Passive Dissent and the “Pattern-or-Practice” Threshold:
Seventh Circuit Tightens Asylum Standards in Rivas-Jarquin v. Bondi
1. Introduction
In Leonis Amanda Rivas-Jarquin & C.A.C-R. v. Pamela J. Bondi,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit confronted yet another claim
arising out of Nicaragua’s 2018 political turmoil. The petitioners—Leonis Amanda
Rivas-Jarquin and her minor son—sought asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) after providing humanitarian aid
to anti-Sandinista protestors. Although an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found Ms. Rivas
credible, both the IJ and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) concluded that she
failed to demonstrate an objectively reasonable fear of persecution or torture.
The Seventh Circuit (Chief Judge Sykes, with Judges Hamilton and Pryor)
denied the petition, generating a carefully reasoned opinion that
cements a series of doctrinal points:
- The “pattern-or-practice” standard for future persecution remains extremely demanding and cannot be satisfied with evidence of generalized political repression.
- Family members who remain unharmed in the home country remain a powerful ground for rejecting a well-founded fear.
- Failing to meet the relatively low asylum threshold automatically defeats claims for withholding of removal and CAT, which require yet higher probabilities of harm.
2. Summary of the Judgment
After reviewing the administrative record under the deferential “substantial
evidence” standard, the court affirmed the BIA on all fronts:
- No Past Persecution. Ms. Rivas admitted she had never been threatened,
detained, or harmed in Nicaragua.
- No Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution. The court rejected her
pattern-or-practice theory for two proposed social groups—(a) healthcare
professionals who aided protestors and (b) all opponents of the Sandinistas—
finding insufficient proof of a systematic, state-driven campaign of persecution
targeting either group.
- Withholding of Removal. Because the petitioners could not meet the
lower asylum standard, they necessarily failed the higher “clear probability”
test for withholding.
- CAT Relief. Absent individualized evidence that Ms. Rivas personally
faced a substantial risk of torture, the claim fell short of CAT’s stringent
“more likely than not” requirement.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence
- Gulomjonov v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 601 (7th Cir. 2025).
Clarifies that the appellate court reviews both the IJ’s and the
BIA’s reasoning “as a whole.” This case provided the template for
the court’s integrated review.
- Dai v. Garland, 24 F.4th 628 (7th Cir. 2022).
Reiterates the “highly deferential” substantial-evidence standard. The
court leaned on Dai to uphold the agency’s factual findings unless the
record compelled the opposite.
- Krishnapillai v. Holder, 563 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2009).
Establishes that a “pattern or practice” requires a “systematic,
pervasive, or organized” effort by state actors, setting a high bar
that the petitioners could not clear.
- Halim v. Holder, 755 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 2014) and
Ahmed v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2006).
Both emphasize that finding a pattern or practice effectively grants
asylum to every member of the group, justifying the stringent standard.
- Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 2011) and
N.Y.C.C. v. Barr, 930 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2019).
Define “persecution” and explain why sporadic threats or harassment
do not suffice.
- Granados Arias v. Garland, 69 F.4th 454 (7th Cir. 2023), and
Hernandez-Garcia v. Barr, 930 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 2019).
Reaffirm that generalized violence, even when severe, is ineffective
without evidence of individual targeting or an extreme, state-run
campaign.
- Guardia v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 2008).
Permits the inference that an applicant is safe when similarly
situated relatives remain unharmed.
- Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2016) and
Ayele v. Holder, 564 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2009).
Set the “clear probability” standard for withholding, higher than
that for asylum.
- Meraz-Saucedo v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2021);
Molina-Avila v. Sessions, 907 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 2018); and
Mabuneza v. Garland, 16 F.4th 1222 (7th Cir. 2021).
Define torture and reaffirm CAT’s rigorous “more likely than not” threshold.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
The court’s analysis proceeds in two overarching steps:
- Threshold Factual Findings. Accepting the IJ’s credibility finding,
the panel nonetheless noted the total absence of direct threats, arrests,
or physical harm to Ms. Rivas, weakening both past-persecution and
individualized future-persecution theories.
- Application of Doctrinal Tests.
- Pattern or Practice. The petitioners relied on U.S. State
Department reports and press articles describing Nicaragua’s sweeping
crackdown but could not show a
systematic, pervasive, or organized
effort
targeting either proposed group. The court highlighted the
crucial but often overlooked distinction between “oppression” and
“persecution”—the former does not automatically establish the latter
for asylum purposes.
- Family Safety Inference. The continuing safety of Ms. Rivas’s
mother—an active party member still distributing medicine—was
“powerful counter-evidence” that a return posed no reasonable
possibility of persecution.
- Incremental Standards. Because the asylum claim failed,
withholding (which demands a higher probability) and CAT (requiring
both extreme harm and governmental acquiescence) necessarily failed
as well.
3.3 Potential Impact of the Decision
- Asylum Litigation Strategy. Practitioners representing clients who
assisted foreign protestors only indirectly will need far more granular
evidence—including individualized threats, documented surveillance, or
similarly situated individuals actually harmed—to clear the elevated
“pattern-or-practice” bar.
- Nicaraguan Claims Nationwide. Thousands of Nicaraguan cases
pending before immigration courts may now face tighter scrutiny whenever
applicants do not belong to a well-defined, narrowly tailored group or
cannot demonstrate personal targeting.
- Family Safety Evidence. Rivas-Jarquin fortifies a line of
authority allowing adjudicators to infer safety from unharmed relatives,
even when overall country conditions remain dire.
- Judicial Economy. By expressly linking the asylum, withholding,
and CAT standards, the panel encourages IJs and the BIA to dispose of
higher-threshold claims swiftly once the baseline asylum analysis fails.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Persecution vs. Harassment. Persecution involves serious,
life-threatening harm or similarly grave non-physical deprivations.
Harassment—insults, sporadic threats, social ostracism—does not qualify.
- Pattern-or-Practice. Think of it as a nationwide policy or
campaign: systematic, government-backed, and directed against a
discernible group. Isolated or localized incidents, even if frequent,
usually fall short.
- Substantial Evidence Standard. On review, the court asks only:
Could a reasonable fact-finder have reached the same conclusion?
If yes, the court must affirm—even if it personally finds the alternate
view more persuasive.
- Clear Probability (Withholding) vs. Reasonable Possibility (Asylum).
Imagine rolling dice: a reasonable possibility is any meaningful chance;
a clear probability requires odds over 50% (“more likely than not”).
- Convention Against Torture (CAT). Beyond persecution,
CAT relief demands proof that (1) the applicant faces at least a 51% risk
of severe pain or suffering and (2) that a public official will
perpetrate, consent to, or acquiesce in that torture.
5. Conclusion
Rivas-Jarquin v. Bondi is less about Nicaragua than about the
evidentiary demands of U.S. asylum law. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion
re-energizes a doctrinal framework that:
- Distinguishes generalized oppression from legally cognizable persecution;
- Elevates the burden for applicants relying on pattern-or-practice theories,
particularly when their own political activity was passive or indirect;
- Affirms the family safety inference as a potent, sometimes decisive,
piece of evidence; and
- Integrates the escalating standards for asylum, withholding, and CAT
into a streamlined analytic cascade.
For immigration advocates, the decision is a cautionary tale: without
individualized threats or a narrowly bounded social group, even credible
testimony and robust country reports may be insufficient. For the judiciary,
the case offers a blueprint for synthesizing precedent while preserving
the deferential stance demanded by the substantial-evidence standard.