Date: Jan 29, 2026

“Accumulate” Under DPA §4512 Has No Temporal Requirement; Prefatory “Prevent Hoarding” Clause Does Not Narrow the Resale-at-Above-Market-Price Prohibition

1. Introduction

United States v. Bulloch (2d Cir. Jan. 27, 2026) addresses a focused question of statutory interpretation under the Defense Production Act of 1950 (“DPA”), 50 U.S.C. §4512, which criminalizes certain “accumulation” of designated scarce materials “in order to prevent hoarding.” During the early COVID-19 pandemic, Kent Bulloch—an attorney who used an attorney trust account as the transaction vehicle—participated in a scheme to purchase large quantities of personal protective equipment (“PPE”), including KN95 masks, and resell them at an inflated price.

The central dispute on appeal was not whether Bulloch sought to profit from the transactions, but whether §4512’s word “accumulate” should be read to require acquisition and withholding over a period of time (Bulloch’s proposed “hoarding-like” temporal element). That interpretation would have narrowed the statute to cover only prolonged inventory-holding, potentially excluding fast “flip” resale arrangements.

The Second Circuit rejected the proposed temporal gloss, held that “accumulate” is unambiguous, and affirmed the misdemeanor conspiracy conviction.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that the term “accumulate” in 50 U.S.C. §4512 has its ordinary meaning—“to gather, collect, or accrue”—and contains no temporal requirement.
The prefatory clause (“In order to prevent hoarding”) states a purpose but does not narrow the operative prohibition, and cannot be used to add a durational element to “accumulate.”
Because the statute is unambiguous, the court declined to apply interpretive aids (canons, legislative history) and held the rule of lenity does not apply.
The court affirmed the conviction and approved the trial instruction defining “accumulate” as “to gather, collect, or accrue,” without the “over a period of time” limitation.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The opinion is primarily an exercise in textualist statutory interpretation. The cited precedents supply the governing framework and reinforce specific interpretive constraints.

Foundational DPA context

Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954): Cited for historical purpose—DPA’s wartime roots and the broad allocation authority designed to support national defense while managing civilian-market disruptions. This background explains why Congress could criminalize accumulation behavior that destabilizes distribution during emergencies.

Standards for sufficiency framing and appellate posture

United States v. Capers, 20 F.4th 105 (2d Cir. 2021): Used to note that factual recitations on appeal are viewed “in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.” Although Bulloch styled his argument as sufficiency, the court treated it as turning on a pure legal interpretation of “accumulate.”
United States v. Prawl, 149 F.4th 176 (2d Cir. 2025): Cited for abandonment principles—arguments not pressed on appeal are deemed abandoned (here, Bulloch’s vagueness theory about “prevailing market price”).

Plain meaning and ordinary usage

United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012): Supplies the baseline rule that interpretation begins with statutory language and the assumption ordinary meaning expresses legislative purpose; also notes “restraint” in interpreting federal crimes (often favoring narrower readings), yet the court found no ambiguity permitting Bulloch’s narrowing rewrite.
United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257 (2d Cir. 2000): Reinforces that when Congress does not define a term, courts use ordinary common-sense meaning, often informed by dictionaries.
EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Reﬁn., L.L.C., 145 S. Ct. 1735 (2025): Cited for the modern Supreme Court articulation that undefined terms are presumptively given their ordinary meaning, supporting the court’s dictionary-driven approach.

Reading in context / whole-statute approach

Springﬁeld Hosp., Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403 (2d Cir. 2022): Invoked to reject construing words in isolation and to confirm that context did not inject a time component into “accumulate.”
United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2003), as amended (Jan. 7, 2004): Used for the “statutory scheme as a whole” principle and the directive to end the inquiry when text is unambiguous.

When to use canons or legislative history

United States v. Rowland, 826 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2016): Provides the sequencing rule—canons apply only if ambiguous; legislative history only if ambiguity remains after canons. The court cited Rowland to justify stopping at plain meaning.

Prefatory clause limits

District of Columbia. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): Supplies the key structural rule: a prefatory clause announces purpose but does not limit or expand the operative clause. This is central to rejecting Bulloch’s attempt to use “In order to prevent hoarding” to add a temporal element to “accumulate.”

Anti-surplusage / distinct-word meaning

Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001): Used for the canon that courts should give effect to every word where possible, resisting interpretations that make words redundant.
Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124 (2024): Cited for the principle that different terms usually have different meanings. This undercuts Bulloch’s effort to collapse “accumulate” into “hoard.”
United States v. Kozeny, 541 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2008): Reinforces the obligation to give effect to each clause and word, supporting the court’s resistance to reading “accumulate” as mere duplication of “hoarding.”

Rejecting rare/contradictory dictionary meanings and “convoluted” readings

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994): Deployed to discount a “rarity” dictionary meaning that contradicts broader usage—here, Bulloch’s reliance on a Cambridge definition implying “over a long period of time.”
Stanley v. City of Sanford, Fla., 606 U.S. 46 (2025): Cited twice for the proposition that courts do not choose a “conceivable-but- convoluted” interpretation over an ordinary one, and that broad statutory goals do not license judicial rewriting beyond text.

Purpose-based arguments cannot override clear text

Mei Xing Yu v. Hasaki Rest., Inc., 944 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 2019): Supports the rejection of appeals to broad remedial goals as a substitute for statutory text. The court used this to dismiss Bulloch’s “distribution” policy argument as insufficient to overcome clear operative language penalizing resale-at-above-market accumulation.

Lenity

United States v. Gonzalez, 407 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2005): States lenity’s prerequisite—statutory ambiguity.
United States v. DiCristina, 726 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2013): Applies the principle that when plain language is unambiguous, there is no occasion to invoke lenity.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Text first: “accumulate” has no built-in duration

The court began and ended with text. Section 4512 prohibits accumulating designated scarce materials (or threatened materials) either (1) beyond reasonable demand, or (2) for resale at above “prevailing market prices.” The court emphasized that Congress did not define “accumulate,” so ordinary meaning governs. The mainstream dictionary definitions cited describe “accumulate” as “heap up,” “amass,” “collect,” “gather”—without a requirement that the conduct occur over any particular period.

The court also grounded its interpretation in ordinary usage: accumulation can occur instantly (e.g., purchasing 100 units in a single trip) just as it can gradually. Bulloch’s own sources (Dictionary.com and Cambridge) at most permitted gradualness; they did not compel a temporal requirement, and the court used MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. to discount an outlier definition as insufficient to manufacture ambiguity.

(b) Context confirms, rather than alters, plain meaning

The opinion’s most consequential contextual move is distinguishing the statute’s prefatory clause (“In order to prevent hoarding”) from its operative clauses (the two disjunctive prohibitions). Under District of Columbia. v. Heller, the prefatory clause cannot narrow the operative prohibition by adding elements Congress did not include.

The court reasoned that a temporal limitation would be especially inconsistent with the “resale at prices in excess of prevailing market prices” prong: market prices can change rapidly, and the statutory goal of preventing exploitative accumulation would be defeated if liability depended on some undefined minimum holding period.

(c) Avoiding redundancy: “hoarding” and “accumulate” are not the same word

Bulloch’s argument—that because the statute’s purpose is “to prevent hoarding,” “accumulate” must mean hoard over time—ran into the anti-surplusage line of cases (Duncan v. Walker; Pulsifer v. United States; United States v. Kozeny). If “accumulate” were made synonymous with “hoard” (and “hoard” were then given an added durational requirement), the operative text would be judicially narrowed based on purpose language—contrary to Heller—and would risk collapsing distinct statutory terms into each other.

(d) Administrative wording does not rewrite Congress’s text

Bulloch pointed to the HHS notice describing materials “the supply of which would be threatened by hoarding,” arguing this substitution showed “accumulation” and “hoarding” were interchangeable. The court treated the argument as non-dispositive: the statute itself uses “accumulate,” and the notice cannot alter the elements Congress enacted. Further, even if “hoard” were used as a paraphrase, it would not logically imply a fixed, prolonged time component.

(e) Lenity rejected because ambiguity rejected

Having found “accumulate” unambiguous, the court applied United States v. Gonzalez and United States v. DiCristina: lenity is a last resort; without ambiguity, it does not apply.

3.3. Impact

Clarifies §4512’s reach against rapid “flip” resale schemes. The decision signals that §4512(2) can apply even where a defendant intends immediate distribution/resale rather than prolonged withholding. The actionable “accumulation” is the gathering of designated scarce materials coupled with the purpose of resale above prevailing market price—not a minimum duration of possession.
Limits “purpose” arguments based on the prefatory clause. By leaning on District of Columbia. v. Heller, the opinion provides a template for rejecting attempts to use prefatory language to add elements to criminal prohibitions.
Strengthens government charging and jury-instruction positions. Trial courts within the Second Circuit may rely on Bulloch to instruct that “accumulate” means “gather, collect, or accrue,” without “over a period of time.”
Constrains vagueness and lenity defenses premised on a durational element. While Bulloch’s appeal was framed narrowly, the holding that the term is unambiguous reduces room for defendants to argue §4512’s “accumulate” is unclear as to timing.
Practical compliance effect for brokers and intermediaries. The facts underscore that intermediated transactions—escrow agreements, attorney trust accounts, “paymaster” roles—do not immunize conduct if the purpose is resale above prevailing market prices of designated scarce materials.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Defense Production Act (DPA): A federal statute empowering the President to manage production and distribution of critical materials for national defense and emergencies. During COVID-19, PPE could be designated “scarce,” triggering restrictions.
50 U.S.C. §4512 (“Hoarding of designated scarce materials”): Despite the title and purpose language about “hoarding,” the operative ban is on “accumulation” in two situations: (1) excessive amounts beyond reasonable demand, or (2) accumulation for resale above prevailing market prices—when the materials are designated scarce (or threatened).
Prefatory clause vs. operative clause: A prefatory clause explains why Congress is legislating; operative clauses state what is prohibited. Under District of Columbia. v. Heller, the prefatory clause generally cannot add requirements not found in the operative text.
Plain meaning rule: Courts start with the ordinary meaning of statutory words. If the text is unambiguous, the analysis typically ends without resort to legislative history.
Rule of lenity: A tie-breaker for genuinely ambiguous criminal statutes: ambiguity is resolved in the defendant’s favor. In Bulloch, lenity did not apply because the court found no ambiguity.
“Prevailing market prices”: The market price at the relevant time; §4512(2) targets accumulation for resale above that price. Bulloch did not pursue on appeal his separate vagueness challenge to this phrase.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Bulloch establishes (within the Second Circuit) a clear interpretive rule: under DPA §4512, “accumulate” carries its ordinary meaning and does not require proof of accumulation or withholding “over a period of time.” The decision further reinforces a structural constraint on statutory interpretation—purpose-prefatory language cannot narrow operative prohibitions—and, because the text is unambiguous, rejects lenity-based narrowing. The result is a broader, text-grounded enforcement pathway for §4512(2) against schemes to gather designated scarce materials for above-market resale, even when the contemplated turnover is rapid.