§ 3582(c)(2) After Amendment 821: District Courts May Deny a Zero-Point-Offender Reduction Based on § 3553(a) and Consider “Obstructive” Offense Conduct Even Without a § 3C1.1 Enhancement

1. Introduction

United States v. Carlos Rafael Tello Cedeno (11th Cir. June 5, 2026) addresses the limits of retroactive sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) following the Sentencing Commission’s creation of the “zero-point offender” adjustment in U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 (added by Amendment 821 and made retroactive by Amendment 825).

Cedeno, the master of a “go-fast” boat intercepted in international waters, pled guilty to a cocaine-trafficking conspiracy involving 787.6 kilograms of cocaine. He originally received a low-end guideline sentence of 168 months. After Amendment 821 became retroactively applicable, his amended guideline range became 135–168 months. Although his § 3582(c)(2) motion was unopposed and he requested a reduction to 135 months, the district court denied relief based on its view of the § 3553(a) factors, emphasizing the scale of the trafficking and the dangerous circumstances of the interdiction.

The central issues on appeal were whether the district court (i) clearly erred by characterizing Cedeno’s conduct as “dangerous obstruction,” and (ii) abused its discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors to deny any reduction despite Cedeno’s eligibility for the retroactive guideline change.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It held that:

  • The district court did not clearly err in describing Cedeno’s flight, jettisoning of cocaine bales, and the Coast Guard’s need to use disabling gunfire as “dangerous obstruction.”
  • The district court permissibly considered that conduct in evaluating the § 3553(a) factors, even though Cedeno did not receive an obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 at his original sentencing.
  • The district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors and denying the reduction; it was not required to give decisive weight to Cedeno’s rehabilitation or mitigating history, and its brief mention of an ICE detainer did not show reliance on an improper factor.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is built on a set of familiar § 3582(c)(2) and sentencing-discretion precedents:

Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010)

Dillon supplies the controlling framework: § 3582(c)(2) creates a two-step inquiry. Step one requires recalculating the amended guideline range as if the retroactive amendment applied at the initial sentencing, while leaving other guideline decisions untouched (tracking U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1)). Step two requires the court to consider applicable § 3553(a) factors and decide, in its discretion, whether a reduction is warranted.

In Cedeno’s case, step one was not disputed on appeal; the dispute was entirely step two—how the district court exercised its discretion after acknowledging eligibility and the lower amended range.

United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2017)

Caraballo-Martinez provides the standard of review: denial of an eligible defendant’s § 3582(c)(2) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. This standard is highly deferential; it frames the appeal as a challenge to the district court’s discretionary judgment rather than a re-sentencing on the merits.

United States v. Turner, 61 F.4th 866 (11th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Wilk, 572 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2009)

These cases supply the definition of “abuse of discretion”: applying an incorrect legal standard or making clearly erroneous fact findings. The panel uses them to reject Cedeno’s arguments that the district court’s “dangerous obstruction” characterization was factually mistaken or legally improper.

United States v. Marks, 156 F.4th 1169 (11th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1993)

Marks (quoting Hogan) supplies the “clearly erroneous” benchmark: reversal is appropriate only if the appellate court has a “definite and firm conviction” a mistake occurred. Applying that bar, the panel deemed it reasonable to view fleeing, forcing disabling gunfire, and jettisoning contraband as dangerous obstructive behavior.

United States v. Turner, 626 F.3d 566 (11th Cir. 2010)

This earlier Turner decision is the key bridge between “guideline enhancements” and “§ 3553(a) reasoning.” The panel relied on it for the proposition that conduct “underlying an enhancement” may be considered when weighing § 3553(a), even if the enhancement is not (or was not) applied.

This supports the court’s central move: Cedeno argued the district court effectively punished him for obstruction despite no § 3C1.1 enhancement; the panel responded that the court did not change the guideline calculation at step one and could still consider the conduct’s seriousness at step two.

United States v. Doyle, 857 F.3d 1115 (11th Cir. 2017)

Doyle is cited to reject any claim that the district court had to credit rehabilitation: a court may consider post-sentencing rehabilitation, but it is not required to do so. This matters because Cedeno emphasized his “spotless disciplinary record” and educational programming.

United States v. Ramirez-Gonzalez, 755 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007)

These cases reinforce that the weight assigned to each § 3553(a) factor is “committed to the sound discretion of the district court,” and the court of appeals does not reweigh the factors. This is the doctrinal core of the affirmance: Cedeno’s main complaint was weight, not legal error.

United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) and United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)

Cedeno argued the district court improperly referenced an ICE detainer. The panel cited Irey (quoting Campa) for the principle that abuse of discretion can occur if the court gives “significant weight” to an improper or irrelevant factor. But the panel found the reference to ICE detainer was passing and not shown to be outcome-determinative.

Guideline Authorities: U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1) and U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.5

The opinion ties the analysis back to the Guidelines themselves. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1) is the step-one constraint (substitute only the amended guideline; leave other guideline decisions unaffected). But U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.5 supports step-two discretion by noting some conduct may not warrant an obstruction adjustment, yet may warrant a higher sentence within the range—illustrating that “enhancement standards” and “sentencing-factor relevance” are not the same inquiry.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The decision’s logic is straightforward and notable for how it manages the tension between the limited nature of § 3582(c)(2) proceedings and broad § 3553(a) discretion:

  1. Eligibility is not entitlement. Even after Amendment 821/825 made Cedeno eligible and reduced his range, § 3582(c)(2) permits—but does not require—a reduction. Step two remains discretionary.
  2. “Leave guideline decisions unaffected” does not “blind the court to the facts.” Cedeno argued that by describing his conduct as “dangerous obstruction,” the district court effectively smuggled in a § 3C1.1 enhancement. The panel rejected this by separating:
    • Step one: no new enhancements; guideline range correctly recalculated to 135–168 months.
    • Step two: the court may evaluate the offense’s dangerousness and seriousness when applying § 3553(a), even if the same conduct did not yield a formal enhancement.
  3. Factual characterization is reviewed deferentially. Because the record showed flight, disabling gunfire, and jettisoning bales (requiring recovery operations), the “dangerous obstruction” phrasing was not clearly erroneous.
  4. Appellate courts do not reweigh § 3553(a). Cedeno’s main argument—that the district court put “too much weight” on offense seriousness and too little on mitigation and rehabilitation— is typically non-reversible absent a clear indication of irrationality, legal error, or reliance on improper factors.
  5. Post-sentencing rehabilitation is optional. The panel emphasized the district court was not required to discuss or credit Cedeno’s rehabilitation evidence.
  6. Incidental references do not equal improper reliance. The ICE detainer comment, without more, did not show “significant weight” on an improper consideration.

3.3. Impact

Although labeled “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the opinion reflects and reinforces practical rules likely to shape how Amendment 821 retroactivity plays out in the Eleventh Circuit:

  • Denials will commonly be affirmed where the district court ties its reasoning to offense seriousness and danger. Even when a defendant’s amended range drops meaningfully, a district court can deny relief by emphasizing the nature and circumstances of the offense and deterrence.
  • Defendants cannot “enhancement-proof” the § 3553(a) analysis. The absence of a formal obstruction enhancement at original sentencing does not bar later reliance on the same underlying conduct to deny a discretionary reduction.
  • Rehabilitation evidence may be insufficient without a compelling § 3553(a) narrative. Because consideration is discretionary, successful motions will likely require demonstrating why the amended range better satisfies deterrence, public safety, and respect for law—rather than relying primarily on good prison conduct.
  • District courts can write brief orders if they identify relevant § 3553(a) grounds. The affirmance signals that succinct explanations may withstand review when anchored in record facts.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
A statute allowing a court to reduce a sentence when the Sentencing Commission later lowers the guideline range and makes that change retroactive. It is not a full resentencing; it is a limited, two-step process.
Amendment 821 / U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 (“zero-point offender”)
A guideline change giving certain defendants who received zero criminal history points a potential two-level decrease, if they meet multiple listed conditions. It can reduce the guideline range.
Amendment 825 / Retroactivity
Makes the § 4C1.1 reduction retroactively applicable and sets timing limitations on when reduced terms may take effect (e.g., not before February 1, 2024, as referenced in the opinion).
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1) (“leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected”)
When recalculating the amended guideline range for § 3582(c)(2), the court swaps in the new guideline provision but does not revisit other guideline choices from the original sentencing.
§ 3553(a) factors
The statutory considerations that guide sentencing—offense seriousness, deterrence, public protection, defendant’s history, guideline range, and related policy concerns. At step two, they determine whether a reduction is warranted.
Obstruction enhancement vs. “obstructive conduct”
A formal obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 requires meeting specific criteria. But a court may still treat obstructive-like behavior (e.g., fleeing, jettisoning evidence) as aggravating under § 3553(a), even if it does not—or did not—trigger the technical enhancement.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Carlos Rafael Tello Cedeno underscores a critical point for Amendment 821 retroactive litigation: even when a defendant qualifies for the new U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 two-level decrease and receives a lower amended guideline range, a district court retains broad discretion at step two of Dillon v. United States to deny any reduction based on the § 3553(a) factors.

The decision further clarifies that district courts may consider serious or dangerous offense conduct—here, flight and jettisoning cocaine bales requiring disabling gunfire and recovery operations—as aggravating under § 3553(a) even absent an original U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 obstruction enhancement. In practical terms, eligibility for a retroactive guideline change is a doorway, not a guarantee: the ultimate outcome turns on discretionary sentencing judgments that appellate courts will rarely reweigh.