Spud Legs as “Deposited Objects” and the “Normal Navigation” Exemption under the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009

1. Introduction

Richards, R. v [2026] EWCA Crim 178 is a decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) (Andrew Baker J) refusing renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.

The applicant, Dean Gibson Richards, was convicted at Truro Crown Court (HHJ Carr) of an offence under section 85(1) of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 (“the 2009 Act”): carrying on, causing, or permitting a licensable marine activity otherwise than in accordance with a marine licence. The prosecution was brought by the Marine Management Organisation (MMO).

The factual background concerned the applicant’s use of spud legs (“pin anchors”) to hold a large barge in place on foreshore land at his property. The MMO had previously refused (and on appeal upheld the refusal of) a marine licence application for a residential barge mooring. The MMO later alleged that the barge was being held by spud legs driven into the seabed without a licence.

The core legal issues were:

  • whether the spud legs involved a “deposit” of an object “from a vessel” within section 66(1) of the 2009 Act (making it a licensable marine activity); and
  • if so, whether the activity was exempt under the Marine Licensing (Exempted Activities) Order 2011 (“the 2011 Order”), in particular Part 3, paragraph 22 (deposit “in the course of its normal navigation or maintenance”).

On sentence, the applicant challenged the scale of the prosecution costs contribution.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed the renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction, holding there was no arguable merit in the proposed grounds. In particular:

  • the trial judge’s direction that “deposit” does not have to be permanent was correct;
  • the judge’s additional explanatory remarks, though “clumsily expressed”, did not render the summing up unbalanced or unfair;
  • it was not arguable that spud legs were not objects deposited from a vessel; their integration with the barge (via welded housings/spud wells) did not prevent them being “objects” deposited onto/into the seabed;
  • it was correct that whether conduct remains within “normal navigation” can be a matter of fact and degree.

The Court also dismissed the renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence. The costs contribution of £15,000 was not arguably disproportionate, including given the specialist nature of the prosecution and the fact that the order represented only about two-thirds of counsel’s fees.

Additionally, the Court made a further order under section 18(6) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 requiring payment of £101.06 for transcript costs, but refused the MMO’s later application for its costs of the appeal hearing as not “just and reasonable”.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The judgment does not cite named appellate precedents. Instead, it proceeds by applying:

  • the statutory structure of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, particularly:
    • section 66(1) (what constitutes a “licensable marine activity”), and
    • section 85(1) (the offence of undertaking a licensable activity without a licence);
  • the exemption regime in the Marine Licensing (Exempted Activities) Order 2011, including Part 3, paragraph 22 (deposit in the course of “normal navigation or maintenance”); and
  • the costs power and “just and reasonable” approach under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (including section 18(6) for transcript costs).

The Court also referred to “the guideline” governing prosecution costs orders (without naming it in the text provided) to frame the compensatory purpose of such orders: reimbursing properly and reasonably incurred prosecution costs where it is just and reasonable that the defendant should pay rather than the public.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) “Deposit” as an ordinary word; no permanence requirement

A central point was the meaning of “deposit” in section 66(1). The trial judge directed (and the Court endorsed) that:

  • “deposit” is an ordinary English word to be given its ordinary meaning by the jury; and
  • deposit does not have to be permanent.

This matters because the spud legs functioned like anchoring devices: they could be dropped, driven into the seabed, and later removed/raised. The Court treated non-permanence as fully compatible with “deposit” for the purposes of section 66(1).

(b) “From a vessel”: spud legs as deposited objects even if part-integrated

The defence suggested the spud legs were “part of the barge” (because housings/guides were welded on), challenging the idea that there was a “deposit from a vessel”.

The Court rejected this as not realistically arguable. It reasoned that:

  • spud legs are properly viewed as “objects” deployed from the vessel to the seabed, in the same way as an anchor is an object from a vessel; and
  • the welded nature of the spud wells/housings was “neither here nor there” to whether the legs were objects deposited from the barge.

The practical effect is to prevent technical arguments about partial affixation to a hull from defeating the licensing regime where, in substance, an item is being placed onto/into the seabed from a vessel.

(c) The exemption: “normal navigation” as a question of fact and degree

The applicant relied on the 2011 Order exemption for deposits made “in the course of its normal navigation or maintenance”. The judge directed (and the Court accepted) that:

  • “normal navigation” is also to be given its ordinary meaning; and
  • it can become a matter of fact and degree whether conduct that looks like anchoring for navigation crosses into something else, considering factors such as:
    • the type of vessel,
    • the time it has been in place, and
    • the use to which it is being put.

This recognition of “fact and degree” is important for borderline scenarios: short-term anchoring as part of travel is paradigmatically navigation, but long-term stationing—especially for residential or quasi-permanent mooring—may fall outside “normal navigation”, even if the physical mechanism resembles anchoring.

(d) Burden and standard of proof: exemption on the defendant

It was common ground that once the prosecution proved the licensable activity, the defendant bore the burden of proving the exemption under the 2011 Order on the balance of probabilities. The Court treated the judge’s directions on this as correct and found no arguable unfairness from the judge not repeating burden/standard during an additional explanatory passage.

(e) Exclusion of MMO emails as inadmissible opinion

Although not pursued at the hearing, the Court recorded that the trial judge was right to exclude emails from MMO officers offering views on whether a licence was required, as they were “plainly inadmissible opinion evidence” on the legal question of licensability/exemption.

The underlying point is that legal classification under the statutory scheme is for the court/jury applying proper directions—not for informal administrative opinions to be adduced as if determinative.

(f) Sentence and prosecution costs: specialist counsel and proportional recovery

The Court upheld the costs contribution order. Key features of the reasoning were:

  • the costs jurisdiction is compensatory: to compensate the prosecutor for costs actually incurred in the reasonable discharge of its duty;
  • it was “neither unreasonable nor unjust” for the MMO to instruct specialist counsel in a specialist area;
  • the order did not require full recovery of counsel’s fees: the Court analysed the arithmetic to show only about 66.2% of counsel’s fees were effectively being recovered; and
  • comparisons to generic “guideline rates” do not necessarily answer the statutory question of what is “just and reasonable” in the context of a specialist prosecution.

The Court also exercised its power to order payment of transcript costs under section 18(6) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, but refused a further MMO costs application as not just and reasonable in light of the overall circumstances.

3.3 Impact

The decision has practical significance for marine licensing enforcement and for trial directions in environmentally-regulatory prosecutions:

  • Functional approach to “deposit”: equipment deployed from a vessel into the seabed (even if part-integrated with the vessel’s structure) can readily fall within section 66(1). This reduces the scope for avoidance arguments based on engineering integration.
  • Non-permanence is not a safe harbour: the Court’s endorsement that a deposit need not be permanent supports licensing control over temporary or periodically deployed seabed-intrusive apparatus.
  • “Normal navigation” is context-sensitive: the “fact and degree” framing signals that extended stationing (especially for residential or long-term use) may fall outside navigation-based exemptions even where anchoring devices are used.
  • Prosecution costs in specialist regulatory cases: the Court’s reasoning supports recovery of substantial costs where specialist counsel is reasonably engaged, and emphasises proportionality by reference to what is actually ordered (not merely incurred).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Licensable marine activity: an activity listed in section 66(1) of the 2009 Act that requires a marine licence (unless exempt). One such activity is “depositing” objects/substances in the sea or on/under the seabed from a vessel.
  • “Deposit”: placing an object onto/into the seabed. It does not have to be permanent; temporary placement can still be a deposit.
  • Exempt activity (2011 Order): some deposits do not require a licence if they occur during “normal navigation or maintenance” and do not fall within specified exceptions.
  • Burden on the defendant for exemptions: once the prosecution proves the elements of the offence, the defendant may have to prove an exemption applies (here, on the balance of probabilities).
  • Costs orders: orders requiring a convicted defendant to pay some prosecution costs, guided by what is “just and reasonable” and aimed at compensating properly incurred public expenditure.

5. Conclusion

Richards, R. v [2026] EWCA Crim 178 confirms a robust, practical interpretation of marine licensing controls: deploying spud legs into the seabed can amount to depositing objects from a vessel, and “deposit” does not require permanence. Whether an exemption for deposits in “normal navigation” applies is capable of being a fact-and-degree evaluation informed by the vessel’s nature, duration of stationing, and use. The Court also endorsed substantial but proportionate prosecution cost recovery in specialist regulatory prosecutions where the use of specialist counsel is reasonable.