§ 841(b)(1)(C) Authorizes Up to Life Supervised Release After Revocation; § 3583(h) Subtraction Does Not Constrain a 36‑Month Reimposition and Mazarky’s “Notice-Based” Cap Is Narrow

I. Introduction

In United States v. Justice Martinique Holden (11th Cir. Mar. 4, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a revocation sentence of 9 months’ imprisonment followed by 36 months of supervised release. The appeal focused on whether the district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) by imposing a new supervised-release term that, according to the defendant, failed to account for prior revocation imprisonment and exceeded the “maximum” supervised release she believed applied.

The underlying conviction was a drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 841(b)(1)(C). Holden’s supervision had already been revoked twice (2020 and 2023), and the 2025 proceeding was her third revocation. The key issues were (1) the interaction between § 3583(h)’s subtraction rule and the supervised-release authorization for § 841(b)(1)(C), and (2) whether United States v. Mazarky, 499 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2007), effectively capped her supervised-release exposure at three years due to notice/understanding in the case record.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on plain-error review because Holden did not object at the revocation hearing. The court held:

  • Mazarky did not control because, unlike there, Holden had been advised (at least in the plea agreement and plea colloquy, and again at the third revocation hearing) that § 841(b)(1)(C) carries a supervised-release term of not less than three years—i.e., potentially more than three years.
  • Under Eleventh Circuit law, § 841(b)(1)(C) authorizes supervised release up to life because it sets a minimum but no maximum. Therefore, imposing 36 months after revocation does not exceed “the term of supervised release authorized by statute,” and § 3583(h)’s “less any term of imprisonment” subtraction does not make the 36-month term unlawful in this setting.
  • The sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable, including because Holden’s revocation was mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (drug possession and repeated positive tests), and the 9-month prison term fell within the Chapter 7 range.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. United States v. Mazarky, 499 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2007)

Mazarky is the centerpiece of Holden’s argument and the opinion’s principal limiting move. There, the court treated the defendant’s “maximum term of supervised release” as three years because “all parties had treated the statutory maximum as 36 months throughout the entire case” and the defendant was never advised his supervised release could exceed that amount for a § 841(a)(1) conviction. The remedy in Mazarky was to require application of § 3583(h) crediting (subtracting) aggregated revocation imprisonment from the (notice-capped) maximum supervised-release term.

Holden’s panel characterized her case as sharing some surface similarity (including a past revocation hearing where the probation officer and defense counsel agreed on a lower “maximum” supervised-release amount), but distinguished Mazarky on a decisive record fact: Holden had multiple advisements that supervised release could exceed 36 months—including her plea agreement and plea colloquy stating “not less than three years,” and the probation officer’s statement at the third revocation that the “statutory maximum … would be life.”

The key doctrinal consequence is that Mazarky is treated as a notice/record-understanding case, not a categorical rule that § 841(b)(1)(C) is capped at three years. Where the record contains sufficient notice of the “not less than” structure, the court will not impose a three-year ceiling via Mazarky.

2. United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2014)

United States v. Vandergrift supplied the standard of review: because Holden did not object to the supervised-release term at the revocation hearing, the court reviewed only for plain error. This mattered because even arguable uncertainty about how far Mazarky extends will rarely qualify as “plain” under Eleventh Circuit doctrine absent directly controlling precedent.

3. United States v. Verdeza, 69 F.4th 780 (11th Cir. 2023)

United States v. Verdeza furnished the panel’s “plainness” lens: “an error cannot be plain unless the issue has been specifically and directly resolved by on point precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court.” The court used this to reinforce that, given Holden’s multiple advisements and lack of objection, any extension of Mazarky to her facts was not “plain.”

4. United States v. Cunningham, 800 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2015)

United States v. Cunningham stands for the general proposition that the maximum supervised-release term for a Class C felony is ordinarily three years under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2). But the Holden opinion, following established circuit law, reiterates that this “general rule” yields where another statute—here § 841(b)(1)(C)—authorizes a different supervised-release regime.

5. United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc), abrogated in part on other grounds by United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2005)

The opinion relies on United States v. Sanchez (en banc) for the crucial structural point: § 3583(b) does not limit the term of supervised release authorized by § 841(b)(1)(C). The citation to United States v. Duncan clarifies that Sanchez was “abrogated in part on other grounds,” preserving the specific supervised-release principle used here.

6. United States v. Brame, 997 F.2d 1426 (11th Cir. 1993)

United States v. Brame provides the interpretive bridge from “minimum but no maximum” to “maximum is life.” The panel invoked Brame to conclude that because § 841(b)(1)(C) sets only a floor (“at least 3 years”), it implies a ceiling of life. This conclusion is what eliminates Holden’s § 3583(h) argument as a practical constraint in her case: subtracting revocation imprisonment from “life” does not render a 36-month term excessive.

7. Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169 (2020) and United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)

These cases are used in the discussion of substantive reasonableness. Holguin-Hernandez v. United States addresses how a party preserves a substantive-reasonableness challenge by advocating for a shorter sentence. United States v. Irey restates the abuse-of-discretion framework and the appellate deference given to sentencing courts within a range of reasonableness.

8. United States v. Brown, 224 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated in part on other grounds as recognized by Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1309

United States v. Brown supports the proposition that when revocation is mandatory under § 3583(g), the district court is not required to consider the § 3553(a) factors. The panel notes the partial abrogation as recognized in Vandergrift but treats the mandatory-revocation point as applicable to Holden.

9. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739 (11th Cir. 2008)

United States v. Hunt is cited for the practical appellate presumption: while within-Guidelines sentences are not automatically presumed reasonable, the Eleventh Circuit “ordinarily expects” them to be reasonable. The panel uses this to bolster its substantive reasonableness conclusion.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Standard of review drives the outcome. Because Holden did not object at the third revocation hearing, the court applied plain error. This heightened threshold makes reversal unlikely unless (a) there is legal error, (b) the error is “plain” under on-point precedent, and (c) it affects substantial rights and the fairness/integrity of proceedings.
  2. Mazarky is treated as a narrow, record-dependent doctrine. The panel read Mazarky as turning on the defendant’s lack of notice and the parties’ consistent treatment of the maximum as three years. In Holden’s case, the record contained contrary signals:
    • Plea agreement: supervised release “not less than three years.”
    • Plea colloquy: court advised “not less than three years.”
    • Third revocation: probation officer stated the “statutory maximum … would be life.”
    Even though earlier proceedings included a misstatement (the 2023 revocation’s “26 months” figure), the panel emphasized the later correction and Holden’s lack of objection at the critical hearing.
  3. Statutory maximum supervised release for § 841(b)(1)(C) is life in this circuit. Applying Sanchez and Brame, the court concluded § 841(b)(1)(C) provides only a minimum supervised-release term; therefore, the authorized term extends up to life and is not constrained by § 3583(b)’s Class C felony cap.
  4. § 3583(h)’s subtraction rule does not invalidate a 36-month term when the authorization is life. Section 3583(h) caps post-revocation supervised release at “the term … authorized by statute … less any term of imprisonment … upon revocation.” The panel reasoned that where the authorization is life, the subtraction does not meaningfully constrain a 36-month term; thus, the district court was not required (as a matter of legality) to reduce the supervised-release term by prior revocation imprisonment to keep within a three-year ceiling.
  5. Reasonableness review confirms affirmance. The prison term (9 months) fell within the Guidelines revocation range the parties agreed applied. The panel also stressed that revocation was mandatory under § 3583(g) due to drug possession and repeated positives, making § 3553(a) consideration not required (though the district court still referenced background and continued violations). These considerations supported both procedural and substantive reasonableness.

C. Impact

Although “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the opinion’s reasoning has practical implications for litigants and district courts in the Eleventh Circuit:

  • Limits the reach of Mazarky. Defendants invoking a three-year “cap” after revocation in § 841(b)(1)(C) cases face an uphill climb if the plea paperwork or colloquy used “not less than” language or otherwise conveyed that supervised release could exceed three years.
  • Reinforces the “life maximum” framework for § 841(b)(1)(C). By reaffirming Sanchez + Brame logic, the opinion underscores that § 3583(h) arguments premised on a three-year ceiling will fail unless the defendant can fit into a Mazarky-style notice/record-understanding limitation.
  • Highlights preservation and the plain-error barrier. When the probation officer or the court states the applicable statutory maximum at the hearing, a defendant who disagrees must object then; otherwise, even plausible disputes about statutory interaction will be reviewed under the demanding Vandergrift/Verdeza plain-error framework.
  • Signals how “mandatory revocation” affects sentencing procedure. The court’s reliance on § 3583(g) and Brown indicates that, in mandatory-revocation situations, arguments focused on the district court’s failure to discuss § 3553(a) factors may carry less force—though courts often still discuss them.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised release
A period of court-ordered monitoring after prison. Violations can lead to revocation and additional prison and/or renewed supervised release.
Revocation
A court finding that the defendant violated supervision conditions, permitting (and in some cases requiring) sanctions such as imprisonment.
Plain-error review
A strict appellate standard applied when the defendant did not object in the district court. The error must be clear under existing, on-point precedent and must have affected substantial rights.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) “subtraction”
After revocation, the court may impose another supervised-release term, but it cannot exceed the supervised-release term authorized for the original offense, minus the prison time imposed for revocations. If the authorization is effectively “up to life,” subtracting months of revocation imprisonment does not restrict a modest renewed term such as 36 months.
“Not less than three years”
This is a minimum, not a maximum. The phrase means the supervised-release term must be at least three years and can be longer if the statute otherwise allows.
Mandatory revocation (18 U.S.C. § 3583(g))
Certain violations—such as possessing a controlled substance or repeatedly testing positive—require revocation. In that setting, Eleventh Circuit law treats § 3553(a) consideration as not required to trigger revocation (though courts may still consider sentencing factors in selecting the sanction).
“Abrogated in part on other grounds”
A later case changed some legal aspect of an earlier case, but not necessarily the specific rule being cited. Here, the panel treated Sanchez’s supervised-release holding as intact despite partial abrogation elsewhere.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Justice Martinique Holden reaffirms that for convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), the statutory scheme authorizes supervised release up to life (minimum three years), so a post-revocation term of 36 months does not violate 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) even without subtracting prior revocation imprisonment to fit a three-year ceiling. The decision also cabins United States v. Mazarky to its notice-driven circumstances and underscores the importance of timely objections to avoid the formidable constraints of plain-error review.