18 U.S.C. § 1542: “Use” Includes Submitting a Prior Passport for Renewal, and “False Documents” Includes Genuine Passports Containing Untrue Identity Information

1. Introduction

United States v. Steven Schreck addresses how broadly 18 U.S.C. § 1542 reaches when a defendant renews a passport after decades of using an assumed identity. Steven Schreck escaped from an Oregon prison in 1977 and adopted the identity of a deceased man, Hervey Eugene Sandburg. That same year he obtained a passport in Sandburg’s identity, and over successive renewals he continued to carry forward Sandburg’s birth information (date and place).

In 2021, Schreck attempted to “correct” the remaining identity inaccuracies by listing his true birth information and birth name (“Steven Schreck”) on his renewal application (Form DS-82). But as the mail-renewal process required, he submitted his prior passport (issued in 2011), which still listed Sandburg’s birth date and birthplace. He also signed the DS-82 certification stating: I have not knowingly and willfully made false statements or included false documents in support of this application.

A grand jury indicted Schreck on two § 1542 counts:

• Count One: willfully and knowingly us[ing] a passport secured by a false statement—based on submitting the 2011 passport with the 2021 renewal application.
• Count Two: willfully and knowingly mak[ing] a false statement in a passport application—based on certifying he did not include any “false documents,” despite attaching a passport containing untrue identity information.

The central legal issues were interpretive and practical:

• Does submitting a prior passport with a renewal application constitute “use” of a passport within § 1542?
• Is a government-issued passport with untrue identity data a “false document” for purposes of the DS-82 certification and § 1542?
• What mental state does “willfully and knowingly” require in these contexts?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed both convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient under a correct reading of § 1542. The court concluded:

• “Use” is broad: Schreck “used” his 2011 passport by submitting it with his 2021 renewal application to satisfy identity/citizenship requirements.
• “False documents” includes genuine documents with untrue information: Although the 2011 passport was authentically issued, it was “false” because it contained untrue statements (birth date and birthplace).
• Mens rea is general intent as to the proscribed act with knowledge of falsity: The crimes were complete because Schreck intentionally submitted the passport and intentionally signed the certification while knowing the prior passport contained false information; the government need not prove a further intent to defraud or that Schreck understood the passport’s precise evidentiary role.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Statutory interpretation and textual methodology

• United States v. Shamsid-Deen (11th Cir. 2023): Cited for de novo review of statutory interpretation. It frames the court’s posture: the sufficiency challenge depended on what § 1542 means.
• United States v. Chinchilla (11th Cir. 2021) and EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols. (11th Cir. 2016): Used to justify consulting contemporaneous dictionaries to capture “plain and ordinary meaning” at enactment.
• Moskal v. United States (1990) and Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns (2001): Reinforced the contextual nature of meaning—particularly important to deciding whether “false documents” meant only “inauthentic” or also “untrue.”
• United States v. Zuniga-Arteaga (11th Cir. 2012): Cited for the proposition that context supplies meaning where a term is ambiguous.
• Regions Bank v. Legal Outsource PA (11th Cir. 2019): Used for the canon that a word is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text—supporting the “false”/“false” parallel in “false statements” and “false documents.”

B. The meaning of “use”

• Browder v. United States (1941): The decision’s anchor precedent. The Eleventh Circuit relied on Browder for two points:
  • Scope: “Use” is not limited to foreign travel; while passports are “used chiefly in foreign travel,” “there is no limitation … to that field.”
  • Mens rea/structure: For the “use” paragraph, the offense is complete when an intentionally used passport was “dishonestly obtained”; “fraudulent use” beyond that is not an additional element.
  Browder thus rebuffed Schreck’s attempt to confine § 1542 to travel-related uses.
• Smith v. United States (1993): Quoted for the general proposition that “use” is “expansive,” supporting a broader ordinary-meaning reading.
• Dubin v. United States (2023): Schreck invoked Dubin to argue that “use” must be at the “crux” of criminality and that submitting the old passport was “ancillary.” The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Dubin as context-specific (relying on neighboring words like “in relation to” and adjacent verbs in § 1028A) and, in any event, found that the prior passport is central—not ancillary—to DS-82 renewal because it is required proof.
• Leocal v. Ashcroft (2004), Jones v. United States (2000), and Bailey v. United States (1995): Cited by Schreck to suggest “use” can require “active employment” in some statutes. The court treated them as inapposite due to different statutory language, but also observed that Schreck’s conduct involved intentional mailing/submission—i.e., “active” employment even under those decisions’ framing.
• United States v. Doe (11th Cir. 2011): Cited for the proposition that a passport can be used to establish legal presence or proof of citizenship—supporting the conclusion that submitting a passport to prove identity/citizenship is a paradigmatic “use.”

C. Sufficiency of the evidence

• United States v. Flores (11th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Grow (11th Cir. 2020): Set the “light most favorable to the government” lens and the “any reasonable construction” standard, informing the court’s willingness to credit agency testimony about the role of the prior passport in renewals.
• United States v. Williams (11th Cir. 2015): Used to characterize the appeal as statutory-interpretation-driven sufficiency review and to reject a lenity-based narrowing where a common-sense reading resolves ambiguity.

D. “Willfully and knowingly” and general intent

• United States v. O'Bryant (11th Cir. 1985): Extended Browder’s mens rea analysis to the first paragraph of § 1542. Quoted for the formulation that the crime is complete when one makes a statement one knows is untrue to procure a passport.
• United States v. Phillips (11th Cir. 1994): Cited for the general-intent understanding of “willfully,” meaning intent to engage in the prohibited conduct (voluntary, knowing, intentional action) rather than intent to violate the law.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Count One: Submitting a prior passport with DS-82 is “use” under § 1542

The court began with ordinary meaning at enactment, consulting contemporaneous dictionaries to show “use” encompasses employing something “for the accomplishment of a purpose.” Against that backdrop, Schreck’s submission of the 2011 passport served a specific purpose: it was required by the DS-82 mail renewal process and functioned as proof of citizenship/identity. The record supported that functional role through testimony (Special Agent Qurraa and fraud manager Arauz-Figueroa).

The court rejected two narrowing theories:

• Travel-only limitation (Browder): Browder did not impose a travel-only rule; it held a travel/reentry use was within the statute and emphasized there was “no limitation” to foreign travel.
• “Ancillary use” limitation (Dubin): Dubin’s “crux” analysis was tied to § 1028A’s distinctive text. Even if imported conceptually, the prior passport was not ancillary because DS-82 renewal depends on it.

Bottom line: “Use” includes employing a prior passport as documentary proof in the renewal process—i.e., submitting it to obtain a renewed passport.

B. Count One mens rea: “willfully and knowingly” requires intentional use with knowledge the passport was secured by false statements

Relying heavily on Browder v. United States, the court treated the statute as targeting the “basic wrong” of obtaining the passport by false statement; once that occurred, “any intentional use” of that passport is punishable. “Willfully and knowingly” means deliberate conduct, not carelessness or accident.

Applied here, Schreck admitted the historical false applications and intentionally mailed the 2011 passport with the 2021 renewal packet. His subjective aim—“trying to correct” mistakes—did not negate that he intentionally used a passport he knew contained (and had been obtained/renewed through) false statements.

C. Count Two: “false documents” on DS-82 includes genuine passports containing untrue statements

The court’s interpretive move was to treat “false” as ambiguous (it can mean “untrue” or “inauthentic”) and then resolve it by context within the DS-82 certification and accompanying warnings.

Three contextual features drove the holding:

• Parallel phrasing: The certification prohibits “false statements” and “false documents” using the same adjective (“false”). Because “false statements” necessarily includes “untrue” statements, the court presumed “false” retains the same sense when it modifies “documents” only a few words later.
• Built-in warning about documents: The DS-82 warning references “[f]alse statements … including affidavits or other documents submitted to support this application,” reinforcing that “false” extends to untrue statements embedded in supporting documents, not merely counterfeit paperwork.
• Functional reading of the verbs: “Made” false statements covers statements on the form itself; “included” false documents captures falsehoods embedded in attachments. Reading “false documents” as “inauthentic only” would create a gap for untrue statements in attachments—the very type of misrepresentation the warning highlights.

Therefore, the 2011 passport—though authentic—qualified as a “false document” because it contained untrue identity information. Signing the certification while submitting that passport created a “false statement” in the application within § 1542’s first paragraph.

D. Count Two mens rea: knowingly signing the certification while aware of the untrue passport content sufficed

The court applied the same “willfully and knowingly” understanding from Count One, reinforced by United States v. O'Bryant and United States v. Phillips. The evidence supported knowledge: Schreck admitted his earlier falsities and acknowledged he was trying to correct the information, which necessarily presupposed awareness that the old passport contained false data. The act was willful because he intentionally signed and submitted the packet.

3.3. Impact

A. Expansion/clarification of § 1542 “use” beyond travel

The opinion supplies a clear Eleventh Circuit rule: “use” under the second paragraph of § 1542 includes employing a passport as proof of identity/citizenship in administrative processes—specifically, submitting the prior passport with a renewal application. That is practically significant because modern “uses” of passports frequently occur domestically (employment verification, banking, licensing, and federal/state benefits) and, as the court emphasized, within the passport system itself.

B. “False documents” includes authentic government documents containing untrue statements

The court’s treatment of “false documents” is likely to matter beyond DS-82 renewals. Many government processes require submission of authentic documents; the holding rejects a defense that authenticity immunizes a document from being “false” if it contains materially untrue assertions. This aligns § 1542 enforcement with the reality that identity fraud often operates through genuine documents issued on false predicates.

C. Mens rea: corrective motives do not negate “willfully and knowingly”

A particularly consequential implication is that “trying to correct” prior falsehoods does not necessarily avoid criminal exposure if the applicant:

• intentionally “uses” the previously fraudulently obtained passport (e.g., submits it as required), and
• signs certifications that become false by virtue of including that document.

The decision thus draws a sharp line between motive (why the defendant acted) and intent (whether the defendant deliberately did the proscribed acts with knowledge of relevant facts).

D. Litigation and compliance consequences

• Prosecution strategy: The government can charge “use” based on submission of an old passport in renewal—without proving international travel or border use.
• Defense strategy constraints: “But the government issued it” is not a complete answer where the document contains known untrue identity information.
• Administrative caution: Individuals seeking to regularize identity inconsistencies may need counsel before submitting legacy documents with known inaccuracies, particularly where the process requires certifications about “false documents.”

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

5. Conclusion

United States v. Steven Schreck crystallizes two practical rules for § 1542 in the Eleventh Circuit: (1) “use” of a fraudulently obtained passport includes submitting it as required proof in a renewal application, and (2) “false documents” in the DS-82 certification encompasses authentic passports that contain untrue identity information. Anchored in Browder v. United States and reinforced by contextual-textual canons, the court also emphasizes that “willfully and knowingly” is satisfied by deliberate submission/signature with knowledge of falsity—regardless of corrective motives. The decision strengthens § 1542 as a tool not only for border/travel misuse but also for fraud embedded in administrative passport processes.