§ 6-10-301(c) Applies Only to Juvenile Life Sentences; Term-of-Years Juvenile Homicide Sentences Tested as “Unusual” Under Hicks

Introduction

In Eavan Castaner v. The State of Wyoming, 2026 WY 25, the Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the legality and constitutionality of a lengthy indeterminate prison sentence imposed on a juvenile homicide offender. Eavan Castaner, age fifteen at the time of the offense, pleaded guilty to an amended charge of second-degree murder under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104(a) and misdemeanor stalking. The district court imposed 42-to-75 years on the murder count (with credit for 330 days) and time served on stalking.

The appeal raised three interrelated questions: (1) whether the juvenile parole-eligibility provision, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c), capped the sentence in a way that constrained the district court’s term-of-years options; (2) whether the sentence exceeded statutory limits for second-degree murder and Wyoming’s indeterminate-sentencing statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201; and (3) whether the sentence violated Wyoming’s “cruel or unusual” punishment clause, Article 1, Section 14, as recently rearticulated in Hicks v. State, 2025 WY 113, 578 P.3d 366 (Wyo. 2025).

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed. It held:

  • § 6-10-301(c) does not apply to juvenile offenders who receive a term-of-years sentence; its plain text applies only to juveniles “sentenced to life imprisonment.”
  • The 42-to-75-year indeterminate sentence fits within the statutory punishment for second-degree murder (“not less than twenty (20) years, or during life”) and complies with § 7-13-201’s 90% rule for the minimum term.
  • Under Hicks, Castaner conceded the sentence was not “cruel”; the Court held it was not “unusual” because there is no clear consensus of state legislatures or courts that sentences of this length for juvenile second-degree murder contravene contemporary standards.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Juvenile sentencing backdrop: Miller, Graham, and Wyoming’s Bear Cloud line

The opinion frames sentencing as complicated by juvenile constitutional doctrine associated with Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and its “progeny,” plus Wyoming’s responses in the Bear Cloud cases and legislation. Although Castaner did not press an Eighth Amendment claim, Miller and related cases supplied the historical reason Wyoming enacted § 6-10-301(c) and the interpretive question of what that statute does—and does not—cover.

  • Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) is cited for the proposition that a mandatory juvenile life-without-parole sentencing scheme violates the Eighth Amendment and requires an individualized hearing considering “youth and attendant circumstances.” The Court used Miller as context for the Legislature’s targeted fix: parole eligibility for juveniles sentenced to “life imprisonment.”
  • Graham v. Florida, 560 US 48 (2010) is referenced via Miller for the “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” concept, which the Wyoming Legislature implemented through parole eligibility after 25 years for juvenile life sentences.
  • Wyoming’s “Bear Cloud line” appears as a jurisprudential framework for distinguishing between formal life sentences and “functional” life-without-parole outcomes. The Court referenced multiple Bear Cloud cases and later applications, emphasizing that the State invoked Sam v. State, 2017 WY 98, 401 P.3d 834 (Wyo. 2017) during pre-sentencing discussions and that the parties argued about how Bear Cloud principles interact with statutory sentencing. The opinion lists: Davis v. State, 2020 WY 122, 472 P.3d 1030 (Wyo. 2020); Sam v. State, 2019 WY 104, 450 P.3d 217 (Wyo. 2019); Sen v. State, 2017 WY 30, 390 P.3d 769 (Wyo. 2017); Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, 334 P.3d 132 (Wyo. 2014) (Bear Cloud III); Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, 294 P.3d 36 (Wyo. 2013) (Bear Cloud II); and Bear Cloud v. State, 2012 WY 16, 275 P.3d 377 (Wyo.) (Bear Cloud I).
  • The Court highlighted Bear Cloud III’s “45/61” benchmark (as reiterated in Davis v. State, 2020 WY 122, 472 P.3d 1030 (Wyo. 2020)) for when a juvenile’s earliest parole opportunity (45 years, release at 61) may equate to life without parole. But the Court expressly avoided deciding whether that benchmark should extend to juveniles convicted of second-degree murder, noting only that Castaner’s sentence was “under the 45/61 standard.”
  • The defense also relied on Wiley v. State, 2020 WY 49, 461 P.3d 413 (Wyo. 2020), arguing that a lengthy minimum term could be a de facto life-without-parole sentence. The Court did not adopt that framing here because it resolved the statutory issue by limiting § 6-10-301(c) to life sentences and then addressed “unusualness” under Hicks.

2) The controlling Wyoming constitutional framework: Hicks v. State

The decision’s constitutional core is its application of Hicks v. State, 2025 WY 113, 578 P.3d 366 (Wyo. 2025). Hicks matters in two ways:

  1. It clarifies that Article 1, Section 14 is disjunctive: the challenger must show the punishment is either “cruel” or “unusual.”
  2. It establishes a bifurcated analytical method: “cruel” is assessed by gross disproportionality (gravity vs. harshness), while “unusual” asks whether the punishment is obsolete or contravenes contemporary standards measured by a clear consensus of state legislatures or courts.

Castaner conceded the “cruel” prong after Hicks issued, so the Court’s substantive constitutional work is concentrated on “unusual.”

3) Statutory interpretation and separation-of-powers cases used to confine § 6-10-301(c)

The Court relied on established statutory-interpretation authorities to hold that courts must apply the statute as written:

  • State v. Mares, 2014 WY 126, 335 P.3d 487 (Wyo. 2014) and Rock v. Lankford, 2013 WY 61, 301 P.3d 1075 (Wyo. 2013) for the primacy of legislative intent, plain-language interpretation, and harmonizing related statutes.
  • Matter of U.S. Currency Totaling $470,040.00, 2020 WY 30, 459 P.3d 430 (Wyo. 2020) for the rule against interpretations that render statutory phrases meaningless (used to preserve significance of “commutation ... to a term of years”).
  • Delcon Partners, LLC v. Wyo. Dep't of Revenue, 2019 WY 106, 450 P.3d 682 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Seherr-Thoss v. Teton Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 2014 WY 82, 329 P.3d 936 (Wyo. 2014)) for the proposition that courts cannot “legislate” by reading exceptions into statutes.
  • Sinclair Wyo. Refining Co. v. Infrassure, Ltd., 2021 WY 65, 486 P.3d 990 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Taylor v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 2003 WY 83, 72 P.3d 799 (Wyo. 2003)) to reinforce that departing from clear text risks substituting judicial views for legislative policy choices.

4) Illegality-of-sentence authorities

The Court anchored its “illegal sentence” review in a standard line of Wyoming cases:

  • Bush v. State, 79 P.3d 1178 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46 (Wyo. 1999)) for defining an illegal sentence and de novo review.
  • Sanchez v. State, 982 P.2d 149 (Wyo.1999) (citing Duran v. State, 949 P.2d 885 (Wyo.1997)) for the core definition of illegality.
  • Daugherty v. State, 44 P.3d 28 (Wyo. 2002) for the principle that courts can impose only what the Legislature authorizes.
  • Leger v. State, 855 P.2d 359 (Wyo. 1993) for the rule that unlawful sentence claims can be raised on direct appeal.

On indeterminate sentencing, the Court cited Cothren (quoted for the proposition Wyoming requires a minimum and maximum for felony term-of-years sentences) and relied on § 7-13-201. It also discussed Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46 (Wyo. 1999) to note why it did not need to revisit Ryan’s life-sentence/minimum-term holding: Castaner did not receive a life sentence.

5) “Unusual punishment” comparative authorities

For “obsolete punishment,” the Court invoked historical-form cases: In re McDonald, 33 P. 18 (Wyo. 1893) and In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), along with Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530 (Ind. 1998), to show that “obsolete” typically concerns the mode of punishment, not sentence length.

For “contemporary standards,” the Court referenced proportionality-comparison tools and the need for a “clear consensus,” citing: Norgaard (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 292) and Johnson to reject the notion that mere uniqueness makes a punishment unusual. It also used Tennessee v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022) as an example of a true national outlier in juvenile sentencing.

Finally, it examined other jurisdictions’ statutes and cases that either allow lengthy terms or have upheld them, including Armstrong v. Colorado, 2017 CO 51, 395 P.3d 748 (Colo. 2017), Louisiana v. Brown, 51,418 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/21/17), 273 So.3d 442, Nebraska v. Cardeilhac, 876 N.W.2d 876 (Neb. 2016), South Dakota v. Quevedo, 2020 S.D. 42, 947 N.W.2d 402, and a developing split illustrated by Michigan v. Eads, ---N.W.3d ---, 2025 WL 223470 (Mich. Ct. App. 2025) (appeal granted).

Legal Reasoning

1) The statutory holding: § 6-10-301(c) is triggered only by a life sentence

The opinion’s clearest rule is textual: § 6-10-301(c) applies only when a juvenile is “sentenced to life imprisonment.” The Court emphasized three interpretive moves:

  • Plain meaning controls. The statute’s operative condition—“[a] person sentenced to life imprisonment”—excludes term-of-years sentences.
  • Surplusage avoidance. Reading § 6-10-301(c) to cover term-of-years sentences would nullify the clause “after commutation of his sentence to a term of years,” because commutation would be irrelevant if the defendant already had a term-of-years sentence.
  • Separation of powers. Expanding a life-sentence parole statute into a general juvenile-homicide parole cap would be judicial legislation; the Court framed this as impermissible under cases like Delcon Partners, LLC v. Wyo. Dep't of Revenue and Sinclair Wyo. Refining Co. v. Infrassure, Ltd..

This reasoning draws a sharp line between Wyoming’s legislative remedy for juvenile life sentences (a guaranteed parole-eligibility point at 25 years) and the broader universe of juvenile term-of-years sentencing, which remains governed by the underlying offense statute and general sentencing rules.

2) The legality holding: sentence within § 6-2-104(a) and § 7-13-201

Once § 6-10-301(c) was held inapplicable, the legality analysis became straightforward: second-degree murder under § 6-2-104(a) authorizes imprisonment for “any term not less than twenty (20) years, or during life.” Under § 7-13-201, the minimum cannot exceed 90% of the maximum. A 42-to-75 year sentence satisfies both: 42 years is above the 20-year floor and below 90% of 75 (67.5 years).

The Court underscored the institutional point from Daugherty v. State: defining crimes and punishments is for the Legislature, and courts exceed their authority if they carve out juvenile exceptions not present in the statute (contrasting § 6-2-104 with the juvenile-specific limitation in § 6-2-101(b) for first-degree murder).

3) The constitutional holding: not “unusual” under Article 1, § 14 after Hicks

Under Hicks, Castaner’s concession that the sentence was not “cruel” narrowed the field to “unusual.” The Court then rejected two theories:

  • Not “obsolete.” Lengthy imprisonment is not an antiquated mode of punishment like whipping posts; the cited history cases deal with form, not duration.
  • Not contrary to contemporary standards by clear consensus. Even accepting Castaner’s state-by-state survey suggesting Wyoming is in the minority of jurisdictions, the Court found no “clear consensus” among legislatures or courts abandoning sentences of this magnitude for juvenile second-degree murder. The Court pointed to statutes and decisions allowing comparable or greater sentencing exposure and to ongoing disagreement among courts (e.g., the developing posture of Michigan v. Eads).

The Court’s approach signals that, after Hicks, “unusualness” is a demanding, externally anchored inquiry: Wyoming may be stricter than many states without being unconstitutional unless it is a true outlier in the sense of being rejected by a clear consensus.

Impact

  • Statutory clarity for juvenile term-of-years cases. The decision forecloses arguments that § 6-10-301(c) implicitly caps parole ineligibility (or sentences) for juveniles who are not sentenced to “life imprisonment.” Practically, this preserves broad judicial discretion within the statutory range for second-degree murder when the sentence is a term of years.
  • Constitutional litigation will pivot to Hicks’ “unusual” consensus test. Defendants challenging lengthy juvenile term-of-years sentences under Article 1, § 14 must assemble compelling cross-jurisdiction evidence of a clear consensus against such sentences—not merely show Wyoming is in the minority.
  • Unresolved question: Bear Cloud III’s 45/61 benchmark outside LWOP-eligible crimes. The Court noted the sentence falls under Bear Cloud III’s 45/61 line and explicitly left open whether that benchmark extends to juveniles convicted of second-degree murder (where LWOP is not available). Future cases may test whether “functional LWOP” doctrine is offense-dependent or broadly juvenile-status-dependent.
  • Legislative invitation (implicit). The Court repeatedly emphasized it is not its role to legislate. By highlighting that other states have enacted juvenile second-degree murder parole statutes (e.g., Massachusetts and Pennsylvania), the opinion implicitly points the policy debate to the Wyoming Legislature if a parole-eligibility rule for term-of-years juvenile homicide sentences is desired.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Indeterminate sentence (Wyoming). Under § 7-13-201, felony sentences (other than life sentences) must include a minimum and a maximum (e.g., 42-to-75 years). The parole board generally considers release after the minimum is served, subject to law and board discretion.
  • Commutation vs. parole. Commutation is executive clemency (typically by the governor) that changes a sentence (e.g., life to a term of years). Parole is conditional release granted by the parole board under statutory authority.
  • “Functional equivalent of life without parole.” Even if a sentence is not labeled “LWOP,” it may operate like it if parole eligibility is pushed so far into the future that release is unrealistic. Bear Cloud III used a benchmark (45 years to first parole possibility, release at 61) in an LWOP-eligible context; this case did not decide the doctrine’s reach for second-degree murder.
  • “Cruel” vs. “unusual” (Wyoming). After Hicks, a punishment violates Article 1, § 14 if it is either: (a) cruel (grossly disproportionate to the offense), or (b) unusual (obsolete or rejected by contemporary standards shown through a clear state-level consensus).
  • Clear consensus requirement. Being “in the minority” is not enough. “Unusual” requires a showing that most state legislatures or courts have effectively abandoned the punishment as impermissible.

Conclusion

2026 WY 25 establishes a concrete statutory rule with significant practical consequences: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) is limited to juveniles sentenced to “life imprisonment” and does not constrain term-of-years sentencing. The Court also confirms that, after Hicks v. State, Wyoming constitutional challenges to lengthy juvenile sentences will often turn on the demanding “unusual punishment” inquiry, requiring proof of a clear consensus across jurisdictions. In affirming Castaner’s 42-to-75-year sentence, the Court positioned Wyoming’s juvenile term-of-years homicide sentencing as constitutionally permissible absent stronger evidence that contemporary standards have decisively rejected such penalties.