Sanctions-Based Travel Bans Defeat “Presence” for Common Law Jurisdiction: Service at UK “Usual Residence” Invalid Without Permission to Serve Out

1. Introduction

Fridman v Agrofirma Oniks LLC & Anor [2026] EWCA Civ 139 addresses a sharp jurisdictional question created by modern sanctions regimes: can an English claimant validly serve a claim form “within the jurisdiction” at a London residence when the defendant has been sanctioned and is subject to a statutory travel ban preventing lawful re-entry to the UK?

The appellant, Mr Mikhail Fridman, had lived at Athlone House, Hampstead and owned it, but from March 2022 was designated under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 and became an “excluded person” under section 8B of the Immigration Act 1971, cancelling his leave and prohibiting entry (the “Travel Ban”). The claimants served at Athlone House under CPR r 6.9.

At first instance, Bryan J held service valid and rejected a CPR Part 11 jurisdiction challenge ([2025] EWHC 300 (Comm)). The Court of Appeal (Civil Division) allowed Mr Fridman’s appeal, holding that—despite technical compliance with CPR service rules—the court lacked personal jurisdiction as of right because the common law requirement of “presence” was not satisfied where absence was indefinite and state-enforced.

Key issues

  • Whether, at common law, an individual can be served “within the jurisdiction” when not physically present, and specifically when legally barred from re-entering.
  • Whether the CPR (notably CPR r 6.9) supersede or displace the common law/international-law territoriality principle underpinning personal jurisdiction.
  • How to reconcile conflicting Court of Appeal authority on “presence” and service: Kamali v City & Country Properties Ltd versus SSL International Plc v TTK LIG Ltd.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal held:

  • The “presence” requirement for service within the jurisdiction is not merely procedural; it is a substantive jurisdictional principle rooted in international law and territoriality (paras 72–77).
  • The CPR do not, without clear words, abrogate that principle; they must be interpreted against the background presumption against extraterritoriality and international comity (paras 47–55, 72–76).
  • A sanctioned “excluded person” subject to an indefinite travel ban is not “present” in England and Wales in the relevant sense, even if he owns, staffs, and intends to return to a UK home; his absence is not “temporary” (paras 79–94).
  • Accordingly, service at Athlone House under CPR r 6.9 did not found personal jurisdiction “as of right”; claimants must seek permission to serve out under CPR r 6.36 and relevant PD 6B gateways, and may then seek CPR r 6.15 alternative/substituted service (paras 95–96).

The appeal was allowed (para 96), with Phillips LJ and Sir Launcelot Henderson agreeing (paras 97–98).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) Foundational international-law/territoriality authorities

  • Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v Rajah of Faridkote [1894] AC 670
    Role in this case: Treated as the deep source of the “presence/subjection” concept. The Court of Appeal relied on its statement that jurisdiction in personam is territorial; it “does not follow” a person after withdrawal to another independent country, absent submission or another recognized basis. This anchored “presence” as a rule of substantive jurisdiction recognized internationally, not a mere service formality (paras 32–35).
  • Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation Ltd v Sedgwick, Collins & Co Ltd [1927] AC 95
    Role: Used to show the international-law consequences of service: valid jurisdiction (for recognition abroad) arises when the defendant is within the territorial jurisdiction at service, absent submission (paras 34–35). It reinforced that the rule is not “just procedure”; it matters to recognition and legitimacy.
  • Re Sawers (1879) 12 Ch D 522
    Role: Provided the classic articulation of territorial legislative reach: English rules bind foreigners who come within allegiance; not those abroad (paras 36–37). The Court of Appeal treated this as equally applicable to “subordinate legislation such as rules of court” (para 37), supporting a restrictive reading of the CPR.
  • Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433
    Role: Central support for the reciprocity principle (“protection and subjection are reciprocal”; the “rough with the smooth”) (paras 31, 88–89). The Court used Adams to explain why amenability is linked to voluntary physical presence and benefit from local law—then applied that logic to a person excluded by the state.

(b) Modern jurisdiction and service principles

  • Airbus Industries GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119
    Role: Cited for the baseline proposition that English jurisdiction is founded on presence, supplemented by specified “serve out” circumstances (para 26).
  • Stichting Shell Pensioenfonds v Krys [2014] UKPC 41, [2015] AC 616
    Role: Used to restate amenability: presence, service out, or submission (para 27). It supported the architecture: “serve within” is not free-standing; it sits alongside service out and submission.
  • Chellaram v Chellaram (No 2) [2002] EWHC 632 (Ch), [2002] 3 All ER 17
    Role: Presented the “fundamental rule” formulation that service within the jurisdiction requires presence at service or deemed service (para 25). The Court of Appeal ultimately endorsed its core thrust, but with the SSL qualification that “temporary absence” does not negate presence (paras 65–67, 77).

(c) The service-by-post line and the CPR “code” debate

  • Barclays Bank of Swaziland Ltd v Hahn [1989] 1 WLR 506
    Role: A pivotal anchor. The House of Lords accepted the appellant’s proposition that presence is a “substantive jurisdictional requirement” not altered by the introduction of postal service; otherwise service rules could “outflank” the controlled regime for service out (paras 40–42, 73–76). The Court of Appeal here treated Barclay’s acceptance of the jurisdictional premise as underappreciated in later cases (paras 73–76).
  • Rolph v Zolan [1993] 1 WLR 1305
    Role: Held county court rules permitted postal service to last known address even if defendant emigrated, provided received abroad. The present Court of Appeal treated Rolph (and later reliance on it) as problematic when set against the House of Lords’ jurisdictional analysis in Barclays Bank of Swaziland Ltd v Hahn (paras 45–46, 76).
  • Okura & Co Ltd v Forsbacka Jernverks AB [1914] 1 KB 715
    Role: Provided interpretive method: rules of court in jurisdiction questions are assumed to reflect “broad principles of international comity” (para 47).
  • Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd (No 4) [2009] UKHL 876, [2010] 1 AC 90
    Role: Crucial for interpretive presumption: even if the rule-making power could theoretically extend extra-territorial reach, the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to CPR interpretation (para 48). This undercut the approach in Kamali (para 76).

(d) The conflicting Court of Appeal authorities: Kamali vs SSL

  • Kamali v City & Country Properties Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1879, [2007] 1 WLR 1219
    Role: Held CPR Pt 6 did not require defendant to be within the jurisdiction at time of postal service; suggested earlier “presence” principle had not survived CPR (paras 56–62). The present Court of Appeal found this reasoning inconsistent with (i) the territoriality/international-law basis of jurisdiction, and (ii) later House of Lords acceptance of territorial presumptions in CPR interpretation (Masri) (paras 72–76).
  • SSL International Plc v TTK LIG Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1170, [2012] 1 WLR 1842
    Role: Preferred and followed. SSL affirmed that, absent specific service-out provision, courts exercise jurisdiction only over those “within” the jurisdiction in a meaningful sense, while recognizing that temporary absence (e.g., holiday) does not negate amenability (paras 65–67). The present Court treated SSL as consistent with international comity and with Barclays Bank of Swaziland Ltd v Hahn (paras 76–77).

(e) Other supporting first-instance/tribunal decisions

  • Clavis Liberty Fund 1 LP v HMRC [2015] UKUT 72 (TCC), [2015] 1 WLR 2949
    Role: Interpreted procedural rules against the background of common law jurisdiction limits (para 69), supporting the Court’s approach here.
  • The Libyan Investment Authority v Société Générale [2017] EWHC 781 (Comm)
    Role: Noted as following Clavis (para 69), reinforcing a consistent line that CPR must be read with jurisdictional background principles.
  • Broom v Aguilar [2024] EWHC 1764, [2025] BPIR 4
    Role: Endorsed as correctly applying the “fundamental rule” (para 70), and singled out as the exception that did not ignore the jurisdictional foundation.
  • Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1407, [2003] QB 679 and Nasrullah v Rashid [2018] EWCA Civ 2685, [2020] Ch 37
    Role: Cited for the court’s obligation to follow House of Lords authority over inconsistent Court of Appeal decisions (para 76). This justified departing from Kamali/Rolph insofar as irreconcilable with Barclays Bank of Swaziland Ltd v Hahn.

(f) Authorities used to assess “intention” and sanction duration

  • Cunliffe v Goodman [1950] 2 KB 237
    Role: Applied to demote “intention to return” where the outcome is beyond the person’s control (paras 90–91). This was key to rejecting reliance on Mr Fridman’s stated intention to return while legally excluded.
  • Dalston Projects Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport [2024] EWCA Civ 172, [2024] 1 WLR 3327 and PJSC National Bank Trust v Mints [2023] EWCA Civ 1132, [2024] 3 WLR 714
    Role: Used to characterize sanctions as “severe and open-ended” and of uncertain duration (para 93), supporting the conclusion that exclusion was not “temporary.”

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(i) Service rules vs jurisdiction: why CPR compliance was not enough

A central contribution of the judgment is its insistence on separating: (a) compliance with procedural service rules, from (b) the deeper question of whether the defendant is amenable to the court’s personal jurisdiction.

The Court accepted that service is often described as what “creates” or “crystallises” jurisdiction (paras 24, 28), but it emphasized that service under the CPR does not conclusively settle jurisdiction because service can be set aside and jurisdiction denied on substantive grounds (para 29). This matters acutely where a claimant attempts to use an “in-territory” service rule to achieve what is substantively an extra-territorial assertion of power.

(ii) The presumption of territoriality and international comity governs CPR interpretation

The Court treated the “presence” requirement as rooted in international law and territoriality (paras 32–37, 72–73), and applied the interpretive approach in Okura & Co Ltd v Forsbacka Jernverks AB and Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd (No 4): absent clear words, the CPR should not be construed to extend English courts’ reach over persons abroad (paras 47–48, 51–55, 72–76).

This reasoning directly answered the respondents’ notice point: the Court rejected the notion that CPR r 6.9 could, by itself, supersede the common law/international-law jurisdictional limitation (paras 20–21, 72–78). The CPR may regulate “how” service is performed, but cannot be read as silently expanding “who” can be compelled to answer in England and Wales.

(iii) Reconciling and choosing between Kamali and SSL

The Court identified a genuine conflict: Kamali v City & Country Properties Ltd suggested the “presence” limitation did not survive the CPR, whereas SSL International Plc v TTK LIG Ltd treated the limitation as fundamental and surviving (para 76).

It preferred SSL for three linked reasons:

  • Doctrinal coherence: SSL aligns with the international-law basis of territorial jurisdiction (paras 72–76).
  • Hierarchy of authority: Kamali/Rolph were seen as irreconcilable with the House of Lords’ acceptance in Barclays Bank of Swaziland Ltd v Hahn that presence is a substantive jurisdictional requirement (paras 73–76).
  • Modern interpretive constraint: after Masri, the presumption against extraterritoriality in CPR interpretation cannot be ignored (para 76).

(iv) “Temporary absence” has narrow scope—and exclusion by the state is not temporary

The Court accepted the important qualification that temporary absence does not necessarily negate “presence” (paras 79–80). But it confined that concept to a relatively narrow and realistic category (para 81)—the typical example being holidays or trips where return is lawfully available.

The decisive feature here was the Travel Ban under section 8B of the Immigration Act 1971: Mr Fridman was not entitled to enter the UK (paras 4, 80–81). The Court accepted the submission that it would be legally incoherent for the state to deny lawful entry while the courts treat him as “present” for founding compulsory jurisdiction (para 80).

(v) Intention to return vs hope: applying Cunliffe v Goodman

The first-instance judge gave significant weight to Mr Fridman’s stated intention to return (paras 9–10, 90). The Court of Appeal held this was an error of evaluative approach because it failed to assess whether the intention could be effectuated. Under Cunliffe v Goodman, one cannot “intend” a result wholly beyond one’s control; at most one can hope for it (para 90).

Sanctions were described (by reference to Dalston Projects Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport and PJSC National Bank Trust v Mints) as open-ended and of uncertain duration (para 93). The combination of indefinite designation, required removal of that designation, and a further need to apply for leave to enter meant there was a “formidable succession of fences” (para 90) between aspiration and actual return.

(vi) Practical consequences: permission to serve out, then substituted service if appropriate

The Court’s disposition was not that Mr Fridman is unreachable; rather, the correct procedural architecture must be followed: if he is abroad and not “present”, claimants must seek permission to serve out under CPR r 6.36 and PD 6B gateways (para 95). If permission is granted, claimants may then apply for CPR r 6.15 substituted/alternative service at Athlone House (para 95).

This preserves the structural distinction between: service within (territorial jurisdiction as of right) and service out (controlled, court-supervised extension).

3.3 Impact

(a) A clear rule for sanctioned/excluded individuals

The judgment establishes a strong precedent that an indefinite, state-imposed travel ban preventing lawful entry will ordinarily mean the person is not “present” in England and Wales for founding personal jurisdiction as of right, even if the person owns and maintains a UK residence. This materially affects litigation strategies against sanctioned persons with UK assets and UK homes.

(b) Re-assertion of the territoriality constraint on CPR service provisions

The Court re-centres the presumption that procedural rules should not be read to expand substantive jurisdiction absent clear language. In practical terms, claimants cannot safely rely on CPR r 6.9 (“usual or last known residence”) to avoid the service-out regime when the defendant is abroad.

(c) Doctrinal resolution: SSL preferred over Kamali in cases of genuine foreign absence

While Kamali remains historically influential, this decision narrows the circumstances in which it can be relied upon and indicates that, where Kamali implies CPR displaced territorial “presence,” it should not be followed when inconsistent with Barclays Bank of Swaziland Ltd v Hahn and the extraterritoriality presumption recognized in Masri. Future disputes about serving defendants “at” English addresses while they live abroad are likely to be argued through this lens.

(d) Litigation management and fairness

By requiring court permission to serve out, the decision increases judicial supervision in cases that are substantively international: forum appropriateness, gateways, and method of service will be examined, rather than being achieved by a unilateral in-territory posting. This may reduce default-judgment risk where the defendant is abroad, while still permitting effective substituted service if justified.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Personal jurisdiction in personam”: the court’s power to make orders binding a person (e.g., to pay money), as distinct from power over property.
  • “Presence”: traditionally physical presence at service, but qualified so that short, ordinary, lawful absences (holiday, brief travel) do not end amenability. This case draws a line where absence is indefinite and legally enforced.
  • “Territoriality”: the principle that courts’ compulsory power is normally limited to persons within their territory unless a recognized extension applies (submission, statute, treaty, or permission to serve out).
  • CPR r 6.9 (“usual or last known residence”): a rule about where to serve when personal service is not required and no authorised solicitor exists. This judgment stresses that r 6.9 cannot be used to bypass the separate jurisdictional requirement of presence (or the supervised service-out regime).
  • Service out (CPR r 6.36; PD 6B “gateways”): the controlled mechanism for bringing a person abroad before the English court, requiring permission and satisfaction of specified connecting factors.
  • Substituted/alternative service (CPR r 6.15): once the court has power to bring the defendant before it (often after permission to serve out), it can permit service by an alternative method or at an alternative place (including, potentially, the UK property) if that is likely to bring the claim to the defendant’s attention.
  • “Intention” vs “hope” (Cunliffe v Goodman): you cannot “intend” something you cannot practically bring about; legal barriers can reduce “intention” to mere aspiration.

5. Conclusion

Fridman v Agrofirma Oniks LLC & Anor reasserts a jurisdictional boundary with particular force in the sanctions context: service within the jurisdiction presupposes the defendant’s meaningful presence within it, and the CPR will not be construed to expand that reach contrary to territoriality and international comity.

The decision’s practical message is equally clear. Where a defendant is abroad—and especially where the state has made return unlawful and indefinite—claimants must proceed via permission to serve out, and only then (if appropriate) seek substituted service. The judgment thus restores the structural integrity of English private international law: coercive jurisdiction is territorial by default, and extensions require explicit legal footing and judicial control.