“125 Working Days” Defines a Regulatory “Year” for Black Lung Eligibility in the Eleventh Circuit

I. Introduction

Jeffrey Hayes v. Director, OWCP (11th Cir. Apr. 7, 2026) addresses a recurring but outcome-determinative question in Black Lung Benefits Act litigation: how to count “years” of coal mine employment when a miner’s work history is intermittent or split between coal-mine and non–coal-mine assignments.

The miner, Ermine Hayes, worked for Cowin & Company from 1955 to 1986, often in underground mine construction with significant coal-dust exposure. Decades later, he sought benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, asserting total disability from pneumoconiosis. His claim turned on whether he could invoke the statute’s and regulations’ 15-year presumption for totally disabling respiratory impairment after qualifying coal mine employment.

The key dispute was interpretive: whether 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(32) requires (a) only 125 working days in a calendar year to credit a “year” of coal mine employment, or (b) a two-part showing that the miner was engaged in coal mine employment for a full 365/366-day period and also worked at least 125 working days within that year. The Benefits Review Board adopted the two-step approach; the Eleventh Circuit rejected it on plain-text grounds.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded. The court held that the plain text of 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(32)(i) requires a claimant to prove only that the miner worked at least 125 working days in coal mine employment “during a calendar year or partial periods totaling one year” to receive credit for one year of coal mine employment.

The court concluded the Board erred by requiring an additional, threshold showing that the miner maintained a coal mine employment relationship for a full 365/366-day period before the 125-day rule could apply. Because that legal error reduced Hayes’s credited years (and eliminated access to the 15-year presumption), the denial of benefits could not stand.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards of review and the court’s posture toward agency decisions

  • U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Director, OWCP, 386 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2004): cited for the Eleventh Circuit’s review framework in black-lung cases—de novo review of Board decisions and “substantial evidence” review of the ALJ’s factual findings. This framing mattered because the dispute was principally legal (regulatory interpretation), not factual.
  • Black Diamond Coal Mining Co. v. Director, OWCP, 95 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 1996): cited for the proposition that the court reviews de novo the interpretation of regulations implementing the Act. This case undergirded the court’s authority to reject the Board’s construction of § 725.101(a)(32) rather than defer reflexively.
  • Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019): invoked as the modern limit on Auer-type deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation. The court used Kisor chiefly to explain why deference was inappropriate once it found the regulation unambiguous by ordinary textual meaning.

2. Black-lung eligibility elements and the presumption framework

  • Fairfield S. Co. v. Director, OWCP, 161 F.4th 791 (11th Cir. 2025): cited for a concise statement of the four elements miners must generally establish absent a presumption: pneumoconiosis, arising out of coal mine employment, contributing to total disability, and total disability itself. The citation highlights the practical importance of the 15-year presumption—without it, claimants face a more demanding proof structure.

3. Cross-circuit guidance and the Sixth Circuit’s approach

  • Shepherd v. Incoal, Inc., 915 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 2019): the Board criticized the ALJ for relying on Shepherd because the Eleventh Circuit had not yet adopted that approach. The Eleventh Circuit in this case effectively aligned with Shepherd on the core reading: § 725.101(a)(32)(i) does not require proof of a continuous 365/366-day coal mine employment relationship; 125 working days within the relevant period suffices to credit a year.

4. The “reasonable method” debate and adjudicator discretion

  • Muncy v. Elkay Mining Co., BRB No. 11-0187, 2011 WL 6140705 (Nov. 30, 2011): Cowin argued that using the “125-day approach” is discretionary because ALJs may use any reasonable method. The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Muncy: it concerned a different subsection—§ 725.101(a)(32)(iii)—that uses “may,” whereas § 725.101(a)(32)(i) states that if the 125-day condition is met, “the miner has worked one year,” leaving no similar discretion.

5. Preambles, regulatory history, and interpretive hierarchy

  • Blanco v. Samuel, 91 F.4th 1061 (11th Cir. 2024): used to articulate a priority rule: regulatory preambles can illuminate contemporaneous understanding, but they cannot override the text “formally used” in the regulation. This allowed the court to consider (and ultimately discount) Federal Register language urged by the Director when it did not clearly align with the enacted text.

6. Avoidance canons and when they apply

  • Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005): cited for the proposition that avoidance doctrines apply only after ordinary textual analysis reveals multiple plausible constructions. Because the court found § 725.101(a)(32)(i) unambiguous, it refused Cowin’s invitation to adopt an alternative reading to avoid an asserted Administrative Procedure Act conflict.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The interpretive target: “Year” under 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(32)

The opinion treats § 725.101(a)(32) as the operative definition of “year” for purposes of measuring coal mine employment to reach the 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) / 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 fifteen-year presumption. The court focused on the internal structure of § 725.101(a)(32), particularly subparts (i) and (ii).

2. The holding anchored in § 725.101(a)(32)(i)’s plain text

The dispositive sentence in subsection (i) provides that if evidence establishes the miner worked “at least 125 working days during a calendar year or partial periods totaling one year,” then “the miner has worked one year in coal mine employment for all purposes under the Act.”

The Director’s approach effectively inserted an extra prerequisite: that the miner must first prove a 365/366-day coal-mine employment relationship and only then ask whether 125 working days occurred within it. The court rejected that insertion as inconsistent with the words actually used—particularly the regulation’s use of “worked … at least 125 working days during a calendar year,” which naturally reads as a sufficiency rule for crediting a “year.”

3. How subsection (ii) confirms (rather than narrows) subsection (i)

Subsection (ii) creates a rebuttable presumption: if evidence shows the miner’s employment “lasted for a calendar year or partial periods totaling a 365-day period,” it is presumed the miner spent at least 125 working days in such employment (absent contrary evidence). The court reasoned this presumption has a coherent role only if subsection (i) does not already require proof of both (a) a full-year employment duration and (b) 125 working days. Otherwise, subsection (ii)’s presumption would be largely redundant.

4. The court’s response to “surplusage” arguments

The opinion addresses the claim that Hayes’s reading would make “during a calendar year” surplusage. It explains that the phrase still performs limiting work: for example, working 125 days spread across one and a half years does not automatically equate to a credited “year” under subsection (i). In other words, the regulation still ties the 125-day threshold to the time-bounding concept of a calendar year (or partial periods totaling one year), rather than permitting free aggregation across open-ended spans.

5. Rejection of deference under Kisor

After concluding subsection (i) is unambiguous by “ordinary, everyday meaning,” the court declined to defer to the Director’s contrary construction under Kisor v. Wilkie. This is significant: the court did not merely prefer its reading; it held that the ambiguity prerequisite for deference was absent.

6. Regulatory preamble and history: considered but not controlling

The Director sought support in the Federal Register preamble (65 Fed. Reg. 79960), emphasizing language suggesting partial periods must be aggregated to a 365-day period before counting 125 working days. The court, citing Blanco v. Samuel, prioritized regulatory text over preamble and also noted the preamble’s mixed signals: other language in the same discussion supported Hayes’s interpretation.

The court also discounted reliance on “predecessor regulations,” because they materially differed and thus could not dictate the meaning of the 2000-adopted definition.

7. Avoidance and the APA argument

Cowin contended Hayes’s interpretation could imply the Secretary violated the Administrative Procedure Act, but did not seek invalidation of the regulation—only a narrowing construction. The court applied Clark v. Martinez to hold that avoidance cannot rewrite an unambiguous text; because the regulation had a clear meaning, the court would not adopt an alternate reading to “avoid” a potential conflict.

C. Impact

1. A binding Eleventh Circuit rule for crediting employment years

The decision establishes a clear interpretive rule in the Eleventh Circuit: for § 725.101(a)(32)(i), 125 qualifying working days in a calendar year (or partial periods totaling one year) is sufficient to credit one “year” of coal mine employment. Adjudicators may not impose an extra prerequisite that the claimant prove a continuous 365/366-day coal mine employment relationship for that same year.

2. Easier access to the 15-year presumption in intermittent-work cases

Practically, this strengthens claimants’ ability—especially construction and contract workers with rotating assignments—to reach the 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) / 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 threshold. Because the presumption often determines the case’s trajectory (shifting the burden to the employer to rebut), the definition of “year” is frequently dispositive.

3. Constraining Board remands and ALJ methodologies

The Board’s two-step instruction (first prove a full calendar-year coal mine employment period, then count 125 days within it) is now inconsistent with circuit law. On remand and in future cases, ALJs in the Eleventh Circuit must treat § 725.101(a)(32)(i) as mandatory when its factual predicate (125 working days in the relevant bounded year) is established.

4. Limiting the practical reach of agency interpretive positions

The opinion reinforces that where regulatory text is clear, litigating positions by the Director—even if grounded in preamble language—will not receive deference. This may shape how OWCP frames arguments in future definitional disputes, pushing the agency to rely more heavily on text-based arguments or formal rulemaking if a different policy outcome is desired.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rebuttable presumption (30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4); 20 C.F.R. § 718.305): If a miner has (1) at least 15 years of qualifying coal mine employment and (2) a totally disabling respiratory impairment, the law presumes the disability is due to pneumoconiosis. The employer can still “rebut” (defeat) the presumption with sufficient evidence.
  • “Year” under 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(32): A regulatory counting rule for employment duration. Under this decision, a “year” can be established by showing 125 paid working days as a miner within the relevant calendar-year framework; a claimant need not separately prove uninterrupted year-long employment.
  • “Working day”: Any day or part of a day the miner received pay for work as a miner, excluding paid approved absences (vacation/sick leave), though such absences may count toward the calendar-year period in certain determinations.
  • Substantial evidence: A deferential standard for factual findings—whether a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate. Here, the decisive issue was legal interpretation, reviewed de novo.
  • Kisor deference: Courts may defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own genuinely ambiguous regulation, but only after exhausting traditional tools of construction. No deference applies when text is clear.
  • Preamble vs. regulation text: A Federal Register preamble may explain intent, but it cannot override the binding words codified in the regulation.
  • Avoidance doctrines: Tools to choose among multiple plausible meanings to avoid constitutional or statutory conflicts. They do not permit courts to create ambiguity where none exists.

V. Conclusion

Jeffrey Hayes v. Director, OWCP sets a bright-line interpretive rule in the Eleventh Circuit: under 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(32)(i), proving at least 125 working days of coal mine employment within the regulation’s calendar-year framework is enough to credit a “year” of coal mine employment, without an added requirement of a continuous 365/366-day coal mine employment relationship. The decision curbs the Benefits Review Board’s two-step approach, limits reliance on preamble language to contradict clear regulatory text, and meaningfully affects access to the Black Lung Act’s 15-year presumption for miners with intermittent or mixed-duty work histories.