A. Precedents Cited
(i) Statutory construction: Cadent Gas v City Fibre [2026] EWCA Civ 46
The Court reaffirmed an orthodox approach to construction: identify what a reasonable legislature sought to convey, with the statutory words
as the primary source, read in context (citing Cadent Gas v City Fibre [2026] EWCA Civ 46 at [27]–[29]). This framed the analysis of:
- what “protection” in s.25(3)(b) encompasses; and
- whether s.30(6) can be split into “proprietor” and “licensee” halves for the purposes of s.25(3)(b).
(ii) Accrual of the cause of action and limitation: Coburn v Colledge [1897] 1 QB 702 (CA) and Sevcon Ltd v Lucas CAV Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 462 (HL)
On limitation, the Court relied on classic authority that a statutory precondition to bringing proceedings is typically
procedural and does not postpone the accrual of the cause of action. In particular, in
Sevcon Ltd v Lucas CAV Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 462 (HL), the House of Lords held that a cause of action for patent infringement accrues
when the infringement occurs even though proceedings could not be brought until grant of the patent. The Court treated the same principle as
applying to trade mark infringement: infringement is actionable when committed; registration-application requirements do not shift the start
of the limitation clock.
B. Legal Reasoning
(i) The “waterfall” structure of s.30 and why s.30(6) is licensee-protective
The Court rejected the first-instance judge’s attempt to carve s.30(6) into a proprietor-facing component (first sentence) and a licensee-facing
component (directions to hold proceeds). It accepted the appellants’ characterisation of s.30 as a coherent “waterfall” of licensee protection:
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Route 1: the proprietor sues (and, by s.30(6), licensee losses are taken into account and proceeds can be
held for licensees);
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Route 2: if the proprietor does not sue when called upon, the licensee may sue (subject to s.30(2)–(5) as then in force).
The Court’s central point was that s.30(6) does not “protect” the proprietor in any meaningful sense, because the proprietor’s own loss is
already recoverable under s.14 TMA 1994. The only real function of s.30(6) is to enable recovery for losses suffered
by licensees in proceedings brought by the proprietor, with machinery to allocate those proceeds. Read as a proprietor windfall divorced from
licensee protection, s.30(6) would be unprincipled.
(ii) The effect of s.25(3)(b): no “protection of s.30” until an application to register is made
Section 25(3)(b) provides that until an application is made to register prescribed particulars:
“a person claiming to be a licensee … does not have the protection of section 30 or 31”.
The Court held that this language naturally covers the entirety of s.30’s licensee-protective scheme, including s.30(6). Accordingly:
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If the (sub-)licence is not the subject of a registration application, the claimant cannot enlarge the damages claim by invoking s.30(6) to
capture the (sub-)licensee’s losses.
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This applies even where the proprietor is the named claimant: the “protection” is still for licensees, and s.25(3)(b) controls access to it.
(iii) Ground 2: registration may be late, but limitation still bites
The Court accepted (and the appellants did not dispute) that:
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s.25(3) imposes no freestanding statutory deadline for the registration application; and
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following the 2006 amendment to s.25(4), registration can operate “retrospectively” in the sense that a licensee is not
substantively barred from claiming damages for pre-registration infringements (though costs may be affected).
But the Court drew a sharp boundary: the Limitation Acts still apply. Because s.25(3)(b) makes a registration application a
precondition to deploying s.30 remedies, a claim for licensee losses under s.30(6) must be rendered legally available
(by making the application) within the limitation period. A late application cannot revive a time-barred claim.
(iv) “Separate claim” analysis
The Court treated “proprietor’s own loss” and “licensee’s loss recoverable via s.30(6)” as different claims. Issuing
proceedings in time for the proprietor’s loss did not preserve, without more, a later-added claim for sub-licensees’ losses—particularly where
the damages inquiry initially sought “damages suffered by the Claimants” and only years later attempted to add unnamed sub-licensees’ losses.
(v) Practical fairness and litigation transparency
The Court considered the respondents’ position would allow the scope and quantum of the claim to remain uncertain deep into proceedings, even
potentially up to judgment, depending on when licences were registered and which licensee losses were asserted. The appellants’ construction was
said to promote transparency and fairness.