“Arguable Probable Cause” in the Context of Domestic-Violence Injunctions:
The Johnston Clarification by the Eleventh Circuit

1. Introduction

In Deon Johnston v. Deputy Sean M. Carlson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit revisited the doctrinal contours of qualified immunity where officers misinterpret the reach of a domestic-violence injunction. The appellant, Deon Johnston, was twice arrested while attending a Sunday service at his long-standing church—events prompted by calls from his estranged wife, Nicole, who had secured an injunction for protection against domestic violence. Johnston sued three Pinellas County deputies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest. The district court dismissed his complaint on qualified-immunity grounds, and the Eleventh Circuit has now affirmed.

The pivotal issue: when a protective injunction’s wording is silent as to a particular location, can officers reasonably rely on Florida Statute § 741.31(4)(a)(2) (“within 500 feet of a specified place frequented regularly by the petitioner”) to arrest an alleged violator? The Court’s answer—yes, where the mistake of law is reasonable—adds practical guidance to the “arguable probable cause” standard.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court (Newsom, Luck & Anderson, JJ., per curiam) affirmed dismissal because:

• The deputies were acting within their discretionary authority.
• Although the domestic-violence injunction did not expressly ban Johnston from attending the church, Florida § 741.31(4)(a)(2) could be read—albeit mistakenly—to criminalize Johnston’s presence at a place he knew Nicole frequented.
• This interpretation supplied at least “arguable probable cause,” satisfying qualified-immunity doctrine.
• Therefore, Johnston failed to show that the deputies violated a clearly established right, and his § 1983 false-arrest claims were properly dismissed with prejudice.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) – reaffirmed that qualified immunity shields officials for reasonable mistakes of law or fact.
• Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991) – established that even a mistaken belief in probable cause can support immunity.
• District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018) – clarified “arguable probable cause” by asking whether a reasonable officer “could have interpreted” the law to permit arrest.
• Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014) – held that a reasonable mistake of law can justify a stop, foreshadowing the present extension.
• Garcia v. Casey, 75 F.4th 1176 (11th Cir. 2023); Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891 (11th Cir. 2022); and Washington v. Rivera, 939 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2019) – recent circuit treatments of arguable probable cause and qualified immunity.

These cases lay the groundwork: the officer’s immunity turns not on the correctness of the arrest, but on the objective reasonableness of the officer’s legal and factual assessment at the moment of arrest.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Discretionary Function Prong
   All parties conceded the deputies were on duty responding to calls—an easy satisfaction of the first qualified-immunity prong.
2. Clearly Established Law Prong = Arguable Probable Cause Inquiry
   The Court fused the two: if arguable probable cause existed, the law was not “clearly established” against the officers. The deputies:
   • Reviewed a facially valid, 12-page injunction with a bold “No Contact” directive.
   • Observed Johnston and Nicole simultaneously at a location he allegedly knew she frequented.
   • Consulted (at least in Carlson/Stickney’s case) each other before acting.
   Though the injunction never named the church, the statutory phrase “specified place frequented regularly by the petitioner” arguably covered it. The Court candidly admitted Johnston’s statutory construction was likely correct, but stressed that reasonableness—not ultimate accuracy—is dispositive for immunity.
3. Reasonableness of Legal Mistake
   The Court drew on Heien to endorse a space for “reasonable legal uncertainty,” especially in dynamic policing contexts. That three different deputies made the same interpretive choice on two separate occasions corroborated objectivity.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation and Law Enforcement

a) Domestic-Violence Injunction Enforcement
Officers often confront vague or lengthy injunctions in real-time. Johnston signals that when statutory and injunction language overlap ambiguously, courts will likely credit an officer’s on-the-spot, good-faith interpretation.

b) False-Arrest § 1983 Claims
Plaintiffs now face a steeper climb: they must show not merely an incorrect arrest, but one outside the zone of reasonable statutory interpretation. The decision reinforces that arguing pure statutory text—without an on-point precedent invalidating the officer’s reading—will seldom survive a motion to dismiss.

c) Qualified-Immunity Doctrine
The ruling tightens the nexus between the “arguable probable cause” standard and the “clearly established” prong, emphasizing practical policing realities over textual exactitude. Expect officers to cite Johnston when defending split-second injunction and protection-order arrests.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified Immunity – a legal shield for government officials sued for money damages, protecting them unless they violated clearly established constitutional rights.
• Probable Cause – enough trustworthy facts to lead a prudent person to believe a crime was being committed.
• Arguable Probable Cause – a qualified-immunity variant: would a reasonable officer believe probable cause existed, even if later proven wrong?
• Domestic-Violence Injunction – a civil court order restraining an individual from specific conduct (contact, proximity, etc.) toward the petitioner.
• § 741.31(4)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. – criminalizes entering “within 500 feet of the petitioner’s residence, workplace, or specified place frequented” in violation of an injunction. The words “specified” and “frequented” created the interpretive tension in this case.

5. Conclusion

Deon Johnston v. Deputy Carlson does not rewrite Fourth-Amendment doctrine, but it meaningfully clarifies its application in injunction settings. By holding that a reasonable misreading of § 741.31(4)(a)(2) confers arguable probable cause, the Eleventh Circuit:

• Reinforced the protective reach of qualified immunity for officers coping with ambiguous statutory or injunctive text.
• Placed on plaintiffs a heavier burden to demonstrate that no reasonable officer could have believed an arrest lawful.
• Provided law-enforcement agencies with practical reassurance when interpreting domestic-violence orders in the field.

Going forward, litigants challenging similar arrests must either (i) identify binding authority plainly foreclosing the officer’s interpretation, or (ii) show the officer’s reading was plainly untenable under the statute’s wording. Absent those showings, the Johnston Clarification will serve as a robust citation for immunity at the pleading stage.