A Related Statutory Argument Does Not Necessarily Exhaust a Standalone Agency-Policy Challenge

Case: Linares-Recendiz v. Bondi, No. 23-9575, captioned in the supplied opinion with Todd Blanche as the substituted Attorney General.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date: November 5, 2026
Disposition: Petition for review denied; Judge Federico dissented.

Precedential status: This order and judgment expressly states that it is not binding precedent, except under law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. Its broader significance is persuasive, not precedential.

1. Introduction

This case concerns the intersection of cancellation-of-removal eligibility, administrative delay, and the obligation to present a sufficiently specific legal argument to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) before seeking judicial review.

Juan Linares-Recendiz, a Mexican citizen, sought cancellation of removal based on the hardship his removal would cause his United States citizen daughter. Although an immigration judge (IJ) granted relief, the BIA reversed because his daughter had turned twenty-one before the IJ issued her decision. An intervening Tenth Circuit decision foreclosed most of Linares’s arguments about when a qualifying child’s age should be measured.

The remaining issue concerned the agency’s allocation of cancellation grants under an annual statutory cap. Linares argued that agency procedures unfairly favored detained applicants over non-detained applicants, exposing the latter to delays during which their children could lose qualifying status. The majority declined to reach that challenge because it concluded that Linares had not presented the same standalone policy challenge to the BIA.

The central disagreement was therefore procedural rather than substantive: had Linares introduced a new legal theory, or merely requested a different remedy for an argument already presented? The majority adopted the former characterization; the dissent adopted the latter and favored remand.

2. Background and Statutory Framework

Cancellation of removal

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), a qualifying nonpermanent resident must establish:

  1. At least ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States;
  2. Good moral character during the relevant period;
  3. No conviction for a disqualifying offense; and
  4. Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, or child.

Eligibility does not itself guarantee relief. The IJ must separately decide whether to grant cancellation as a matter of discretion. For the relevant statutory definition, a “child” is an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age. Section 1229b(e)(1) also imposes an annual limit of 4,000 cancellation grants.

The proceedings

  • 1996: Linares entered the United States without admission or parole following inspection.
  • 2011: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings. Linares admitted the allegations and conceded inadmissibility.
  • 2012: He applied for cancellation of removal, relying on hardship to his daughter, G.R., then fourteen.
  • Late 2017: The IJ conducted two hearings. G.R. was still twenty, but the IJ reserved her decision because the fiscal-year cancellation cap had been reached.
  • Fall 2018: As G.R.’s twenty-first birthday approached, Linares unsuccessfully requested release of the reserved decision and assignment of an available cancellation grant.
  • June 2019: The IJ granted cancellation, notwithstanding G.R.’s intervening twenty-first birthday, reasoning that undue or unfair delay not primarily attributable to Linares justified an exception.

DHS appealed. The BIA rejected the IJ’s conclusion that unfair delay had occurred, held Linares statutorily ineligible because G.R. had aged out, vacated the grant, and ordered removal to Mexico.

The challenged allocation policy

Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 12-01 (OPPM 12-01) established a cut-off after 3,500 covered grants in a fiscal year. After that point, IJs were to reserve decisions in covered non-detained cases until a grant became available. Detained cancellation cases, however, could continue throughout the fiscal year.

OPPM 12-01 governed the relevant hearings. Its successor, OPPM 17-04, became effective for hearings concluded on or after January 4, 2018. The opinion notes that the challenged distinction continued in similar form under the successor policy.

Linares argued that detention-based priority was disconnected from applicants’ comparative deservingness and could disadvantage non-detained applicants whose qualifying children aged out while decisions remained reserved. Those assertions were his merits arguments; the court did not decide whether they were correct.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The court initially held Linares’s petition in abeyance pending Rangel-Fuentes v. Bondi. That decision upheld measuring a qualifying child’s age when the IJ issues the decision. Linares then conceded that the decision foreclosed most of his original arguments.

His remaining claim asked the court to require equal application of the grant-reservation policy to detained and non-detained applicants. He also requested a remand for the agency to reconstruct how quickly his case would have been decided without the alleged preference and adjust his grant date retroactively.

The majority denied review of that claim for insufficient administrative exhaustion. It distinguished:

  • The BIA argument: The effects of the allocation policy helped demonstrate why the agency’s interpretation of the qualifying-child statute was arbitrary and capricious.
  • The judicial-review argument: The allocation policy itself should be modified independently of the statutory interpretation, followed by retrospective recalculation of Linares’s grant date.

Although those arguments overlapped, the majority concluded that they were different legal theories. The BIA briefing had not clearly presented a freestanding request to invalidate or modify the policy.

The majority also applied statutory exhaustion despite the government’s stated disclaimer of that defense. Because the government simultaneously sought prudential exhaustion for substantially the same reasons, the court found no clear, binding waiver.

The court did not decide whether the allocation policy was lawful, whether Linares deserved cancellation, or whether retroactive adjustment would otherwise be available.

4. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Intervening authority narrowed the dispute

The child-age issue supplied the underlying eligibility problem but was no longer open in this proceeding after Rangel-Fuentes v. Bondi. G.R.’s age at the hearing did not preserve her qualifying status through the later issuance of the IJ’s decision.

This distinction mattered because Linares’s remaining theory sought a different route around the timing problem: altering the allocation policy and reconstructing an earlier grant date. The court therefore needed to determine whether that independent route had been adequately presented to the BIA.

B. Related subject matter did not establish exhaustion of the same theory

Section 1252(d)(1) requires exhaustion of administrative remedies available as of right. Tenth Circuit decisions interpret that requirement to demand presentation of the same specific legal theory to the BIA before advancing it in court.

Linares’s BIA brief did discuss OPPM 12-01, identify the detained/non-detained distinction, and describe that distinction as arbitrary and capricious. The majority did not overlook those references. Instead, it examined their role within the brief.

Before the BIA, the policy’s consequences supported Linares’s preferred statutory construction: eligibility should be measured at the hearing rather than when the reserved decision issued. His requested disposition was affirmance of the IJ’s grant and dismissal of DHS’s appeal.

In court, by contrast, Linares sought policy modification even accepting the statutory interpretation established by Rangel-Fuentes v. Bondi. His request required the agency to revisit its allocation practices and reconstruct their historical effect on his case.

For the majority, that was more than a remedial variation. It changed the legal object of the challenge from statutory interpretation to the policy’s independent validity.

The decision thus illustrates a demanding, context-sensitive approach to issue preservation: using the same terminology and criticizing the same administrative practice may not suffice when the earlier criticism served a different legal theory.

C. The government’s qualified disclaimer was not a binding waiver

The government expressly declined to rely on statutory exhaustion. It explained that Linares had prevailed before the IJ and was not required to file a cross-appeal, and that exhaustion did not require a discretionary motion for reconsideration.

Nevertheless, the government urged the court to decline review on prudential exhaustion grounds because the agency should first consider the argument. The majority treated those positions together rather than viewing the statutory disclaimer in isolation.

It reasoned that the government had relinquished exhaustion with one hand while invoking substantially the same principle with the other. Finding neither a clear waiver nor a straightforward invocation of statutory exhaustion, the court exercised its discretion to examine exhaustion itself.

This reasoning is narrow but significant. The court did not hold that judges may disregard an unequivocal waiver. It acknowledged that statutory exhaustion can be waived, but concluded that the government’s position here was not unequivocal.

D. The missing reply brief limited the available responses

The majority also noted that Linares had not filed a reply brief addressing the government’s exhaustion argument. Under circuit authority, that omission waived non-obvious rejoinders to arguments in the response brief.

This was a supporting procedural consideration, not a ruling that every substantive contention was waived. It limited the counterarguments the court would consider when evaluating exhaustion and the government’s position.

E. Denial rather than remand was the decisive remedial choice

Once the majority found the sole remaining issue unexhausted, it declined to consider that issue and denied the petition. It did not return the case to the BIA for an initial determination of the policy challenge.

That choice left the BIA’s removal order undisturbed. It did not amount to a judicial endorsement of the allocation policy on its merits.

5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Eligibility and the effect of intervening law

Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 212–13 (2024). The court used this decision to describe cancellation’s two stages: statutory eligibility followed by discretionary relief. It clarifies why a favorable discretionary assessment cannot, by itself, overcome the absence of a qualifying relative. The opinion did not rely on it to decide the exhaustion dispute.

Rangel-Fuentes v. Bondi, 155 F.4th 1138 (10th Cir. 2025). This was the controlling substantive authority. It upheld the BIA’s position that a qualifying child’s age is assessed when the IJ issues the decision. Its intervention eliminated most of Linares’s original arguments and produced the narrower dispute over whether his remaining policy challenge had been preserved.

Exhaustion, waiver, and preservation

Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023). This decision establishes that § 1252(d)(1) is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule, capable of waiver or forfeiture. It also explains why exhaustion does not require discretionary BIA remedies such as reconsideration or reopening. The majority accepted those propositions but found no clear waiver here. The dissent emphasized that the nonjurisdictional character of exhaustion leaves room for a less rigid disposition, particularly remand.

Miguel-Pena v. Garland, 94 F.4th 1145 (10th Cir. 2024). This decision supplied the majority’s principal exhaustion framework. It requires presentation of the same specific legal theory to the BIA and permits the court, in appropriate circumstances, to address exhaustion even when the government has forfeited the issue. Its recognition that exhaustion serves interests beyond the parties supported sua sponte consideration here. The dissent also relied on its statement that courts enforce exhaustion by declining to consider the unexhausted issue, arguing that this need not foreclose remand.

Garcia-Carbajal v. Holder, 625 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2010). Cited in the dissent, this case expresses the same-specific-legal-theory requirement and the principle that an agency should have an opportunity to address an argument before judicial review. Judge Federico distinguished it as involving a changed argument seeking the same relief, whereas he viewed Linares as maintaining the same argument while changing the requested relief. The opinion notes that Santos-Zacaria v. Garland abrogated this precedent on other grounds.

In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig. (Hossley-Embry Grp. II), 111 F.4th 1095, 1110 n.15 (10th Cir. 2024). This authority supported treating non-obvious responses to the government’s exhaustion argument as waived because Linares filed no reply brief. Its relevance was appellate briefing practice rather than immigration eligibility.

Statutory interpretation and independent policy review

Rest. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Lab., 120 F.4th 163, 175 (5th Cir. 2024). The majority cited this decision to acknowledge that statutory interpretation and arbitrary-and-capricious review can overlap. That acknowledgment sharpened its conclusion: overlap does not necessarily make two arguments the same legal theory for exhaustion purposes.

Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 & n.7 (2011). This decision recognizes the application of the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard within removal proceedings. Here, it helped identify the type of freestanding policy challenge that Linares had not clearly presented to the BIA. The majority did not apply its merits analysis to decide whether the challenged allocation policy was arbitrary.

The dissent’s authorities on exhaustion and remand

Gill v. I.N.S., 420 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2005), and Seegobin v. Ashcroft, 112 F. App’x 195 (3d Cir. 2004). Judge Federico acknowledged these decisions as suggestive authority favoring exhaustion in the circumstances under discussion. He nevertheless considered them distinguishable and emphasized that both preceded the Supreme Court’s clarification that statutory exhaustion is nonjurisdictional. The dissent did not treat either as resolving whether a changed remedy alone required denial.

Grullon v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir. 2007). This decision appears as subsequent-history information establishing that Gill v. I.N.S. was overruled on other grounds. The dissent did not develop a separate substantive reliance on it.

Ortega-Cordova v. Garland, 107 F.4th 407, 414 (4th Cir. 2024). The dissent cited this decision as recognizing that an unexhausted issue may be remanded in exceptional circumstances. It supported Judge Federico’s proposed alternative to outright denial, not the majority’s disposition.

I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002). This decision supports the ordinary administrative-law principle that agencies should decide matters assigned primarily to them. The dissent invoked it to argue that remand would honor agency primacy without having the court resolve the policy challenge itself. The majority did not adopt that approach.

Robles-Garcia v. Barr, 944 F.3d 1280, 1283–84 (10th Cir. 2019). The dissent cited this case to illustrate the circuit’s former treatment of statutory exhaustion as jurisdictional. Its role was historical: earlier dismissal practices arose under a conception of exhaustion that Santos-Zacaria v. Garland displaced.

Shepherd v. Holder, 678 F.3d 1171, 1185 (10th Cir. 2012). Similarly, the dissent used this decision to explain the consequences of treating exhaustion as a jurisdictional limitation. Judge Federico argued that those consequences should not automatically control after exhaustion’s reclassification as a waivable claim-processing rule.

6. The Dissent: A Changed Remedy, Not a Changed Argument

Judge Federico disputed the majority’s description of Linares’s argument as having undergone a significant transformation. In his view, Linares had consistently challenged the preference for detained applicants. The intervening decision changed the relief he could realistically request, not the underlying legal theory.

The dissent’s analysis rested on three points:

  1. The agency had an opportunity to address the argument. Linares had raised the policy distinction in his BIA briefing, even though the BIA resolved the appeal on other grounds.
  2. A remedial change is not necessarily a new issue. The dissent identified no controlling authority requiring strict exhaustion solely because requested relief changes after intervening law narrows the case.
  3. Remand could serve exhaustion’s purpose. Even if the court should not reach the merits, returning the matter to the BIA would allow agency consideration without judicial policymaking.

The dissent acknowledged the breadth of Linares’s requested relief and did not propose that the court itself invalidate the policy. Its disagreement concerned whether procedural restraint required final denial or instead supported agency reconsideration.

This exposes the opinion’s central tension: exhaustion protects the agency’s first opportunity to decide an issue, but demanding highly specific preservation can prevent a remand even where the agency previously encountered the substance of the complaint.

7. Potential Impact

More explicit preservation of independent challenges

The decision signals that practitioners should distinguish between using an agency policy’s consequences to support statutory interpretation and independently challenging that policy’s legality. Where both theories are intended, both should be stated clearly before the BIA.

A general request to reject “arbitrary and capricious” treatment may not preserve every later challenge involving the same administrative practice. The requested remedy can help reveal whether the agency received notice of the particular theory.

Intervening law may expose preservation gaps

A policy objection presented as supporting an alternative statutory interpretation may prove insufficient when intervening precedent defeats that interpretation. The opinion favors preserving independent grounds expressly rather than assuming a court will treat them as implicit alternatives.

Exhaustion positions require precision

The government’s combination of a statutory disclaimer and a prudential exhaustion request did not produce a binding waiver. Parties seeking to waive, invoke, or contest exhaustion should make their positions unambiguous. Petitioners should also address exhaustion objections directly rather than leave potentially important responses unstated.

The allocation policy’s validity remains unresolved

The judgment neither approves detention-based priority nor rejects it as irrational. It also does not establish that retrospective recalculation or nunc pro tunc relief is available. Those substantive and remedial questions remain outside the holding.

The significance is persuasive and contested

Because the disposition is nonprecedential, it does not establish a binding circuit-wide rule governing every shift in requested relief. Nevertheless, its reasoning offers a concrete example of strict issue exhaustion, while the dissent supplies a developed argument for remand where intervening law changes a case’s posture.

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

Administrative exhaustion
Giving the agency the required opportunity to address a legal claim before asking a court to resolve it. Here, the dispute concerned whether the BIA had been presented with the same specific theory.
Statutory eligibility versus discretion
Eligibility means satisfying the legal prerequisites. Discretion concerns whether relief should actually be granted to an eligible applicant. A favorable discretionary assessment does not replace a missing eligibility requirement.
Aging out
Losing qualifying “child” status upon turning twenty-one. Under the controlling decision applied here, age is assessed when the IJ issues the decision.
Reserved decision
A decision whose issuance is deferred. Here, the agency’s cap-management procedures required certain non-detained cases to wait until a grant became available.
Arbitrary and capricious
A standard asking whether agency action rests on a reasoned, legally permissible basis rather than an irrational or inadequately justified distinction. The court did not apply that standard to resolve the policy’s validity.
Claim-processing rule
A procedural requirement governing litigation rather than the court’s fundamental power to hear a case. Unlike a jurisdictional limitation, it may be waived or forfeited.
Waiver and forfeiture
Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a position; forfeiture generally results from failing to raise it. The distinction mattered because circuit authority permits consideration of forfeited exhaustion in appropriate circumstances.
Sua sponte
Action taken by the court on its own initiative. The majority independently considered statutory exhaustion after finding the government’s position insufficiently clear.
Nunc pro tunc
Literally, “now for then”: giving an action effect as of an earlier date. Linares sought an adjusted historical grant date, but the court did not decide whether that relief was legally available.
Remand
Sending a matter back to the agency for further consideration. The dissent favored remand; the majority denied the petition without ordering one.

9. Conclusion

The opinion’s central lesson is that discussing an agency policy before the BIA does not necessarily exhaust a later, independent challenge to that policy. The majority viewed Linares’s request for policy modification and retrospective recalculation as materially different from his earlier statutory-interpretation argument.

The dissent viewed the underlying argument as unchanged and considered remand the appropriate response. The resulting nonprecedential decision highlights both the importance of precise administrative issue preservation and the continuing debate over how flexibly courts should enforce nonjurisdictional exhaustion requirements after intervening law reshapes a case.