ACCA Predicate Identification from Conflicted State Records and Eleventh Circuit Foreclosure of Bruen-Based § 922(g)(1) Challenges

I. Introduction

Case: United States v. Alvin Lee McCary (11th Cir. May 5, 2026) (unpublished).
Parties: United States (Plaintiff-Appellee) vs. Alvin Lee McCary (Defendant-Appellant).
Charge: Possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Sentence: 300 months, driven by an Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) enhancement.

The appeal presented three issues: (1) whether McCary’s 1999 Florida aggravated battery conviction qualified as an ACCA “violent felony” despite inconsistent state-court paperwork; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his § 922(g)(1) conviction; and (3) whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional after New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held:

  1. The district court did not clearly err in finding that McCary’s 1999 conviction was under Fla. Stat. § 784.045(1)(a) (a categorical violent felony under circuit precedent), notwithstanding a judgment form referencing § 784.045(1)(b).
  2. The evidence was sufficient to support the § 922(g)(1) conviction, including proof of status, knowledge, possession, and interstate commerce.
  3. McCary’s Bruen-based constitutional challenge failed under the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-precedent rule because United States v. Dubois had already rejected a materially identical challenge.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. ACCA predicate identification and standard of review

  • United States v. Alicea, 875 F.3d 606 (11th Cir. 2017)
    The panel relied on Alicea for the proposition that a district court’s factual finding about what offense the defendant was convicted of is reviewed for clear error. This framing matters: McCary was not merely disputing legal classification, but the antecedent factual question—what subsection his conviction actually fell under given conflicting paperwork.
  • United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948)
    The opinion invoked U.S. Gypsum Co. to define “clear error” (“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed”). That high bar was dispositive: the Eleventh Circuit treated the district court’s reconstruction of the state record as supported enough to withstand appellate second-guessing.
  • Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI (Medium), 709 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2013)
    Turner supplied the key merits rule: a conviction under Fla. Stat. § 784.045(1)(a) is a categorical violent felony. Once the district court found (as a fact) that McCary’s 1999 conviction was under subsection (1)(a), Turner effectively locked in the ACCA “violent felony” result.
  • United States v. Braun, 801 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2015)
    Braun served as the counterpoint: a conviction under Fla. Stat. § 784.045(1)(b) is not a categorical violent felony. The entire ACCA dispute turned on which subsection governed McCary’s conviction, making the record-conflict question outcome-determinative.

2. Sufficiency of the evidence for § 922(g)(1)

  • United States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Williams, 144 F.3d 1397 (11th Cir. 1998)
    These cases provided the de novo sufficiency standard with deference to the jury: evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the government, drawing reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.
  • United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Johnson, 981 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2020)
    The panel cited these cases for the elements the government must prove under § 922(g)(1): (i) felon status, (ii) knowledge of that status, (iii) knowing possession, and (iv) interstate commerce nexus.
  • United States v. Greer, 440 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2006)
    Greer provided the constructive possession principle: knowing possession may be proven via direct or circumstantial evidence, including constructive possession. The court used this framework to characterize the government’s proof as comfortably sufficient (and, in this case, it also had eyewitness testimony of actual firing).

3. Constitutional challenge after Bruen and the prior-precedent rule

  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)
    McCary invoked Bruen to attack § 922(g)(1) as unconstitutional. The panel did not reweigh the full Bruen “history and tradition” analysis because circuit precedent already controlled the issue.
  • United States v. Ostrander, 114 F.4th 1348 (11th Cir. 2024)
    Cited for the general de novo standard for constitutional challenges, while clarifying that a different standard applies when the issue is raised for the first time on appeal.
  • United States v. Hughes, 840 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2016) and United States v. Peters, 403 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2005)
    These cases anchored the panel’s “plain error” review because McCary raised the constitutional challenge for the first time on appeal—another doctrinal gatekeeping move that narrows the appellant’s path.
  • United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-6281, 2026 WL 135685 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026)
    This was the controlling merits precedent: the Eleventh Circuit had already “considered—and rejected” a Bruen-based challenge to § 922(g)(1). By citing the denial of certiorari, the panel underscored that Dubois remains binding law in the circuit.
  • United States v. Hanna, 153 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 1998)
    Hanna supplied the “prior precedent rule”: a later panel cannot overrule a prior panel’s holding. This rule, not the panel’s independent constitutional analysis, is what concretely decided the Bruen issue in McCary’s case.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. ACCA enhancement despite inconsistent state records

The central sentencing dispute was not the abstract legal status of Florida aggravated battery under ACCA (that was largely settled by Turner and Braun), but the messy factual question of what McCary was actually convicted of in 1999.

The record “wrinkle” was stark: the charging document referenced § 784.045(1)(a), but a judgment form from a jury trial referenced § 784.045(1)(b). The district court resolved the inconsistency by finding—by a preponderance of the evidence—that the (1)(b) judgment had been superseded and set aside, and that a later proceeding culminated in a nolo contendere plea and sentence for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, matching § 784.045(1)(a)(2).

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit treated that determination as a factual finding reviewed only for clear error (Alicea; U.S. Gypsum Co.). Given record support for the “superseded judgment / later plea” narrative, the panel concluded it could not be left with the “definite and firm conviction” of mistake. Once subsection (1)(a) was established, Turner made it categorically a violent felony, completing the ACCA analysis.

2. Sufficiency of the evidence under § 922(g)(1)

Applying the deferential sufficiency framework (Jiminez; Williams), the panel found ample evidence for each element identified in Howard and Johnson:

  • Status as a felon: fingerprint comparison tied McCary to prior felony convictions.
  • Knowledge of status: McCary testified he was “a convicted felon.”
  • Knowing possession: eyewitness testimony (the victim’s wife) that McCary fired the shotgun; constructive possession doctrine (Greer) also supported the inference given the gun’s location on his property.
  • Interstate commerce nexus: ATF expert testimony that the firearm was manufactured in Brazil.

With these proofs, the panel held the district court properly denied both motions for judgment of acquittal.

3. Bruen-based constitutional challenge foreclosed

McCary’s constitutional argument faced two independent barriers:

  1. Plain error review: because the issue was raised for the first time on appeal (Hughes; Peters), narrowing the circumstances in which relief is available.
  2. Binding circuit precedent: Dubois had already rejected the same post-Bruen attack on § 922(g)(1), and the prior-precedent rule (Hanna) required the panel to follow it.

The result is a doctrinally “straightforward” affirmance: the court did not reopen or innovate on the Second Amendment question; it enforced hierarchical decisional rules.

C. Impact

  • ACCA litigation with “dirty” state records: The decision reinforces that, in the Eleventh Circuit, district courts may resolve conflicts in state-court documents about the specific offense of conviction using a preponderance standard, with appellate review highly deferential (clear error). Practically, defendants contesting ACCA predicates will need to do more than point to an inconsistent form; they must show the district court’s reconstruction is clearly mistaken.
  • Florida aggravated battery remains bifurcated: The case underscores the continuing importance of the (1)(a) vs. (1)(b) distinction under Fla. Stat. § 784.045—(1)(a) qualifying categorically under Turner, (1)(b) not under Braun. This keeps document-level subsection identification pivotal in federal sentencing.
  • § 922(g)(1) challenges after Bruen in the Eleventh Circuit: The opinion signals that, unless and until the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc displaces Dubois, panels will summarily reject Bruen-based challenges to felon-in-possession prosecutions under the prior-precedent rule.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • ACCA (Armed Career Criminal Act): A federal law that increases penalties for certain firearm offenses when the defendant has three prior convictions for specified categories of serious crimes (including “violent felonies”).
  • Categorical violent felony: A conviction that qualifies based on the statutory elements of the offense, not the specific facts of the defendant’s conduct. Here, circuit law treats Fla. Stat. § 784.045(1)(a) as qualifying categorically.
  • Preponderance of the evidence: The “more likely than not” standard. The district court used it to decide what subsection McCary was actually convicted under in 1999.
  • Clear error review: A very deferential appellate standard for factual findings; reversal occurs only when the appellate court is firmly convinced the district court made a mistake.
  • Constructive possession: Possession can be shown without the firearm being in the defendant’s hand; it can be inferred from control over the location or other circumstances.
  • Interstate commerce nexus: For § 922(g)(1), the government commonly proves this by showing the gun was manufactured outside the state (or outside the U.S.), implying it traveled in commerce at some point.
  • Plain error: A strict standard used when an argument wasn’t raised in the trial court; it is harder for defendants to win relief on appeal.
  • Prior precedent rule: A circuit panel must follow earlier binding circuit decisions, even if it might think they are wrong, unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court.
  • Nolo contendere plea: A plea in which a defendant does not admit guilt but accepts conviction; it generally functions like a guilty plea for sentencing and judgment purposes.

V. Conclusion

United States v. McCary is a rule-of-decision opinion with two practical takeaways. First, when ACCA eligibility turns on which statutory subsection underlies a prior conviction, the district court’s factfinding—grounded in the state record as a whole—will be hard to overturn on appeal under clear-error review. Second, within the Eleventh Circuit, Bruen-based constitutional attacks on § 922(g)(1) remain foreclosed by United States v. Dubois under the prior-precedent rule, making such challenges largely nonstarters absent higher-court intervention.