§ 922(g)(1) Applies Absent Full Civil-Rights Restoration; Suppression Error Is Harmless When Digital Evidence Is Not Used in the Government’s Case-in-Chief

Introduction

In United States v. Warner (10th Cir. Mar. 18, 2025), the Tenth Circuit affirmed Charles Warner’s federal convictions for (1) being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and (2) dealing in firearms without a license. The case arises from Warner’s long-running involvement with a firearms business (Elite Warrior Armament, “EWA”) and later firearms sales and custom builds after EWA’s federal firearms license (“FFL”) was revoked. The appeal presented four principal issues:

  • Whether Warner was a “prohibited person” under § 922(g)(1) given his South Carolina felony convictions and his claimed restoration of rights;
  • Whether alleged Fourth Amendment defects in the computer-search warrants and an eight-month search delay required suppression;
  • Whether evidence was sufficient to prove dealing without a license (including willfulness);
  • Whether the sentencing court properly counted “firearms” (including frames/receivers) for the U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) enhancement.

Summary of the Opinion

The court rejected each claim and affirmed. It held that Warner is prohibited under § 922(g)(1) because his prior state felony convictions were punishable by more than one year and he had not had all civil rights restored as required by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B). It also held that Warner’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge is foreclosed by circuit precedent reaffirmed after United States v. Rahimi. On suppression, the court declined to reach the merits, concluding any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the challenged evidence did not come in during the government’s case-in-chief and the lone admitted computer exhibit was used only for impeachment (permissible even if seized unlawfully). The court further held the trial evidence sufficient to prove Warner dealt firearms without a license, and it upheld the firearm-count enhancement based on expert testimony that frames/receivers qualified as “firearms” under federal definitions.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review, preservation, and waiver

  • United States v. Berres: Provided the general framework for reviewing denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment—abuse of discretion overall, but de novo for statutory interpretation—supporting the panel’s de novo review of whether Warner fell within § 922(g)(1).
  • Havens v. Colo. Dep't of Corrs.: Cited for the forfeiture principle—arguments not raised below are ordinarily forfeited—setting up the court’s treatment of Warner’s late reliance on United States v. Hisey.
  • United States v. Herrera and United States v. Bowline: Applied to Rule 12 timing; absent good cause, the Tenth Circuit will not conduct plain-error review for untimely Rule 12 arguments. Even assuming good cause, the panel emphasized the separate requirement that the appellant actually argue plain error on appeal.
  • United States v. Thornton: Supplied the four-part plain-error test, which Warner failed to invoke meaningfully.
  • United States v. Leffler: Critical to disposition—when a litigant fails to make a plain-error argument on appeal, the issue is ordinarily treated as waived and not reviewed at all. This drove the court’s refusal to entertain Warner’s belated Hisey-based predicate-offense theory.

2) Civil-rights restoration under § 921(a)(20)(B)

  • United States v. Flower: The controlling circuit precedent for the “bundle of civil rights” approach. The panel relied on Flower’s rule that the rights to vote, serve on a jury, hold public office, and possess firearms must all be restored before a prior conviction is excluded as a § 922(g)(1) predicate. Because Warner lacked restoration of jury-service rights (requiring a pardon), the exception in § 921(a)(20)(B) did not apply.

3) The “business practices” exception under § 921(a)(20)(A)

  • State v. Scott (quoting State v. Owings) and State v. Keith: Used to characterize South Carolina “breach of trust with fraudulent intent” as akin to common-law embezzlement/larceny—i.e., theft-like conduct—not “regulation of business practices.”
  • State v. Parris: Cited to show that a “trust relationship” is broader than business regulation and does not transform the offense into one “relating to the regulation of business practices.”

4) Second Amendment doctrine and § 922(g)(1) after Bruen and Rahimi

  • District of Columbia v. Heller: The opinion leaned on Heller’s statement that “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” are not called into doubt, and its “presumptively lawful” framing.
  • United States v. McCane: The Tenth Circuit’s earlier decision upholding § 922(g)(1) in reliance on Heller; treated as still binding unless abrogated.
  • McDonald v. City of Chicago: Reinforced Heller’s assurances regarding felon dispossession as “longstanding regulatory measures.”
  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen: Acknowledged as shifting the Second Amendment analytic framework, but the panel emphasized that later circuit authority has preserved McCane’s bottom line.
  • Vincent v. Garland and Vincent v. Garland (mem.): Explained the procedural path—Vincent reaffirmed McCane post-Bruen; SCOTUS vacated and remanded in light of Rahimi.
  • United States v. Rahimi: Central intervening Supreme Court decision; the panel highlighted Rahimi’s repetition that felon-dispossession laws remain “presumptively lawful.”
  • Vincent v. Bondi: The decisive post-remand precedent. Warner’s as-applied claim (non-violent felon) was foreclosed because Bondi held Rahimi did not abrogate McCane and § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional as applied to non-violent felons in this circuit.
  • The panel also surveyed post-Rahimi circuit landscape for context (not as controlling law): United States v. Hunt, United States v. Jackson, United States v. Hester, Range v. Att'y Gen. U.S., United States v. Diaz, and United States v. Williams. This discussion underscored doctrinal flux elsewhere while reinforcing that the Tenth Circuit’s rule is settled by Bondi.

5) Fourth Amendment suppression: harmlessness, impeachment, and mootness

  • United States v. Finnigin and United States v. Biglow: Provided standards for suppression review—deference to factual findings, de novo review of Fourth Amendment reasonableness and probable cause.
  • United States v. Leon: Used for the specific principle that evidence inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief due to a Fourth Amendment violation may still be used to impeach a defendant’s testimony. This supported the court’s conclusion that the lone admitted computer exhibit (impeachment-only) would not yield appellate relief even if suppression were granted.
  • United States v. Mullikin: Anchored the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” approach where the challenged evidence largely did not reach the jury.
  • Smith v. Plati and Church of Scientology v. United States: Addressed mootness. The government urged mootness, but the panel rejected it, explaining mootness requires an intervening event making relief impossible; instead, the court resolved the issue on harmless-error grounds.

6) Sufficiency of evidence for dealing without a license

  • United States v. Gregory and United States v. Sparks: Provided the de novo sufficiency standard and “light most favorable to the government” lens.
  • United States v. Fernandez: Confirmed that sufficiency review considers all evidence admitted at trial even if arguably admitted improperly, defeating Warner’s attempt to discount older conduct evidence.

7) Sentencing: counting firearms and deference to findings

  • United States v. McDonald: Provided the mixed fact/law review framework (clear error vs. de novo).
  • United States v. Hoyle: Emphasized appellate deference to district court factual findings with a basis in the record, and viewing evidence/inferences favorably to the district court’s determination.

Legal Reasoning

A) Why Warner was a § 922(g)(1) “prohibited person”

  1. Predicate felonies “punishable by” > 1 year: Warner attempted to argue (via United States v. Hisey) that because he received probation, his South Carolina convictions should not qualify. The panel never reached the merits because the argument was not raised below and Warner failed to properly present a plain-error argument on appeal (per United States v. Leffler and United States v. Herrera).
  2. § 921(a)(20)(B) civil-rights restoration: Even if South Carolina law restored some firearm rights, the Tenth Circuit applies the “all core civil rights” rule from United States v. Flower. Warner conceded jury service requires a pardon in South Carolina and he had not been pardoned; therefore, civil rights were not “adequately” restored and the convictions remained usable predicates.
  3. § 921(a)(20)(A) business-practices exception: The panel rejected Warner’s attempt to reframe “breach of trust with fraudulent intent” as business regulation. Using South Carolina authority (State v. Scott, State v. Owings, State v. Keith, State v. Parris), it treated the offense as theft-like conduct, outside the narrow class of antitrust/unfair competition/restraints-of-trade-type regulatory offenses.

B) As-applied Second Amendment challenge: foreclosed in the Tenth Circuit

Warner argued § 922(g)(1) cannot constitutionally apply to non-violent felons, particularly where convictions are old and resulted in no prison. The court’s reasoning was principally hierarchical and precedential: Vincent v. Bondi (post-United States v. Rahimi) reaffirmed that United States v. McCane remains binding and § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to non-violent felons. Given that controlling authority, Warner’s claim failed without a fresh Bruen-style historical analysis.

C) Suppression issues resolved through harmless error (not merits)

Warner challenged overbreadth and an eight-month delay in searching seized computers. The panel bypassed these Fourth Amendment questions because the remedy—exclusion—would not affect the conviction. Almost all computer evidence was excluded at trial on chain-of-custody/foundation grounds; the only admitted exhibit was used solely to impeach Warner. Under United States v. Leon, impeachment use is permitted even for Fourth Amendment-tainted evidence. Therefore, even a successful suppression ruling would not remove any case-in-chief evidence and would not undo the impeachment use. Relying on United States v. Mullikin, the court held any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

D) Dealing without a license: “business” plus willfulness

Applying the statutory definition of “dealer” in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(11), the panel found the evidence showed more than an isolated sale: Facebook communications offering custom builds, statements that firearms were “made from scratch,” and invoices/receipts in 2019 after the FFL revocation supported an ongoing business. For willfulness, evidence that Warner concealed his role on the FFL application and repeatedly acknowledged ATF warnings supported the finding that he knew his conduct was unlawful yet continued.

E) Firearm counting: frames/receivers as firearms

The panel upheld the six-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) (25–99 firearms), applying the definition in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (including frames or receivers). Expert testimony supported counting 80 firearms total (14 operable plus 66 frames/receivers). The panel rejected claims that the expert conflicted with federal definitions, emphasizing her reliance on the regulatory definition and detailed item-by-item reporting; under United States v. Hoyle, the district court’s finding had a basis in the record.

Impact

  • Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) in the Tenth Circuit: The case reinforces that, after Vincent v. Bondi, non-violent felons’ as-applied challenges are effectively foreclosed at the circuit level, regardless of conviction age, lack of imprisonment, or claimed non-dangerousness—unless and until higher authority changes the rule.
  • Civil-rights restoration remains “all-or-nothing” under circuit law: By reaffirming United States v. Flower’s bundle-of-rights approach, the decision signals that partial restoration (even if including firearm possession under state law) does not defeat § 922(g)(1) when jury service (or other core rights) remains lost absent a pardon.
  • Appellate suppression litigation: emphasize trial use and prejudice: Warner illustrates that suppression issues may be resolved on harmless-error grounds when challenged evidence does not enter the government’s case-in-chief and impeachment use would remain permissible under United States v. Leon. Appellants must connect Fourth Amendment error to actual trial prejudice.
  • Dealing-without-a-license prosecutions: The opinion demonstrates that online marketing, customer communications, and transaction records can establish an ongoing “business,” and that repeated regulatory warnings can strongly support willfulness.
  • Sentencing enhancements for firearm quantity: The decision underscores that frames/receivers can drive firearm counts into higher enhancement brackets, and that detailed expert documentation can be sufficient to sustain those findings on appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” (§ 922(g)(1)): This focuses on the maximum sentence the law allowed for the prior conviction, not necessarily what the defendant actually served. (Warner tried to dispute application using United States v. Hisey, but the court treated the argument as waived on appeal.)
  • “Civil rights restored” (§ 921(a)(20)(B)): A prior conviction may stop counting for § 922(g)(1) if the person gets their civil rights back. In the Tenth Circuit (per United States v. Flower), restoration must include key rights like voting, holding office, and serving on a jury (and firearm rights). If even one is missing—here, jury service absent a pardon—the conviction still counts.
  • “Business practices” exception (§ 921(a)(20)(A)): This narrow carveout covers regulatory offenses like antitrust or unfair trade practices. Theft-like crimes (even if involving a “trust” relationship) are not treated as business-regulation offenses.
  • Harmless error in suppression: Even if a search might be unconstitutional, an appellate court will not reverse if excluding the evidence would not change what the jury heard in a way that matters to guilt. Here, the challenged digital evidence did not come in during the government’s main presentation, and impeachment use can remain allowed under United States v. Leon.
  • Frames/receivers count as “firearms”: Federal law treats certain core components (frames/receivers) as firearms even if the gun is not assembled or operable. That matters greatly for sentencing enhancements tied to number of firearms.

Conclusion

United States v. Warner is a consolidation of several consequential, practice-facing rules: (1) § 922(g)(1) predicates remain valid absent full civil-rights restoration under the Tenth Circuit’s all-core-rights approach; (2) as-applied Second Amendment challenges by non-violent felons are foreclosed in the circuit after Vincent v. Bondi; (3) suppression disputes can be defeated on harmless-error grounds when the challenged evidence does not substantively reach the jury and impeachment use would remain available; (4) online conduct and records can establish an ongoing firearms “business” and willfulness; and (5) frames/receivers may be counted as firearms for guideline enhancements when supported by detailed expert testimony. Together, these holdings strengthen prosecutorial tools in felon-in-possession and unlicensed-dealing cases, while narrowing the practical payoff of certain appellate challenges absent a concrete showing of prejudice.