Actual Notice and Date-Specific “Good Cause” Control When an ALJ Dismisses for Nonappearance; HALLEX Naming Guidance Does Not Invalidate Notice

1. Introduction

Alterna Timepeace v. Commissioner Social Security (3d Cir. Feb. 27, 2026) concerns the Social Security Administration’s ability to dismiss a claimant’s request for an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) hearing after the claimant and her appointed non-attorney representative fail to appear.

The claimant, Alterna Timepeace, had been awarded disability benefits in 2015. Following a continuing disability review in 2018, the SSA moved to cease benefits, citing insufficient information to determine continuing disability. After Timepeace missed a Disability Hearing Officer proceeding and failed to submit updated medical evidence, an adverse determination issued. Timepeace then sought an ALJ hearing, but requested postponements twice. When a third hearing (video) was scheduled for May 1, 2023, Timepeace and her mother/representative Tonya Brown did not appear. The ALJ issued a show-cause request for medical documentation tied to the missed hearing date; the response did not provide date-specific support. The ALJ dismissed the hearing request; the Appeals Council denied review.

In federal court, Timepeace and Brown sued the Commissioner. The District Court dismissed Brown for lack of standing and granted summary judgment to the Commissioner, finding no abuse of discretion in the ALJ’s dismissal. The Third Circuit affirmed.

The case presented two practical issues: (1) what constitutes sufficient notice and “good cause” when a claimant fails to appear for a scheduled ALJ hearing, and (2) whether a non-attorney representative (and/or power-of-attorney holder) can litigate in federal court as a party based on representative status.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed. It held that substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Timepeace had adequate, timely notice of the May 1, 2023 hearing and of the risk of dismissal for nonappearance. It further held that the ALJ did not abuse discretion in finding no “good cause” because the claimant did not provide date-specific medical documentation explaining why she (and her representative) missed the hearing. The court also upheld dismissal of Brown from the civil action for lack of standing and treated an underdeveloped appellate argument on that point as forfeited.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 471, 478 n.19 (2019)
    The court relied on Smith for two key propositions reflected in its framing of review:
    1. Standard of review for dismissal-type administrative dispositions: the opinion states that review is for “abuse of discretion as to the overall conclusion, and substantial evidence as to any fact.” This is important because the challenged action was procedural (dismissal for failure to appear), not a merits adjudication of disability.
    2. Exhaustion can be waived by the Commissioner: the panel expressly declined to address exhaustion because the Commissioner waived it “in his brief,” citing Smith. That reflects a practical gatekeeping point: even when SSA exhaustion questions could be raised, they may not be jurisdictionally fatal if waived.
  • Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. Of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2017)
    Cited for the Third Circuit’s rule that it will not address “ill-developed arguments.” The panel used Barna to decline consideration of the appellants’ conclusory assertion that Brown’s representative/POA status allowed her to sue “on her behalf.”
  • Doeblers' Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 821 n.10 (3d Cir. 2006)
    Used in tandem with Barna to support forfeiture: where a point is mentioned but not developed beyond a conclusory statement, it is treated as forfeited on appeal. This directly narrowed the appellate issues and left intact the District Court’s standing ruling against Brown.
  • Edelman v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 83 F.3d 68, 71 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996)
    Central to rejecting the “wrong name” notice argument. Appellants argued notice was defective because it was not issued under Timepeace’s new legal name. The court cited Edelman for the proposition that guidance in the Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law Manual (HALLEX)—including naming conventions—“does not have the force of law.” That significantly limits procedural attacks that rest solely on internal SSA manual provisions rather than statutes, regulations, or constitutional due process.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Regulatory/statutory basis for dismissal for nonappearance
    The court applied the rule stated in the opinion: “An ALJ may dismiss a request for a hearing regarding a disability determination if neither the individual nor the individual's representative appears for the hearing and, when asked the reason for not appearing by the ALJ, fails to demonstrate good cause.” (The opinion cites “20 U.S.C. § 404.957(b)(1)(ii).”) Under that framework, the legal hinge is not disability merits but (i) nonappearance and (ii) failure to show good cause when prompted.
  2. Notice: substantial evidence of actual, timely notice
    The panel emphasized record evidence that SSA mailed the Notice of Hearing on February 9, 2023—“81 days in advance”—and a reminder on April 3, 2023. Even though a reminder notice to Brown was returned as undeliverable, the notice sent to Timepeace was not. The court also relied on a common-sense inference: if no notice had been received, it is difficult to explain how Brown requested another postponement “a week before the May 2023 hearing.” In other words, the court treated actual notice and the parties’ conduct as confirming adequate service for due-process purposes.
  3. Warning of dismissal: repeated, documented advisements
    The opinion underscores that both the Notice of Hearing and the reminder notice warned that nonappearance could lead to dismissal absent good cause. The warning was reiterated when SSA denied the third postponement and again after the missed hearing when the ALJ specifically requested medical documentation to support “just cause.” This matters because dismissal procedures can be challenged if the claimant is not warned of consequences; the record here showed layered warning.
  4. Good cause: the court endorses a date-specific evidentiary expectation
    The ALJ requested documentation “specific to the hearing days missed” (e.g., “discharge papers, inpatient documentation, and a doctor's notes”). The claimant’s response relied largely on (a) assertions of illness, (b) a name-change argument, and (c) older records including a “one-page discharge document from January 2022,” roughly “fifteen months prior” to the May 1, 2023 hearing. The Third Circuit agreed that this was insufficient to compel a finding of good cause.
  5. Name-change / “proper name” argument rejected as non-binding manual guidance
    Appellants contended no “proper” notice was served because notices used the claimant’s prior name. The panel rejected this for two reasons:
    • The notices were in fact addressed to the claimant’s “legal name prior to her name change in late 2022,” i.e., a correct identifier at the time used historically in the record.
    • To the extent HALLEX suggested a “proper name” requirement, Edelman v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. foreclosed treating HALLEX as binding law.
    The practical rule emerging is that a claimant must show a legally cognizable defect (e.g., lack of notice or confusion that defeats actual notice), not merely a departure from internal manual phrasing.
  6. No duty to “investigate the diagnosis” once the hearing is properly dismissed
    Timepeace argued the ALJ should have “fully investigat[ed]” her diagnosis. The court responded that such development “would have taken place if the hearing had proceeded,” citing the provisions identified in the opinion concerning issues/evidence at an ALJ hearing (“20 U.S.C. §§ 404.946” and “404.950”). Because the dismissal for nonappearance was within discretion, the ALJ did not have to reach the merits or develop the record further.
  7. Standing/party status of a non-attorney representative; forfeiture on appeal
    The District Court held Brown lacked standing because she “had not been a party to the administrative action.” On appeal, the Third Circuit did not engage a full doctrinal standing analysis; instead it treated the argument as forfeited under Barna and Doeblers' Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler because appellants offered only a “single conclusory statement.” The net effect is that representative status alone did not keep Brown in the case, and appellants failed to preserve a developed challenge.

C. Impact

  • Procedural dismissals will be sustained when the record shows (i) actual notice and (ii) a clear opportunity to show cause.
    This opinion illustrates that SSA can defend dismissal orders by documenting mailing dates, warnings, and post-hearing show-cause requests. Claimants should assume courts will credit contemporaneous administrative records and reasonable inferences drawn from claimant conduct (like requesting postponements).
  • “Good cause” must be tied to the missed hearing date.
    Older medical records or generalized statements about illness may not suffice. The opinion signals that ALJs (and reviewing courts) may expect documentation that directly explains inability to attend on the scheduled date.
  • HALLEX-based notice challenges face an uphill climb in the Third Circuit.
    By invoking Edelman v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., the panel reinforced that internal SSA manuals generally do not create enforceable rights. Future litigants challenging notice should focus on constitutional due process, statutes, and regulations, and on concrete confusion or prejudice.
  • Non-attorney representatives are not automatically proper federal-court plaintiffs.
    While the opinion resolves this primarily through forfeiture, it leaves intact the District Court’s view that a non-attorney representative “had not been a party to the administrative action,” underscoring the need to plead and brief capacity/standing issues with precision.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Continuing Disability Review (CDR)
A periodic SSA review to determine whether someone receiving disability benefits remains disabled under SSA rules. Benefits can stop if the SSA concludes disability has ended or if the claimant does not provide needed information.
ALJ dismissal for failure to appear
If the claimant (and representative) do not attend a scheduled hearing, the ALJ can dismiss the request for hearing—ending administrative review—unless the claimant shows “good cause” for missing it when asked to explain.
Good cause
A legally sufficient reason for missing a required step (here, the hearing). This opinion reflects that “good cause” is often evidentiary: the ALJ may require documentation (e.g., doctor’s note) tied to the hearing date.
Substantial evidence vs. abuse of discretion
“Substantial evidence” asks whether there is enough evidence that a reasonable person could accept to support factual findings (e.g., mailing of notices). “Abuse of discretion” asks whether the decision (e.g., dismissal) was arbitrary, irrational, or outside permissible choices given the facts and law.
HALLEX
An internal SSA manual providing guidance to adjudicators. Under Edelman v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., HALLEX generally does not create binding legal rights; failing to follow it is not automatically reversible error.
Forfeiture of an argument on appeal
If a party mentions an issue but does not meaningfully develop it with reasoning and citations, the appellate court may treat it as forfeited and decline to decide it.

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s disposition affirms a straightforward but consequential procedural principle in Social Security litigation: when the record shows timely actual notice of an ALJ hearing and repeated warnings about dismissal, a claimant who fails to appear must provide concrete, date-specific support to establish good cause—otherwise dismissal is within the ALJ’s discretion. The opinion also reinforces that HALLEX-based objections (such as naming conventions) generally do not supply an enforceable basis to invalidate notice, and it highlights the importance of properly briefing standing and capacity issues, particularly where a non-attorney representative seeks to participate as a party in federal court.