“Stagnation Suffices” – Vermont Supreme Court Clarifies the Single-Step Change-in-Circumstances Standard under 33 V.S.A. § 5113(b)

1. Introduction

The Vermont Supreme Court’s entry order in In Re E.M., Juvenile, 25-AP-104 (Aug. 8 2025), addresses the termination of a father’s parental rights but, more significantly, articulates a concise clarification of the analytical framework courts must apply under Vermont’s juvenile code when assessing “changed circumstances” at the first stage of a post-disposition termination proceeding. The Court dispels any suggestion that § 5113(b) requires a “multifactorial” inquiry, holding instead that evidence of stagnation in parental capacity alone is sufficient to establish the required change in circumstances. The opinion also reiterates that a finding of reasonable efforts by the Department for Children and Families (DCF) is not a prerequisite to terminating parental rights.

The case arose after E.M., an infant born in August 2023, entered DCF custody following allegations of parental abandonment, domestic violence, and threatening behaviour by the father (C.M.). After roughly eighteen months of failed reunification efforts, the trial court terminated both parents’ rights. Only the father appealed.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court affirmed the family division’s order terminating father’s parental rights. It held that:

• The family court’s finding of “changed circumstances” based on stagnation in father’s parental capacity met the § 5113(b) threshold.
• The court correctly evaluated the four best-interest factors in 33 V.S.A. § 5114(a), emphasizing father’s inability to resume parenting within a reasonable time from the child’s perspective.
• Father’s argument that DCF failed to provide reasonable efforts— specifically by not arranging prison visits—did not undermine the termination order because reasonable efforts are not a condition precedent to termination.
• Any imprecision in the family court’s articulation of the change-in-circumstances standard was harmless; nevertheless, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to clarify the correct, streamlined test.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. In re D.S., 2016 VT 130 – Provides the two-step structure for post-disposition terminations (change in circumstances then best interests).
2. In re D.C., 2012 VT 108 – Recognises multiple routes to demonstrating changed circumstances, usually via stagnation.
3. In re B.W., 162 Vt. 287 (1994) – Defines stagnation as “passage of time with no improvement.”
4. In re R.W., 2011 VT 124 – Applies harmless-error review in termination appeals.
5. In re C.P., 2012 VT 100 – Declares that the reasonable-efforts inquiry is distinct from the ultimate best-interest decision.

The Court synthesised these cases to reinforce the rule that stagnation is itself a form of changed circumstances; no additional sub-elements are needed. By both citing and refining these precedents, the Court ensures that family divisions will adopt a uniform one-step threshold analysis.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two main parts:

1. Clarification of § 5113(b). Although the family court referred to two separate questions (lack of progress and stagnation), the Supreme Court declared that these considerations are interrelated expressions of the same concept. The statute asks a single question: “Has there been a change in circumstances requiring action to serve the child’s best interests?” Demonstrating stagnation through failure to make expected progress on the case plan answers that question.
2. Affirmance under § 5114(a). The Court reviewed each statutory best-interest factor, giving greatest weight to father’s inability to resume parenting within a reasonable time. The father had no verified progress on substance use, mental health, or domestic-violence accountability; he was incarcerated on multiple felony charges; he had not seen the child since infancy; and he predicted he would be ready in 18-24 months—an eternity to a two-year-old. Conversely, the child was thriving with his foster family.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

• Streamlined Hearings. Family courts can treat evidence of stagnation as ipso facto proof of changed circumstances, avoiding unwarranted segmentation of the analysis.
• Predictability. Lawyers and litigants gain clearer guidance on what evidence is necessary at the first stage, potentially reducing disputes and appeals focused on the threshold issue.
• Reinforcement of Child-Centric Timelines. By emphasising the child’s perspective when measuring “reasonable time,” the decision underlines Vermont’s commitment to timely permanency for infants and toddlers.
• Perimeter on “Reasonable Efforts” Challenges. The reiteration that reasonable efforts are not a prerequisite to termination curtails a common appellate strategy and aligns Vermont law with federal requirements under the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Changed Circumstances (§ 5113(b))

Before moving to the best-interest test, the court must find that something material has changed since the last disposition order (e.g., new problems or failure to improve). This decision confirms that simply standing still—stagnating—is enough.

Stagnation

A legal shorthand for “passage of time with no meaningful improvement in parental ability.” No new misdeeds are needed; failure to progress can justify termination.

Reasonable Efforts

Steps DCF must ordinarily take to help families reunify. Though important, Vermont law (and ASFA) permits termination even if such efforts fall short, provided it is in the child’s best interests.

Best-Interest Factors (§ 5114(a))

Four statutory considerations—relationships, adjustment, parental prognosis, and constructive role—used to decide whether a child should remain with or reunify with a parent.

5. Conclusion

In Re E.M., Juvenile fortifies Vermont jurisprudence in two critical ways: it crystallises the “change-in-circumstances” standard into a single-step inquiry satisfied by stagnation, and it reiterates that reasonable efforts, while important, are not a legal prerequisite to terminating parental rights. Practitioners should read this opinion as both a procedural guide and a policy statement prioritising swift permanency for young children. Going forward, parties will need to focus their energy less on parsing the mechanics of § 5113(b) and more on substantive evidence of progress—or the lack thereof—under the case plan. The Court’s child-centric lens ensures that delays born of analytical confusion will no longer impede a child’s path to a safe, permanent home.