Short‑Term Control Still a “Significant Role”: Plea Credit, Harm Category, and Administrative Surcharge Clarified in R v Adetoyi [2025] EWCA Crim 1393

Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

Date: 5 November 2025

Citation: [2025] EWCA Crim 1393

Introduction

This appeal against sentence concerns two counts of being concerned in the supply of Class A drugs (cocaine), contrary to section 4(3)(b) of the Misuse of Drugs Act. The appellant, Mr Adetoyi, was linked to two county lines operations: the “Diego” line (count 1) operating in Wiltshire and surrounding areas, and the “Troy” line (count 2) operating in Avon and Somerset over a short period in early 2024. He pleaded guilty to count 2 at the plea and trial preparation hearing (PTPH) and later to count 1 following a misunderstanding about potential discontinuance that was not pursued by the Crown.

At first instance, the judge assessed the appellant as occupying a significant role within the guideline framework, emphasising that he controlled the Diego line and that he possessed 17 bags of cocaine upon arrest in relation to the Troy line, together with drug-dealing paraphernalia. The judge adopted a starting point of 4½ years, uplifted for aggravation (previous drug supply convictions and commission while on licence) and applied a 20% discount for guilty pleas, ultimately pronouncing a total term of four years’ imprisonment. Some confusion arose on the transcript about the allocation between counts, but the total sentence was clear.

On appeal, the principal issues were: whether the starting point and role assessment (particularly for the Diego line) were too high; whether the wrong level of plea credit was applied (arguing for 33% on count 2 and that count 2 ought to have been the “lead offence”); whether sufficient weight was given to the defence bases of plea (including pressure and debt in relation to Troy); whether totality was properly addressed; and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive. A discrete ancillary issue arose in relation to the victim surcharge, which had been added administratively.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed the substantive sentence appeal, holding that an overall four-year term for two county lines counts, over a relatively short period, was not manifestly excessive. The court:

  • Upheld the categorisation of the appellant’s role as significant for the Diego line, notwithstanding the short duration of control, because he acted as a controller of that line.
  • Rejected the argument that harm should be Category 4, confirming Category 3 where supply is to end-users, irrespective of whether the appellant personally sold directly to users.
  • Accepted that 25% credit for guilty pleas would have been appropriate on the facts (given the early plea to Troy and the bona fide misunderstanding delaying the plea to Diego), but rejected a claimed entitlement to 33% credit in the absence of evidence of first-stage indication and given counsel’s stance at sentence. The court cited the Sentencing Council’s guilty plea guideline and R v Plaku [2021] EWCA Crim 568.
  • Held that even with 25% credit, a notional after-trial sentence of 5 years and 4 months for the Diego line alone would be well within the guideline range, so a global term of four years for both counts was not excessive.
  • Found no material delay in sentencing and no error in the totality approach.
  • Allowed the appeal only to the limited extent of directing that the record be corrected to remove a victim surcharge that had been added administratively but not imposed by the judge. R v Jones [2018] EWCA Crim 2994 governed the position: the Court of Appeal could not impose it on appeal owing to section 11(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.

Analysis

Precedents and Guidelines Cited and Applied

  • Sentencing Council Drug Offences Definitive Guideline: The court applied the guideline framework for supply of Class A drugs, particularly the role assessment (significant role for a controller of a line) and harm categorisation. For county lines supplying to end-users, the court confirmed Category 3 harm, rejecting a defence submission for Category 4.
  • Sentencing Council: Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea (Definitive Guideline): The court affirmed that one-third credit requires an indication of guilty plea at the “first stage of the proceedings,” usually the first hearing in the magistrates’ court unless the guideline’s exceptions apply. The absence of a Better Case Management (BCM) form on the Digital Case System (DCS) prevented proof of a first-stage indication in this case.
  • R v Plaku [2021] EWCA Crim 568: Cited to confirm both the need for a clear record of any early indication (through BCM) and the principle that 33% credit is reserved for a true first-stage indication. The court used Plaku to reject the appellant’s 33% credit claim.
  • R v Jones [2018] EWCA Crim 2994: Applied to hold that a victim surcharge added administratively, rather than judicially imposed, is unlawful. Despite section 42 of the Sentencing Act 2020 making the surcharge mandatory at first instance, the Court of Appeal is precluded (by section 11(3) Criminal Appeal Act 1968) from imposing it on appeal. The proper course is to correct the Crown Court record to reflect that no surcharge was imposed.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded from three anchors: the guideline structure for drug supply, the guilty plea guideline and case law, and the totality principle.

1) Role and Harm Assessment under the Drug Offences Guideline

A central appellate complaint was that the judge overstated the appellant’s role, particularly in relation to the Diego line, given that his control lasted only from 4 to 8 March 2024. The Court rejected this, holding that control of a drug line—even for a short period—properly places an offender within a significant role. This is consistent with the guideline’s emphasis on function and responsibility within the supply chain rather than mere duration. The appellant was described as “controller” of the Diego line, and the phone analysis corroborated his operational authority and mobility (travel to Southampton, Melksham, and Swindon), reinforcing the assessment.

On harm, the defence advanced Category 4. The Court disagreed: where the operation is selling to end-users, Category 3 applies, regardless of whether the individual appellant handled the final hand-off. The proper focus is the nature of the operation as a whole. This clarifies that defendants cannot de-escalate harm categorisation by disavowing personal end-user contact where the enterprise plainly targeted users.

2) Mitigation and the Relevance of the Basis of Plea

The basis of plea for the Troy line included significant pressure and threats arising from a drug debt connected to earlier offending (for which the appellant had received five years in 2021), continuing through custody and into release in Lewisham. The Court accepted that such pressure is relevant mitigation. However, the basis of plea for the Diego line did not assert pressure or coercion; it only limited the dates of involvement. The Court expressly noted the absence of pressure/duress for the Diego operation and concluded that mitigation there was “negligible.” This is a practical boundary-setting point: mitigation is operation-specific unless the evidential basis clearly spans multiple counts.

3) Aggravation and Recidivism

The judge took into account the appellant’s previous conviction (2021) for being concerned in the supply of heroin and cocaine, and the fact he offended on licence. The Court endorsed those as legitimate aggravating features. This aligns with the guideline’s treatment of relevant, recent, similar offending and offending on licence as aggravating.

4) Plea Credit: 25% vs 33%, and the Practical Role of BCM and Plaku

The Court indicated it was prepared to accept that 25% credit was appropriate overall: the appellant pleaded to Troy at the PTPH (the first Crown Court opportunity) and did not plead to Diego on that date only because of a genuine misunderstanding that the prosecution might discontinue that count. He later pleaded to Diego once the misunderstanding was resolved. However, the Court rejected the claim for 33% credit:

  • There was no BCM form on DCS evidencing an indication at the first stage (magistrates’ court), as required by the guideline and emphasised in Plaku.
  • Counsel below had accepted 25% credit, undermining the late claim for 33%.

Importantly, the Court treated the asserted credit misstep as immaterial to the overall justice of the sentence. Even applying 25%, the implied after-trial sentence for Diego alone would be approximately 5 years and 4 months (since a 25% discount to reach 4 years implies an undiscounted sentence of 5 years 4 months). That undiscounted figure lies comfortably within the guideline’s range for a significant role (starting point 4½ years, range up to 7 years). In short, the four-year global term was not driven by an erroneous credit calculation producing an excessive result.

5) Totality and Concurrency/Consecutivity

There was some transcript confusion about how the sentence was structured between counts (references to three years on count 1 and one year consecutive on count 2). The Court approached the appeal on the basis of the overall four-year term across both counts, noting the short duration of both operations and treating them together for totality purposes. The Court emphasised that the key inquiry is whether the total reflects the overall criminality. Here, the aggregate of four years was only ten months more than the guideline starting point for a single significant-role offence—yet it accounted for two discrete operations and aggravation, with limited mitigation. On that view, totality was not only respected but benign to the appellant.

6) Administrative Surcharge and the Limits of Appellate Power

The Crown Court record and monetary order showed a £228 victim surcharge. The judge’s sentencing remarks did not impose it. Because section 42 of the Sentencing Act 2020 makes imposition mandatory, clerical staff had added it administratively. That was unlawful under R v Jones. The Court of Appeal confirmed it could not correct the omission by imposing the surcharge itself owing to section 11(3) Criminal Appeal Act 1968, and directed that the Crown Court record be corrected to show no surcharge was imposed. The appeal therefore succeeded to that limited extent.

Likely Impact and Practical Significance

  • Short-term control can amount to a significant role: Those who take control of a county line, even briefly, can expect to be assessed at least as “significant role.” Duration is not determinative where the function within the operation is managerial or coordinating.
  • Harm Category 3 in user-facing county lines: Where the operation sells to end-users, harm will be Category 3 even if the particular defendant did not personally conduct hand-to-hand sales. This closes a common defence route seeking Category 4 by focusing on the defendant’s limited personal contact with users.
  • Operation-specific mitigation: Pressures such as drug debt, threats, or coercion must be clearly tied to each count. A compelling basis on one line does not automatically dilute culpability on another absent evidence that the same pressure explains the other offending.
  • Plea credit rigor and record-keeping: The case reinforces Plaku: 33% credit turns on a first-stage indication, which should be recorded on the BCM form and uploaded to DCS. Absent a clear record, appellants will struggle to secure the full third, even if they pleaded at PTPH and even where there were misunderstandings in charging or discontinuance.
  • Totality as a safety net: The Court’s willingness to affirm a global sentence despite identifying that 25%, not 20%, would have been the appropriate credit shows that harmless error will not necessarily disturb the overall term where totality produces a just and proportionate outcome.
  • Administrative surcharge cannot cure judicial omission: Listing officers and court staff must ensure that the surcharge is expressly imposed by the judge. If omitted, it is not open to administrative correction, and the Court of Appeal cannot impose it on appeal. The correct course is record correction, per Jones.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • County lines: Organised drug supply operations that move controlled drugs from urban hubs to smaller towns and rural areas, often using dedicated “deal lines” (mobile numbers) to coordinate orders and runners.
  • Being concerned in the supply: Involvement in the chain of supply, such as controlling a deal line, coordinating deliveries, or arranging sales, even without personally handing drugs to users.
  • Role assessment (significant role): Under the drug guideline, a “significant role” covers offenders with operational influence or management functions (e.g., controllers of a line), with some expectation of financial advantage, but not at the top of the hierarchy.
  • Harm categories: The guideline grades harm largely by scale and market impact. For supply to end-users, harm is generally Category 3; Category 4 is reserved for lesser activity not involving direct user supply or minimal quantities.
  • Guilty plea credit: Reduction in sentence for early guilty pleas. The maximum one-third reduction usually requires an unequivocal indication at the first hearing in the magistrates’ court. Pleas at the PTPH typically attract 25%, absent justification for more. BCM forms evidence the timing of indication.
  • On licence: An offender released early from a custodial sentence remains under licence. Committing further offences on licence is an aggravating feature.
  • Totality: The sentencing principle that where multiple offences are sentenced together, the overall sentence must be just and proportionate to the combined criminality. Courts can use concurrency or modest consecutivity to achieve that outcome.
  • Manifestly excessive: An appellate standard focusing on whether the sentence is so high as to be plainly wrong, having regard to guidelines and the facts. Minor errors which do not alter the just overall outcome may not warrant intervention.
  • Victim surcharge: A mandatory financial order imposed on conviction to fund victim services. It must be imposed by the sentencing judge; administrative addition is unlawful. The Court of Appeal cannot impose it if omitted (R v Jones).

Conclusion

R v Adetoyi clarifies three practical points for county lines sentencing. First, short-term control of a deal line still constitutes a significant role for guideline purposes; the focus is on function and authority rather than duration. Second, where the operation supplies end-users, harm is Category 3 regardless of whether the defendant personally undertook street-level transactions. Third, the upper limit of plea credit (33%) requires a recorded first-stage indication, consistent with the guilty plea guideline and Plaku; in the absence of a BCM record, a claim to the full third will fail.

The decision also restates that mitigation grounded in pressure or coercion must be clearly connected to the particular count in question, and that the totality principle permits the Court to uphold a global sentence even where a discrete component (such as plea credit on one count) might have been marginally more favourable. Finally, the Court reiterates the strict rule from Jones on the victim surcharge: a surcharge must be judicially imposed; administrative add-ons are unlawful and cannot be cured on appeal.

The appeal therefore stands as a measured reaffirmation of guideline orthodoxy in county lines cases, offering concrete guidance on role assessment, harm categorisation, plea credit practice, and the procedural integrity required for financial impositions. Save for correcting the unlawful surcharge, the four-year total sentence was upheld as proportionate and within the proper ambit of the guideline framework.