Separate-but-Related Proceedings and Expert Fees under § 1988 in § 1983 Takings Litigation: A Commentary on HRT Enterprises v. City of Detroit

I. Introduction

HRT Enterprises v. City of Detroit, decided by the Sixth Circuit on December 22, 2025, addresses two important and recurring issues in civil rights fee-shifting under 42 U.S.C. § 1988:

  1. When, if ever, may a prevailing § 1983 plaintiff recover attorney’s fees for work performed in other forums—specifically state-court litigation and municipal bankruptcy proceedings—related to the federal claim?
  2. Are expert witness fees recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in a § 1983 action, beyond the narrow default limits of the federal costs statute?

The case arises out of a long-running dispute between HRT Enterprises (“HRT”), a property owner, and the City of Detroit over an alleged uncompensated taking of property, litigated first in state court, then in federal court, and later intersecting with the City’s municipal bankruptcy. After HRT finally prevailed on its federal Takings Clause claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the parties litigated the scope of HRT’s entitlement to attorney’s fees and expenses.

The district court granted HRT a significant fee award but categorically refused to consider hours incurred in the prior state takings case and in the City’s bankruptcy, and it also awarded expert witness fees under § 1988(c). Both sides appealed. The Sixth Circuit vacated the fee order and remanded, holding that:

  • The district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that it had no discretion to award § 1988 fees for time spent in HRT’s state-court takings proceedings and in the City’s bankruptcy.
  • The district court erred in awarding expert witness fees under § 1988(c) because that subsection authorizes expert fee shifting only in actions to enforce 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 or 1981a, not § 1983.

The opinion clarifies how Supreme Court precedents on related proceedings such as Webb, New York Gaslight Club, and Delaware Valley apply in the § 1983 context, particularly to pre‑Knick takings claims that were forced through state courts by the now-overruled Williamson County ripeness regime, and it reinforces a narrow reading of § 1988(c) on expert fees.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Litigation Background

The opinion sketches an unusually complex procedural history:

  • Initial state action (2005). HRT first sued Detroit in state court for a taking. A jury found in favor of the City in 2005.
  • First federal action (2008). HRT then filed a federal § 1983 action alleging a post‑2005 taking. The district court dismissed it without prejudice, applying Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, which required a property owner to first seek just compensation in state court before bringing a federal takings claim.
  • State-court takings proceedings (2009–2012). Pursuant to this requirement, HRT returned to state court in 2009. The state trial court dismissed on claim preclusion (res judicata), and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed in 2012.
  • Second federal § 1983 action (2012). Having now been denied just compensation in state court, HRT refiled in federal court in August 2012. The case was stayed in 2013 when Detroit filed for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy.
  • City’s bankruptcy (2013–2014). HRT filed a $7 million proof of claim and, jointly with other creditors, objected to the City’s proposed plan, which treated them as general unsecured creditors. HRT argued that the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause requires just (full) compensation and that the City could not discharge its constitutional obligation through bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court excepted HRT’s takings claim from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 944(c)(1), allowing HRT to pursue full compensation back in district court.
  • Federal trial and judgment (2015–2023). The district court reopened the case in 2015. After two jury trials, the court entered judgment for HRT on the federal takings claim in September 2023, which the Sixth Circuit later affirmed in a separate appeal.

B. Attorney’s Fee Proceedings in the District Court

As the prevailing § 1983 plaintiff, HRT sought $1,796,626.87 in attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, covering work from 2009 through the verdict. It submitted billing records from several attorneys. The district court found those records problematic:

  • Lead counsel’s entries were organized into four broad categories (the instant case/bankruptcy, the 2009 state case, the state appeal, and an unrelated sewer dispute) but:
    • The federal case and bankruptcy entries were commingled with an ongoing sewer dispute and “blight ticket” matters.
    • The 2009 state-court lawsuit entries were commingled with blight ticket matters.
  • Co-counsel’s descriptions were extremely vague (e.g., “Research, calls,” “Work on file”).

The City opposed the fee request, contending that the poor records made the request unsupportable and that a much lower fee—on the order of $300,000 to $500,000—would be appropriate. It also argued that expert witness fees are not recoverable under § 1988 in this case.

After conferral between the parties (which yielded modest voluntary reductions and a City proposal of $600,000 total), the district court:

  • Expressed “grave doubts” about the “extremely large” fee request and the “poor descriptions” and commingled billing entries;
  • Concluded that, as a matter of law, work performed in proceedings “separate from the litigation before the district court” could not be compensated under § 1988, which led it to treat hours spent in the state takings proceedings and the bankruptcy as categorically non-compensable;
  • Applied a 33% across-the-board reduction to the pre-verdict hours (from 3,169 to 2,091) to account for the “pervasive corruption” of the records;
  • Added the undisputed post-verdict hours to reach a total of 2,259.6 hours;
  • Used a blended “overall market average” hourly rate of $300 for all attorneys (rather than differentiating by lawyer), because the commingled records made it impossible to reliably identify who did what;
  • Calculated a lodestar of $677,880 (2,259.6 hours at $300/hour), which it found reasonable without further adjustment;
  • Added $40,906.25 in expert witness fees, based on its reading of 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c);
  • Included some additional expenses, yielding a total award of $720,486.25.

Both parties appealed: the City sought a reduction; HRT sought a higher award and argued that the district court should have included fees for the state-court takings proceedings and the bankruptcy.

C. The Sixth Circuit’s Holding

The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded the fee award, holding that:

  1. Separate-but-related proceedings may be compensable. The district court erred in concluding that it had no legal authority to award § 1988 fees for work performed in the earlier state-court takings litigation and in the City’s bankruptcy. Under Supreme Court precedent (Webb, New York Gaslight Club, and Delaware Valley), a district court may award fees for work done in related proceedings when that work was “both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance the civil rights litigation,” or “crucial to the vindication” of the plaintiff’s rights. That standard was satisfied, at least as a matter of law, with respect to the Williamson County–mandated state takings case and the bankruptcy litigation that preserved HRT’s right to full compensation.
  2. Expert witness fees are not recoverable in § 1983 actions under § 1988(c). Section 1988(c) expressly permits expert fee shifting only in actions to enforce 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 or 1981a. By negative implication (and in light of Casey and Crawford Fitting), expert fees in § 1983 cases are not recoverable under § 1988 beyond the limited amounts allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b). The district court therefore abused its discretion by awarding $40,906.25 in expert fees in this § 1983 takings case.

Because these errors infected the entire fee analysis, the court declined to reach the parties’ remaining arguments about the precise number of hours and the reasonableness of the hourly rate. Instead, it vacated the order and remanded for a full recalculation of the fee award consistent with its legal rulings.

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Lodestar and Documentation: Hensley and Freed

The opinion reiterates the familiar “lodestar” framework derived from Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983):

  • Courts calculate a presumptively reasonable attorney’s fee by multiplying:
    • the reasonable number of hours expended, by
    • a reasonable hourly rate.
  • The fee applicant bears the burden of submitting adequate documentation; when records are inadequate, the district court may reduce the award “accordingly.”

The panel also cites Freed v. Thomas, 137 F.4th 552 (6th Cir. 2025), for the standard of review (abuse of discretion) and for the proposition that the lodestar is presumed reasonable.

B. Separate vs. Related Proceedings: Webb, Carey, Delaware Valley, Binta B., and Sullivan

1. Webb v. Board of Education

In Webb v. Board of Education of Dyer County, 471 U.S. 234 (1985), the Supreme Court considered whether § 1988 allows fees for work performed in related state administrative proceedings. It held that:

  • Attorney’s fees under § 1988 are generally limited to work in the “action or proceeding to enforce” the civil rights statute;
  • But fees may be awarded for work in another forum when it is “both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance the civil rights litigation.”

Webb cited New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980), as an example of when such fees are proper: in Carey, a Title VII plaintiff was required by statute to pursue state administrative remedies before going to federal court, and the Court allowed fees for that state work.

The Sixth Circuit applies Webb and Carey directly here: HRT’s return to state court after the 2008 federal filing was not a strategic detour; it was mandated by the Supreme Court’s then-governing ripeness doctrine in Williamson County.

2. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey

Carey involved Title VII’s requirement that certain claims be presented first to state or local agencies. The Court held that Title VII’s fee-shifting provision allowed recovery for work in those pre-suit administrative proceedings because they were a required predicate to federal litigation.

Although Carey interpreted a different fee statute (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)), the Supreme Court in Webb and Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986), has treated § 2000e-5(k) and § 1988 as functionally analogous for fee purposes, given their similar language and policy goals. The Sixth Circuit follows this equivalence, as the opinion notes explicitly.

3. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council

In Delaware Valley, the Supreme Court approved an award of fees for time spent in “separate” but related proceedings under the Clean Air Act when that work was “crucial to the vindication of [the prevailing party’s] rights.”

The Sixth Circuit invokes Delaware Valley to justify potential fee recovery for HRT’s work in the City’s bankruptcy:

  • Detroit’s plan of adjustment would have treated HRT as a general unsecured creditor, paying only a fraction of its takings claim and discharging the remainder.
  • HRT’s objection, grounded in the Fifth Amendment, resulted in the bankruptcy court’s decision to except HRT’s takings claim from discharge, allowing pursuit of full compensation in federal district court.
  • Without that objection, HRT’s constitutional right to full just compensation would effectively have been extinguished.

On those facts, the panel holds that the bankruptcy work was “crucial to the vindication” of HRT’s Takings Clause rights within the meaning of Delaware Valley.

4. Binta B. ex rel. S.A. v. Gordon

The City relied on the Sixth Circuit’s earlier decision in Binta B. ex rel. S.A. v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2013), which held that attorney’s fees are generally not recoverable for work done in a “completely separate case.”

The Sixth Circuit distinguishes Binta B. by emphasizing that:

  • Binta B. reaffirmed the general rule that work on separate litigation is not compensable;
  • But Binta B. simultaneously acknowledged the Webb / Delaware Valley exception for separate-but-related proceedings that are necessary or crucial to the federal civil-rights effort;
  • The district court here effectively ignored that exception by embracing a categorical ban on fees for any “separate proceeding,” which is inconsistent with Webb, Delaware Valley, and Binta B. itself.

5. Sullivan v. Hudson

The panel also cites Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 (1989), a case interpreting the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), not § 1988. In Sullivan, the Court held that proceedings “intimately tied to the resolution of the judicial action and necessary to the attainment of the results Congress sought to promote” could be treated as part of the same “civil action” for fee purposes.

The Sixth Circuit invokes this concept to underscore that HRT’s mandated state-court takings action and its bankruptcy objection were “part and parcel” of obtaining the relief Congress contemplated when it authorized § 1983 suits and § 1988 fee awards.

C. Takings Ripeness and Bankruptcy: Williamson County, Knick, and Takings Clause Cases

Two Supreme Court takings decisions frame the background of HRT’s litigation path:

  • Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
    Under Williamson County, a property owner alleging an unconstitutional taking by a local government had to:
    1. obtain a “final decision” from the regulatory body, and
    2. seek just compensation through state procedures and be denied just compensation,

    before bringing a federal takings claim under § 1983. This “state-litigation requirement” is why the district court dismissed HRT’s 2008 federal suit and why HRT had to file the 2009 state action.

  • Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019).
    Knick later overruled the Williamson County state-litigation requirement, holding that a property owner has a ripe federal takings claim as soon as the government takes property without paying just compensation—no prior state litigation is required.

Although Knick postdated the events here, the Sixth Circuit uses it to describe the now-discredited ripeness rule that governed HRT’s case. Critically, Williamson County made HRT’s state-court takings litigation not just useful, but legally required—squarely analogous to the state administrative process in Carey and thus potentially compensable under § 1988.

The court also references:

  • Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933)., emphasizing that the Constitution guarantees a right to just (i.e., full, not partial) compensation for takings.
  • General language from Knick reaffirming that a property owner acquires an “irrevocable right” to just compensation at the moment of the taking.

These principles inform the court’s conclusion that the bankruptcy litigation was “crucial” to preserving HRT’s full constitutional entitlement and thus within the ambit of compensable related proceedings.

D. Who Can Award § 1988 Fees? Crest Street and Children’s Center

The panel invokes two cases to explain why the § 1988 fees for the state and bankruptcy proceedings had to be sought in federal district court:

  • N.C. Dep’t of Transp. v. Crest Street Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6 (1986).
    The Supreme Court held that § 1988 fees may be awarded “only [by] a court in an action to enforce one of the civil rights laws listed in § 1988.” Thus, a stand-alone fee petition in another forum, unconnected to a substantive civil-rights action, cannot be the basis for a § 1988 award.
  • Children’s Center for Developmental Enrichment v. Machle, 612 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2010).
    The Sixth Circuit applied Crest Street, reaffirming that only the tribunal adjudicating the substantive § 1983 claim may award § 1988 fees, even if the compensable work occurred elsewhere.

That framework explains why HRT could not seek § 1988 fees from the state or bankruptcy courts themselves, and why the federal district court was the appropriate forum to consider all related work (state and bankruptcy included) when fashioning the final fee award.

E. Expert Witness Fees: Crawford Fitting, Casey, and § 1988(c)

1. Baseline Rule: Crawford Fitting

In Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987), the Supreme Court held that, absent explicit statutory authority or contract, federal courts are bound by 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) in awarding witness fees:

  • Section 1821(b) sets a fixed “attendance fee” for witnesses of $40 per day plus certain travel costs;
  • That default cap applies even to expert witnesses unless a fee-shifting statute explicitly authorizes higher expert-fee awards.

2. West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey and Congress’s Response

In West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), the Court addressed whether “attorney’s fees” under § 1988 included expert witness fees. It held that:

  • The phrase “attorney’s fees” in § 1988(b) does not include expert fees;
  • Therefore, absent another statute, expert fees in § 1988 cases remain subject to § 1821(b).

Congress responded by adding § 1988(c) as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Section 1988(c) provides:

In awarding an attorney’s fee under subsection (b) in any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section 1981 or 1981a of this title, the court, in its discretion, may include expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee.

Notably, Congress did not extend this expert-fee authorization to § 1983 or to the other civil rights statutes listed in § 1988(b).

3. The Sixth Circuit’s Statutory Interpretation

Applying this framework, the Sixth Circuit holds:

  • Section 1988(c) explicitly authorizes expert fee shifting only in actions or proceedings to enforce §§ 1981 or 1981a.
  • The omission of § 1983 is meaningful. Under the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius (“the expression of one is the exclusion of others”), by specifying §§ 1981 and 1981a but not § 1983, Congress signaled that expert fees in § 1983 cases were not to be included within “attorney’s fees.”
  • Given Casey and Crawford Fitting, courts must respect that limitation and cannot award expert witness fees in § 1983 actions under § 1988, beyond the per diem provided by § 1821(b), unless some other statute or contract provides a basis.

Because this case is a § 1983 takings action, the district court erred in relying on § 1988(c) to award $40,906.25 in expert fees.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Standard of Review and Abuse of Discretion

The Sixth Circuit reviews attorney’s fee awards for abuse of discretion, but that standard encompasses:

  • Use of an erroneous legal standard,
  • Improper application of correct legal standards, or
  • Clearly erroneous factual findings.

Here, the core problem was not primarily factual (e.g., whether a certain number of hours were reasonably expended), but legal: the district court believed it was forbidden to consider any work done in other proceedings, and it assumed that § 1988(c) authorized expert fees in a § 1983 case. These are legal errors that constitute an abuse of discretion.

B. State-Court Takings Proceedings as Compensable “Related” Work

The court’s reasoning on the state proceedings unfolds in three steps:

1. Identifying the Applicable Legal Standard

The panel starts from the general rule: § 1988 fees are ordinarily limited to work in the “action or proceeding” enforcing the covered civil rights statute, and fees for a “completely separate case” are generally not recoverable (Binta B.).

But it then emphasizes the Webb / Carey exception:

A district court has discretion to award fees under § 1988 for work performed in another proceeding that was “both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance the civil rights litigation.”

Carey is particularly instructive because it involved a statutory requirement to pursue state remedies before coming to federal court—a situation closely analogous to HRT’s.

2. Applying the Standard to HRT’s State Takings Case

At the time HRT filed its first federal takings suit, Williamson County required a property owner to seek just compensation in state court before suing in federal court. The district court therefore dismissed HRT’s 2008 case without prejudice. HRT then:

  • Filed the 2009 state-court action,
  • Litigated through a state appellate affirmance of the dismissal,
  • Returned to federal court in 2012 only after the state courts had denied relief.

In other words, HRT’s state-court takings case was not an optional collateral lawsuit; it was required by governing Supreme Court precedent as a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction over its § 1983 takings claim.

That brings the case squarely within the logic of Carey. The state proceedings were:

  • Useful — they supplied the ripeness element needed to pursue a federal takings claim under then-binding law; and
  • Of a type ordinarily necessary to advance a federal takings case at that time.

3. Conclusion: The District Court Had Discretion, but Not a Mandate

The Sixth Circuit does not hold that the district court must award all of HRT’s requested hours from the state proceedings. Rather, it holds that:

  • The district court erred in treating those proceedings as categorically outside the scope of § 1988;
  • The court instead had discretion to determine what state-court work was reasonably necessary and useful for the federal § 1983 claim, and to award fees accordingly;
  • Any such fees had to be sought in the federal action itself, not in the state courts (Crest Street, Children’s Center).

On remand, the district court must revisit its lodestar calculation with this correct legal framework, parsing which state-court hours qualify and how to account for the billing deficiencies.

C. Bankruptcy Work as “Crucial” to Vindicating Takings Rights

The reasoning for compensating bankruptcy-related work is similar.

1. The Threat Posed by the Bankruptcy Plan

Detroit’s proposed bankruptcy plan treated HRT as a general unsecured creditor. If confirmed as proposed, the plan would:

  • Pay HRT only a pro-rata fraction of its $7 million claim; and
  • Discharge the remainder of its claim, leaving no further recourse in the district court.

That outcome would have effectively deprived HRT of the full just compensation guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and reaffirmed in cases like Jacobs and Knick.

2. The Role of HRT’s Objection

HRT’s counsel, jointly representing HRT and two other creditors, objected to the plan on the ground that:

  • The Takings Clause requires full just compensation;
  • The Takings Clause “trumps” the Bankruptcy Clause and related bankruptcy statutes; and
  • The plan could not be confirmed if it allowed less than full just compensation on a takings claim.

The bankruptcy court—apparently persuaded by this constitutional argument (the opinion does not detail the reasoning)—excepted HRT’s takings claim from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 944(c)(1). This result:

  • Preserved HRT’s right to seek full compensation in district court,
  • Made the subsequent federal jury verdict meaningful rather than largely academic, and
  • Prevented the constitutional right to full compensation from being undercut by the reorganization process.

3. Applying Delaware Valley

On these facts, the Sixth Circuit concludes that HRT’s work in the bankruptcy was “crucial to the vindication” of its Fifth Amendment rights. Without the objection, HRT would have been permanently limited to the partial payment allocated under the confirmed plan.

Thus, consistent with Delaware Valley, the district court had discretion to award § 1988 fees for at least those portions of bankruptcy work that:

  • Were necessary to secure nondischargeability of HRT’s takings claim; and
  • Specifically furthered HRT’s own constitutional rights (as opposed to work performed solely on behalf of other creditors).

The panel adds an important limitation: on remand, the district court must separate work done for HRT from work done for co-creditors. Only the former, and only to the extent tied to vindicating HRT’s takings claim, may be compensable.

D. Expert Witness Fees in § 1983 Actions

The second major legal issue is more straightforward: Is there statutory authority to award expert witness fees in a § 1983 case under § 1988?

The court’s reasoning is textual and canonical:

  1. Baseline: “Attorney’s fees” do not include expert fees. Under Casey, the term “attorney’s fees” in § 1988(b) excludes expert expenditures.
  2. Default cap on expert fees. Under Crawford Fitting, expert fees are capped by § 1821(b) unless some statute explicitly says otherwise.
  3. Congress’s targeted amendment. Congress responded to Casey by adding § 1988(c), but only for actions enforcing §§ 1981 and 1981a, explicitly allowing “expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee” in those two types of cases.
  4. Expressio unius. By naming §§ 1981 and 1981a, but not § 1983, in § 1988(c), Congress indicated that the special expert-fee rule does not extend to § 1983 actions.
  5. Conclusion. In this § 1983 takings case, the district court lacked authority under § 1988(c) to award expert witness fees beyond § 1821(b), and the $40,906.25 award was therefore an abuse of discretion.

V. Impact and Significance

A. Clarifying Fee Recovery for Pre‑Knick Takings Plaintiffs

For many years, Williamson County forced takings plaintiffs into state courts before they could file § 1983 claims in federal court. That requirement was later overruled in Knick, but a large cohort of pre‑Knick cases still bear its procedural scars: plaintiffs who had to litigate (and often lose) in state forums before getting a hearing in federal court.

HRT Enterprises addresses what happens to attorney’s fees for that “forced detour” once the plaintiff finally prevails in federal court. The Sixth Circuit’s answer is:

  • Those state proceedings are not per se “separate” or non-compensable;
  • When they were legally required to ripen the § 1983 claim (as they were under Williamson County), they may be compensable under § 1988, subject to ordinary reasonableness constraints.

This is important for fairness: a plaintiff should not be penalized, in fee recovery, for having been forced into state court by a now-discredited ripeness doctrine. The decision ensures that, at least within the Sixth Circuit, such plaintiffs can seek to recover fees for necessary state-court litigation as part of their § 1988 awards.

B. Municipal Bankruptcy and Preservation of Civil Rights Claims

The decision also has implications for civil rights claims intersecting with municipal bankruptcy:

  • When a municipal debtor files bankruptcy, civil rights plaintiffs can find their claims recharacterized and reduced alongside other unsecured debts.
  • If participation in the bankruptcy case is necessary to prevent discharge or to preserve the full scope of federal rights, that participation can involve substantial attorney time.
  • HRT Enterprises holds that such work can, in appropriate circumstances, be compensable as “crucial” related litigation under Delaware Valley.

Practically, this decision encourages civil rights counsel to actively protect their clients’ claims in bankruptcy without fearing categorical non-compensation for that work, so long as they can show:

  • A close nexus between the bankruptcy efforts and the vindication of the federal right; and
  • That the work was reasonable and necessary.

C. Guidance on Billing Practices and Related-Matter Time

The opinion is also a cautionary tale on billing practices. Although the Sixth Circuit did not ultimately pass on whether a 33% reduction was appropriate, it endorsed:

  • The district court’s authority under Hensley to reduce hours when documentation is “inadequate” or when records are “pervasively corrupted” by commingled, non-compensable work;
  • The use of an average or blended hourly rate when the records make it impossible to reliably attribute time to particular lawyers.

On remand, the district court will likely have to undertake a more refined parsing of the records, distinguishing:

  • State and bankruptcy work that is compensable under the new ruling,
  • Non-compensable work (e.g., unrelated sewer disputes or blight-ticket matters, which HRT did not appeal),
  • Time that is too vague or insufficiently documented to justify a fee,
  • Work performed for co-creditors rather than for HRT itself.

For practitioners, the message is clear: if you anticipate seeking § 1988 fees for work in related forums, you must:

  • Maintain contemporaneous, detailed time entries that identify the proceeding, client, task, and its connection to the federal civil rights claim;
  • Avoid commingling unrelated matters in single entries; and
  • Be prepared to explain why work in another tribunal was “useful,” “ordinarily necessary,” or “crucial” to vindicating federal rights.

D. Restricting Expert Fee Recovery in § 1983 Cases

On expert fees, the impact is more direct and restrictive:

  • In the Sixth Circuit, § 1983 plaintiffs cannot rely on § 1988(c) to recover expert witness fees as part of their “attorney’s fee.”
  • Expert fees remain limited to the nominal statutory witness fee ($40 per day plus limited costs) unless:
    • a separate statute applicable to the claim authorizes expert fee-shifting, or
    • the parties have a contract (e.g., a settlement agreement) that shifts those costs.
  • By contrast, plaintiffs in § 1981 and § 1981a cases (e.g., certain employment discrimination cases) may recover expert fees under § 1988(c), highlighting an asymmetry in the civil rights fee statutes.

Civil rights litigators in § 1983 cases must therefore:

  • Factor the unrecoverability of expert fees into case selection and settlement strategy;
  • Consider alternative fee arrangements with clients to cover expert costs;
  • If possible, frame claims under statutes that do allow expert fees (e.g., § 1981/1981a) where such claims are legitimately available, while recognizing that § 1983 claims remain limited.

E. Subtext: Res Judicata and the Fragility of “Prevailing Party” Status

A noteworthy footnote reveals that Judge Thapar would have reversed the jury’s verdict for HRT on res judicata grounds, which would have stripped HRT of “prevailing party” status and any entitlement to § 1988 fees. He joined the fee opinion only because the majority had already affirmed the merits judgment, citing a similar posture in In re Flint Water Cases.

This underscores a broader point: a plaintiff’s eligibility for any fee-shifting under § 1988 is contingent on prevailing on the merits (or achieving equivalent relief through settlement or judicially-sanctioned agreements). Where the underlying liability determination is contested, even a detailed fee analysis may ultimately be moot.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988 in Plain Terms

  • Section 1983 allows individuals to sue state and local officials (and, in some contexts, municipalities) in federal court for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights.
  • Section 1988(b) allows a court to award “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to the prevailing party in a list of civil rights actions, including § 1983. This is “fee-shifting”: instead of the winner paying their own attorney, the losing side may have to pay.
  • Section 1988(c) lets courts treat “expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee” but only in actions enforcing § 1981 or § 1981a (mainly racial discrimination in contracts and certain employment discrimination claims).

B. “Lodestar” Method for Attorney’s Fees

Courts use the “lodestar” approach to calculate fee awards in most civil rights cases:

  1. Determine how many hours the lawyers reasonably spent on winning claims (excessive, duplicative, or poorly documented hours can be cut).
  2. Determine a reasonable hourly rate for each lawyer based on their experience and the market.
  3. Multiply hours by rates to get the “lodestar.”
  4. Adjust up or down only in rare cases (the lodestar is presumed reasonable).

The key practical takeaway: detailed, accurate time records are critical. Vague entries like “work on file” or commingling unrelated cases in a single entry make it much harder to get fees awarded.

C. “Separate” vs. “Related” Proceedings

HRT’s case illustrates how “separate” proceedings can still be “related” for fee purposes:

  • Completely separate case: Another lawsuit with different legal issues or defendants, not required for or tightly linked to the federal civil rights claim. Time spent here is generally not compensable under § 1988.
  • Separate-but-related proceeding: A state or administrative or bankruptcy proceeding that:
    • Is required by law as a prerequisite to the federal claim (as in Carey and the pre‑Knick takings regime); or
    • Is crucial to preserving or vindicating the federal right (as in Delaware Valley and HRT’s bankruptcy litigation).

Time in these latter proceedings may be compensable under § 1988, but only at the district court’s discretion and only if the plaintiff can show the necessary connection and reasonableness.

D. Takings Clause vs. Bankruptcy Clause (in Brief)

  • The Takings Clause (Fifth Amendment) says the government cannot take private property for public use without paying “just compensation” (full, fair value).
  • The Bankruptcy Clause empowers Congress to enact uniform bankruptcy laws, under which debts can be restructured, reduced, or discharged.
  • In HRT’s case, the key question in bankruptcy was whether a city’s constitutional obligation to pay just compensation could be treated like any other unsecured debt and partially discharged. HRT argued that it could not; the bankruptcy court effectively agreed, exempting HRT’s claim from discharge.

While the Sixth Circuit did not formally decide that constitutional hierarchy question in this fee opinion, it relied on the outcome of the bankruptcy proceeding to conclude that HRT’s participation there was essential to protecting its federal rights.

E. Expert Witness Fees vs. Ordinary Witness Costs

  • Ordinary witness fees are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b), which provides:
    • $40 per day for attendance in court (or deposition), plus
    • limited travel and subsistence costs.
  • Expert witness fees can be much higher (hundreds per hour). Under Crawford Fitting and Casey, those higher amounts are not recoverable under general fee-shifting statutes unless Congress clearly says so.
  • Section 1988(c) is one such clear exception—but only for § 1981 and § 1981a cases, not § 1983.

Thus, in HRT’s § 1983 takings lawsuit, the district court could not shift the bulk of HRT’s expert costs to the City under § 1988.

VII. Conclusion

HRT Enterprises v. City of Detroit is a significant Sixth Circuit decision on the scope of fee-shifting under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in complex civil rights litigation, particularly § 1983 takings cases.

Substantively, the opinion establishes two important principles for the circuit:

  1. Separate-but-related proceedings may be compensable under § 1988.
    A district court has discretion to award fees for work performed in other forums—state courts, bankruptcy courts, administrative agencies— when:
    • Governing law required those proceedings as a prerequisite to the federal § 1983 action (as with pre‑Knick takings under Williamson County); or
    • The work was “crucial to the vindication” of the plaintiff’s federal rights (as HRT’s bankruptcy objection was to preserving full just compensation).
    Categorical exclusion of such work as “separate cases” is erroneous.
  2. Expert witness fees are not recoverable in § 1983 cases under § 1988(c).
    Congress authorized expert fee-shifting only in actions enforcing §§ 1981 and 1981a. In § 1983 actions, courts remain bound by the $40/day cap in § 1821(b), absent another explicit statutory or contractual basis for shifting expert costs.

Procedurally, the decision underscores the importance of accurate billing and of understanding when “related” work outside the main federal case can justifiably be included in a fee petition. On remand, the district court must recalculate HRT’s fee award with these principles in mind, which may significantly alter both the compensable hours and the recoverable components of the award.

In the broader legal landscape, HRT Enterprises protects the ability of civil rights plaintiffs to recover fees for complex, multi-forum litigation that was compelled by law or necessary to preserve constitutional rights, while simultaneously enforcing a narrow, text-based interpretation of § 1988(c) that limits expert fee recovery in § 1983 actions. It thus refines the contours of civil rights fee-shifting in the Sixth Circuit and offers practical guidance to courts and practitioners navigating the intersection of federal civil rights, state procedures, and municipal bankruptcy.