Clarifying “Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship” and Domestic Relocation under CAT:
A Comprehensive Commentary on Jose Leopoldo Perez-Gonzalez v. Attorney General, United States (3d Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a non-precedential but analytically significant decision dated 7 July 2025, denied the petition for review filed by Jose Leopoldo Perez-Gonzalez, a Guatemalan national ordered removed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Although officially non-precedential, the panel opinion delivers two clarifications that will inform future immigration litigation within – and likely beyond – the Third Circuit:

• The threshold for demonstrating “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative when seeking cancellation of removal; and
• The role of internal relocation in evaluating probability of torture under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

Perez-Gonzalez sought four distinct forms of relief – asylum, statutory withholding of removal, CAT protection, and cancellation of removal. He argued primarily that past violence in Guatemala and his spouse’s lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) status warranted relief. Both the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and the BIA rejected the claims, and the Third Circuit, applying familiar standards of review, affirmed.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court held:

• Asylum & Withholding: Substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding that petitioner neither endured past persecution on a protected ground nor showed a well-founded fear of future persecution. Incidents cited by the petitioner were categorized as criminal or personal, lacking requisite nexus to a protected ground, and the Guatemalan government was found neither complicit nor unwilling/unable to control perpetrators.
• CAT Protection: Petitioner failed to establish it was “more likely than not” he would be tortured upon return. The ability to relocate internally to Petén, coupled with police responsiveness during earlier incidents, foreclosed CAT relief.
• Cancellation of Removal: The record did not compel the conclusion that removal would cause the LPR spouse “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” especially given the three-year separation and minimal contact.
• Procedural Due-Process Claim: The argument that the IJ barred counsel’s participation was unexhausted before the BIA and therefore unreviewable under § 1252(d)(1).

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 2012) – Confirmed dual review of IJ and BIA decisions when the latter adopts the former. Guided the scope of appellate scrutiny.
• Herrera-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 952 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. 2020) & Manuel-Soto v. Att’y Gen., 121 F.4th 468 (3d Cir. 2024) – Reinforced the bifurcated standard: substantial-evidence for facts, de novo for legal conclusions.
• Wilkinson v. Att’y Gen., 131 F.4th 134 (3d Cir. 2025) – Supplies the controlling standard for hardship determinations in cancellation cases. The panel quotes Wilkinson to emphasize that sadness alone is insufficient for the statutory threshold.
• Wang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2005); Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 2003) – Established contours of persecution, stressing severity of harm and protected-ground nexus.
• Galeas Figueroa v. Att’y Gen., 998 F.3d 77 (3d Cir. 2021) – Clarified that government complicity (action or omission) is required alongside protected-ground nexus. Relied on to dismiss personal-crime-based allegations.
• Chavarria v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 508 (3d Cir. 2006); Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677 (3d Cir. 2015); Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 2003) – Provide authority that isolated criminal or interpersonal violence is not persecution absent protected-ground link.
• Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020); Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106 (2d Cir. 2021) – Support consideration of internal relocation when assessing CAT claims.
• Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023) – Treated § 1252(d)(1) as non-jurisdictional but mandatory, guiding the dismissal of the unexhausted due-process challenge.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

The panel structured its analysis around each form of relief sought:

1. Asylum/Withholding
   • Past Harm Insufficient: The 1985 questioning by soldiers did not rise to the “threat-to-life or freedom” level.
   • Lack of Protected-Ground Nexus: Handkerchief incident, childhood sexual assault, 2007 shooting, and later threats were personal or criminal in nature without political, religious, or social-group motivation.
   • Government Complicity Lacking: The police responded to the shooting; no evidence showed state acquiescence.
   • Logical Consequence for Withholding: Failure on asylum (lower standard) doomed the higher “clear probability” burden for withholding.
2. CAT
   • Probability of Torture: Petitioner had no prior torture experience; threats were geographically distant.
   • Internal Relocation: Ability to relocate to Petén (home region) defeated “more likely than not” standard.
   • State Protection: IJ’s finding that Guatemalan authorities in Petén would probably help was un-rebutted.
3. Cancellation of Removal
   • Hardship Benchmark: The statutory bar, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), demands hardship “substantially” above that experienced by deported parents/spouses in most cases.
   • Marital Estrangement: Three-year separation, 11-month silence, and wife’s independent life weighed strongly against hardship.
   • Subjective vs. Objective: Petitioner’s speculation about wife’s emotional distress was deemed ordinary, not “extremely unusual.”
4. Procedural Claim
   • Exhaustion Doctrine: The due-process complaint was never pressed before the BIA, triggering mandatory claim-processing rule.
   • Merits (in Dicta): Even if reached, the attorney had already been permitted to withdraw; IJ provided a list of pro bono counsel, satisfying procedural fairness.

3.3 Potential Impact on Future Litigation

• Hardship Clarification: The decision reinforces that estrangement can undercut a cancellation claim even where a spouse is an LPR. Practitioners will need detailed, contemporaneous evidence of ongoing, close relational ties and specific hardship mechanisms.
• Internal Relocation in CAT Analysis: While other circuits (e.g., Second Circuit’s Singh) already treat relocation as potentially dispositive, this opinion imports that logic into the Third Circuit’s jurisprudence. Going forward, petitioners must rebut the relocation presumption with concrete barriers – economic, social, or safety-related.
• Unexhausted Due-Process Claims: The opinion underscores post-Santos-Zacaria duty to present procedural grievances first to the BIA unless impossible. Counsel should craft a record at the agency level for any alleged IJ misconduct.
• Non-precedential Yet Persuasive: Because the ruling is marked “Not Precedential,” it lacks binding effect under 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7. Nevertheless, district courts and immigration advocates often cite such opinions for their persuasive reasoning, especially absent contrary published authority.

4. Simplifying Complex Concepts

• Persecution vs. Prosecution: “Persecution” involves extreme harm tied to a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, particular social group, political opinion), whereas prosecution is legitimate state enforcement of law.
• Protected Ground Nexus: The causal link between suffered harm and one of the five protected grounds. Absence of nexus is fatal to asylum claims.
• Government Complicity: For asylum/withholding, it must be shown the government is unwilling or unable to prevent the harm (through action or omission). Purely private violence ordinarily does not suffice.
• “Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship” (Cancellation of Removal): A statutorily heightened standard (INA § 240A(b)) that exceeds the “extreme hardship” test under other relief categories. It demands proof of hardship substantially beyond what usually attends deportation, e.g., serious medical crises, profound educational disruption, or caretaking obligations.
• Convention Against Torture (CAT): Protects an applicant if it is more likely than not they will suffer torture— severe, intentional pain or suffering — by or with the acquiescence of a public official. Internal relocation and past torture history are key factors.
• Substantial Evidence Standard: The Court must uphold administrative factual findings unless “no reasonable fact-finder” could reach the same result – a highly deferential benchmark.

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision in Perez-Gonzalez illustrates immigration law’s demanding evidentiary burdens and the narrow pathways to discretionary relief. Two enduring takeaways stand out:

1. A petitioner’s familial hardship argument for cancellation is severely weakened when evidence shows emotional or physical distance from the qualifying relative; and
2. Internal relocation is a potent rebuttal to CAT claims, especially when previous harm lacks government involvement and law enforcement has displayed some effectiveness.

While the opinion is officially non-precedential, it operationalizes recent supreme and circuit-level pronouncements, providing practitioners with a clear roadmap for evidence-building and issue preservation in removal defense. For scholars, it offers another data point in the evolving doctrine around hardship and torture protections — spheres where the courts continue to balance humanitarian concerns against stringent statutory requirements.