A Slowly Executed Emergency Police U-Turn Is Not Reckless Disregard Merely Because Sirens or Lights Were Not Used

Introduction

Murphy v Gallegos addresses the liability standard governing a police officer who causes an accident while exercising an emergency-driving privilege. Vera Murphy was traveling south on White Plains Road when her vehicle collided with a marked police vehicle driven by Officer David Gallegos. Gallegos was attempting a U-turn from the parking lane to respond to a radio report of a fight in progress.

The central issue was whether Gallegos’s conduct could constitute “reckless disregard for the safety of others” under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e), or whether the evidence established only, at most, ordinary negligence or a momentary error in judgment. A related issue was whether the failure to use a horn, siren, or possibly turret lights created a factual question requiring a trial.

Summary of the Opinion

By a 3–2 vote, the Second Department affirmed the order granting summary judgment to Gallegos and the municipal defendants and dismissing the complaint. The majority concluded that:

• Gallegos was operating an authorized emergency vehicle during an emergency operation.
• His U-turn fell within the turning and directional privileges provided by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b)(4).
• The heightened reckless-disregard standard therefore applied.
• Driving no faster than five miles per hour, “creeping” forward, and repeatedly looking for traffic demonstrated precaution rather than conscious indifference.
• The absence of a horn or siren, and the dispute over whether turret lights were activated, did not create a triable issue because police vehicles are exempt from those signaling requirements under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(c).

Justices Dowling and Brathwaite Nelson dissented. They reasoned that Gallegos entered an active travel lane from behind a double-parked vehicle while looking toward his rear rather than toward the lane he was crossing. In their view, the evidence did not conclusively establish that he took adequate precautions, particularly given the disputed use of emergency lights and the undisputed absence of a horn or siren.

Analysis

The Governing Statutory Framework

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 gives drivers of authorized emergency vehicles limited privileges during an emergency operation. Section 1104(b)(4) permits such drivers to disregard rules governing the direction of movement or turns. Section 1104(e), however, preserves liability when the driver acts with reckless disregard for the safety of others.

The protection is conduct-specific. The heightened standard applies only when the accident results from conduct specifically privileged by § 1104(b). Other conduct remains governed by ordinary negligence principles. Because the accident arose from Gallegos’s emergency U-turn, the court treated it as privileged turning conduct and applied the reckless-disregard standard.

Majority’s Legal Reasoning

Reckless disregard requires substantially more than carelessness. It demands an intentional act of an unreasonable character, performed despite a known or obvious risk so serious that harm is highly probable, together with conscious indifference to the outcome.

The majority found no such evidence. The accident occurred during daylight and light traffic. Gallegos’s view was obstructed by a double-parked vehicle, but he moved forward slowly, continued looking, and reached no more than five miles per hour. His failure to see Murphy’s vehicle might support a finding of negligence, but it did not establish that he consciously disregarded a highly probable risk of injury.

Murphy’s testimony did not alter that conclusion because she did not see the police vehicle before impact and therefore could not provide evidence contradicting Gallegos’s description of his speed and manner of movement. Likewise, warning-signal evidence was insufficient: § 1104(c) does not require a moving police vehicle to use audible signals or emergency lights as a condition of receiving the statutory privileges.

The Dissent’s Reasoning

The dissent emphasized that summary judgment evidence must be viewed in the nonmoving plaintiff’s favor. Gallegos was effectively boxed into the parking lane, his view of southbound traffic was obstructed, and he began his U-turn across the front of the double-parked vehicle rather than first entering the travel lane and obtaining a clearer view.

More importantly, Gallegos testified that immediately before impact he was looking toward the rear of his vehicle or into his left rear-view mirror—not toward the southbound lane into which he was moving. The dissent considered that evidence sufficient to question whether he had taken any meaningful precaution against the obvious danger. Although lights and sirens were not legally mandatory, their absence remained relevant to the factual assessment of whether the overall operation reflected conscious indifference.

Precedents Cited

Kabir v County of Monroe

This case supplied the controlling conduct-specific rule: the reckless-disregard standard applies only when an emergency driver is engaged in conduct expressly exempted by § 1104(b). Otherwise, ordinary negligence governs. It framed the threshold inquiry in Murphy.

Cable v State of New York

Cited for both the conduct-specific approach and the proposition that regulations governing movement and turning fall within § 1104(b)(4). It supported treating Gallegos’s U-turn as privileged emergency conduct.

Saarinen v Kerr

The principal authority defining reckless disregard as an unreasonable intentional act undertaken despite a grave and obvious risk, with conscious indifference to the consequences. Both the majority and dissent relied on this formulation but disagreed over its application.

Frezzell v City of New York

Reinforced the demanding nature of the reckless-disregard standard. The majority also used it to support the conclusion that slow, precautionary movement and the absence of required warning signals may defeat a claim of recklessness.

Thomas v City of New York

Cited as further authority for the established definition of reckless disregard and the requirement of conscious indifference rather than simple lack of due care.

Salzano v Korba and Szczerbiak v Pilat

These decisions establish that a momentary lapse in judgment does not meet the heightened standard applicable to emergency drivers. The majority characterized Gallegos’s failure to see Murphy’s vehicle, at worst, as such a lapse.

Beverly v County of Suffolk and Proce v Town of Stony Point

These cases supported the majority’s conclusion that imperfect execution of emergency driving does not become reckless merely because it leads to a collision.

Flood v City of Syracuse

The majority cited this case as an example of precautionary driving inconsistent with recklessness. The dissent distinguished it, contending that the record in Murphy did not comparably establish that the officer was watching the lane he entered.

Moccasin v Suffolk County

This recent precedent represented the contrasting side of the factual boundary. The majority found Gallegos’s cautious movement distinguishable, while the dissent relied on Moccasin to argue that entering a travel path without adequate observation can create a jury question.

Granath v Monroe County

This Court of Appeals decision confirmed both the special privileges granted during emergency operations and the continued prohibition against reckless disregard. It also supported the majority’s reading of § 1104(c) concerning police vehicles’ exemption from audible and visual signaling requirements.

Chiu-Yu v Chin

Cited for the proposition that the failure to activate warning equipment does not, by itself, establish reckless disregard where police vehicles are statutorily exempt from that requirement.

Bourdierd v City of Yonkers

The majority distinguished this authority because Gallegos’s slow movement showed precaution. The dissent invoked it to argue that inadequate observation and warning measures may permit an inference of conscious indifference.

Levere v City of Syracuse and Green v State of New York

The dissent cited these as contrasting cases involving evidence of precaution sufficient to negate recklessness. In its view, the defendants in Murphy had not made an equivalent showing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Ordinary negligence: Failure to act with reasonable care.
• Reckless disregard: Conscious indifference to a serious and obvious risk that makes injury highly probable.
• Emergency operation: Use of an authorized emergency vehicle while responding to an emergency call or performing a comparable statutory function.
• Prima facie showing: The initial evidence a party must present to establish entitlement to judgment unless the opponent produces contrary evidence.
• Triable issue of fact: A genuine factual dispute that must be resolved at trial rather than on summary judgment.
• Turret lights: The emergency warning lights mounted on a police vehicle.

Potential Impact

The decision strengthens the ability of police and municipal defendants to obtain summary judgment where an emergency maneuver is performed at very low speed and with some evidence of observation and caution. A failure to see another vehicle will not necessarily amount to reckless disregard, even when the officer’s view is obstructed.

The ruling also confirms that disputed or absent lights and sirens ordinarily cannot alone establish recklessness because police vehicles are exempt from mandatory signaling under § 1104(c). Such evidence may remain part of the surrounding circumstances, but the majority treated it as insufficient without additional proof of conscious indifference.

Nevertheless, the narrow 3–2 division shows that future cases will remain highly fact-dependent. Evidence about sightlines, the direction in which an officer was looking, speed, obstructions, and alternative ways of performing the maneuver may determine whether summary judgment is appropriate.

Conclusion

Murphy v Gallegos draws a firm distinction between negligent emergency driving and reckless disregard. An officer’s slow and cautious execution of an emergency U-turn does not become reckless merely because the officer fails to see an approaching vehicle or does not activate lights or a siren. Liability under § 1104(e) requires evidence of conscious indifference to a grave and obvious risk—evidence the majority found absent here.

The dissent, however, highlights the continuing importance of where the officer was looking and whether meaningful precautions were actually taken. The decision therefore provides substantial protection for emergency responders while preserving a fact-sensitive boundary between a momentary mistake and actionable recklessness.