Accomplice Liability Does Not Defeat “Crime of Violence” Status for Pennsylvania § 2702(a)(4) Under the Career-Offender Elements Clause

Precedents Cited

1) Framework for “crime of violence” determinations

• United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2014): cited for the standard of review—plenary review applies to whether a prior conviction is a “crime of violence” for career-offender purposes.
• United States v. Ramos, 892 F.3d 599 (3d Cir. 2018): the central precedent. Ramos held (i) Pennsylvania’s aggravated assault statute, 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702, is divisible (supporting the modified categorical approach) and (ii) § 2702(a)(4) qualifies under the elements clause because it categorically requires “physical force” as an element. Cochran does not (and effectively cannot, in this panel posture) relitigate Ramos’s core holding about § 2702(a)(4) itself; instead, he tries to distinguish accomplice-based convictions.
• United States v. Wilson, 880 F.3d 80 (3d Cir. 2018): cited (via Ramos) for the categorical-approach comparison—elements of the statute of conviction versus the Guidelines definition.
• Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013): supplies the definition of a divisible statute and the justification for the modified categorical approach when a statute lists alternative crimes.

2) Accomplice liability and the “force element”

• United States v. Stevens, 70 F.4th 653 (3d Cir. 2023): the opinion’s key analogical bridge. Stevens held that a conviction for Hobbs Act robbery premised on accomplice liability qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The Stevens logic: under aiding-and-abetting principles, if the substantive offense has a force element, the aiding-and-abetting version necessarily incorporates that same element.
• United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2010): quoted in Stevens for the federal aiding-and-abetting elements (knowledge of the offense and intent to facilitate it), reinforcing that aiding-and-abetting liability is a theory of committing the substantive offense, not a distinct “lesser” offense lacking the substantive elements.
• Commonwealth v. Brown, 375 A.2d 331 (Pa. 1977): used to support the Pennsylvania-law proposition that accomplice liability requires proof that “the commission of the crime” occurred—i.e., the offense’s commission remains an element of the accomplice’s liability.
• Commonwealth v. Roebuck, 32 A.3d 613 (Pa. 2011): cited for two points: (i) accomplice culpability derives from the mental state required for the principal offense, and (ii) conspiracy and accomplice liability are distinct doctrines under Pennsylvania law.

3) Mens rea limits and inapposite conspiracy precedent

• United States v. Quinnones, 16 F.4th 414 (3d Cir. 2021): cited for the proposition that an offense requiring mere recklessness is not a “crime of violence.” The panel uses Quinnones chiefly to reject Cochran’s attempt to reframe accomplice liability as “less culpable” in a way that might undermine the elements-clause analysis.
• United States v. Abreu, 32 F.4th 271 (3d Cir. 2022): held that conspiracy is not a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines. The panel explains Abreu is irrelevant because Cochran’s conviction is for aggravated assault (via accomplice liability), not conspiracy.

4) Alternative “generic accomplice liability” route

• Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007): establishes that aiding-and-abetting generally counts toward the generic offense unless the defendant shows the jurisdiction’s accomplice doctrine is “special” (overbroad compared to the generic definition).
• United States v. Carr, 107 F.4th 636 (7th Cir. 2024) and United States v. Yackel, 990 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 2021): cited as examples of other circuits applying Duenas-Alvarez to Guidelines “crime of violence” questions involving accomplice liability.

Legal Reasoning

1. Start with the elements clause and the modified categorical approach. The panel reiterates the elements-clause inquiry under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) and confirms that 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702 is divisible, so courts may identify which subsection—here, § 2702(a)(4)—formed the basis of conviction. Under United States v. Ramos, § 2702(a)(4) categorically includes “physical force” as an element.
2. Accomplice liability does not remove elements of the substantive offense. The court’s core move is to treat “accomplice liability” as a theory of liability for the same substantive offense, not a separate offense with a different element set. Drawing from United States v. Stevens, it reasons: if the underlying offense requires force, then liability for aiding/abetting (or its Pennsylvania analogue) necessarily involves that same force element, regardless of whether the accomplice personally applied force.
3. Pennsylvania accomplice law is materially similar to the federal aiding-and-abetting framework. Citing 18 Pa. C.S. § 306(c) and § 306(g), plus Commonwealth v. Brown, the panel emphasizes that Pennsylvania requires proof of the offense’s commission and the defendant’s complicity. The “commission of the offense” entails the offense’s elements—so the force element is not “lost” when conviction is based on complicity.
4. The court rejects efforts to smuggle in a “recklessness” problem. Cochran relied on the idea (recognized in United States v. Quinnones) that reckless offenses are not crimes of violence. The panel responds that § 2702(a)(4) requires intentional or knowing conduct, and, via 18 Pa. C.S. § 306(d) and Commonwealth v. Roebuck, an accomplice must meet the culpability required for the substantive offense.
5. Conspiracy precedent does not apply. Cochran’s attempt to analogize accomplice liability to conspiracy fails because Pennsylvania law differentiates them (citing Commonwealth v. Roebuck). Therefore United States v. Abreu (conspiracy not a crime of violence) does not undermine treating accomplice-based aggravated assault as a crime of violence.
6. Alternative rationale: Duenas-Alvarez “special” jurisdiction test. Even if one did not adopt the Stevens-style “elements carry over” framing, the panel agrees with the District Court that Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez forecloses Cochran’s argument absent proof that Pennsylvania accomplice liability is unusually broad. Cochran did not attempt that showing.

The opinion also notes (but does not depend on) the 2023 amendment adding U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(d) clarifying that “crime of violence” includes “aiding and abetting.” The panel treats the case as resolvable without the amendment because, on its analysis, § 2702(a)(4) qualifies under the elements clause even under earlier Guidelines versions.

Impact

Although labeled “NONPRECEDENTIAL,” the decision is practically significant in three ways:

• Career-offender litigation in the Third Circuit: It signals that defendants cannot avoid Ramos by recharacterizing qualifying violent predicates as accomplice-based convictions. For Pennsylvania aggravated assault under § 2702(a)(4), the force element remains dispositive under the elements clause.
• Broader “theory of liability” disputes: The opinion reinforces a general approach: where state accomplice liability requires commission of the substantive offense plus intentional facilitation, accomplice liability typically does not change the categorical-elements analysis. That can influence future disputes involving other Pennsylvania violent predicates (and similar state complicity statutes).
• Doctrinal convergence with other circuits: By endorsing Duenas-Alvarez and citing United States v. Carr and United States v. Yackel, the panel aligns Third Circuit reasoning with a cross-circuit trend: absent proof of an unusually broad accomplice doctrine, aiding-and-abetting convictions are treated as equivalent to principal offenses for predicate-offense purposes.