Refusal to Reassess Age: Minimal Reasons Suffice Absent New, Objectively Verifiable Evidence

1. Introduction

In Thuyen Van Nguyen for Judicial Review ([2026] CSOH 78), the Outer House of the Court of Session (Lord Braid) considered the lawfulness of a local authority’s refusal to revisit an earlier age assessment. The petitioner, a Vietnamese asylum seeker, sought judicial review of two decisions by Glasgow City Council dated 9 April 2025 and 22 May 2025 declining to carry out a further (“full”) age assessment.

Crucially, the petitioner did not challenge the original age assessment decision (communicated on 29 February 2024), nor the adequacy of reasons given for it. The petition focused solely on whether the Council’s brief refusal reasons for not reassessing age—after receiving supportive letters from third-sector support workers—were legally adequate and rational. Although, even on the petitioner’s claimed date of birth, he was over 18 by the time of the litigation, the parties agreed (in light of Ibrahimi v Glasgow City Council [2026] CSIH 4) that the dispute was not academic.

Key issues

  • Adequacy of reasons: Were the Council’s reasons for refusing reassessment sufficiently intelligible and informative?
  • Rationality: Was refusal to reassess so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have decided it?
  • What counts as “fresh information”: Do supportive observations/opinions from advocacy organisations compel reassessment?

2. Summary of the Judgment

The court refused the petition. Lord Braid held that, viewed against the “prism” of the earlier lawful age assessment, the Council’s reasons for refusing reassessment—though terse—were legally sufficient. The letters relied upon provided no new, objectively verifiable evidence, but rather offered subjective observations and opinions broadly consistent with either youth or young adulthood. The rationality challenge was also rejected.

Expenses were awarded against the petitioner but, as an assisted person, liability was modified to nil.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

R (B) v London Borough of Merton [2003] 4 All ER 280 (“Merton”)

Merton supplies the classic framework for local-authority age assessments, emphasising an informal process with minimum standards of inquiry and fairness, and warning against “judicialisation”. Lord Braid relied on Merton in two ways:

  • Obvious vs borderline cases: While Merton (para 27) contrasts obvious cases with borderline ones, Lord Braid treated the present litigation as not about the sufficiency of the original inquiry (which was unchallenged), but about revisiting a concluded view.
  • “Compelling evidence” to displace an obvious conclusion: Merton (para 38) recognises that appearance/demeanour can justify treating someone as an adult “in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary”. Lord Braid aligned the reassessment request with this concept: the material advanced did not approach “compelling evidence” capable of dislodging the Council’s prior conclusion that the petitioner was “significantly” over 18.

Ibrahimi v Glasgow City Council [2026] CSIH 4

Ibrahimi mattered for two propositions adopted in this case:

  • Endorsement of the Merton approach (para [35]), reinforcing the acceptability of brief, non-judicialised decision-making in age assessment contexts.
  • Reasons need not be lengthy or elaborate (para [35]), which provided direct support for the conclusion that the Council’s short refusal emails/letters could still satisfy the legal standard for reasons.

It also underpinned the parties’ agreement that the petition was not academic despite the petitioner being over 18 even on his claimed age.

Paton, Petitioner [2019] CSOH 62

Paton was cited (via Ibrahimi) for the familiar public law proposition that adequacy of reasons is judged pragmatically: reasons need not be extensive so long as they enable the informed reader to understand why the decision was made. Lord Braid’s application of that approach is visible in his acceptance that “more might usefully have been said”, but that legal sufficiency was nonetheless met.

QAN v South Lanarkshire Council [2026] CSOH 49

Lord Braid noted Lady Ross’s emphasis on flexibility in age assessment procedure: there is no single mandated process, and the depth of inquiry is for the authority depending on circumstances. Although the statutory basis was not explored in argument, the reference to QAN contextualised the court’s reluctance to impose rigid procedural expectations—particularly at the stage of deciding whether to re-open an assessment.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The “starting point” and the “prism” of the unchallenged original decision

The court treated the lawfulness and adequacy of the original assessment as dispositive background. Because the petitioner accepted the Council was entitled to conclude (after a brief enquiry) that he was “significantly” over 18, the reassessment refusals had to be read in that context. The court was not prepared to let a reassessment request become a surrogate appeal on the merits of the original assessment.

(b) What the new material did—and did not—add

The supportive letters described the petitioner’s behaviour and expressed opinions that he was a minor. The court characterised this as:

  • subjective observation and opinion rather than objective verification;
  • advocacy-aligned input (the authors were supporting the petitioner); and
  • describing behaviours equally consistent with young adulthood as with being under 18.

This mattered because the legal question was not whether others could reasonably disagree with the Council’s social workers, but whether the new information was sufficient to require or justify re-opening the concluded assessment.

(c) Adequacy of reasons: the “informed reader” can understand the refusal

The refusal communications were undeniably brief (e.g., “not sufficient information … to consider a full age assessment” and being “satisfied” with the brief enquiry). Lord Braid accepted they could have been fuller, but held they crossed the legal threshold because the informed reader, knowing the earlier assessment, would understand:

  • the Council continued to rely on its prior appearance/demeanour-based conclusion; and
  • the new material was regarded as insufficient to justify revisiting that conclusion.

In short, where the request amounts to “a contrary opinion” to that already formed by the authority’s assessors, the authority need not give tribunal-style detailed reasoning to refuse to reopen the matter.

(d) Rationality: a high threshold not met

On rationality, the court held that it was plainly open to the Council to decide that the material did not warrant reassessment; it was not an extreme decision falling outside the range of reasonable responses. The observed behaviours did not compel reassessment.

3.3 Impact

The decision supplies practical guidance for Scottish public law challenges in the age-assessment context, particularly at the reassessment stage:

  • Refusal-to-reassess decisions can be upheld on short reasons, provided they are intelligible in light of the existing, unchallenged assessment.
  • Fresh material must do more than express disagreement. Support letters describing behaviour and offering a view on age may be insufficient unless they introduce something that materially undermines the earlier assessment (especially something verifiable).
  • Applicants should focus on objective, checkable new evidence (for example, documentation, consistent external records, or other material capable of independent verification), rather than primarily advocacy-based impressions.
  • The judgment reinforces a non-judicialised, flexible administrative approach consistent with Merton and Ibrahimi, and signals that courts will be slow to impose demanding justificatory burdens for declining to reopen age decisions.

A notable practical message is implicit: while legally sufficient, terse refusals risk avoidable litigation. Lord Braid observed that fuller explanation might have “nipped the present petition in the bud”.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Judicial review
A court process to test the legality of a public body’s decision (how it was reached), not to remake the decision on its merits.
Age assessment / brief enquiry
A local authority’s administrative process for determining whether a person is under 18 (and so potentially entitled to child-related duties), which may be short in clear cases and more detailed in borderline cases.
Adequate reasons / “informed reader” test
Reasons are sufficient if they allow a knowledgeable reader, aware of the context, to understand why the decision was made—even if the reasons are concise.
Rationality (Wednesbury unreasonableness)
A very high bar: the decision must be so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have made it. Mere disagreement is not enough.
Reduction
A Scottish public law remedy setting aside an unlawful decision.
Section 25(1) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995
Imposes a duty to provide accommodation for a child in specified circumstances. Whether a person is a “child” depends on being under 18.
Assisted person / modification of expenses
A legally aided party. The court may award expenses against them but modify liability (here, to nil) due to their assisted status.

5. Conclusion

[2026] CSOH 78 confirms that when an original local-authority age assessment is accepted as lawful, a later request to reassess will not oblige the authority to deliver elaborate reasoning to refuse to reopen the matter—particularly where the “fresh” material amounts to supportive opinion and non-verifiable observations that do not materially undermine the prior conclusion. The judgment strengthens the practical boundary between (i) challenging an assessment itself and (ii) seeking a reassessment, and it signals a restrained judicial approach consistent with Merton and Ibrahimi.