Abandonment as Aggravated Circumstance: Discretionary Denial of Improvement Period and Excusal of DHS Reunification Efforts

1. Introduction

This abuse-and-neglect appeal concerned whether a father who had long been absent from his child’s life was entitled to a post-adjudicatory improvement period before termination of parental rights. The DHS alleged (1) abandonment and failure to protect the child from the mother’s abuse, (2) failure to provide basic necessities and educational support, and later (3) incapacity to parent due to mental impairment. After adjudication, the father sought a post-adjudicatory improvement period, pointing to sobriety, negative drug screens, employment, and participation in some services. The circuit court denied an improvement period and terminated parental rights, finding abandonment (an aggravated circumstance), a lack of relationship, and ongoing barriers (including mental-health concerns and noncompliance with visitation and record-release directives).

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing that abandonment both supports denial of an improvement period and, as an aggravated circumstance, removes the usual requirement that DHS provide reasonable reunification efforts.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the termination order. Applying the appellate standard of review stated in Syl. Pt. 1, In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, 930 S.E.2d 400 (2026), it held:

• The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying a post-adjudicatory improvement period under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), because the father failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he was likely to fully participate and benefit—particularly given abandonment, inappropriate conduct during phone visitation, and failure to sign a medical release.
• The circuit court properly found “no reasonable likelihood” that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected, because abandonment is expressly recognized as such a circumstance under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(4).
• Termination was permissible under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) because there was no reasonable likelihood of correction and termination was necessary for the child’s welfare.
• The father’s claim that DHS failed to adapt services to cognitive limitations failed because, once abandonment/aggravated circumstances were found, DHS was not required to make reasonable efforts under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(7)(A).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

a) Standard of review framing the appellate posture

The Court opened with Syl. Pt. 1, In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, 930 S.E.2d 400 (2026), reiterating the familiar tripartite lens: abuse of discretion for dispositional/substantive rulings, clear error for factual findings, and de novo review for legal issues. This allocation matters because the father’s primary challenge—denial of an improvement period—falls squarely within discretionary territory, making reversal difficult absent a clear misapplication of governing principles or an evidentiary gap.

b) Improvement periods are discretionary; “no improvement likely” defeats the request

Relying on In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002), the Court emphasized that even when services exist or a parent makes some efforts, an improvement period “need not be granted when no improvement is likely.” That precedent supports a pragmatic inquiry: not whether the parent has done something positive, but whether the parent is likely to fully participate and remedy the conditions within the case’s timeframe.

c) Abandonment as a near-disqualifier for improvement periods

The opinion’s doctrinal center of gravity is abandonment. Quoting In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 336, 540 S.E.2d 542, 553 (2000), the Court repeated that where the underlying conduct is abandonment, “such parental recalcitrance is perceived as so egregious as to warrant the virtually automatic denial of an improvement period.” It reinforced that proposition with Syl. Pt. 2, James M. v. Maynard, 185 W. Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 (1991), holding that abandonment constitutes “compelling circumstances sufficient to justify the denial of an improvement period.” Together, these cases shape the normative judgment that abandonment is not merely another correctable deficit; it reflects a sustained failure of parental responsibility that courts may treat as fundamentally incompatible with the premise of incremental reunification.

d) Termination without less restrictive alternatives where no reasonable likelihood of correction exists

The Court relied on Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)) to restate the rule that termination may proceed without intervening less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions can be substantially corrected. This is pivotal because it undercuts an implicit argument that a court must try “something less” before termination. The cited syllabus-point authority rejects any categorical requirement of stepwise escalation when the statutory findings justify immediate termination.

e) Reasonable-efforts duty and statutory exceptions

In footnote 7, the Court cited In re K.V., 251 W. Va. 418, 426, 914 S.E.2d 517, 525 (2025) for the proposition that DHS must provide services unless a statutory exception applies. Here, the exception was abandonment as an aggravated circumstance under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(7)(A). This citation anchors the Court’s rejection of the father’s “adapted services” argument: the obligation to tailor or intensify reunification services is contingent on the existence of a reasonable-efforts duty in the first place.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in a structured statutory-and-precedential sequence:

• Threshold factual foundation (abandonment): The circuit court found that the father had not been meaningfully involved since the child was very young, provided essentially no support, and lacked a relationship such that the child did not even know his father’s name. That abandonment finding did substantial downstream work under both improvement-period doctrine and the termination statutes.
• Improvement period denial (participation likelihood): Although the father emphasized negative drug screens, employment, and residence in a sober living facility, the Court agreed with the circuit court that those facts did not establish (by clear and convincing evidence) likelihood of full participation and benefit. The Court highlighted evidence that directly undermined “successful participation,” including inappropriate communication during supervised phone visits, attempts to call the child in the middle of the night, and refusal to sign a medical release—facts suggesting noncompliance, poor judgment, and impediments to informed case planning.
• Statutory termination findings: With abandonment established, the Court treated W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(4) (abandonment as a “no reasonable likelihood” circumstance) as essentially dispositive on that prong. It then affirmed the welfare finding and the ultimate dispositional choice under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6).
• Reasonable efforts and service adaptation: The Court rejected the argument that DHS should have provided services adapted to cognitive limitations because, under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(7)(A), DHS “is not required to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family” once aggravated circumstances (including abandonment) are found.

3.3 Impact

Although issued as a memorandum decision, the opinion consolidates and applies established West Virginia doctrine in a way that is likely to influence trial-level practice in three recurring scenarios:

• Sobriety is not a full answer to abandonment: Parents may increasingly present negative screens and treatment participation as proof of readiness. This decision underscores that where the core harm is abandonment and relational absence, sobriety—while relevant—does not necessarily show an ability to parent or a likelihood of full, appropriate participation.
• Visitation conduct can be outcome-determinative: The Court treated inappropriate supervised phone conduct and boundary-violating calls as meaningful indicators that an improvement period would not work. Practitioners should expect visitation quality and compliance to carry substantial weight when improvement periods are sought.
• Service-adaptation arguments face a statutory gatekeeper: Claims that DHS must tailor services to intellectual or cognitive limitations may be significantly constrained when abandonment is found, because the “reasonable efforts” duty can be statutorily excused. Litigants will likely focus more heavily on contesting the aggravated-circumstances finding itself.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Post-adjudicatory improvement period: A court-ordered window after a parent is adjudicated as abusing/neglecting, during which the parent is given structured time and services to fix problems (e.g., parenting skills, treatment) before the court decides final disposition.
• “Clear and convincing evidence” (for an improvement period request): A heightened level of proof requiring a strong showing—more than “more likely than not”—that the parent is likely to fully participate in the improvement period.
• Aggravated circumstances: Statutorily recognized serious situations (including abandonment) that justify expedited permanency and can relieve DHS of the usual duty to attempt reunification.
• Reasonable efforts: The general obligation of DHS to provide services designed to help reunify the family. Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(7)(A), that obligation can be removed when the court finds aggravated circumstances like abandonment.
• “No reasonable likelihood that conditions can be substantially corrected”: A statutory finding that the problems are not realistically fixable soon enough to meet the child’s need for safety and permanency; abandonment is expressly listed as one such circumstance under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(4).
• Termination without less restrictive alternatives: Under Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., courts may terminate parental rights without trying intermediate options (like guardianship) if the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” finding is made and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.

5. Conclusion

In re D.C. reaffirms a stringent approach to abandonment in West Virginia abuse-and-neglect jurisprudence: abandonment is treated as both a powerful reason to deny a post-adjudicatory improvement period and a statutory basis to find no reasonable likelihood of correction, thereby supporting termination when the child’s welfare requires permanency. The decision also clarifies that where abandonment constitutes an aggravated circumstance, DHS is not required to provide reasonable efforts toward reunification—limiting arguments that services must be expanded or specially adapted before termination can occur.