleared of restrictions before returning to work. The court found the “admissions” were specific to Robinson’s circumstances and did not establish a general policy. The court also relied on undisputed record evidence that Mountaire had:
    • accommodated other employees, and
    • allowed others to return with restrictions when those restrictions did not prevent performance of essential functions.
    Thus, the per se claim failed both as a pleading/admissions matter (no companywide policy admitted) and as an evidentiary matter (record contradicted the existence of such a policy).

Impact

Although unpublished, the decision reinforces several practical points likely to influence ADA litigation and employer practice in the Fourth Circuit:

  • Essential functions, not job titles, drive outcomes. Detailed evidence about what the job actually requires (e.g., percentage of time walking/standing; lack of seating; production-floor realities) can be decisive at summary judgment.
  • Timing is critical. The relevant question is qualification at the moment of the termination/return-to-work decision, not the employee’s future potential improvement.
  • “100% healed” claims require proof of a genuine policy. A plaintiff must show more than a one-off demand for clearance in a specific job context; evidence that others returned with restrictions can significantly undermine a per se theory.
  • FMLA expiration does not itself establish ADA liability. The ADA analysis remains whether the employee can perform essential functions with reasonable accommodation, and whether a suitable vacant position exists if reassignment is proposed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Qualified individual” (ADA): A person who can do the job’s essential tasks, either as-is or with a reasonable accommodation. If not, most ADA employment claims fail at the threshold.
  • “Essential functions”: The fundamental duties of the job (not marginal tasks). Courts look to real workplace demands—what the job actually requires day-to-day.
  • “Reasonable accommodation”: A change or assistance enabling performance of essential functions (e.g., modified schedules, equipment, reassignment to a vacant position). It does not require eliminating essential functions or creating a new job.
  • “Interactive process”: The employer-employee dialogue to identify possible accommodations. A breakdown can matter, but it does not create liability if no reasonable accommodation would enable performance of essential functions.
  • “100% healed policy” / per se ADA violation theory: Some courts treat blanket requirements that employees be fully healed as incompatible with the ADA’s individualized assessment. This case emphasizes the need to prove the policy is actually blanket/companywide, not a job-specific conclusion tied to essential functions.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s decision underscores that ADA liability hinges on whether the employee was a “qualified individual” at the time of the employment decision. Where medical restrictions prevent performance of essential functions—and no reasonable accommodation or vacant reassignment exists—wrongful termination and failure-to-accommodate claims fail. The opinion also narrows per se “100% healed” arguments by requiring proof of a genuine companywide policy, not merely an employer’s job-specific determination that certain restrictions are incompatible with essential functions.