§ 4C1.1(a)(7) Requires Defendant-Specific Firearm Possession Findings; § 2D1.1(b)(1) Enhancement Alone Does Not Automatically Bar the Zero-Point Offender Reduction

Case: United States v. Dominic Giannantonio (11th Cir. Feb. 27, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication)

1. Introduction

This appeal arises from Dominic Giannantonio’s guilty plea to multiple drug-trafficking offenses, including a conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and substantive possession-with-intent counts under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The charged conduct involved controlled buys tied to a drug trafficking organization led by co-defendant Eric Lemon and operating out of several residences in Saint Petersburg, Florida.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the firearm enhancement but vacated and remanded because the district court did not make the defendant-specific factual findings required by § 4C1.1(a)(7).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that the government satisfied § 2D1.1(b)(1) by showing firearms were present at the site of offense conduct and that Giannantonio did not prove a firearm-offense connection was “clearly improbable.” But the court emphasized § 4C1.1(a)(7) uses different, “defendant-focused” language and does not turn solely on firearm proximity or co-conspirator possession. Accordingly, the district court’s summary denial of § 4C1.1 (because § 2D1.1(b)(1) applied) was legally incomplete without findings that Giannantonio himself possessed (actually or constructively) a firearm or induced another to do so in connection with the offense.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review and guidelines interpretation

• United States v. Kluge and United States v. Dupree (en banc): cited for de novo review of the interpretation/application of the Guidelines—framing the appellate court’s role in parsing the meaning of § 4C1.1(a)(7) and its relationship to § 2D1.1(b)(1).
• United States v. Bergman and United States v. Moran: cited for the “clearly erroneous” standard governing sentencing factfinding—important because the firearm enhancement turned on proximity/presence findings at the 6th Avenue premises.

2) § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement framework (presence + burden shifting)

• United States v. Stallings: provides the key rule that the government meets its initial burden by showing a firearm was present at the site of charged conduct (not necessarily in the defendant’s hands). This anchors the panel’s approval of the enhancement despite the absence of evidence that Giannantonio personally handled a weapon.
• United States v. Graham: restates the burden-shifting approach (government shows presence; defendant must show the connection is “clearly improbable”). The opinion applies this structure directly.
• United States v. George: used to classify firearm possession under § 2D1.1(b)(1) as a factual determination reviewed for clear error, supporting deference to the district court’s proximity-based findings.
• United States v. Trujillo and United States v. Hall: reinforce that firearms need not be on the defendant’s person; proximity within the same premises and connection to drug activity can suffice.
• United States v. Fields: supports the inference that firearms function as “tools of the drug trade” and that their availability to protect drugs/participants links them to trafficking conduct.

3) Co-conspirator possession and relevant conduct principles (critical to the § 2D1.1 / § 4C1.1 split)

• United States v. Pham (citing United States v. Fields): confirms § 2D1.1(b)(1) may apply based on a co-conspirator’s possession, via relevant conduct rules. This is central because the panel contrasts that broad reach with the narrower, defendant-specific language of § 4C1.1(a)(7).
• United States v. Jews: cited to justify relying on guideline commentary where its validity is not contested; this matters because § 2D1.1(b)(1)’s “clearly improbable” test is driven by commentary note 11(A).

4) “Multiplicity of standards” for firearms in drug sentencing

• United States v. Carillo-Ayala: supplies the conceptual lens that different guideline provisions can impose different firearm-related standards. The panel uses this to reject the district court’s implicit assumption that § 2D1.1(b)(1) and § 4C1.1(a)(7) rise and fall together.

5) Plain-language reading of Guidelines text

• United States v. Rogers (quoting United States v. Fulford): invoked for giving guideline text its plain and ordinary meaning; the panel uses this to emphasize that § 4C1.1(a)(7) expressly targets what “the defendant” did.

6) Safety-valve analogy and consistent construction across guidelines

• United States v. Clavijo: interprets the safety-valve’s firearm disqualifier (U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(2)) as defendant-specific and explicitly distinguishes it from § 2D1.1(b)(1). The panel treats Clavijo as strongly instructive because the operative language (“the defendant did not possess ... or induce another participant”) mirrors § 4C1.1(a)(7).
• United States v. Martinez: supplies the interpretive canon that identical language in two guideline provisions is presumed to have the same meaning, supporting the panel’s conclusion that § 4C1.1(a)(7) should be read like § 5C1.2(a)(2).

7) Burden for obtaining reductions

• United States v. Wilson: used to assign the burden to the defendant to show entitlement to a reduction (here, § 4C1.1), which will govern the remand proceedings once the correct legal test is applied.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Why § 2D1.1(b)(1) was affirmed

The panel treated the firearm enhancement as a two-step inquiry rooted in the guideline commentary: (i) the government shows by a preponderance that a firearm was present at the site of charged conduct (or possessed during related conduct); (ii) the burden shifts to the defendant to show a connection is “clearly improbable.”

Applying this framework, the court found adequate proximity and availability:

• Firearms were found inside the same premises as the December 7 controlled buy location (the 6th Avenue house), in a room “immediately adjacent” to the outdoor courtyard used for sales—supporting that weapons were “present at the site” of offense conduct even if the transaction occurred outside.
• The organization stored significant quantities of narcotics in the house and used the premises to facilitate trafficking, making the presence of readily accessible firearms consistent with protection of contraband and participants.
• Giannantonio’s argument that he never “actually possessed” a firearm did not satisfy the “clearly improbable” rebuttal burden given the premises-based connection the court inferred from the undisputed record.

2) Why § 4C1.1 denial was vacated

The remand turns on a textual and structural distinction: § 4C1.1(a)(7) requires that “the defendant” did not possess a firearm (or induce another to do so) in connection with the offense. By contrast, § 2D1.1(b)(1) asks only whether a firearm “was possessed,” and Eleventh Circuit precedent allows that to include co-conspirator possession and mere presence at the site.

The district court denied § 4C1.1 solely because it applied § 2D1.1(b)(1), without making a factual finding that Giannantonio himself possessed a firearm (actually or constructively) or induced another participant to do so in connection with the offense.

The opinion underscores two doctrinal drivers:

• Plain text: § 4C1.1(a)(7) is explicitly defendant-focused (“the defendant did not possess ...”).
• Safety-valve symmetry: Because § 5C1.2(a)(2) uses the same defendant-focused language, and United States v. Clavijo holds that co-defendant possession triggers § 2D1.1(b)(1) but does not automatically defeat safety-valve, the panel reasoned § 4C1.1(a)(7) should be treated similarly.

The panel also flagged a structural point embedded in the opinion’s discussion: relevant conduct rules differ by guideline chapter. It noted that Chapter Four provisions (like § 4C1.1) are limited to “conduct and information specified” in the guideline, in contrast to the broader conspiracy relevant-conduct attribution that often informs Chapter Two enhancements (like § 2D1.1(b)(1)). This further supports the conclusion that § 4C1.1(a)(7) cannot be denied reflexively based on the broader § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement standard.

C. Impact

Although labeled “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision supplies a clear, practice-shaping lesson for sentencing proceedings within the Eleventh Circuit: firearm-related outcomes under different guideline provisions are not interchangeable.

• Sentencing procedure: District courts must make explicit findings responsive to § 4C1.1(a)(7)—i.e., whether the defendant personally possessed a firearm (including constructive possession) or induced another to do so in connection with the offense—rather than assuming that a § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement resolves the issue.
• Defense strategy: Defendants may still challenge § 4C1.1(a)(7) eligibility even if § 2D1.1(b)(1) applies, by focusing on the absence of defendant-specific possession/inducement evidence (and, where relevant, contesting constructive possession elements such as access, dominion, or control).
• Government burden allocation: While the defendant bears the burden to show entitlement to § 4C1.1, the government’s reliance on “presence at the site” or co-conspirator possession—often sufficient under § 2D1.1(b)(1)—may be insufficient under § 4C1.1(a)(7) without proof tied to the defendant.
• Appellate review: A record that lacks the necessary factual findings risks remand even where the overall sentence appears substantively reasonable, because the Guidelines calculation process must apply the correct legal test.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement: Adds 2 offense levels if a gun was possessed in connection with drug trafficking. In this circuit, it can apply even if the defendant never held the gun—so long as it was present at the site of the offense and the defendant cannot show the connection is “clearly improbable.”
• “Clearly improbable” (commentary standard): Once the government shows firearm presence/proximity, the defendant must affirmatively persuade the court that the gun had nothing to do with the drug offense (a difficult standard in drug-house contexts).
• Zero-point offender reduction (§ 4C1.1): A 2-level reduction for defendants with zero criminal history points who satisfy a list of criteria; one key criterion is that the defendant did not possess a firearm (or induce another to do so) in connection with the offense.
• Actual vs. constructive possession: “Actual” means physical control (holding/carrying). “Constructive” generally means the power and intent to exercise control—often inferred from access plus dominion/control over the place where the firearm is located (e.g., ability to enter, store items, control who has access).
• Co-conspirator possession: Some guideline rules allow a defendant’s offense level to increase based on what co-conspirators did if it was within the conspiracy’s scope and reasonably foreseeable. The opinion stresses this logic fits § 2D1.1(b)(1), but not automatically § 4C1.1(a)(7) given its defendant-specific text.
• Downward variance: A sentence below the advisory guideline range based on the statutory sentencing factors (not a guideline “adjustment”); here the judge varied downward but the sentence still had to be recalculated correctly due to the § 4C1.1 error.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s central contribution in United States v. Dominic Giannantonio is its insistence on provision-specific analysis of firearm-related sentencing consequences. The court reaffirmed the breadth of § 2D1.1(b)(1)—where proximity/presence and conspiracy context can support an enhancement—but held that § 4C1.1(a)(7) requires a distinct, defendant-focused inquiry. A sentencing court cannot deny the zero-point offender reduction merely because it applied the firearm enhancement; it must instead make the necessary factual findings as to whether the defendant possessed (actually or constructively) a firearm or induced another to do so in connection with the offense.