Renewed Confiscation Appeal Adjournments: No “Start-Again” by Stealth—Renewal Confined to Existing Grounds Absent a Formal Amendment Application

3.1 Precedents Cited

The judgment, as provided, does not cite any prior authorities by name. Its reasoning is therefore driven primarily by (i) case-management principles in appellate procedure, (ii) fairness between parties (including “equality of arms” in a practical sense), and (iii) the institutional interests of the court system (efficient use of resources and finality).

Although no authorities are referenced, the Court’s approach reflects established appellate practice: a renewed application is not a re-run conducted on newly devised grounds; parties must comply with procedural directions; and late applications which would cause unfairness or wasted court time will generally be refused absent a compelling explanation.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. What a “renewed application” is (and is not)

A decisive feature of the reasoning is the Court’s characterisation of the hearing: it was a renewal of an application for leave to appeal already drafted (by Mr Krolick), lodged in time, responded to by the Crown, and refused by a single judge. The Court stated in terms that:

• The renewal proceeds on “the grounds of appeal settled by Mr Krolick”.
• “Those are the only grounds which can be advanced in the absence of any application to amend those grounds.”
• The suggestion that new counsel needed to re-review the entire evidential and transcript record “misunderstands the nature of the renewed application” and suggested an attempt to “starting again from scratch.”

On that footing, the asserted need for extensive re-analysis of 65,000+ pages of material was treated as largely beside the point: the Court itself had been able to understand and evaluate the existing grounds with “a few days’ reading” and the “documents necessary” to do so.

B. Adjournment/vacation: “good reason” and timing

The Court contrasted (i) the weak explanation for late instruction/preparation with (ii) the concrete prejudice of vacating the hearing.

• No adequate explanation for delay in instructing counsel: the Court rejected the premise that earlier fee disputes or release of funds under restraint justified waiting to instruct counsel for the renewed application. It noted there was “no evidence” that Mr Ibori lacked funds apart from restrained accounts and also pointed to the confiscation judge’s finding of hidden assets.
• Sufficient time even on the applicant’s own dates: even if agreement was reached on 19 September and implementation took “a few weeks”, the Court considered that new counsel could have prepared in time for the listed hearing.
• Resource and listing realities: the Court noted the listing could likely have accommodated oral submissions had proper notice been given, and that other cases listed had not occupied the full day.

C. Fairness, notice, and the “ambush” concern

The Court’s refusal was also grounded in procedural fairness to the respondent and the integrity of the appellate process:

• Non-compliance with directions: the court expected prompt notice if counsel was to attend. The failure was “entirely unsatisfactory.”
• Late service and new material: the morning-of-hearing filing of a multi-page note (raising points not in the existing grounds) and an 800-page bundle heightened the risk of unfairness.
• Oral submissions restricted: the Court declined to allow counsel to advance further oral submissions because of the “real danger” of going beyond the CLP letters, which would be “quite unfair” to the Crown lacking notice and opportunity to respond.
• “Perfecting” grounds seen as a red flag: directions to “perfect” grounds were described as “troubling” and consistent with an attempt to mount a different appeal under cover of an adjournment application.

D. Prejudice, finality, and the broader administration of justice

The Court articulated multiple forms of prejudice and systemic harm if the hearing were vacated:

• Substantial further delay in “already a much delayed process.”
• Wasted judicial resources (including days of reading time).
• The prosecution’s legitimate interest in finality in long-running confiscation proceedings.
• Knock-on prejudice to third parties: a “very real possibility” of unfairness to Mr and/or Mrs Gohil because a Family Division stay (by King LJ) of permission-to-appeal applications was pending resolution of these renewed applications in the criminal confiscation context.

Notably, while the Court indicated it was “minded” to grant leave to both Mr Gohil and Mr Ibori on a limited basis, it refused to let that prospective merits assessment translate into indulgence on case management: the integrity of the process and fairness considerations remained controlling.

3.3 Impact

The decision is likely to be relied upon as a robust statement of appellate case-management discipline in complex confiscation matters:

• Renewed applications are bounded by existing grounds: parties should not expect to “rebuild” an appeal at the renewal stage without a formal amendment application. Attempts to reframe a renewal into a re-litigation exercise may be treated as improper.
• Adjournments close to hearing dates face a high bar: especially where the court has prepared, where the respondent would be disadvantaged, and where delay affects related proceedings.
• Compliance and fair notice are non-negotiable: late bundles and new notes risk being viewed as ambush, with oral advocacy restricted to prevent unfairness.
• Complexity does not automatically justify delay: even in “unprecedented complexity” confiscation litigation, the court will focus on what is actually required for the procedural step at hand (here, a renewal on defined grounds), not on the scale of the underlying record in the abstract.