Accrual of Florida Tortious-Interference-with-Inheritance Claims Begins When Probate Defeats the Expected Will (Not When Probate Litigation Ends)

1. Introduction

This appeal arises out of a multi-will estate dispute involving Addison McNairy and competing probate petitions filed by Charles Steven Chauncy (plaintiff-appellant) and Dennis Lee Gorden (defendant-appellee). Chauncy alleged that Gorden tortiously interfered with Chauncy’s inheritance expectancy under a 2007 will by procuring a later 2018 will (favoring a charitable trust administered by Gorden), exerting undue influence, exploiting alleged lack of testamentary capacity, and inducing false testimony that led to the 2007 will being rejected.

The dispositive issue on appeal was limitations: whether Florida’s four-year statute of limitations for tortious interference with an expectancy had expired by the time Chauncy filed suit in March 2024. The answer turned on accrual—when all elements of the tort were complete—and whether later-discovered facts or continued probate litigation delayed that accrual.

Key factual timeline

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Gorden, holding that Chauncy’s tortious-interference claim was time-barred under Florida’s four-year limitations period, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(i), (n), and Florida’s general accrual rule, Fla. Stat. § 95.031(1). The court concluded that all elements of the claim had occurred by July 2019, when the probate court rejected the 2007 will and probated the 2018 will.

The court rejected two efforts to avoid limitations:

• Fraud discovery argument: Even if the theory were treated as “founded upon fraud,” Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(a) would start the clock no later than September 2019, when Chauncy discovered the receipts suggesting false testimony—still outside four years for a March 2024 filing.
• 1998 will concealment / delayed accrual argument: Chauncy’s complaint was pleaded as interference with the 2007 will expectancy, not interference tied to the 1998 will; a plaintiff cannot pivot to a new theory at summary judgment or on appeal without amending the complaint, citing Sorenson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 174 F.4th 54 (11th Cir. 2026), and Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2006). In any event, the Florida appellate court had already determined Chauncy had no interest under the 1998 will because the gift to Morgan lapsed when she predeceased McNairy. See Chauncy v. Gorden, 374 So. 3d at 886.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

M.H.D. v. Westminster Schs., 172 F.3d 797 (11th Cir. 1999)

The court relied on M.H.D. v. Westminster Schs. for the standard of review: de novo review of “application of the statute of limitations and its subsequent grant of summary judgment.” This framed the appeal as a legal question about accrual rather than a factual dispute requiring deference.

Whalen v. Prosser, 719 So. 2d 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

Whalen v. Prosser supplied the governing Florida elements and accrual logic for tortious interference with an expectancy:

• Elements: “(1) the existence of an expectancy; (2) intentional interference with the expectancy through tortious conduct; (3) causation; and (4) damages.”
• Accrual principle: Because a beneficiary’s “hope of an inheritance is not sufficiently concrete to create a property right,” the claim cannot accrue while the testator is alive. Instead, it accrues when rights would have vested—“when the testator dies or the will is filed for probate.”

The Eleventh Circuit used Whalen to pinpoint the earliest possible accrual (not before death/probate) and then to hold that accrual occurred by the probate court’s July 2019 ruling rejecting the expected will and admitting the competing will—i.e., when damages from the lost expectancy crystallized in the probate forum.

Chauncy v. Gorden, 374 So. 3d 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2023)

The Eleventh Circuit treated the state appellate decision as determinative of Chauncy’s lack of “interested person” status under the 1998 will. That mattered in two ways:

• It undercut the notion that concealment of the 1998 will could salvage or “restart” a tort claim tied to the 2007 will.
• It supplied a substantive backstop: even if a new interference theory about the 1998 will had been properly pleaded, there was “nothing for Gorden to interfere with” because Chauncy had no expectancy under that instrument (the gift to Morgan lapsed).

Sorenson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 174 F.4th 54 (11th Cir. 2026) and Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc. 439 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2006)

These cases were used for a procedural gatekeeping rule: new “basis for entitlement” theories must be pursued by amending the complaint, not by reframing the case at summary judgment or on appeal. In this opinion, that principle prevented Chauncy from transforming a 2007-will interference claim into a 1998-will concealment/interference claim late in the litigation.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Identifying the limitations period and accrual framework

The court applied Florida’s four-year limitations period for tortious interference with an expectancy (citing Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(i), (n)) and Florida’s general rule that accrual occurs “when all the elements of the claim have occurred” (citing Fla. Stat. § 95.031(1)). The analysis then became element-matching: the court looked to the complaint’s own allegations to determine when expectancy, tortious conduct, causation, and damages were complete.

(b) Why July 2019 was the accrual date (on the pleaded theory)

On the complaint’s narrative, July 2019 was the moment the interference allegedly “worked” in a legally cognizable way: the probate court invalidated the 2007 will and admitted the 2018 will, and Chauncy lost what he alleged to be his “rightful testamentary expectancy.” That ruling supplied:

• Vesting/cognizability: the testator was deceased and the will contest had produced a dispositive probate determination;
• Causation: the complaint itself tied the July 2019 probate outcome to Gorden’s alleged conduct;
• Damages: the alleged loss of inheritance was realized in the probate order admitting the competing will.

(c) Fraud discovery rule did not rescue the claim

Chauncy argued that the claim depended on fraud (perjured testimony) and he did not discover it until after July 2019. The court accepted the best version of that argument for limitations purposes and still found it fatal: under Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(a), a fraud-based action accrues upon discovery or when it should have been discovered with due diligence. The court held that discovery occurred no later than September 2019 (when Chauncy found receipts), making March 2024 too late even under a fraud-discovery accrual theory.

(d) “Later probate litigation” did not postpone accrual

The court implicitly rejected the idea that accrual waits until “the probate case was complete” (e.g., after later proceedings to reopen or later appeals). Instead, it treated accrual as tied to completion of the tort elements—particularly the occurrence of probate injury—rather than the exhaustion of all probate-related avenues. In practical terms: subsequent collateral probate efforts do not, by themselves, delay accrual of a tort claim arising from the initial adverse probate ruling.

(e) The 1998 will theory failed procedurally and substantively

Procedurally, Sorenson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. and Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc. barred a late-stage pivot to a new theory not pleaded. Substantively, Chauncy v. Gorden established Chauncy lacked any inheritable interest under the 1998 will because the gift was to Morgan alone and lapsed when she predeceased McNairy. Without an expectancy, there can be no tortious interference with that expectancy.

3.3 Impact

For Florida tortious-interference-with-expectancy litigation in federal court

• Accrual anchors to the adverse probate event: Claimants should assume the clock starts no later than the probate ruling that defeats the expected will or admits a competing will, not when all probate skirmishing and appeals end.
• Fraud theories require diligence and do not create open-ended accrual: Even where perjury or fraud is alleged, the relevant date becomes when the plaintiff discovered (or should have discovered) facts suggesting fraud—here, receipts prompting a belief of false testimony.
• Pleading discipline matters: If a claimant believes concealment of a different testamentary instrument is the core wrong, that theory must be pleaded (and timely), not introduced as a limitations workaround at summary judgment.

For probate-adjacent strategy

• Parties who lose a will contest and suspect interference must evaluate parallel civil-tort deadlines immediately after the adverse probate decision.
• Discovery of new evidence during or after probate appeals may shift accrual in fraud-based theories, but only to the discovery date—and that date itself can be years before probate finally ends.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Tortious interference with an expectancy: A civil claim alleging someone wrongfully prevented you from receiving an expected inheritance (e.g., by undue influence, fraud, or other tortious conduct).
• Accrual: The moment a claim “comes into existence” for limitations purposes—when all required elements (wrongful act, causation, and harm) are present.
• Statute of limitations: A deadline to file suit. Here, four years under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(i), (n).
• Discovery rule for fraud (Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(a)): For fraud-based actions, the limitations clock starts when the fraud is discovered (or should have been discovered with diligence), not necessarily when the fraud occurred.
• Lapse of a testamentary gift: If a will leaves property to a beneficiary who dies before the testator, that gift may “lapse” (fail), meaning it does not pass to the beneficiary’s heirs unless a statute (e.g., an anti-lapse statute) or the will’s language prevents lapse.
• Standing / “interested person” in probate: Only someone with a legally recognized stake in the estate (e.g., a valid beneficiary) can challenge certain probate actions.
• Summary judgment: A decision entered without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; here, because the claim was time-barred.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision underscores a practical rule for Florida tortious-interference-with-inheritance claims: limitations generally begin to run when the probate court’s action defeats the claimant’s expected inheritance—here, the July 2019 order invalidating the 2007 will and admitting the 2018 will—rather than when probate litigation finally winds down. Allegations of fraud may shift the accrual date only to the point of discovery (here, September 2019), and litigants cannot evade limitations by pivoting to new, unpleaded theories at summary judgment. The opinion thus reinforces both the time sensitivity of probate-adjacent tort claims and the need for precise, early pleading of the operative interference theory.