Date: Jul 18, 2026

2026 VT 31 (Justin Tiedemann v. Bernard Wheeler & Catherine Wheeler): Low Noneconomic Damages Upheld Absent Clear Proof of Compromise; Premises-Liability Instructions Need Not Track Restatement § 343 Verbatim

I. Introduction

In Justin Tiedemann v. Bernard Wheeler & Catherine Wheeler, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the denial of a post-trial motion in a premises-liability negligence case arising from a slip-and-fall during a FedEx delivery. Plaintiff Justin Tiedemann (a courier) alleged he was injured when he stepped on a white board obscured by snow on the Wheelers’ property.

After trial, the jury found negligence and apportioned fault 60% to the Wheelers and 40% to plaintiff. The jury awarded substantial economic damages but only $5,000 in noneconomic damages. Plaintiff moved for additur or a new trial under V.R.C.P. 59, arguing the noneconomic award reflected an impermissible compromise and that the court erred in its premises-liability and insurance/workers’ compensation instructions. The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, with a dissent finding the verdict tainted by juror confusion and compromise.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Rule 59 / compromise verdict: The Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the jury could reasonably award only $5,000 in noneconomic damages given conflicting evidence—especially competing expert testimony about permanency and future pain.
Smedberg distinguished: The Court emphasized that Smedberg v. Detlef's Custodial Serv., Inc. involved a jury award of zero noneconomic damages despite invasive surgery and strong medical testimony of ongoing pain—unlike this case, where some noneconomic damages were awarded.
Jury instructions: Even assuming error, plaintiff failed to show harm because the jury found defendants liable. On the merits, the premises-liability instruction adequately conveyed the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 standard and need not have tracked § 343 verbatim.
Insurance/workers’ compensation: The Court upheld the instruction directing the jury not to speculate about insurance or workers’ compensation and found no reversible prejudice from an “oblique” closing reference to workers’ compensation standards.
Dissent: Chief Justice Reiber would reverse for a new trial, reasoning juror confusion about the verdict form and duty elements produced an impermissible compromise: full economic damages paired with only $5,000 for pain and suffering.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

1. Rule 59 discretion, deference to verdict, and appellate posture

Gregory v. Vt. Traveler, Inc.: The trial court applied Gregory’s directive that new-trial decisions are discretionary and evidence is viewed “in the light most favorable to the verdict.” The Supreme Court treated this framing as correct and central to affirmance.
Shahi v. Madden and Irving v. Agency of Transp.: These cases supplied the Supreme Court’s standard of review: abuse of discretion, with “all possible presumptive support” afforded to the trial court—analogous to deference owed to a jury verdict. The Court used this lens to reject plaintiff’s attempt to reweigh evidence.

2. Inadequate damages, “compromise verdicts,” and when courts intervene

Newkirk v. Towsley: Provided the classic Vermont threshold for setting aside verdicts—requiring a showing that the verdict was “clearly erroneous,” that the jury disregarded the “reasonable and substantial import of the evidence,” or that the result stemmed from “passion, prejudice, or some misconception.”
Fournier v. Loiselle's Est.: Anchored the compromise-verdict inquiry. The Court emphasized Fournier’s “threshold determination”: whether the jury could reasonably calculate the damages on the evidence. Only if the award is so small that it “plainly indicates” prejudice or misguidance should courts interfere.
Smedberg v. Detlef's Custodial Serv., Inc.: The key comparator. The Court treated Smedberg as a narrow but powerful example: where liability and substantial medical damages (including invasive surgery) are found, an award of zero noneconomic damages may be irrational and reflect disregard of uncontroverted pain evidence. Here, however, the jury awarded $5,000, and future harm was contested—so Smedberg did not compel relief.
Brooks v. Brattleboro Mem'l Hosp.: Cited as consistent outside authority for the proposition that “zero” pain-and-suffering awards can be “irreconcilably inconsistent” with liability and medical-expense findings in certain circumstances. The Court used Brooks to reinforce why Smedberg is persuasive in the “zero noneconomic” context, while still distinguishing this case.
Quesnel v. Raleigh: Supported the principle that pain, suffering, and impairment damages are “entrusted to the discretionary judgment of the jury,” and a below-demand verdict may reflect rational acceptance of some items and rejection of others—i.e., not necessarily compromise.
Kerr v. Rollins (dissent): The dissent invoked Kerr for the idea that “symptoms of compromise and misunderstanding” coupled with inadequate compensation can justify reversal even if the trial court refused to set aside the verdict. The majority did not adopt this application and instead adhered to the Fournier/Newkirk framework and deference to the jury and trial court.

3. Credibility, factfinding, and the limits of appellate second-guessing

State v. Hinchliffe and B & F Land Dev., LLC v. Steinfeld: The Court used these decisions to stress that credibility and evidentiary weight are for the jury. This mattered because plaintiff’s noneconomic proof relied heavily on his own testimony and that of close friends—evidence the jury was free to discount.

4. Jury instructions: “charge as a whole,” preservation, and presumed compliance

Barber v. LaFromboise: Supplied the controlling instruction-review principle: evaluate the “charge as a whole,” not isolated phrases, and ensure the “spirit of the law” is imparted without misleading the jury. This directly answered plaintiff’s insistence that the Restatement’s exact wording must appear in multiple places.
State v. Webster: Reinforced the presumption that jurors follow the court’s instructions—used to rebut plaintiff’s claim the jury “ignored” the damages instruction and to treat the unanimity re-instruction as adequate.
Bull v. Pinkham Eng'g Assocs., In re S.B.L., and V.R.A.P. 28(a)(4): These authorities framed preservation and appellate burden. The Court declined to address some claims (e.g., that the detailed duty instruction was confusing) because plaintiff did not show a timely objection or adequate appellate development.
Meyncke v. Meyncke: Used to reject arguments that amounted to disagreement with the trial court rather than a demonstrated abuse of discretion.

5. Insurance and workers’ compensation references (collateral-source concerns)

Hardy v. Berisha: Reaffirmed the general rule that “deliberate injection of insurance” to influence the jury is normally reversible error and that the rule applies to the presence or absence of insurance. This supported excluding workers’ compensation benefit information.
Joslin v. Griffith: Provided the standard for handling oblique insurance references—no mistrial/new trial if the reference is “oblique or obscure” and the prejudicial effect is minimal. The Court applied this to defense counsel’s “ill-advised” closing remark.

6. Premises liability and Restatement § 343 references

Barton v. Wharf Lane Hous. LP: Cited for the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 articulation (in an unpublished memorandum), supporting plaintiff’s claim about the standard’s content—yet the Court held the trial instruction already captured that substance.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why the $5,000 noneconomic award survived Rule 59 scrutiny

The Court’s reasoning is best understood as a two-step analysis drawn from Fournier v. Loiselle's Est. and Newkirk v. Towsley:

Could the jury reasonably calculate the award on the evidence? The Court held yes, because (a) plaintiff received some noneconomic damages (unlike Smedberg), and (b) the record contained a genuine evidentiary dispute on ongoing consequences: defendants’ orthopedic expert expected complete recovery and saw no ongoing issues; plaintiff’s physiatrist predicted permanent range-of-motion limits and likely arthritis. The jury could rationally land on limited noneconomic damages.
Is the award so small it plainly indicates prejudice/misguidance/compromise? The Court held no, emphasizing the jury’s role in deciding what to credit—especially where noneconomic evidence came from plaintiff and friends with intermittent observation of his condition.

2. Distinguishing “zero noneconomic damages” cases

The Court treated Smedberg v. Detlef's Custodial Serv., Inc. (and supportive authority such as Brooks v. Brattleboro Mem'l Hosp.) as addressing a particular pathology: where a jury finds liability and awards substantial medical expenses (including invasive surgery) but awards nothing for pain and suffering despite strong evidence of pain, the verdict may be logically inconsistent. Here, by contrast, the jury acknowledged pain with a $5,000 award; the dispute was degree and duration.

3. Instruction error: the Court’s “no harm, no reversal” emphasis

On the liability instruction challenge, the Court first held that plaintiff failed to show prejudice because the jury found defendants negligent. Even if the instruction’s phrasing were imperfect, plaintiff obtained the liability determination he sought. The Court rejected the notion that the wording of the duty elements plausibly tainted the noneconomic damages award, particularly where plaintiff did not challenge the damages instruction.

4. Restatement language: substance over verbatim recitation

Applying Barber v. LaFromboise, the Court concluded the instructions, read as a whole, adequately conveyed that a landowner must exercise reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions—capturing the thrust of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 even though the earlier summary element used “knew or should have known.” The Court held a verbatim, duplicated § 343 quotation was not required.

5. Responding to juror questions and alleged compromise indicators

Plaintiff argued various deliberation events signaled discord (requests to “see” testimony, childcare call, questions about instructions/unanimity). The Court treated these as speculative and insufficient—particularly given (a) the presumption under State v. Webster that jurors follow the court’s instructions and (b) the lack of concrete evidence that the verdict was the product of impermissible bargaining rather than ordinary deliberation.

6. Insurance/workers’ compensation: keeping collateral benefits away from the jury

The Court endorsed a conservative approach consistent with Hardy v. Berisha: do not invite the jury to consider insurance or workers’ compensation, and do not “correct” possible speculation by telling the jury the plaintiff must repay benefits. It also held that the closing remark about workers’ compensation standards, while “ill-advised,” was too oblique to warrant a new trial under Joslin v. Griffith.

C. Impact

Clarifies the limits of Smedberg: This decision solidifies that Smedberg v. Detlef's Custodial Serv., Inc. is most potent in “economic-but-zero-noneconomic” scenarios. Where the jury awards some noneconomic damages and the evidence on severity/duration is disputed, Vermont appellate courts will be reluctant to infer compromise.
Reinforces deference under Rule 59: The opinion underscores how difficult it is to overturn a trial court’s denial of additur/new trial on damages given the combined deference to jury factfinding and trial-court discretion.
Instruction challenges must show prejudice: The Court’s harm-based rationale signals that even arguably imperfect liability instructions may not support post-trial relief when the plaintiff prevails on liability and cannot concretely tie the alleged error to a damages misinstruction.
Substance-over-form in premises instructions: Trial courts may paraphrase Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 so long as the “charge as a whole” accurately conveys the duty, reducing incentives for hyper-technical wording disputes.
Collateral-source discipline: By rejecting plaintiff’s request to mention workers’ compensation repayment obligations, the Court’s approach discourages litigants from attempting to “neutralize” speculation with collateral-source details that risk introducing insurance considerations to the jury.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Additur (V.R.C.P. 59(a)): A procedure allowing a judge to condition denial of a new trial on the defendant’s acceptance of an increased damages amount the court deems reasonable. Vermont’s rule prohibits granting a new trial “solely” for inadequate damages until the defendant has had that opportunity.
Compromise verdict: As defined in Fournier v. Loiselle's Est., it occurs when jurors trade positions—e.g., agreeing to liability in exchange for reduced damages (or vice versa). Courts look for signs that damages could not reasonably be calculated from the evidence and instead reflect bargaining or confusion.
Noneconomic damages: Compensation for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, emotional distress, and similar non-monetary harms—often dependent on credibility and difficult-to-quantify proof.
Premises liability / invitee duty (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343): A land possessor may be liable to invitees for dangerous conditions if the possessor knows or should discover the condition, should realize it poses an unreasonable risk, should expect invitees may not protect themselves, and fails to use reasonable care to protect or warn.
“Charge as a whole” review: Under Barber v. LaFromboise, appellate review of instructions considers the entire instruction package, not isolated sentences. The question is whether the jury was misled about the law.
Collateral source / insurance references: Under Hardy v. Berisha, injecting insurance into a case risks distorting damages. Even “fixing” potential juror speculation by mentioning workers’ compensation can improperly introduce insurance considerations.

V. Conclusion

2026 VT 31 reaffirms Vermont’s strong deference to jury damages determinations and trial-court discretion under V.R.C.P. 59. It confines the force of Smedberg v. Detlef's Custodial Serv., Inc. largely to situations where juries award no noneconomic damages despite substantial, essentially uncontroverted pain evidence. Where, as here, the jury awards some noneconomic damages and the evidence is meaningfully disputed, the Court will not readily infer an impermissible compromise. The decision also confirms that premises-liability instructions need not quote Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 verbatim so long as, viewed as a whole, they accurately convey the duty—and it maintains a cautious stance against injecting workers’ compensation/insurance considerations into jury deliberations.