Sentencing Adults for Offences Committed as Very Young Children: Youth-Regime First, Not Adult-Starting-Point Discounts

1) Introduction

R v LIJ [2026] EWCA Crim 1053 concerned the correct approach to sentencing an adult for serious sexual offences committed when he was himself a child—indeed, between 11 and 13. The appellant was convicted of offences against two younger siblings: causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity (Sexual Offences Act 2003, s.8(1)) and rape of a child under 13 (Sexual Offences Act 2003, s.5(1)).

The central issue on appeal was whether the Crown Court erred by selecting adult guideline starting points and then applying a large percentage reduction for youth and immaturity, rather than starting with the sentence that would have been available and likely imposed under the youth sentencing regime at the time of offending, as required by R v Ahmed [2023] EWCA Crim 281 and the Sentencing Children and Young People guideline.

2) Summary of the Judgment

  • The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge adopted the wrong methodology: she began with adult guideline ranges and then reduced by 60% for youth and immaturity.
  • Applying R v Ahmed [2023] EWCA Crim 281, the court held the sentencer must first consider what sentence would have been passed on a child of the offender’s age at the time, including what custodial and non-custodial powers were actually available.
  • On the facts, custodial sentences should not have been imposed; a non-custodial disposal was appropriate.
  • The appeal was allowed: the total sentence of 7 years’ imprisonment was quashed and replaced with a 24-month community order (Building Choices programme; Rehabilitation Activity Requirement days), with no punitive requirement due to exceptional circumstances (custody already served pending appeal).
  • The Sexual Harm Prevention Order was reduced from indefinite duration to five years, and the court noted that notification requirements followed that duration by operation of statute (Sexual Offences Act 2003, s.103G as cited).

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

R v Ahmed [2023] EWCA Crim 281

Ahmed was treated as the governing authority. The Court of Appeal in LIJ relied on Ahmed’s core propositions:

  • Children “are not to be treated as if they were just cut-down versions of adult offenders”; youth culpability is qualitatively different.
  • The Children guideline applies to sentencing for offences committed under 18 even where the offender is an adult by the time of sentence; passage of time does not increase culpability at the time of offending.
  • Sentencers must consider what sentence would have been imposed on a child of that age, including statutory maxima and the sentencing tools then available.

LIJ is a practical application of Ahmed to very young ages (11–13), where the youth-custody gateway conditions (and the “last resort” principle) are especially restrictive.

R v Bowker [2007] EWCA Crim 1608

R v Bowker [2007] EWCA Crim 1608 was invoked by the appellant among “pertinent authorities”. While the judgment’s reasoning turned primarily on Ahmed, the inclusion of Bowker signals the continuing relevance of established principles on sentencing historic sexual offending and structured appellate correction where the first-instance approach fails to reflect the applicable framework.

Forbes (as referenced in Ahmed)

The court repeated Ahmed’s disapproval of a distinction (drawn in Forbes) between cases where no custody would have been available and cases where some form of custody would have been available. The point mattered here because, for an 11–13 year old, custody is not simply a scaled-down adult option; it is gated by statutory conditions and the “last resort” expectation, and may be unavailable altogether for certain ages or absent “persistent offender” status.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The required methodology: youth sentencing regime first

The court held the “starting point” must be Ahmed: identify what would have happened had the offender been sentenced as a child at the time. That involves:

  • Identifying the maximum sentences and custodial routes then available (and their preconditions).
  • Considering the full menu of youth disposals, not merely custody.
  • Applying the Sentencing Children and Young People guideline, including that custody is a last resort and “particularly rare” for those aged 14 or under.

(b) The statutory youth-custody constraints were decisive in practice

The court carefully mapped the youth sentencing architecture for ages 11–13:

  • For s.8(1) offences (counts 1–2), the maximum as cited was 14 years’ detention under s.91 Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, but s.91 detention requires the court to be satisfied that lesser youth disposals (e.g., YRO/DTO) are unsuitable, and it is Crown Court-only; in context, this meant custody beyond two years.
  • A Detention and Training Order (DTO) is capped at two years and (for ages 12–13) is only available if the child is a “persistent offender”.
  • A DTO is not available at age 11.
  • Non-custodial options listed included discharge, reparation, financial orders, and variants of Youth Rehabilitation Orders (YRO) including intensive supervision/surveillance or fostering requirements.

The court then addressed “persistent offender” under the Children guideline (paras 6.4–6.10 as quoted) and held that, given the appellant’s previous absence of contact with authority, it was likely to preclude a finding of persistence. If so, the youth court would have had to look to non-custodial options.

(c) The first-instance error: adult starting points plus a percentage discount

The sentencing judge:

  • Applied adult sexual offence guideline categories and starting points (including adult starting points of 6 years and 10 years for certain categories),
  • Identified aggravation/mitigation, and
  • Reduced by 60% for youth and immaturity.

The Court of Appeal held this was not the approach dictated by the Children guideline. The correct approach is not an “adult sentence minus a discount”, but a structurally different inquiry anchored in the youth regime and the offender’s child culpability at the time.

(d) Seriousness and harm acknowledged—but not a licence to bypass the youth framework

The court expressly recognised:

  • The seriousness of the offending and the lasting harm to both victims (as reflected in victim personal statements),
  • The breach of sibling trust and threats used, and
  • The appellant’s difficult childhood and mental health vulnerabilities.

Nonetheless, it concluded that proper application of Ahmed and the Children guideline revealed “very real limitations” on custody for an offender of this age at the time, and that a non-custodial option was the correct disposal.

(e) Orders ancillary to sentence: minimum necessary duration

After receiving written submissions, the court held that where a Sexual Harm Prevention Order is indefinite, the notification period is driven by it and is also indefinite (Sexual Offences Act 2003, s.103G as cited). However, applying the principle that such orders must be for the minimum period necessary, and taking account of the offender’s age at offending and current age, the SHPO was reduced to five years, with notification requirements accordingly reduced (the judgment references s.104G in this context).

3.3 Impact

  • Methodological discipline in historic youth offending: The decision reinforces that courts must not “back into” a youth-appropriate sentence via percentage reductions from adult guidelines. The sentencing exercise must begin with the youth framework and available disposals at the time.
  • Practical significance for very young ages (11–13): The case highlights how statutory gating (DTO availability, “persistent offender” requirements, and s.91 conditions) can make immediate custody unavailable or inappropriate, even for grave sexual offending, depending on the youth regime and the child’s prior record/contact with authority.
  • Greater scrutiny of “persistent offender” findings: Courts are reminded that persistence is not automatic from multiple allegations; the guideline stresses prior opportunities to address behaviour and prior contact with authority, which may be absent in intra-familial abuse disclosed years later.
  • Ancillary order proportionality: The reduction of an indefinite SHPO to five years underscores active appellate oversight of duration, including the knock-on effect for notification requirements.
  • Advocacy expectations: The court’s observation that the judge was not assisted “in the way that she should have been” signals that counsel should provide structured assistance on historical youth sentencing powers and constraints, not only adult guideline analysis.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

“Sentencing adults for offences committed as a child”
Even if the defendant is an adult at sentence, the law requires the court to treat the offender as having child culpability at the time and to apply the Sentencing Children and Young People guideline unless contrary to the interests of justice (as reflected in Ahmed and s.59(1) Sentencing Code, quoted in Ahmed).
Detention and Training Order (DTO)
A youth custodial sentence with a maximum length of two years. For some ages (including 12–14), it is only available if the child is a “persistent offender”.
“Persistent offender” (youth)
Not defined in statute; the guideline expects prior contact with authority (previous findings of guilt or admissions via certain disposals). Multiple offences in one sentencing occasion can sometimes qualify, but courts must consider whether the child had any prior opportunity to address offending before using custody options reserved for persistent offenders.
s.91 Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 detention
A route to longer youth detention for specified serious offences, but only if the court considers other youth sentences (such as YRO/DTO) unsuitable, and it is imposed in the Crown Court.
Principle of totality
Sentences for multiple offences must be just and proportionate overall; consecutive terms should not produce an excessive total. In this appeal, the core error was more fundamental (wrong framework), but the case sits alongside totality concerns in multi-count historic sentencing.
Sexual Harm Prevention Order (SHPO) and notification requirements
An SHPO is a protective order imposing restrictions to prevent sexual harm. Notification requirements (often called “sex offender registration”) can be driven by the sentence and/or the existence and duration of such orders; here the court treated the notification period as tracking the SHPO duration (per s.103G as cited) and reduced both by limiting the SHPO to five years.

5) Conclusion

[2026] EWCA Crim 1053 confirms that when sentencing an adult for offences committed at ages 11–13, courts must begin with the youth sentencing regime that applied at the time and the sentence that would likely have been imposed on a child of that age, rather than applying adult guideline starting points and then discounting. The case is a strong reminder that, even for grave sexual offending with profound harm, custody for very young offenders is tightly constrained by statute and guideline principle, and that protective ancillary orders must be set for the minimum period necessary.