18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) Is Jurisdictional: Post-Expiration Revocation Fails When Delay Is Justified by an Unlawful Extension of Supervision

1. Introduction

United States v. Gulley (10th Cir. Mar. 10, 2025) addresses a recurring supervised-release problem: what authority a district court retains to revoke supervised release after the supervised-release term has expired. The case arose after Tegan C. Gulley’s three-year supervised-release term (the statutory maximum for his underlying offense) expired, but revocation proceedings continued and ultimately resulted in a 15-month custodial sentence.

The key issues were:

  • Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i)—which allows revocation proceedings to extend beyond supervision expiration under specified conditions—is jurisdictional (a question of first impression in the Tenth Circuit).
  • Whether the six-month delay between Gulley’s initial revocation hearing and the continued revocation hearing was “reasonably necessary” under § 3583(i), where the district court also ordered him to remain on supervised release during that delay, despite his having already served the statutory-maximum term.

The parties were the United States (Appellee) and Tegan C. Gulley (Appellant).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit (Rossman, J.) held that § 3583(i) is jurisdictional because it speaks in terms of the court’s “power” and sets conditions for extending that power past the expiration of supervised release. Although a summons issued before Gulley’s supervised-release term expired (satisfying one statutory prerequisite), the court concluded that the additional six-month delay was not “reasonably necessary” because it was implemented through an unlawful extension of Gulley’s already-expired supervised release, contrary to § 3583(e)(2).

Because the “reasonably necessary” condition was not satisfied, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke and sentence. The Tenth Circuit therefore vacated the revocation judgment and remanded with instructions to release Gulley from custody.

3. Analysis

3.1. The New Rule / Precedent

United States v. Gulley establishes two central propositions for the Tenth Circuit:

  1. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) is a jurisdictional statute governing the district court’s power to revoke supervised release after its expiration.
  2. A post-expiration revocation cannot proceed when the period of delay is not “reasonably necessary,” and a delay justified or implemented through an unlawful extension of supervision (in violation of § 3583(e)(2)) is not “reasonably necessary” as a matter of law. Consent, waiver, and invited-error principles cannot supply jurisdiction.

3.2. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. Framing “jurisdiction” and Congress’s control over it

  • United States v. Morton and Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't were used to define subject-matter jurisdiction as the court’s “statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case,” anchoring the analysis in first principles.
  • Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. and Kontrick v. Ryan supported the premise that federal courts possess only the power Congress grants—and only Congress determines lower federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction.

B. The Tenth Circuit’s jurisdictional methodology

  • Case v. Hatch (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.) and relying on Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki supplied the court’s test: a statute is jurisdictional when it “speak[s] to the power of the court” and “governs a court’s adjudicatory capacity.” The panel treated § 3583(i)’s “power of the court” language as dispositive evidence of jurisdictional character.
  • United States v. Spaulding (quoting Barnes v. United States) reinforced the instruction that statutes speaking clearly to adjudicatory power must be treated as jurisdictional.
  • United States v. Bailey supplied the standard of review for jurisdictional challenges (de novo).

C. Cross-circuit authority treating § 3583(i) as jurisdictional

The panel emphasized it was “not alone” by citing decisions that characterize § 3583(i) in jurisdictional terms:

  • United States v. Merlino (3d Cir.) (explicitly holding “§ 3583(i) is a jurisdictional statute”).
  • United States v. Janvier (2d Cir.) (statute identifies conditions for extending the court’s power).
  • United States v. Garrett (9th Cir.) (referring to § 3583(i) as extending “jurisdiction” only for time “reasonably necessary”).
  • United States v. Hernández-Ferrer (1st Cir.), United States v. Block (7th Cir.), United States v. Thompson (4th Cir.), and United States v. Talley (11th Cir.) were cited as consistent with the basic proposition that post-expiration revocation power is constrained by § 3583(i)’s conditions.
  • United States v. Broemmel (10th Cir. unpublished) was cited for persuasive value as having previously suggested § 3583(i)’s jurisdictional nature.

D. What counts as “reasonably necessary” delay

  • United States v. Morales-Isabarras provided the decision’s operational test: a “practical approach” guided by “reasonableness with respect to the legitimate interests of the defendant and the government,” and recognizing that some delay may be reasonable even if not “technically necessary.”
  • United States v. Ramos (2d Cir.) supplied the “legitimate interests” formulation quoted in Morales-Isabarras and adopted by the panel.
  • United States v. Madden and United States v. Morales-Isabarras / United States v. Ramos were cited to support that waiting for resolution of related state charges can be “reasonably necessary.” That line of authority helped the court distinguish two delay periods: (i) the unchallenged one-month delay to the initial revocation hearing, and (ii) the challenged six-month continuance.

E. Nonwaivability of subject-matter jurisdiction; limits of invited error

  • United States v. Green provided the core principle that litigants cannot waive arguments that the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
  • New Mexico v. Trujillo (quoting Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)) and United States v. Burch were cited for the rule that parties cannot confer subject-matter jurisdiction by consent, waiver, estoppel, or stipulation.
  • The government’s reliance on invited error (citing United States v. McBride and United States v. Deberry) failed because, in the panel’s view, Gulley invited only a continuance—not an unlawful extension of supervised release—and, in any event, jurisdictional defects are not curable by invitation.

3.3. Legal Reasoning

A. Jurisdictional holding: why § 3583(i) limits adjudicatory power

The opinion relies heavily on text. Section 3583(i) begins: “The power of the court … extends beyond the expiration…” For the panel, that phrasing places § 3583(i) squarely on the jurisdictional side of the modern line between jurisdictional limits and nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules.

The panel treated § 3583(i) as imposing two jurisdictional predicates for post-expiration revocation: (1) issuance of a warrant or summons before expiration; and (2) a post-expiration delay that is “reasonably necessary” to adjudicate matters arising before expiration.

B. Applying “reasonably necessary”: separating permissible delay from impermissible delay

The court accepted that the delay from October 23, 2023 (expiration) to November 30, 2023 (initial revocation hearing) was reasonable, principally because related state charges were pending and relevant to alleged violations—an established justification recognized in United States v. Morales-Isabarras, United States v. Madden, and United States v. Ramos.

The case turned on the subsequent six-month delay—from November 30, 2023 to May 30, 2024—requested by the defense as an opportunity for Gulley to demonstrate improvement. The district court granted the continuance but also ordered Gulley to remain on “existing conditions of supervision,” and later entered a written “Order Continuing Supervised Release” for six months.

C. The illegality that made the delay unreasonable

The panel concluded the district court did not merely continue the hearing; it extended the term of supervised release. That extension violated 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), which permits extension only “if less than the maximum authorized term was previously imposed.” Gulley had already served the statutory maximum three-year term.

From that premise, the panel announced the key bridge in its logic: an unlawful act (here, extending a statutory-maximum term) cannot qualify as “reasonable,” and therefore cannot be “reasonably necessary” under § 3583(i). That meant § 3583(i)’s second condition for post-expiration revocation power was unmet, and the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke on May 30, 2024.

D. Why defendant request/consent did not save jurisdiction

The panel rejected the government’s attempt to characterize Gulley’s actions as invited error or consent sufficient to deem the delay “reasonably necessary.” It drew a doctrinal line: jurisdictional conditions are nonwaivable, and parties cannot create jurisdiction by agreement. The panel also distinguished between requesting a continuance and requesting an unlawful extension of supervision.

3.4. Impact

  • Operational constraint on district courts: When supervised release has expired, a district court must treat § 3583(i) as a jurisdictional boundary. If revocation will occur post-expiration, the court must ensure both prerequisites are satisfied—especially that the delay is “reasonably necessary.”
  • No “probationary grace period” via supervision extension at the statutory maximum: The decision strongly discourages a common pragmatic impulse: continuing “supervision conditions” as leverage during a continuance after expiration when the original term was already the statutory maximum. If a court wants to continue the hearing for mitigation-related reasons, it must avoid doing so through an unlawful extension of supervision.
  • Jurisdictional consequences are severe: A failure of § 3583(i) eliminates power to revoke (at least as to post-expiration adjudication), leading to vacatur and release—even where violations were admitted. This increases the importance of careful calendaring, precise orders, and correct statutory authority in revocation practice.
  • Strategic litigation effects: The holding incentivizes defendants (and courts) to separate (i) a continuance of adjudication from (ii) any attempted continuation of supervision conditions, and it strengthens appellate jurisdictional challenges where orders blur that boundary.
  • Doctrinal tension signaled by the dissent: Judge Carson’s dissent argues the “reasonably necessary” requirement should not be jurisdictional and would allow waiver/invited error. The majority’s contrary holding creates a sharper divide between jurisdictional and discretionary elements of § 3583(i) and may invite further review or en banc attention in future cases.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Supervised release: A period of court-ordered monitoring after prison. Violations can lead to revocation and imprisonment.
  • Revocation: The court’s decision that a defendant violated supervision conditions, allowing the court to impose custody (and sometimes new supervision).
  • Subject-matter jurisdiction: The court’s legal power to decide a category of cases. If it is missing, the judgment is void and must be vacated.
  • § 3583(i) “extended power”: A limited exception allowing revocation after supervision expires, but only if a warrant/summons issued before expiration and the delay is “reasonably necessary.”
  • Statutory maximum term and § 3583(e)(2): If the defendant already received the maximum supervised-release term allowed by statute, the court cannot extend it further under § 3583(e)(2).
  • Invited error: A doctrine usually preventing a party from complaining on appeal about an error it induced. The majority held it cannot cure a jurisdictional defect.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Gulley is a significant Tenth Circuit decision on post-expiration supervised-release revocations. It holds that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) is jurisdictional and that the statute’s “reasonably necessary” limitation is a nonwaivable constraint on judicial power. Most importantly, it establishes that a continuance implemented through an unlawful extension of a statutory-maximum supervised-release term cannot satisfy § 3583(i), requiring vacatur and release even where violations were admitted.