Remote Judicial Sentencing Is Exceptional: Statutory Safeguards, Evidence-Based Fraud Sentencing and Immediate Custody

1. Introduction

This judgment addresses two distinct aspects of criminal sentencing: the safeguards required when a judge proposes to sentence remotely, and the proper assessment of harm, mitigation and suspension in a substantial accommodation fraud.

The appellant challenged a sentence of 35 months’ imprisonment imposed after his early guilty plea to fraud by false representation. The Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to 24 months but refused to suspend it. The sentencing court had overstated the appropriate harm categorisation and given insufficient weight to substantial mitigation, particularly the appellant’s gambling addiction.

The appeal also revealed that the sentencing Recorder had appeared by video link while the appellant, counsel and other participants attended court in person. No explanation or advance warning had been given to counsel, no representations had been invited, and no live-link direction had been recorded on the digital case system. Although the appellant did not allege that this arrangement made the hearing unfair, the Court considered it necessary to give guidance.

The principal procedural clarification is that a judge may lawfully sentence by live link, but this is an exceptional course requiring compliance with the statutory framework, meaningful consultation and a transparent, reasoned decision. The substantive sentencing decision separately demonstrates that victim impact must be assessed from the evidence, while substantial mitigation and rehabilitation prospects do not necessarily justify suspending custody.

2. Background and Procedural History

The offending

The appellant advertised accommodation through a Facebook housing group and approached people seeking somewhere to live. He supplied apparently legitimate tenancy agreements, requested deposits and sometimes advance rent, and represented that deposits were protected under a tenancy deposit scheme.

Shortly before the proposed moving date, he would invent a reason why the accommodation was unavailable. These explanations included family emergencies and property damage. Requests for repayment were met with excuses, delay or silence. Some persistent victims received partial or full refunds, funded by payments from later victims. The remaining money supported the appellant’s longstanding gambling addiction.

The judgment records total receipts of £77,406.15. Thirty-four victims reported their experiences to Action Fraud, and 15 supplied victim personal statements. Those statements described financial strain, anxiety and disrupted accommodation arrangements. Some victims faced the prospect of homelessness after travelling from abroad. One victim, who had advanced cancer and could no longer work, lost savings intended to secure a stable home.

The appellant’s circumstances

The appellant had no previous convictions and pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity to an offence under sections 1 and 2 of the Fraud Act 2006. He made full admissions and had expressed remorse to victims before his arrest.

A psychiatric report diagnosed ADHD and a gambling disorder. Other mitigation included positive previous employment, earlier attempts to obtain help for gambling, voluntary work supporting people with addictions, family support and compliance with bail. The pre-sentence assessment nevertheless identified a medium risk of reoffending and harm because of the possibility of relapse.

The original sentence

The Recorder adopted a five-year starting point, reduced it by eight months for mitigation, and ultimately imposed 35 months’ imprisonment after correcting the guilty-plea allowance. She declined to suspend the sentence.

Her reasoning was affected by a mistaken belief that the parties agreed on the higher harm categorisation. Defence counsel had agreed the culpability category, but had disputed the prosecution’s assessment of victim impact and expressly sought to correct the misunderstanding.

3. Summary of the Decision

• Remote judicial participation remains lawful: section 51(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 authorises a live-link direction concerning the judge.
• Remote sentencing is exceptional: particularly where imprisonment is likely, administrative convenience is insufficient justification.
• Proper procedure is essential: parties must have an opportunity to make representations, and the judge should explain and record the decision.
• The fraud sentence was excessive: the evidence justified movement within the original guideline category, rather than adoption of the next category’s five-year starting point.
• Mitigation deserved greater weight: a 12-month reduction, rather than eight months, was appropriate.
• Immediate custody remained necessary: the resulting two-year sentence was not suspended because of the seriousness and character of the offending.

The reduction therefore rested on errors in sentencing assessment, not on a finding that remote participation had rendered the hearing unfair or invalid.

4. Authorities and Materials Considered

No named judicial precedents

The judgment cites no named previous judicial decisions. Its reasoning rests principally on legislation, procedural rules and sentencing guidance. It would therefore be misleading to attribute the outcome to an earlier case not identified by the Court.

The Criminal Justice Act 2003

Section 51(1) supplies the power to require or permit participation in eligible criminal proceedings through a live audio or video link. Sentencing hearings are eligible proceedings under section 56(3)(o).

The Court also examined the former section 51(1A), introduced in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, which expressly confirmed that a direction could concern a judge or justice. Its repeal in 2022 did not remove the underlying power: that power came from section 51(1), while subsection (1A) had clarified its scope.

The Criminal Procedure Rules

The Court referred to provision 3.35, which permits live-link directions to be made on the court’s initiative, at a public or private hearing, or without a hearing. That procedural flexibility does not dispense with the statutory requirement to give the parties an opportunity to make representations.

The Lady Chief Justice’s live-link guidance

The judgment considered the latest guidance, coming into effect in October 2026. It emphasises the interests of justice rather than administrative convenience. For exceptional judicial participation by live link during Crown Court trials, it requires prior discussion with the Resident Judge and, where practicable, the Presiding Judge.

The guidance did not expressly address judges attending sentencing hearings remotely. The Court treated that omission as consistent with such arrangements being especially unusual and developed corresponding safeguards for sentencing. This was forward-looking guidance; the judgment did not suggest that the October guidance had already governed the June sentencing hearing.

The sentencing guidelines

The fraud guideline governed culpability, financial harm and victim impact. The Guideline on the Imposition of Community and Custodial Sentences governed the separate question whether the custodial term should be suspended. Both were central to the substantive appeal.

5. Remote Sentencing: Power, Procedure and Effective Participation

A lawful power, but not an ordinary arrangement

The Court rejected any suggestion that a judge’s remote participation is inherently unlawful. It recognised that remote judicial attendance may cause little difficulty at purely procedural hearings, particularly where the defendant is absent.

Sentencing is materially different. Where a defendant faces imprisonment, the circumstances justifying a judge’s absence from the courtroom are likely to be rare. The Court envisaged possible justification where there is a good reason preventing attendance, no substitute judge is available, and an adjournment would not serve the interests of justice. These considerations direct attention to genuine necessity and practical alternatives, rather than convenience.

The statutory safeguards

Section 51(4) prevents a direction unless the court is satisfied that remote participation serves the interests of justice and the parties have had an opportunity to make representations. Where section 52(9) applies, the relevant youth offending team must also have that opportunity.

Under sections 51(5) and (6), the court must consider relevant judicial guidance and all the circumstances, including:

• the proposed remote participant’s availability;
• any need for attendance in person;
• that person’s views;
• the suitability of the facilities; and
• whether effective participation is possible.

These requirements apply when the proposed remote participant is the judge. The fact that a judge may initiate the process does not remove the need to hear the parties.

Notice, explanation and judicial responsibility

The Court stated that the Resident Judge should be consulted in advance so that alternatives can be explored. Counsel should also be told, as soon as practicable, both that a live-link direction is proposed and why.

The explanation need not disclose sensitive personal information. A statement that the judge cannot attend for medical reasons may suffice. However, responsibility for ensuring that counsel receive the explanation rests with the judge; it cannot simply be assumed that court staff will pass it on.

This is more than professional courtesy. Without knowing the reason for the proposal, counsel cannot make properly informed submissions about alternatives, facilities or the interests of justice.

A reasoned ruling and a reliable record

If the judge decides to proceed remotely, there should be a short ruling explaining the exceptional course, confirming consideration of the statutory circumstances and the parties’ representations, and addressing effective participation. The ruling should explain why proceeding remotely is preferable to adjournment or sentencing before another judge.

Both the direction and ruling should be uploaded to the digital case system. This creates an accessible record of the legal basis and reasoning, rather than leaving an appellate court to reconstruct events from incidental exchanges in a transcript.

Technical quality is legally significant

Section 56 defines a live video link through reciprocal visibility and audibility between participants in different locations. The apparent inability of the Recorder to see the appellant was therefore a serious concern, not merely a presentational inconvenience.

The Court also noted poor picture and sound quality, audio delay and inadvertent overspeaking. Had representations been invited, it might have been possible to adjust the camera so that the Recorder could see the appellant, at least when pronouncing sentence.

Where advance notice is impossible and no practical alternative exists, the Court contemplated an initial live-link direction enabling submissions to be heard before a final decision on whether sentencing should proceed remotely.

Limits of the procedural ruling

The judgment does not establish that every defective live-link arrangement automatically invalidates a sentence. No unfairness ground was advanced, and the Court did not determine such a challenge. Its contribution is to identify the proper statutory process and establish practical safeguards for future hearings.

6. Fraud Sentencing: Harm Must Be Assessed from the Evidence

The guideline framework

Category A culpability was agreed because the fraud involved numerous victims and continued over a sustained period. The financial amount placed the offence in harm Category 3, covering £20,000 to £100,000. For Category A3, the starting point was three years’ custody, with a range of 18 months to four years.

The guideline then required consideration of the effects on victims. Those effects could justify movement within the category or towards the corresponding point in a higher category. The prosecution sought Category 2, with a five-year starting point and a range of three to six years. The defence accepted that some upward movement might be appropriate but disputed that escalation.

The error in treating victim impact as uniform

The Recorder assumed that victims who had not supplied statements suffered in essentially the same way as those who had. The Court held that this generalised assumption was inappropriate.

The available evidence itself showed materially different consequences. Some victims had recovered money; others had not. Some experienced inconvenience and additional travel, whereas others faced insecure accommodation or homelessness. One victim suffered exceptionally grave consequences because of serious illness and the loss of savings.

The decision does not mean that missing victim statements establish an absence of harm. Rather, a court must not fill evidential gaps by assuming that every victim experienced the same severe consequences.

Proportionate assessment across the offending

Even taking the statements collectively, the Court considered the offending to involve medium impact overall. One particularly vulnerable victim did not make the entire case one of the most serious emotional or psychological harm.

The amount obtained exceeded the £50,000 figure underlying the Category 3 starting point. Together with the victim impact and the presence of two Category A culpability factors, this justified moving to the top of the Category 3 range: four years.

The Court described the offending as falling between Categories 2 and 3, but rejected the five-year starting point. This illustrates the importance of using the guideline’s ranges and overlaps rather than treating categorisation as a rigid choice between fixed outcomes.

7. Gambling Addiction, Remorse and Personal Mitigation

The Court found that the original eight-month reduction did not adequately reflect the mitigating features. These included genuine remorse expressed before arrest, acceptance of responsibility without self-exculpation, positive good character, rehabilitation efforts, voluntary work and family support.

Particular weight was given to the gambling addiction. The Court accepted that the appellant had been in its grip and that it provided an explanation for the offending, while expressly maintaining that it did not excuse his conduct.

Defence counsel argued that gambling addiction should be treated as seriously as alcohol or drug addiction. The Court’s reasoning supports meaningful, individualised consideration of gambling disorder. It did not, however, establish a universal rule equating all addictions or prescribing a fixed reduction for such a diagnosis.

The appropriate reduction for personal mitigation was 12 months. The revised calculation was:

The calculation separates personal mitigation from guilty-plea credit. The plea discount was applied only after the appropriate sentence following a trial had been identified.

8. Why the Court Refused to Suspend the Sentence

The Court carefully considered the Imposition Guideline. Several factors favoured suspension: good rehabilitation prospects, family support, good character, compliance with bail and no history of failing to comply with court orders. However, the assessed risk of reoffending remained medium, not low.

The personal mitigation justified a shorter sentence but was not sufficiently strong to justify suspension. The appellant had no dependants, and substantial compensation claims remained outstanding despite his wish to make amends.

Above all, the Court considered immediate custody necessary to provide appropriate punishment. The fraud was sustained, carefully planned and persuasive. It exploited people seeking accommodation, used plausible falsehoods to secure sympathy, and continued across numerous victims over several months.

The Court recognised that Parliament had expanded the availability of suspended sentences for more serious offending. Nevertheless, legal eligibility did not determine the result. Even where favourable factors exist, the nature and seriousness of an offence may require immediate imprisonment.

The Recorder’s suggestion that she might have suspended a 30-month sentence, but not the 35-month term imposed, also exposed a reasoning problem. Whether immediate custody is necessary cannot be explained solely by a small numerical difference in sentence length. The relevant guideline factors and the demands of punishment must be addressed directly.

9. Likely Impact

Management of sentencing hearings

The judgment provides a practical framework for unexpected judicial unavailability. Courts should explore substitution or adjournment, consult the Resident Judge, inform the parties, assess the facilities and record a reasoned decision before treating remote sentencing as appropriate.

It also makes clear that counsel’s silence in the face of an unexpected arrangement is not a substitute for an express opportunity to make representations. In this case, the lengthy wait for sentence helped explain why counsel sought to make the arrangement work rather than object.

Evidence in multi-victim fraud cases

Prosecutors seeking a substantial uplift for victim impact should identify evidence supporting the asserted level of harm. Defence representatives should distinguish between victims’ experiences and ensure that agreement on culpability is not mistaken for agreement on harm.

The decision preserves the importance of exceptional individual suffering without allowing the most serious experience automatically to represent every victim’s position.

Addiction and rehabilitation

The judgment supports serious consideration of gambling disorder as mitigation where the evidence explains its connection to offending and demonstrates genuine efforts at recovery. It equally confirms that addiction does not displace responsibility for deliberate, sustained exploitation.

Suspended sentences

Future sentencing decisions should keep three questions distinct: how serious the offence is, what reduction mitigation warrants, and whether the resulting prison term should be suspended. A favourable answer on rehabilitation does not necessarily resolve the final question.

10. Complex Concepts Simplified

Live-link direction

A formal court decision permitting or requiring someone, including the judge, to participate remotely.

Interests of justice

An assessment of whether the arrangement serves fair and effective proceedings, not simply whether it is convenient.

Culpability and harm

Culpability concerns blameworthiness, such as planning and persistence. Harm concerns financial loss and the effects on victims.

Guideline starting point

The initial sentence for the relevant offence category, before adjustments for the circumstances, mitigation and a guilty plea.

Mitigation

Factors supporting a lower sentence, such as genuine remorse, previous good character and evidenced rehabilitation.

Suspended sentence

A prison sentence whose immediate operation is suspended subject to conditions. Availability does not create an entitlement to suspension.

11. Conclusion

The judgment’s central procedural contribution is to confirm that remote judicial sentencing is lawful but exceptional, requiring statutory safeguards, informed representations, effective participation and recorded reasons.

Its sentencing analysis is equally important: victim impact must be grounded in evidence, gambling addiction may warrant substantial mitigation without excusing fraud, and rehabilitation prospects do not automatically justify suspension. Those principles produced a reduced sentence of 24 months’ immediate imprisonment.