Unduly Lenient Rape Sentences: Domestic Abuse Aggravation and Totality Uplift for Multiple Sexual Offences

1. Introduction

In R v Akram [2026] EWCA Crim 732 (Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), Popplewell LJ, Linden J, and HHJ Jeremy Richardson KC), the Solicitor General referred a sentence as unduly lenient under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

The offender (anonymised in the judgment to protect the complainant’s statutory lifelong anonymity) was convicted after trial of: (1) rape (June 2023, lead count), (2) rape (winter/spring 2022/2023), and (3) assault by penetration (same earlier incident). The complainant (“V”) remained entitled to lifelong anonymity under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992.

The central issues were whether the original sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment (concurrent on both rapes) fell outside the permissible range, and how the court should treat (i) aggravating features in a domestic-abuse context and (ii) totality where there are multiple serious sexual offences sentenced concurrently.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal held that the original sentence was unduly lenient. It:

  • Granted leave on the Attorney General’s Reference.
  • Quashed the 4-year concurrent sentences on the two rape counts.
  • Substituted concurrent sentences of 6½ years’ imprisonment on each rape count.
  • Left the 2-year concurrent sentence for assault by penetration undisturbed.
  • Corrected the victim surcharge to £190; other ancillary orders (including a restraining order) remained.

The overall effect was to increase the total sentence from 4 years to 6½ years.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The judgment did not cite individual prior case authorities by name. Instead, it reiterated settled principles governing undue leniency references and sentencing methodology, anchored in:

  • Criminal Justice Act 1988, s.36 (Attorney General’s Reference jurisdiction).
  • Sentencing Act 2020, s.231(2) (custody must be the “shortest sentence commensurate with the seriousness”), emphasising that justified leniency is not to be condemned.
  • The Sentencing Council guideline for rape (including categorisation, starting points/ranges, and the limited role of “good character” in mitigation for serious sexual offending).

Although unnamed, the court’s articulation of the “unduly lenient” test reflects the orthodox approach: intervention is reserved for sentences that fall outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge, bearing in mind that sentencing is an “art not a science” and that appellate courts correct gross error, not mere differences of emphasis.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The “unduly lenient” threshold and the appellate function

The court reaffirmed that a sentence is unduly lenient if it falls outside the range that a judge, properly directing themselves on relevant factors, could reasonably impose. It also restated the policy rationale of the s.36 regime: correcting gross error, addressing legitimate public concern, and maintaining confidence where sentencing has departed substantially from usual norms.

(b) Proper identification and weight of aggravating factors in the lead rape

The trial judge treated the lead rape as falling at the lower end of the guideline range and found no “particular” aggravating features. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that the prosecution-identified aggravators were of “real weight”, including:

  • Domestic abuse / controlling relationship context: the rape occurred within an abusive dynamic involving persistence, coercion, and sexual entitlement.
  • Express acknowledgement of rape: when V said “you know this is actually rape”, the offender replied “Good”, underscoring culpability and disregard for consent.
  • Victim’s home as a place of safety: offending in V’s home heightened seriousness; she was entitled to feel secure there.
  • Child present in the house: while the child did not witness the assault, the court held it was not irrelevant—there was a risk the child could wake, and the presence of the child constrained V’s ability to escape.
  • Ejaculation despite an express request not to, and in circumstances where the offender was not wearing a condom; treated as a material aggravating feature.
  • Exploitation of relational and parenting context: while not “abuse of trust” in the technical guideline sense, the offender exploited the trust and access created by the prior relationship and ongoing co-parenting arrangements.
  • Consequences: it was significant that V ultimately had to leave her home due to fear and the impact of the offending.

A key doctrinal clarification is the court’s careful distinction between: “abuse of trust” as a guideline category feature (rejected on these facts) and “exploitation of trust/access” as an aggravating circumstance (accepted and given weight).

(c) Mitigation: clean record vs. “good character” in serious sexual offending

The sentencing judge placed substantial weight on the offender’s positive character references and lack of convictions. The Court of Appeal sharply confined mitigation:

  • The offender’s clean record at 26 provided the “only real mitigation”.
  • The rape guideline position—endorsed by the court—was that positive good character will not normally mitigate an offence of this seriousness.
  • V’s stated wish (at an early stage) that the offender not be “locked away” did not reduce seriousness or culpability; the later victim statement demonstrated the longer-term recognition and impact typical in domestic abuse contexts.

(d) Totality and the need for a meaningful uplift for additional offences

A central error identified was the failure to ensure the final sentence properly reflected the additional rape months earlier. Even where sentences are imposed concurrently, the overall term must still represent the total criminality.

The court held that the lead rape required a substantial uplift to account for the earlier rape (and associated penetration assault). The earlier incident involved similar coercive features and, importantly, more clearly engaged exploitation of child-contact arrangements as the offender used access linked to parenting to facilitate offending.

(e) The substituted sentence

“Looking at the matter in the round”, the court determined the least commensurate overall sentence was 6½ years, and substituted that term (concurrently) for both rapes.

3.3 Impact

The decision is likely to be relied upon in three practical ways in rape sentencing and in s.36 references:

  • Domestic-abuse context as a seriousness multiplier: coercive dynamics, sexual entitlement, and exploitation of continuing co-parenting access can require meaningful upward adjustment even where the relationship history is “complicated” or there was prior consensual sex.
  • Concurrent sentencing does not excuse lack of uplift: where there are multiple rapes on separate occasions, totality usually requires an increased headline term even if concurrency is maintained.
  • Character evidence has tight limits: courts should be cautious about treating “glowing” references as significant mitigation for rape; absence of convictions may mitigate, but positive character will “not normally” do so.

The judgment also reinforces careful analytical separation between guideline “category factors” (e.g., formal abuse of trust) and other aggravating circumstances (e.g., practical exploitation of access and vulnerability).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Unduly lenient: not merely “a bit low”; it means the sentence is outside the range reasonably available to a properly directed judge.
  • Totality: the final sentence must reflect the overall criminality across all offences. Concurrent terms can still require an uplift of the headline sentence if additional offences materially increase seriousness.
  • Aggravating vs. mitigating factors: aggravating factors increase seriousness/culpability (e.g., domestic abuse dynamics, ejaculation against express wishes); mitigating factors reduce it (e.g., genuine lack of previous convictions). Some commonly-invoked points—like “good character”—may carry little or no weight for very serious offences.
  • “Abuse of trust” in guidelines: a technical concept typically reserved for defined trust relationships; even where it does not apply, courts can still treat “exploitation of trust/access” as aggravating on the facts.

5. Conclusion

R v Akram [2026] EWCA Crim 732 confirms that rape sentencing must properly reflect domestic-abuse seriousness and that concurrency cannot be used to obscure the need for a real totality uplift where there are multiple rapes on different occasions. It also tightens the approach to mitigation: absence of convictions may matter, but positive good character will generally not. The substituted sentence of 6½ years illustrates the Court of Appeal’s willingness—via the Attorney General’s Reference procedure—to correct sentences that materially understate culpability and harm in intimate-partner sexual violence.