Acquittal-First Jury Instructions Are Plain Error and Warrant Retrial When They Obstruct a Supported Heat-of-Passion Defense

Introduction

Michael Lee LaFlex was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder for shooting and killing his daughter’s boyfriend, Bryce Brogle. LaFlex admitted the shooting and burial of Brogle’s body, but maintained that he acted in the heat of passion after confronting Brogle about alleged abuse of LaFlex’s daughter.

The appeal presented two principal questions. First, did exigent circumstances permit officers to seize LaFlex’s cell phone without a warrant while they sought judicial authorization to search it? Second, did the district court improperly direct the jury to decide first-degree premeditated murder before considering heat-of-passion manslaughter—and to disregard manslaughter entirely if it found LaFlex guilty of murder?

The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the temporary warrantless seizure of the phone but reversed the conviction because the “acquittal-first” jury instructions constituted prejudicial plain error. The court concluded that the instructions may have prevented the jury from fully considering the central defense that LaFlex acted in the heat of passion rather than with premeditation.

Factual and Procedural Background

Brogle disappeared after leaving with LaFlex to unload a U-Haul trailer at LaFlex’s storage unit. LaFlex initially claimed that unidentified tactical officers had apprehended Brogle. His account differed from what he had previously told his daughter, and he later admitted possessing and discarding Brogle’s cell phone.

During a voluntary interview, investigators requested access to LaFlex’s own phone because its location data could show where he had traveled after Brogle disappeared. Although LaFlex consented to a search, an investigator immediately took possession of the device to prevent destruction of its data. Officers then obtained a warrant before searching it.

The phone’s location history led investigators to a wooded area where they found Brogle’s body buried approximately three feet underground. Brogle had died from a gunshot wound to the head.

At trial, the State presented evidence that LaFlex had threatened Brogle, discussed killing him, claimed to know where to hide a body, and retrieved a firearm on the day of the shooting. LaFlex testified that Brogle threatened to kill his daughter, raised his voice, and appeared to move toward an area containing knives. According to LaFlex, he became shocked, enraged, and fearful, loaded a nearby gun, and fired without remembering that he had aimed.

The district court agreed that the evidence warranted an instruction on first-degree heat-of-passion manslaughter. It nevertheless instructed the jury to consider first-degree premeditated murder first and, upon finding LaFlex guilty of that offense, to “bypass” and “ignore” manslaughter. The jury convicted LaFlex of both first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder.

Summary of the Opinion

1. The cell phone seizure was constitutional. Officers had probable cause to believe LaFlex’s phone contained evidence, possessed an individualized reason to fear destruction of that evidence, temporarily secured the phone, promptly sought a warrant, and did not search it until the warrant issued.
2. The jury instructions were plainly erroneous. Minnesota law prohibits trial courts from directing jurors to consider offenses in a prescribed order or telling them not to consider a lesser-included offense after finding guilt on a greater offense.
3. The error affected substantial rights. A rational jury could have accepted the heat-of-passion theory, and the State’s evidence of premeditation, although substantial, was not overwhelming or incontrovertible.
4. Correction was necessary to protect the judicial process. Because the instruction may have distorted the jury’s consideration of LaFlex’s principal defense, leaving the error uncorrected would undermine public confidence in fair and independent jury deliberations.

The court did not decide LaFlex’s request for a Schwartz hearing concerning alleged juror misconduct because the new-trial ruling made that issue unnecessary.

Analysis

I. Warrantless Seizure of the Cell Phone

A. Governing constitutional rule

The Fourth Amendment and article I, section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution presumptively prohibit warrantless searches and seizures. Exigent circumstances provide an exception when immediate action is objectively necessary, including when delay would create a substantial risk that evidence will be destroyed.

The inquiry is objective and based on the totality of the circumstances known to officers at the moment of seizure. Courts consider probable cause, the immediacy of the risk, the availability of time to obtain a warrant, and the duration and scope of the intrusion.

B. Application to LaFlex’s phone

The court found several facts establishing a genuine risk of destruction:

• LaFlex initially concealed that he had possessed Brogle’s phone.
• He admitted throwing Brogle’s phone into a gas-station garbage can.
• He knew a missing-person report would lead officers to question him.
• Officers told him they were interested in his own phone’s location data.
• He was not under arrest and could have ended the interview and erased or destroyed the phone before a warrant issued.

The police response was also narrowly tailored. Officers seized, but did not immediately search, the phone. They promptly applied for a warrant and searched the device only after judicial authorization. This limited interference reconciled the need to preserve evidence with LaFlex’s privacy interests.

The availability of telephonic or electronic warrant procedures under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.01 did not eliminate the exigency. Preparing an application, presenting it to a judge, and awaiting a ruling still required time during which LaFlex could leave and destroy the evidence.

C. Precedents cited on the Fourth Amendment issue

The State also asserted the plain-view doctrine, but the court declined to address it because the argument had not been preserved below, relying on Steward v. State and State v. Campbell.

II. The Acquittal-First Jury Instruction

A. The governing rule

Minnesota trial courts may explain the elements of charged and lesser-included offenses, but they may not tell jurors the order in which those offenses must be considered. Nor may they instruct jurors to disregard a lesser offense after reaching a guilty verdict on a greater offense.

Such instructions are often called “acquittal-first” or “hard transition” instructions. They require unanimous acquittal on the greater offense before jurors may discuss a lesser offense. The danger is that jurors favoring the lesser offense may be forced either to surrender their position, produce a deadlock, or assess the evidence solely through the lens of the greater charge.

B. Why the instruction was plainly erroneous

The district court repeatedly directed the jury to decide first-degree premeditated murder first. If it found guilt, the jury was to “bypass,” “ignore,” and refrain from completing the verdict form for heat-of-passion manslaughter. These directions did precisely what prior Minnesota decisions prohibited.

The State argued that the instruction was necessary to prevent legally inconsistent verdicts because premeditation and heat of passion cannot coexist. The court rejected that argument. Avoiding inconsistent verdicts may be legitimate, but an acquittal-first instruction is not the only way to accomplish that goal, and the established prohibition contains no exception for mutually inconsistent mental states.

Minnesota Statutes section 631.14 did not authorize the instruction. That statute permits a jury considering a murder charge to return a manslaughter verdict; it does not prescribe the sequence of deliberations.

C. Precedents defining the instructional error

III. Plain-Error Review and Prejudice

Because LaFlex did not object at trial, the court applied the plain-error framework described in State v. Milton and Pulczinski v. State. LaFlex had to establish an error that was plain and affected his substantial rights. Even then, relief was discretionary and appropriate only if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

A. Effect on substantial rights

Under State v. Johnson and State v. Gomez, an erroneous instruction affects substantial rights when there is a reasonable likelihood that it significantly influenced the verdict. The inquiry must be tailored to the nature of the error, as explained in State v. Davenport.

The critical question was whether a rational jury could have rejected premeditated murder and accepted heat-of-passion manslaughter. State v. Huber supported finding prejudice when the State’s evidence was not overwhelming and evidence supported the defense theory. Conversely, State v. Prtine and State v. Woodard showed that an ordering error may be harmless when evidence of the greater offense is overwhelming and no evidence supports the lesser offense.

Here, the district court’s decision to give a manslaughter instruction itself reflected a rational evidentiary basis for the lesser offense under State v. Cruz and State v. Lopez. LaFlex testified to provocation, rage, fear, clouded judgment, and uncertainty over whether Brogle was reaching for a weapon.

The State’s evidence of premeditation was substantial but contestable:

• Threats and statements about killing or burying Brogle supported premeditation under State v. Kendell and Loving v. State, but some were made when Brogle lived far away and could also be viewed as angry venting.
• Retrieving a gun could show advance preparation under State v. Anderson, but LaFlex offered an unrebutted explanation that he obtained it to shoot a woodchuck.
• Isolating a victim may show planning under State v. Ulrich, but testimony also supported an innocent explanation for sending LaFlex’s daughter elsewhere to shower.
• The State argued that the burial hole had been dug in advance, but the record did not firmly establish its dimensions, the walking distance, or the impossibility of digging it during the period reflected in the phone data.

The jury’s convictions on first- and second-degree murder did not eliminate the prejudice. The court distinguished cases such as State v. Galvan, Phillips v. State, and State v. Chavez-Nelson, which addressed failure to give a heat-of-passion instruction. Here, the instruction was given but then placed behind a deliberative barrier. That barrier may have changed how the jury evaluated the evidence and how jurors interacted with one another.

B. Fairness, integrity, and public reputation

The court emphasized that independent jury judgment lies at the “heart of the jury system,” quoting State v. Porter. It also relied on Troxel v. State for the constitutional right to a fair opportunity to defend against criminal charges.

Unlike State v. Griller, where the defense was considered wholly unbelievable, LaFlex presented a rational and evidence-based theory. The jury’s question during deliberations also indicated uncertainty about the relationship among the offenses.

The court analogized the potential harm to State v. Ahmed, where an error may have prevented the jury from considering the defendant’s primary defense. Because the disputed distinction between premeditation and heat of passion was the core issue at trial, refusing to correct the error would undermine confidence that LaFlex received a fair adjudication.

The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

Justice McKeig, joined by Justices Moore and Hennesy, agreed that exigent circumstances justified seizing the phone but would have affirmed the conviction under the invited-error doctrine.

The dissent stressed that defense counsel did more than remain silent. Counsel expressly agreed that the instructions were consistent with Minnesota law and later confirmed the court’s proposed response to the jury. Under State v. Sullivan, State v. Weigold, State v. Trifiletti, and State v. Evans, a party ordinarily may not obtain appellate relief from an error affirmatively invited at trial.

The dissent would have applied invited-error principles sua sponte, citing United States v. Brown, United States v. Amador, and United States v. Carter. It reasoned that allowing counsel to approve an instruction and then challenge it on appeal would itself damage the integrity of judicial proceedings.

The dissent also regarded the evidence of premeditation as strong. Relying on State v. Cox, State v. Hughes, State v. Moua, State v. Palmer, State v. Petersen, State v. Balandin, State v. Ortega, Hawes v. State, and State v. Hurd, it highlighted LaFlex’s threats, firearm retrieval, isolation of Brogle, close-range shooting, burial of the body, destruction of evidence, and false statements.

The majority did not definitively resolve whether the invited-error doctrine displaced ordinary plain-error review. It instead concluded that this was not an error affirmatively created to advance LaFlex’s interests and that, in any event, correction was necessary to preserve confidence in the fairness of the trial. The proper relationship between invited error and plain error therefore remains an important unresolved issue.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Seizure versus search

Taking temporary possession of a phone is a seizure. Examining its contents is a search. Police seized LaFlex’s phone immediately but waited for a warrant before searching it.

Exigent circumstances

An emergency making it objectively unreasonable to wait for a warrant. Here, the emergency was the individualized risk that LaFlex would erase or destroy digital evidence.

Probable cause

A fair probability, based on known facts, that a place or object contains evidence of a crime.

Lesser-included offense

A less serious crime contained within a greater charge. Heat-of-passion manslaughter was presented as an alternative to premeditated murder.

Premeditation

Considering, planning, preparing for, or deciding to kill before acting. It can arise quickly, but it requires more than an unconsidered or rash impulse.

Heat of passion

A state of intense emotion caused by provocation sufficient to affect an ordinary person’s self-control, cloud reason, or weaken willpower.

Acquittal-first instruction

An instruction requiring jurors to acquit on the greater offense before discussing a lesser one. Minnesota prohibits courts from directing deliberations in that manner.

Plain error

A clear legal mistake not preserved by an objection. Relief generally requires prejudice and a serious effect on the fairness or integrity of the proceeding.

Invited error

An error a party affirmatively requested or approved. The dissent believed defense counsel’s express agreement with the instructions barred ordinary appellate relief.

Legally inconsistent verdicts

Verdicts based on findings that cannot logically coexist because an element of one offense negates an element of another.

Schwartz hearing

A proceeding in which jurors may be questioned, with counsel present, about alleged misconduct. The court did not reach this issue because it ordered a new trial on other grounds.

Potential Impact

• Jury instructions: Minnesota courts must avoid language telling jurors to consider charges sequentially, “bypass” lesser offenses, or stop deliberating after a guilty finding on a greater offense.
• Heat-of-passion cases: When the evidence rationally supports manslaughter, courts must permit meaningful consideration of that defense rather than placing it behind a unanimous-acquittal requirement.
• Harmless-error analysis: A conviction on a greater offense does not automatically cure an acquittal-first instruction. Courts must examine the evidence, the defense theory, and the probable effect on deliberations.
• Digital evidence: Officers may temporarily secure a phone without a warrant when probable cause and specific facts establish a genuine risk of evidence destruction, provided they promptly seek a warrant and do not search prematurely.
• Limits on exigency: The decision does not authorize automatic seizure merely because phone data can be deleted. The justification depended on LaFlex’s deception, prior disposal of another phone, awareness of police interest, and freedom to leave.
• Invited error: The division between the majority and dissent signals future litigation over whether express approval of an instruction bars plain-error relief and when appellate courts may invoke invited error sua sponte.

Conclusion

State of Minnesota v. Michael Lee LaFlex clarifies two important principles. Police may briefly seize a cell phone without a warrant when particularized facts establish probable cause and an imminent risk that evidence will be destroyed, so long as the device is not searched until a warrant issues. But a trial court may not dictate the sequence of jury deliberations or direct jurors to ignore a supported lesser-included offense after finding guilt on a greater charge.

Because heat-of-passion manslaughter was the central defense and the evidence of premeditation was disputed rather than overwhelming, the acquittal-first instruction created a reasonable likelihood of affecting the verdict. Protecting independent jury deliberation and meaningful consideration of the defense therefore required reversal and a new trial.