Acceptance of Workers’ Compensation Benefits Triggers Exclusivity and Bars Tort Claims; Co-Employee Liability Requires Summary-Judgment Evidence of “Willful Conduct”

1. Introduction

In Duke v. Walmart, Inc. (Ala. Mar. 20, 2026), the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed summary judgment for Walmart, Inc. and its employee, Qeon Gray, after Phillip Duke—also a Walmart employee—was struck by a tractor-trailer driven by Gray in a Walmart distribution-center parking lot.

The case presented two core issues:

  • Employer immunity: Whether Walmart’s immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusive-remedy provisions bars Duke’s tort claims where Duke contended he was “off duty” and therefore outside the Act’s coverage, but Walmart presented evidence that Duke received workers’ compensation benefits.
  • Co-employee liability: Whether Duke could proceed against Gray without producing evidence of “willful conduct” required by § 25-5-11, Ala. Code 1975.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held:

  • Claims against Walmart were barred by the Act’s exclusive-remedy provisions because Walmart made a prima facie showing that Duke accepted workers’ compensation benefits for the injury; Duke could not accept those benefits and simultaneously pursue tort damages from Walmart on a theory inconsistent with the Act’s remedy structure.
  • Claims against Gray failed because Duke did not present substantial evidence of “willful conduct” (intent/design to injure, or substantial certainty of injury) as required for co-employee liability under § 25-5-11.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed summary judgment for both defendants.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Summary-judgment framework

  • Nettles v. Pettway, 306 So. 3d 873 (Ala. 2020) and Sykes v. Majestic Mississippi, LLC, 402 So. 3d 203 (Ala. 2024): The Court reaffirmed the de novo standard of review and the Rule 56 burden-shifting scheme. These authorities grounded the Court’s approach: once Walmart and Gray produced evidence establishing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, Duke was required to respond with “substantial evidence” creating a genuine issue for trial.

2) Workers’ compensation exclusivity versus tort remedies

  • ITT Specialty Risk Servs, Inc. v. Barr, 842 So. 2d 638 (Ala. 2002): Duke relied on the general proposition that when an injury does not arise out of and in the course of employment, the Act’s exclusivity does not foreclose other claims (including intentional tort theories). The Court did not dispute that legal proposition; instead, it treated the decisive point as Duke’s acceptance of benefits under the Act, which—under Alabama precedent—operates as a binding election and forecloses inconsistent pursuit of tort damages against the employer.
  • Davis v. M.C. Dixon Lumber Co., 551 So. 2d 305 (1989): This was the cornerstone authority for the Court’s operative rule: “the acceptance of compensation payments under the Workmen’s Compensation Act constitutes an election that estops the employee from resorting to any other remedy.” The Court applied this principle to hold that even if Duke disputed that his injury was “job related,” he could not both accept workers’ compensation benefits and litigate tort claims against the employer as if the Act were inapplicable.
  • Brown v. Hixon, 686 So. 2d 1220 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) and Kelley v. Dupree, 376 So. 2d 1371 (Ala. 1979): These cases reinforced the “election between two inconsistent theories of recovery” concept. The Court used them by analogy: just as an individual cannot accept benefits as an employee while suing as though not an employee, Duke could not accept workers’ compensation benefits and then sue Walmart as though the Act’s exclusivity did not apply.
  • Baptist Mem'l Hosp. v. Gosa, 686 So. 2d 1147 (Ala. 1996): Cited to support the procedural framing that immunity under the exclusive-remedy provisions is a defensible bar when acceptance of workers’ compensation payments is undisputed, and to address (and reject) Duke’s contention that Walmart needed to separately plead “estoppel” or “election of remedies” apart from the exclusivity defense.

3) Co-employee immunity and “willful conduct”

  • Ex parte Newton, 895 So. 2d 851 (Ala. 2004): The Court used Newton to reiterate the statutory structure: co-employees are immune from civil liability except for claims “based on willful conduct,” reflecting the Legislature’s narrow carve-out from the Act’s general immunity scheme.
  • Reed v. Brunson, 527 So. 2d 102 (Ala. 1988): Reed supplied the controlling evidentiary standard: the plaintiff must show either (1) a motive to intentionally injure, or (2) that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would know injury was “substantially certain” to follow from the conduct. The Court treated Reed as establishing a “heavy burden,” and held Duke failed it at summary judgment because he produced no evidence of intent/design to injure (or its substantial-certainty substitute).

4) Preservation of arguments for appeal

  • ITEC, Inc. v. Automated Precision, Inc., 623 So. 2d 1139 (Ala. 1993): The Court invoked ITEC to decline Duke’s newly raised appellate arguments about whether his acceptance of benefits was knowing or constituted a true “election.” The precedent mattered because it prevented Duke from reshaping the case on appeal into a fact dispute he had not litigated below.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Why Walmart prevailed: exclusivity reinforced by acceptance of benefits

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in three steps:

  1. Identify the statutory bar: §§ 25-5-52 and 25-5-53 broadly exclude other remedies for workplace injuries covered by the Act.
  2. Determine whether the exclusivity bar is triggered in this record: Walmart supported its motion with affidavit and business records showing that Duke received medical, temporary-total-disability, and other workers’ compensation benefits tied to the October 2, 2024 incident, plus payment checks identifying him and the claim. This was enough for a prima facie showing under Rule 56.
  3. Enforce the election/estoppel effect of acceptance: Duke responded by arguing he was off duty and pointing to internal documents suggesting he was “walking/running in yard” and not logged into a tablet. The Court held that—even assuming he was off duty—those facts did not overcome the dispositive point: Duke accepted Act benefits and cannot simultaneously pursue a remedy inconsistent with the Act’s exclusivity.

The Court also rejected Duke’s attempt to recharacterize the trial court’s reasoning as unpleaded “estoppel/election” defenses. It treated those concepts as inherent in applying the exclusivity defense where acceptance of benefits is shown, and noted Walmart did plead exclusivity.

2) Why Gray prevailed: no substantial evidence of “willful conduct”

The Court treated Duke’s co-employee claim as statutorily constrained: once an employee receives Act benefits, a co-employee can be sued only for “willful conduct” as defined in § 25-5-11(c)(1) (intent or design to injure) and interpreted by Reed’s motive/substantial-certainty test.

Critically, the Court focused on the summary-judgment posture: Duke did not address Gray’s conduct in his summary-judgment response and offered no evidence of willful conduct. Arguments raised for the first time on appeal could not substitute for record evidence.

Duke also argued on appeal that intoxication can qualify as willful conduct under § 25-5-11(c)(3). The Court did not accept that as a basis to reverse because Duke still produced no summary-judgment evidence showing the required willfulness; additionally, the Court noted Duke’s complaint did not even allege willfulness (instead alleging Gray “did not see” Duke and “ran [him] over,” with allegations of reckless/wanton operation).

C. Impact

1) Practical effect on employer-tort claims in Alabama

The decision strengthens a recurring, defense-favorable pathway to disposition: where an employer can prove acceptance of workers’ compensation benefits tied to the injury, the employee faces a significant barrier to maintaining a parallel tort action against the employer—particularly at summary judgment.

Even when an employee asserts the injury was “off duty” or outside the course of employment, Duke indicates courts may treat benefit acceptance as a binding election that forecloses inconsistent tort recovery, absent a properly preserved and supported challenge to the premise and effect of acceptance.

2) Co-employee cases: pleading versus proof

The opinion underscores that co-employee liability is not merely a pleading exercise. A plaintiff must come forward with evidence satisfying the “willful conduct” standard at the summary-judgment stage. Allegations of wantonness, recklessness, or inattentive driving—without evidence of intent/design to injure or substantial certainty—are unlikely to survive.

3) Litigation conduct and preservation

The Court’s reliance on preservation principles signals that plaintiffs must develop and present any “lack of knowing election” or “misunderstanding of payments” theories in the trial court record. Appellate courts will not supply those disputes after the fact.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Exclusive-remedy provisions (§§ 25-5-52, 25-5-53): A rule that, when the Workers’ Compensation Act applies, the employee generally cannot sue the employer in tort for the injury; workers’ compensation benefits are the tradeoff for giving up broader damages claims.
  • Election of remedies / estoppel by acceptance: If an employee accepts workers’ compensation payments for an injury, Alabama cases treat that acceptance as choosing the workers’ compensation remedy—preventing the employee from later pursuing an inconsistent remedy (like a tort suit against the employer) for the same injury.
  • Co-employee “willful conduct” (§ 25-5-11): A narrow exception allowing suit against a co-employee only when the co-employee acted with intent/design to injure (or conduct so extreme that injury was substantially certain), not merely negligence, recklessness, or wantonness.
  • Summary judgment / “substantial evidence”: Once the moving party shows evidence entitling it to judgment, the opposing party must produce enough admissible evidence that a reasonable jury could find in its favor; argument alone (especially on appeal) is not enough.

5. Conclusion

Duke v. Walmart, Inc. reiterates two consequential principles in Alabama workplace-injury litigation: (1) acceptance of workers’ compensation benefits can operate as a binding election that triggers exclusivity and bars tort claims against the employer, even where the employee asserts the injury occurred “off duty”; and (2) co-employee liability remains tightly confined to claims supported by substantial evidence of statutory “willful conduct,” with Reed’s heavy burden controlling at the summary-judgment stage.