Actual Knowledge of the Specific Peril Required for Co-Employee Gross Negligence Under Iowa Code § 85.20(2)

Griffith v. Kulper, Supreme Court of Iowa (Feb. 6, 2026)

I. Introduction

Griffith v. Kulper arises from a fatal workplace accident at Wendling Quarries’ Garrison, Iowa operation. Michael Griffith, a stockpiler, died after falling through an open catwalk gate into a lime surge hopper and becoming buried in lime. A post-accident investigation revealed that the gate was missing the retaining pins (linchpins) designed to secure it in the closed position and that a strip of wire had been used in lieu of the standard pins.

Because workers’ compensation generally provides the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries and deaths, Griffith’s widow (Brea Anne Griffith, individually, as administrator of the Estate, and on behalf of their minor child) and Griffith’s father (Brian Griffith) pursued a narrow statutory exception: they sued co-employees (including supervisor Travis J. Galloway and safety/environmental director John L. Kulper) under Iowa Code section 85.20(2) for “gross negligence.”

A jury awarded approximately $2.84 million. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that the circumstances made injury “probable” and relying in part on what defendants “should have known.” On further review, the Iowa Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision, reversed the judgment, and remanded for dismissal—holding the plaintiffs failed as a matter of law to prove the required actual knowledge of the specific peril: the missing pins that left the gate unsecured.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Iowa Supreme Court framed the dispositive issue as evidentiary sufficiency under a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV): whether substantial evidence supported each element of co-employee gross negligence.

Reaffirming long-standing precedent, the Court held that Iowa Code section 85.20(2) gross negligence requires proof that the co-employee actually knew of the specific peril that caused the injury, not merely that the co-employee should have known or would have learned of the peril through a better inspection. Because the record contained no evidence that Galloway or Kulper actually knew the pins were missing or that the gate was unsecured (and their denials were unrebutted), the gross negligence claims failed as a matter of law. The Court therefore:

• vacated the court of appeals decision,
• reversed the district court judgment on the verdict, and
• remanded for dismissal with prejudice.

Having resolved the case on the actual-knowledge element, the Court did not reach other appellate issues (jury instruction wording, admission of MSHA citations, and alleged undisclosed expert testimony).

III. Analysis

A. The statutory framework: exclusivity with a narrow co-employee exception

The opinion situates the dispute within the “grand bargain” of workers’ compensation. Citing Baker v. Bridgestone/Firestone (quoting Tunnicliff v. Bettendorf), the Court reiterates that industry bears workplace injury costs through a no-fault benefit scheme, while employers receive immunity from potentially large tort verdicts.

Co-employees generally share that immunity. The Court relies on Walker v. Mlakar (and McGill v. Fish) for the proposition that chapter 85 is “an injured worker’s exclusive remedy against an employer or coemployee,” subject only to the limited gross-negligence carveout. The Court also cites Montague v. Skinner for a fresh restatement: workers’ compensation is exclusive except for gross negligence claims against co-employees.

This framework matters because it explains the Court’s insistence on a demanding threshold: section 85.20(2) is not meant to turn workplace negligence claims into ordinary tort litigation against colleagues; it is reserved for exceptional, blameworthy conduct approaching wanton disregard.

B. The controlling rule: “actual knowledge” of the specific peril is required

The Court applies the familiar three-element gross negligence test articulated in Walker v. Mlakar (itself building on Thompson v. Bohlken):

• (1) knowledge of the peril to be apprehended;
• (2) knowledge that injury is a probable, as opposed to a possible, result of the danger; and
• (3) a conscious failure to avoid the peril.

The key doctrinal move in Griffith is not to create a new multi-factor test, but to tighten and clarify the existing rule against “constructive knowledge” creep. Quoting Walker v. Mlakar, the Court emphasizes that constructive knowledge cannot satisfy element (1) because it would “eviscerate” element (3): one cannot “consciously fail to avoid” a peril one does not actually know exists. The Court also invokes Mehmedovic v. Tyson Foods, Inc., which recently reaffirmed that “constructive knowledge of the peril is insufficient to establish gross negligence.”

C. Precedents cited and how they shaped the result

1. Smith v. Iowa State Univ. of Sci. & Tech., Van Sickle Constr. Co. v. Wachovia Com. Mortg., Inc., and Doe v. Cent. Iowa Health Sys. (standard of review and “substantial evidence”)

The Court uses these cases to set the review lens for JNOV: whether substantial evidence supports each element when viewing evidence most favorably to the verdict winner. This framing is critical because the Court does not reweigh credibility; it instead asks whether the record contains evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the required elements. Here, the Court finds a categorical absence of proof on actual knowledge of the missing pins—an evidentiary void that fails even under the plaintiff-favorable standard.

2. Walker v. Mlakar and Thompson v. Bohlken (the “actual knowledge” bar)

These are the opinion’s core authorities. Walker v. Mlakar supplies (a) the three-element test, (b) the definition that the relevant “peril” is the peril that caused the injury, and (c) the explicit rejection of constructive knowledge for element (1), anchored in the logical impossibility of “conscious failure” without actual awareness.

The Court treats Walker as controlling precedent that the court of appeals departed from by allowing “should have known” reasoning to fill the proof gap.

3. Mehmedovic v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (recent reaffirmation)

By citing Mehmedovic, the Court underscores that this is not an antiquated doctrine: Iowa’s high court has recently reiterated that actual knowledge is required and constructive knowledge is insufficient. This makes Griffith an enforcement decision and a warning against lower courts relaxing the standard.

4. Taylor v. Peck (no liability without knowledge of the specific hazard)

In Taylor v. Peck, even though a manager recognized a general risk (injury is more likely if a hand is in a die), there was no evidence he knew the palm button was weighted down (the specific hazard disabling a safety feature) at the relevant time. The Court in Griffith draws on Peck to show that:

• lack of prior accidents and lack of inspection alerts weigh against “probable injury,” and
• crucially, courts do not impute knowledge that would have been discovered through inspection.

5. Henrich v. Lorenz and Johnson v. Interstate Power Co. (specificity and “no history of similar accidents”)

In Henrich v. Lorenz, defendants lacked knowledge that a combination of conditions would probably injure the operator; the Court also relied on low injury incidence. In Johnson v. Interstate Power Co., the absence of evidence the defendant knew about the specific instrumentality (a metal pole) or that it had been used similarly before, plus the absence of similar prior accidents, defeated the claim.

Griffith uses these decisions to reinforce a consistent pattern: gross negligence demands proof tied to the actual, concrete peril and is not satisfied by generalized awareness that work is dangerous.

6. Swanson v. McGraw and Alden v. Genie Industries (what sufficient proof looks like—and clarifying “constructive knowledge” language)

Swanson provides a contrast case where defendants were warned of a specific defect (a hole in a protective suit) and knew caustic chemicals could cause severe burns if they seeped in. That evidence supported all three elements because the defendants actually knew the specific peril.

Alden is central because the court of appeals relied on it to justify “should have known” reasoning. The Iowa Supreme Court in Griffith carefully cabins Alden:

• Alden used “knew or should have known” language in discussing the second element—probability of injury—i.e., whether the defendant understood the conduct placed the employee in a “zone of imminent danger.”
• That phrasing does not dilute the separate requirement (from Walker) that elements (1) and (3) require actual knowledge of the specific peril.

The Court thus resolves potential doctrinal confusion: “constructive knowledge” rhetoric in Alden cannot be repurposed to supply actual knowledge of the peril itself.

D. The Court’s legal reasoning applied to the facts

1. Identifying the relevant “peril”

The opinion’s factual framing is deliberate: the peril was not “working around the hopper” or the hopper being “insanely dangerous” in general. The peril was the missing pins/linchpins that left the catwalk gate unsecured, allowing it to open and a worker to fall in. This specificity drives the outcome because it focuses the knowledge inquiry on one concrete condition.

2. The evidentiary gap on actual knowledge

The Court finds “not even a scintilla” of evidence that either defendant actually knew the pins were missing or that the gate was unsecured:

• Galloway: performed only a drive-by inspection by headlights from 10–15 feet away and did not climb up to check the pins. The Court accepts a jury could find that negligent, but negligence is not gross negligence under section 85.20(2) without actual knowledge of the missing pins.
• Kulper: was not present at the quarry that day, was not responsible for day-to-day operations or assembly, and there was no evidence he knew about the missing pins or unsecured gate.

The plaintiffs’ theory essentially sought to convert “would have known if they inspected properly” into “did know.” The Court rejects that move as incompatible with Walker v. Mlakar and Taylor v. Peck.

3. Rejecting constructive-knowledge substitution

The court of appeals affirmed in part based on factors like missing supervision and minimal inspection, concluding the injury was “probable.” The Supreme Court does not dispute the accident’s preventability or the importance of inspection; instead it holds that, under section 85.20(2), the plaintiffs must prove more than preventability and substandard practice. The critical error was allowing “should have known/discovered” to substitute for “actually knew” of the missing pins.

4. Alternative safety measures and long accident-free history

The plaintiffs offered evidence of various safety improvements (vibratory motor, netting, lockout/tagout, harnesses, kill switches). The Court treats this evidence as insufficient to prove gross negligence in the absence of actual knowledge of the missing pins—particularly given the decades-long use of the hopper with no similar incident since guardrails were installed and the absence of prior MSHA concerns during inspections. Citing Johnson v. Interstate Power Co. and Taylor v. Peck, the Court reinforces that the lack of similar accidents can undermine claims that injury was “probable” in the required sense.

E. Impact: what changes (and what is clarified) going forward

1. A reinforced barrier against “failure to inspect” becoming gross negligence

The immediate practical impact is a strengthened defense against section 85.20(2) claims premised on inadequate inspection, lax oversight, or poor supervision—unless plaintiffs can prove the defendant actually knew the specific hazard existed. Griffith makes clear that courts may not impute knowledge from what a reasonable inspection would have revealed.

2. Clarification of Alden and limiting “constructive knowledge” language

The decision likely will be cited to cabin Alden and prevent plaintiffs from using “knew or should have known” phrasing to soften the actual-knowledge requirement for elements (1) and (3). Trial and appellate courts should treat Walker v. Mlakar as the controlling authority for the knowledge component of the peril itself.

3. Litigation consequences: earlier dispositive motions and narrower discovery targets

Because actual knowledge of a specific peril is often the make-or-break element, Griffith encourages:

• more aggressive summary judgment and directed verdict/JNOV practice focused on the knowledge proof,
• discovery aimed at identifying direct evidence of awareness (warnings, prior incidents, emails, meeting minutes, admissions), and
• more careful pleading and proof that isolates the specific peril rather than broad workplace danger.

4. Workplace safety governance: policy change vs. tort exposure

The Court’s reasoning implicitly separates two tracks: (a) safety improvements and regulatory compliance (which may be compelled by MSHA or internal policy) and (b) co-employee tort liability, which remains exceptional and tied to actual knowledge and conscious disregard. Safety professionals and supervisors may still face employment and regulatory consequences for lax inspection, but Griffith narrows when those shortcomings translate into co-employee tort damages.

F. Issues the Court did not reach (but that remain relevant)

Because the case was resolved on sufficiency grounds, the Court did not decide:

• whether the gross-negligence jury instruction misstated Iowa law by failing to emphasize “actual knowledge,”
• whether MSHA citations were inadmissible hearsay or unfairly prejudicial, or
• whether the physician’s assistant and therapist testimony amounted to undisclosed expert testimony.

Nevertheless, Griffith will likely influence instruction disputes by reinforcing that “knowledge of the peril” in this context means actual knowledge of the specific peril, not what the co-employee reasonably should have discovered.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Exclusive remedy”

Workers’ compensation is usually the only way an employee (or estate) can recover for a workplace injury/death from the employer or co-workers. Tort lawsuits are barred except for narrow exceptions.

2. “Co-employee gross negligence” under Iowa Code § 85.20(2)

This is a limited exception allowing tort damages against a co-worker only when the co-worker’s conduct is far more blameworthy than ordinary carelessness. Iowa uses a three-part test requiring knowledge of the peril, knowledge injury is probable, and a conscious failure to avoid it.

3. “Actual knowledge” vs. “constructive knowledge”

• Actual knowledge: the person truly knew the specific dangerous condition existed (e.g., knew the gate pins were missing).
• Constructive knowledge: the person didn’t know but should have known (e.g., would have known if they inspected properly).

Griffith holds constructive knowledge is not enough for the “knowledge of the peril” requirement.

4. “Probable” vs. “possible” injury

“Probable” means reasonably expected—more likely than not in the legal sense used here. “Possible” means it could happen but is not expected to happen again under similar circumstances. Iowa’s gross-negligence standard requires the higher “probable” level.

5. Directed verdict and JNOV

These are mechanisms for a judge to end a claim when evidence is legally insufficient. A directed verdict occurs before the case goes to the jury; JNOV occurs after a verdict. In Griffith, the Supreme Court held the evidence was insufficient on an essential element, so the case should not have reached—or should not have survived after—the jury verdict.

V. Conclusion

Griffith v. Kulper is a strong reaffirmation that Iowa’s co-employee gross negligence claim under Iowa Code section 85.20(2) demands proof of actual knowledge of the specific peril that caused the injury, not merely proof that the defendant should have known of it through better inspection or supervision. The Court corrects what it viewed as the court of appeals’ improper reliance on constructive knowledge and clarifies that any “knew or should have known” language drawn from Alden v. Genie Industries cannot dilute Walker v. Mlakar’s controlling requirement for elements (1) and (3).

The broader significance is institutional: Griffith preserves the workers’ compensation exclusivity bargain by preventing ordinary workplace negligence—however tragic in outcome—from being repackaged as co-employee “gross negligence” absent concrete proof of actual awareness and conscious disregard of the specific hazard.