ADA Pleading Rule: Failure-to-Accommodate Requires Specific Accommodation Facts; “Throwaway” Leave-to-Amend Requests May Be Denied

Case: Daniel Lonergan v. Gallagher Sharp, LLP
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date: 2026-05-29
Disposition: Affirmed (judgment on the pleadings for employer)
Publication Status: Not recommended for publication (persuasive, not binding precedent)

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from an employment-disability dispute between Daniel Lonergan, a practicing attorney alleging severe ADHD, and his former employer, Gallagher Sharp, LLP, a Cleveland-based law firm. Lonergan claimed that the firm violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02 by (i) terminating him because of disability, (ii) failing to provide reasonable accommodation, and (iii) failing to engage in a good-faith interactive process to identify feasible accommodations.

The central legal issue was not whether ADHD can be a disability (it can), nor whether timekeeping/billing is an essential function for a law-firm associate (it often is), but instead whether Lonergan’s complaint contained enough factual content to plausibly allege that he was a qualified individual—i.e., able to perform essential functions “with or without reasonable accommodation”—and that he proposed a reasonable accommodation. A second, procedural issue concerned whether the district court should have granted leave to amend when Lonergan, proceeding pro se but as a practicing attorney, included a single sentence requesting amendment at the end of his opposition brief.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit (Clay, J.) affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Applying the same plausibility standard used for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, the court held that Lonergan’s complaint was fatally conclusory: it asserted that he requested “modification[s]” and “suggested accommodations,” but it did not identify any specific accommodation request. Without those facts, the complaint did not plausibly allege that Lonergan was qualified to do the job with a reasonable accommodation, an element required for both failure-to-accommodate and interactive process theories under Sixth Circuit doctrine.

The court also affirmed the denial of leave to amend. It held that a bare, one-sentence request to amend in an opposition brief—without a proposed amended complaint and without particularized grounds—does not constitute a proper motion. The district court acted within its discretion in denying the request, especially given Lonergan’s five-month delay in filing any formal motion to amend after the employer filed its Rule 12(c) motion.

The court additionally noted that Lonergan forfeited any challenge to the denial of reconsideration because his appellate briefing addressed only the July 10 dismissal order. See Geboy v. Brigano.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Outcome)

1) Pleading standards and Rule 12(c)/12(b)(6) framework

• Engler v. Arnold (citing Kottmyer v. Maas): Provided the baseline rule that, on Rule 12(c), courts accept as true well-pleaded factual allegations. This helped Lonergan only in principle; he had too few factual allegations about accommodations to accept as true.
• Hindel v. Husted (citing W.J. O'Neil Co. v. Shepley, Bulfinch, Richardson & Abbott, Inc. and Barany-Snyder v. Weiner): Confirmed de novo review of Rule 12(c) and equivalence to Rule 12(b)(6). The court used this to focus tightly on plausibility rather than the merits.
• JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget (and Mixon v. Ohio): Reinforced that courts need not accept legal conclusions or unwarranted inferences; a critical tool for characterizing “I requested accommodations” as conclusory rather than factual.
• Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly: The opinion’s backbone. The court treated Lonergan’s accommodation allegations as “threadbare recitals” and “naked assertions” without “factual enhancement,” insufficient to push the claim from possible to plausible.
• Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co.: Supplied the Sixth Circuit’s formulation that a complaint must contain direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements under some viable legal theory.
• United States ex rel. Angelo v. Allstate Ins. Co.: Added a functional justification for strict pleading—preventing “sandbagging” by withholding key allegations until later stages.
• Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.: Lonergan invoked it to argue he need not plead a prima facie case. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the general principle but emphasized its limit: even without pleading a prima facie case, a plaintiff must plead facts showing entitlement to relief under Rule 8 and plausibility doctrine.

2) Substantive ADA elements: “qualified individual,” reasonable accommodation, and interactive process

• Hostettler v. Coll. of Wooster: Provided the statutory framing: ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual and includes failure to make reasonable accommodations.
• Cooper v. Dolgencorp, LLC: Reinforced the definition of a qualified individual—able to perform essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation. This definition became the gatekeeper that Lonergan could not plausibly satisfy without pleading what accommodation would make him qualified.
• Darby v. Childvine, Inc.: Supplied the three-part pleading burden highlighted by the panel: disabled; qualified with/without accommodation; and but-for causation regarding discharge. The second element drove dismissal.
• Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc. (citing Walsh v. United Parcel Serv.): Emphasized that the employee must propose a reasonable accommodation. The panel translated that ultimate proof burden into a pleading necessity: facts showing what accommodation was proposed (and thus how the employee would be qualified).
• Nance v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.: Explained the interactive process regulation (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)). The court used it to recognize the process as “mandatory,” but not self-executing as a standalone claim without qualification.
• Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor Co. (en banc)): Delivered the controlling limitation: failure to engage in interactive process is actionable only if the employee can demonstrate qualification. Lonergan’s failure to plead any accommodation facts prevented him from plausibly pleading qualification and therefore sank the interactive process claim too.

3) The “pleadings only” boundary: facts in briefs do not cure a deficient complaint

• Waskul v. Washtenaw Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health (quoting Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass'n): The court relied on this line to reject reliance on accommodation details that appeared only in briefing (e.g., legal assistant timekeeping, flat-rate projects, discounted fees). This principle was decisive because those unpleaded details were the only concrete accommodations described in the record.

4) Leave to amend: Rule 15 generosity constrained by Rule 7 particularity, timing, and substance

• Doe v. Michigan State Univ. (and Boulton v. Swanson): Set the standard of review: abuse of discretion for denial; de novo only if denial rests on futility. The Sixth Circuit treated the district court’s denial as based on form and timing, thus applying abuse of discretion.
• Foman v. Davis: The classic list of reasons to deny leave (undue delay, bad faith, futility, etc.). The court leaned on “undue delay” to uphold denial—Lonergan waited five months after the Rule 12(c) motion without filing a proper motion to amend.
• Evans v. Pearson Enters., Inc.: Connected Rule 15(a) to Rule 7(b)’s requirement that motions state grounds with particularity.
• Beydoun v. Sessions (quoting Roskam Baking Co. v. Lanham Machinery Co.): Required that the district court have “the substance of the proposed amendment” before it; denying leave is not an abuse of discretion when the plaintiff supplies no facts to aid the court.
• PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler (abrogated on other grounds by Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano), plus Kuyat v. BioMimetic Therapeutics, Inc. (quoting La. Sch. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Ernst & Young, LLP): Established the “bare request in an opposition” doctrine—requests to amend “almost as an aside” are not motions under Rule 15(a).
• Forrester v. Am. Sec. & Prot. Serv. LLC (quoting United States ex rel. Owsley v. Fazzi Assocs., Inc.) and Swanigan v. FCA US LLC: Reinforced that denial is proper when no formal motion or proposed amended complaint is filed.

5) Appellate forfeiture and raising issues for the first time on appeal

• Geboy v. Brigano: Applied to deem forfeited any challenge to the reconsideration order because Lonergan did not brief it on appeal.
• Kusens v. Pascal Co.: Used to reject Lonergan’s attempt to introduce on appeal a medical questionnaire and related accommodation material not presented to the district court.

6) Pro se leniency (and its limits)

• Williams v. Curtin (quoting Martin v. Overton): The general rule that pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards. The panel stressed that this leniency is “questionable” where the pro se litigant is a practicing attorney, and also noted Lonergan raised the pro se-leniency argument too late (first on appeal).

7) Ohio law parity

• Rosebrough v. Buckeye Valley High Sch. and the district court’s citation to Hazen v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation: Supported the uncontested proposition that Ohio disability-discrimination claims under O.R.C. § 4112.02 track ADA analysis, so the same pleading defect defeated both claims.

B. Legal Reasoning (Step-by-Step)

1) The opinion treats “what accommodation was requested?” as a pleading-critical fact

The court’s central move is to classify Lonergan’s accommodation allegations as conclusory. The complaint said he requested “modification[s] to job requirements” and “suggested accommodations,” but it did not say what they were. Under Iqbal/Twombly, that is a label (an element) rather than factual content. Without the “what,” the court held it could not plausibly infer that a reasonable accommodation existed that would make Lonergan qualified, or that the employer unlawfully refused it.

2) “Qualified individual” is the doctrinal choke point for both claims

For failure-to-accommodate, qualification is explicit: the employee must be able to perform essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation. The court treated the accommodation allegation as necessary to plausibly plead qualification, because the complaint itself described trouble meeting the firm’s timekeeping expectations—an implied admission that an essential function was at issue. Without pleading a concrete accommodation, the complaint could not plausibly bridge the gap from “I had difficulty” to “I could perform with a reasonable adjustment.”

For interactive process, the court relied on Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor Co. (en banc)) to reaffirm that an interactive-process failure is not actionable unless the employee is qualified. Thus, the same pleading defect (no pleaded accommodation facts) doomed the interactive process theory.

3) The court polices the boundary between pleadings and briefing

Lonergan and the firm’s briefing contained details of suggested accommodations (e.g., legal assistant time entry, flat-rate projects), but the panel refused to consider them because at the pleading stage the court “must focus only on the allegations in the pleadings,” citing Waskul v. Washtenaw Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health. This is an important procedural discipline point: the court declined to “reverse engineer” a plausible claim from post-complaint advocacy.

4) The court declines to reach reasonableness (because the complaint never gets there)

Notably, the panel did not decide whether any proposed accommodation would be reasonable, would remove an essential function, or would impose undue hardship. It held that because Lonergan did not plead any accommodation request at all, the case ends before those merits questions.

5) Leave to amend is denied based on (i) undue delay and (ii) failure to present the substance

The opinion treats Lonergan’s “Alternatively…” sentence as the paradigmatic non-motion described in PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler and Kuyat v. BioMimetic Therapeutics, Inc.. Rule 7(b) requires particularity; Rule 15’s liberality requires enough information for a court to evaluate whether “justice so requires.” By offering neither a proposed amended complaint nor concrete additional facts, Lonergan prevented meaningful Rule 15 analysis. The five-month period between the Rule 12(c) motion and dismissal—without a formal amendment motion—supported the “undue delay” justification under Foman v. Davis.

C. Impact (Why This Opinion Matters Practically)

• ADA plaintiffs in the Sixth Circuit must plead “the accommodation story,” not just the legal conclusion. This decision reinforces that, even though Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. relieves plaintiffs of pleading a full prima facie case, they must still allege enough facts to make each required element plausible. For accommodation claims, that commonly means identifying at least one concrete accommodation requested (and how it would enable performance of essential functions).
• Interactive process claims remain derivative in practice. By reiterating that interactive process failures are actionable only for qualified individuals, the opinion discourages plaintiffs from treating “failure to engage” as a standalone cause of action untethered to a plausible accommodation that would have worked.
• Briefing cannot cure pleading omissions. The opinion underscores a frequent litigation pitfall: courts will not use opposition briefs to “amend” a complaint. This may incentivize more careful initial pleading and early amendments as of right.
• Procedural rigor for leave to amend is reaffirmed. The decision strengthens district courts’ discretion to deny “drive-by” amendment requests—especially when the plaintiff provides no draft amended complaint and delays without explanation. This has broad implications beyond ADA litigation.
• Limited pro se latitude for attorney-litigants. While not a hard rule, the panel’s skepticism suggests that attorney pro se plaintiffs may receive less indulgence for pleading and procedural defects than lay pro se parties.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 12(c) (Judgment on the Pleadings): A request for the court to decide the case based only on the complaint and answer (and materials properly considered at the pleading stage). The standard mirrors Rule 12(b)(6): the complaint must plausibly state a claim.
• Plausibility (Twombly/Iqbal): The complaint must include enough factual content to make liability a reasonable inference, not just a possibility. Courts disregard mere legal conclusions.
• “Qualified individual” under the ADA: Someone who can perform the job’s essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation. If the employee cannot do essential functions even with an accommodation, the ADA does not require continued employment.
• Essential functions: The fundamental duties of the job (not marginal tasks). Here, accurate timekeeping/billing was treated as an essential requirement for a litigation associate—at least enough that the complaint’s failure to plead an enabling accommodation mattered.
• Reasonable accommodation: A change or adjustment that enables a qualified person with a disability to perform essential functions, unless it causes undue hardship. The opinion does not decide what is reasonable here; it decides that the complaint did not identify any accommodation at all.
• Interactive process: The employer-employee dialogue aimed at identifying limitations and possible accommodations. In the Sixth Circuit, the employer’s failure to engage is actionable only if the employee is qualified (i.e., there exists a workable reasonable accommodation).
• Leave to amend (Rules 15 and 7): Courts should “freely give” leave when justice requires, but the request must be a proper motion stating grounds with particularity, typically accompanied by the proposed amended pleading or at least the substance of what would change.

5. Conclusion

Lonergan v. Gallagher Sharp, LLP is a pleading-focused ADA decision that turns on a straightforward but consequential rule: alleging that one “requested accommodations” is not enough; the complaint must describe the accommodation(s) sought so a court can plausibly infer that the plaintiff could perform essential functions with a reasonable accommodation and thus qualifies under the ADA. The opinion also reinforces a procedural discipline point that routinely decides cases early: facts in briefs cannot substitute for missing allegations in a complaint, and a cursory, embedded request for leave to amend—without a proposed amended complaint and after unexplained delay—may be denied without abusing discretion.

In broader context, the decision fits squarely within Sixth Circuit plausibility jurisprudence: Swierkiewicz prevents dismissal for failure to plead a prima facie case, but Twombly and Iqbal still require concrete factual allegations on the elements that make the claim legally actionable—especially where the “qualified individual” requirement is the threshold to both accommodation and interactive-process liability.