Actual Notice Can Satisfy Rule 902(11) and a Large Guidelines Variance Requires a Reasoned Basis to Accept an 11(c)(1)(C) Plea

I. Introduction

In United States v. Reginald DeWayne Brown (Sixth Circuit, Apr. 17, 2026) (not recommended for publication), the defendant-appellant Reginald Brown appealed his jury convictions for (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and (2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine, as well as his 198-month sentence.

The appeal presented three distinct issues:

  1. Plea bargaining / sentencing: Whether the district court erred by rejecting two Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreements that would have bound the court to sentences far below the calculated Guidelines range.
  2. Search warrant integrity: Whether Brown was entitled to a Franks hearing to challenge alleged falsehoods in the affidavit supporting a cell-phone ping warrant.
  3. Evidentiary authentication: Whether an AutoZone receipt and certification were properly admitted as self-authenticating business records under Federal Rule of Evidence 902(11) despite the claimed lack of formal written “notice.”

The Sixth Circuit affirmed on all issues, emphasizing (i) the district court’s discretion to reject binding plea agreements when the parties do not justify a steep variance, (ii) the high threshold for obtaining a Franks v. Delaware hearing, and (iii) a practical approach to Rule 902(11)’s notice requirement where the defense had actual pretrial notice and access to the certification.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Rule 11(c)(1)(C) pleas: The district court gave a “sound explanation” for rejecting the 60-month (and later 72-month) binding agreements because the undisputed Guidelines range in the plea-stage PSR was 130–162 months and the proposed sentence did not, in the court’s view, reflect the seriousness of the offenses and Brown’s significant criminal history.
  • Franks hearing: Even if the affidavit’s reference to a “fugitive investigation” were inaccurate, Brown did not make the “substantial preliminary showing” that any false statement was included knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, as required by Franks v. Delaware.
  • AutoZone receipt: Admission under Rule 902(11) was upheld. Although the government did not file a separate “notice” document, it had produced the receipt and certification in discovery and listed them on an amended exhibit list. Defense counsel acknowledged receipt. That actual notice was sufficient in the circumstances.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. District court discretion to accept or reject Rule 11(c)(1)(C) pleas

  • United States v. Yates: Cited for the baseline principle that acceptance or rejection of a plea agreement is the district court’s prerogative. The Brown panel used this to frame the issue as one of discretion, not entitlement.
  • In re United States: Supplied the operative constraint on that discretion—courts must provide a “sound explanation” when rejecting a plea agreement. Brown applies this requirement by treating the court’s explanation (Guidelines disparity + § 3553(a) concerns) as sufficient.
  • United States v. Cota-Luna: Reinforced the “preferred practice” of deferring acceptance of a binding plea until after reviewing the PSR. Brown uses this to validate the district court’s process.
  • United States v. Doggart (as quoted via In re United States) and United States v. Lanier: Supported the proposition that a court may reject an agreement that does not adequately reflect offense seriousness—central to the panel’s approval of the rejection rationale.
  • United States v. George (quoting United States v. Sabit) and U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(c): Used to emphasize the court’s “independent obligation” to ensure the stipulated sentence is within the Guidelines or that a departure/variance is justified. Brown treats the lack of persuasive justification for such a large downward variance as the key defect.

2. Drug quantity and “relevant conduct” in Guidelines calculations

  • United States v. Sengmany: Cited for the proposition that sentencing requires determination of drug quantity attributable to the defendant.
  • United States v. Knipp: Cited for the general principle that Guidelines offense level is driven by “relevant conduct,” not merely the statute of conviction or charging threshold.
  • United States v. Gardner: Cited for the standard of proof—drug quantity findings must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
  • United States v. Russell: Cited to support converting seized cash into a drug-quantity equivalent for Guidelines purposes.

3. Franks hearings and affidavit challenges

  • Franks v. Delaware: Provided the two-part test requiring (i) a substantial preliminary showing of intentional/reckless falsity and (ii) materiality to probable cause.
  • United States v. Poulson: Provided the standard of review (clear error for fact findings; de novo for legal issues) for Franks hearing denials.
  • United States v. Reed: Emphasized the defendant’s “high” burden and the need to specify the allegedly false portions, justify why, and support with reliable witness statements or explain their absence.
  • United States v. Bateman: Reinforced the requirement that the defendant must show knowing, intentional, or reckless falsity—not merely that a statement is arguably wrong.

4. Authentication and self-authentication of business records

  • United States v. Ramer: Provided the abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings.
  • United States v. Jordan: Served as the Sixth Circuit’s limited guidance on Rule 902(11) notice issues, indicating a non-hypertechnical approach to trial management of notice errors when the defense has an opportunity to respond.
  • United States v. Komasa: A Second Circuit case cited approvingly for the proposition that “actual notice” can suffice for Rule 902(11) purposes.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Rejection of the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreements

The panel treated the district court’s rejection as anchored in two legitimate considerations:

  1. Magnitude of the variance: The plea-stage PSR calculated a 130–162 month range. A binding 60-month sentence (later 72) required an unusually large deviation. Because neither side objected to the PSR, the Guidelines baseline was essentially undisputed for purposes of evaluating whether the proposed binding sentence was adequately supported.
  2. § 3553(a) concerns: The district court expressly found the proposed sentence “insufficient” to provide “just punishment” given the offense circumstances and Brown’s history and characteristics, emphasizing criminal history.

Importantly, Brown argued that the PSR used the “wrong” drug amount because the superseding information charged “500 grams or more” rather than “five kilograms or more.” The court rejected this as a misunderstanding of Guidelines methodology: offense level turns on relevant conduct, and the PSR attributed 11.58 kilograms based on seized drugs and cash conversion. In effect, the panel reaffirmed that charging thresholds limit statutory exposure but do not cap Guidelines drug quantity.

The opinion also flagged a practical reality: the outcome was “harsh” because Brown ended up with 198 months after rejecting pleas proposing 60/72 months. But the appellate court framed its role as limited—so long as the district court provided a sound explanation and acted within discretion, the consequence did not itself establish error.

2. Denial of a Franks hearing

Brown’s Franks theory targeted a single affidavit characterization: that police were conducting a “fugitive investigation of a violent felony offender.” The panel assumed for argument’s sake that “fugitive” might be inaccurate, but found the claim legally insufficient because Brown produced no evidence that the affiant acted knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly with respect to falsity. That evidentiary failure was dispositive under Franks v. Delaware, United States v. Reed, and United States v. Bateman.

The reasoning underscores a frequent Franks pitfall: disputing semantics (e.g., “fugitive”) without making the required preliminary evidentiary showing about the affiant’s mental state and materiality.

3. Admission of the AutoZone receipt under Rule 902(11)

Brown’s authentication challenge centered on Rule 902(11)’s requirement that the proponent give “reasonable written notice” before trial and provide access to the record and certification. The government admitted it did not provide “additional notice” beyond discovery production and inclusion in the exhibit list.

The district court nonetheless admitted the receipt and certification, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the theory that actual notice and a fair opportunity to challenge authenticity existed: the government produced the certification and receipt in discovery, listed both as exhibits (including “Certification for Auto Zone Receipt”), and defense counsel acknowledged having received them. Citing United States v. Komasa, the panel accepted that actual notice can satisfy the notice function of Rule 902(11) in the circumstances presented.

Once admitted as self-authenticating under Rule 902(11), the receipt did not require live-witness authentication under the business-records exception framework (including the “custodian or other qualified witness” concept often associated with Rule 803(6)).

C. Impact

1. Practical guidance for Rule 11(c)(1)(C) bargaining

Brown reinforces that when parties propose a binding sentence far below the Guidelines, the district court may demand a concrete, record-based justification. The decision functions as a warning that:

  • A large variance in an 11(c)(1)(C) deal is not inherently improper, but it must be defensible in terms of § 3553(a) and/or Guidelines departure logic.
  • If the PSR is undisputed, it becomes an especially powerful benchmark when the court assesses whether the parties have justified the bargain.
  • Even mutually agreed mitigation narratives may not suffice if the court finds public-safety, deterrence, or criminal-history concerns predominate.

2. Franks motions: evidentiary rigor, not conjecture

The opinion underscores that Franks litigation turns on evidence about the affiant’s state of mind and probable cause materiality—not merely arguable imprecision. Defendants who cannot marshal affidavits, documents, or other reliable proffers establishing knowing/reckless falsity will often fail at the “substantial preliminary showing” stage.

3. Rule 902(11) notice: function over form (within limits)

Brown may influence trial practice by encouraging courts to treat Rule 902(11)’s notice requirement as satisfied where the defense indisputably received the certification and record pretrial and had a fair chance to object—reducing the likelihood that missing “formal” notice alone will exclude business records.

Still, the decision should not be read as eliminating the rule’s written notice requirement. Rather, it suggests that when the defense has actual pretrial access and awareness, the purpose of notice (a fair opportunity to challenge authenticity) may be met.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement
A plea deal in which the parties agree to a specific sentence (or range). If the judge accepts the agreement, the judge is bound to impose that sentence. If the judge rejects it, the defendant can withdraw the guilty plea.
Guidelines range vs. statutory charge threshold
Statutes (like 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)) set penalty tiers based on charged quantities. The Sentencing Guidelines, however, often use a broader “relevant conduct” quantity—what the court finds by a preponderance of evidence was part of the same course of conduct or conspiracy—regardless of the minimum quantity needed for the charged tier.
Relevant conduct
Sentencing can account for conduct tied to the offense (including uncharged or not-proved-to-a-jury conduct) if it is sufficiently related and proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
Franks hearing
A special hearing to challenge a search warrant by showing the affidavit contained intentionally or recklessly false statements (or omissions) that were essential to probable cause. It is not automatic; the defendant must make a strong preliminary evidentiary showing to get the hearing.
Rule 902(11) self-authentication
A way to admit business records without calling a live custodian witness, using a written certification instead—so long as the opponent gets reasonable pretrial notice and an opportunity to inspect and challenge the record and certification.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Reginald DeWayne Brown affirms three trial-level rulings with broader practical lessons: (1) district courts retain substantial discretion to reject Rule 11(c)(1)(C) deals—especially those proposing steep Guidelines variances—so long as they provide a sound explanation grounded in the Guidelines and § 3553(a); (2) Franks hearings remain difficult to obtain absent concrete evidence of intentional or reckless falsity by the affiant; and (3) Rule 902(11)’s notice requirement may be satisfied by actual, timely pretrial disclosure that affords a fair chance to challenge authenticity, even if the proponent does not file a standalone notice document.