§ 2255 Relitigation Bar Blocks Collateral Relief Based on a Favorable Statutory-Interpretation Ruling Previously Offset by Plain-Error Affirmance

Precedents Cited

1) Due process and “not actually criminal” conduct

• Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001): Cited for the principle that a conviction and continued incarceration violate due process when the punished conduct is not prohibited by the criminal statute “as properly interpreted.” The panel acknowledged the “allure” of Jabateh’s argument under Fiore’s framing, but treated the procedural posture—prior direct appeal resolution—as dispositive.
• Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974): Used to reinforce that punishment for an act the law does not make criminal is a “complete miscarriage of justice,” potentially cognizable under § 2255. The court accepted the general proposition while holding it could not be used to circumvent the relitigation bar after direct appeal.

2) The § 2255 relitigation bar (issues decided on direct appeal)

• United States v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 1993): Quoted for the Third Circuit’s consistent position that § 2255 does not permit relitigation of issues presented and decided on direct appeal.
• United States v. Palumbo, 608 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1979): Provides the foundational statement of the relitigation bar and describes exceptions (e.g., change in applicable law; newly discovered evidence; incompetent representation preventing full and fair consideration). The panel relied on Palumbo both to enforce the bar and to define the limited exceptions.
• United States v. Travillion, 759 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2014): Reaffirms that issues resolved on direct appeal are not reviewed again in a § 2255 motion, while also recognizing that such issues may be used to support an ineffective-assistance claim.
• Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment): Cited for the general rule that federal prisoners may not use § 2255 to relitigate claims previously rejected on direct appeal.

3) Limits on collateral retroactivity arguments

• Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255 (2021): Cited (in a “but cf.”) in the Palumbo-exceptions discussion to emphasize the narrowness of retroactive application on collateral review (there, for new procedural rules). While not central to the holding, it supports the court’s restrictive posture toward expanding collateral review.

4) Ineffective assistance of counsel framework

• Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Supplies the governing standard; the court resolved Jabateh’s claim on the first prong (deficient performance), concluding counsel’s conduct did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
• Nguyen v. Att'y Gen. of N.J., 832 F.3d 455 (3d Cir. 2016): Quoted for the “strong presumption” that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.

5) Procedural default distinguished from relitigation bar

• Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) and United States v. De Castro, 49 F.4th 836 (3d Cir. 2022): Cited to define procedural default (failure to raise issues at trial or on direct appeal) and to distinguish it from the relitigation bar (issues raised and decided on direct appeal). This distinction undercut Jabateh’s attempt to import “cause and prejudice” into the relitigation-bar context.

6) The prior direct-appeal decision that shaped the posture

• United States v. Jabateh, 974 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2020): Central to both claims. It contained (i) the “groundbreaking” holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) does not apply to oral statements, and (ii) the conclusion that affirmance was required under plain-error review because the error was not “plain” given novelty and lack of authoritative guidance. The 2026 panel treated the latter determination as part of what was “presented and decided,” thus triggering the relitigation bar.

Legal Reasoning

A) Why the due process theory failed in § 2255 posture

The court accepted the general due process proposition (Fiore/Davis): incarceration is unlawful when based on conduct not criminal under the statute as properly interpreted. But it concluded that § 2255 cannot be used to re-run the direct appeal by extracting only the favorable part of the prior decision (the statutory interpretation) while discarding the dispositive part (no plain error).

The panel treated Jabateh’s motion as an attempt “to reassess the consequences of an issue presented and decided in his direct appeal” while giving “no effect” to the prior plain-error analysis. That is precisely what the Third Circuit’s relitigation bar forbids.

B) Exceptions to the relitigation bar—and why none applied

The opinion recognized Palumbo’s exceptions, including a “change in applicable law.” But it held that the Third Circuit has not applied that change-in-law exception when the purported “change” arises from the movant’s own direct appeal. In other words, a defendant cannot use § 2255 to capitalize on a favorable interpretive ruling from his direct appeal when that very appeal already determined the conviction stands under the applicable standard of review.

The panel also rejected Jabateh’s effort to analogize to “cause and prejudice” (a procedural-default doctrine). It emphasized that procedural default concerns claims not raised earlier, whereas the relitigation bar applies when the issue was raised and decided.

C) Why counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the statutory argument

Under Strickland’s performance prong, the question was whether it was objectively unreasonable for trial counsel not to argue that § 1546(a) excludes oral statements. The panel answered no for two related reasons:

• Textual plausibility at the time: The statutory phrase “under oath” can naturally refer to oral sworn statements, and the opinion cited examples (including the Oath of Office and dictionary usage) reinforcing that ordinary meaning.
• Novelty and difficulty: The prior decision itself described the interpretive issue as novel, requiring supplemental briefing and close inquiry, and found the error not “plain.” From that, the panel inferred that trial counsel’s failure to anticipate and preserve the eventual statutory limitation did not fall below professional norms.

Because Jabateh could not establish deficient performance, the ineffective-assistance claim failed without the court needing to address prejudice in detail.

Impact

• Strengthening finality after plain-error affirmance: The decision reinforces that when a defendant loses on direct appeal due to plain-error review—even while obtaining a favorable interpretation—§ 2255 is not an avenue to “upgrade” that outcome to vacatur by reframing it as a due process violation.
• Narrowing the “change in law” exception in this context: The panel’s statement that the Third Circuit has not applied the change-in-law exception when the “change” occurred in response to the movant’s own direct appeal may limit collateral efforts by defendants whose cases themselves generated clarifying statutory decisions.
• Guidance on Strickland and novel statutory arguments: The opinion underscores that counsel is generally not deficient for failing to raise an unsettled statutory argument, especially where the statute’s text provides a plausible contrary reading and the issue later proves sufficiently novel that appellate error is not “plain.”
• Practical consequence for immigration-fraud prosecutions: Substantively, the earlier direct-appeal holding (that § 1546(a) targets written statements/documents) remains highly consequential for charging decisions. Procedurally, this 2026 decision limits the ability of already-affirmed defendants to obtain collateral vacatur based on that interpretation.