No-case rulings on accessorial murder: “knowledge of a knife” is for the jury where the totality of circumstantial evidence could support it

Case: Belfon, R. v
Neutral citation: [2026] EWCA Crim 612
Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
Date: 14 May 2026
Appeal type: Prosecution application for leave to appeal against a ruling under s.58 (as identified in the transcript) concerning a “no case to answer” ruling at trial

1. Introduction

This decision concerns a prosecution interlocutory appeal from a live Crown Court trial at Southwark. The respondent (“RB”) and a co-accused were indicted for murder (count 1) and, in the alternative, manslaughter (count 2). The co-accused also faced a bladed article count.

At the close of the prosecution case, the trial judge upheld a submission of no case to answer on murder for RB but left manslaughter to the jury. The prosecution appealed, contending that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a properly directed jury to infer RB’s prior knowledge that the co-accused had a knife when he got out of the car to confront the deceased. That “knowledge of the knife” was accepted as the key gateway to RB’s potential liability for murder on an accessorial basis.

2. Summary of the Judgment

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents cited and their role

(a) Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039

The “classic” test for a submission of no case to answer provided the foundation. In this case, the dispute was not about the legal test but its application to a prosecution case dependent on inference from circumstantial evidence—specifically, whether the inference of RB’s knowledge of a knife was one a reasonable jury could draw.

(b) R v G & F [2012] EWCA Crim 1756

The court treated R v G & F [2012] EWCA Crim 1756 as the key authority on how Galbraith operates where the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence and an “adverse inference” is required. The Court of Appeal quoted the summary at [36], emphasising three points:

(1) apply Galbraith in all cases; (2) where the key issue is an adverse inference from combined circumstances, deciding “case to answer” involves rejection of realistic possibilities consistent with innocence; (3) crucially, the question is whether a reasonable jury (not all reasonable juries) could draw the inference.

The present judgment is a practical application of point (3): the appellate court concluded that at least one reasonable jury, properly directed, could infer knowledge of the knife from the full circumstantial matrix, so withdrawing murder was impermissible.

(c) “Jogee”, “Hussein”, and “Taz” (as referenced in the transcript)

These authorities arose primarily in RB’s attempt to frame a question for certification to the Supreme Court, touching on modern accessorial liability after “Jogee” and the boundary between foresight/risk (relevant to manslaughter) and intention/“contemplation” (relevant to murder). The Court of Appeal refused to certify the proposed point, effectively indicating that the appeal before it was decided on the narrower ground of evidential sufficiency under the no-case framework rather than any broader re-statement of post-“Jogee” doctrine.

3.2 Legal reasoning

(a) The statutory and appellate framework: “wrong in law / error of principle / unreasonable”

The Court of Appeal reminded itself that it could reverse only if satisfied the ruling was wrong in law, involved an error of law or principle, or was not a ruling it was reasonable for the judge to have made (the judgment refers to s.67 in those terms). The court ultimately characterised the trial judge’s approach as an “error of approach” leading to an “unreasonable” ruling.

(b) The key issue: was there evidence on which a reasonable jury could infer prior knowledge of the knife?

It was common ground that RB’s potential liability for murder turned on whether there was sufficient evidence that she knew, before the confrontation, that the co-accused had a knife. If yes, count 1 should go to the jury; if no, it must be withdrawn.

(c) The trial judge’s misstep: treating CCTV visibility as central

The trial judge placed “much store” on CCTV and whether the knife could be seen when the co-accused exited the car. The Court of Appeal accepted the knife could not be seen on the CCTV; however, it held that the prosecution had never put its case on the basis that the knife (or its outline) was visible on that footage. The court considered that centring the no-case decision on CCTV visibility risked losing sight of the broader inference case.

(d) The “whole evidence” approach to circumstantial inference

The Court of Appeal identified a “far wider spectrum of circumstantial evidence” capable of supporting the inference of knowledge, including:

• shared grievance/animus and repeated attempts to recover money;
• the journey together for about two hours with RB driving and the co-accused beside her;
• the nature and size of the weapon (a 10" combat knife) and the likelihood it would be part of planning/discussion;
• RB’s apparent lack of surprise at the stabbing and her immediate assistance in departure;
• escape behaviour: driving away rather than summoning help, stopping to facilitate retrieval of a dropped phone;
• post-event deception in communications to “Kubie”;
• background messaging said to contemplate violence; and
• deletion of the deceased’s postcode from RB’s phone (as relied on by the prosecution).

From these matters, the court reasoned that the jury could infer (i) planning for a confrontation where serious violence was contemplated, and (ii) that knowledge of the knife was a realistic and properly arguable inference—particularly given the prolonged proximity in the car where concealment (as on CCTV) would be less feasible.

(e) The decisive application of R v G & F [2012] EWCA Crim 1756

The Court of Appeal’s conclusion was tightly anchored to the “reasonable jury” standard. It did not decide that RB did know; it decided that a properly directed jury could reasonably infer knowledge from the combined circumstances, meaning the murder count should proceed.

3.3 Impact

(a) Practical guidance for no-case rulings in weapon-knowledge accessory cases

The judgment reinforces that, where the prosecution case is inferential, a trial judge must avoid narrowing the inquiry to a single evidential feature (here, CCTV visibility of a knife). The correct question is whether the totality of the evidence could allow a reasonable jury to draw the adverse inference required.

(b) Increased robustness of prosecution cases resting on behavioural and contextual evidence

In many street-violence cases, CCTV may not show a weapon clearly. This decision indicates that absence of visible weapon on footage does not preclude a jury inference of shared knowledge where surrounding evidence—motive, planning opportunity, immediate post-event conduct, and deception—could support it.

(c) Limits of the decision

The court did not purport to develop “Jogee” principles substantively; indeed it refused certification of the proposed Supreme Court question. The precedential weight therefore lies in the evidential-sufficiency methodology for no-case rulings, rather than in any doctrinal reformulation of accessorial liability.

4. Complex concepts simplified

4.1 “Submission of no case to answer” (half-time submission)

After the prosecution finishes its evidence, the defence may argue there is no case for the defendant to answer. If the judge agrees, the relevant count is withdrawn from the jury and the defendant is acquitted on that count without needing to call evidence.

4.2 The Galbraith test in brief

The judge asks whether the prosecution evidence, taken at its highest, could allow a properly directed jury to convict. If the evidence is so weak that no reasonable jury could convict, the case (or count) must be stopped.

4.3 Circumstantial evidence and “adverse inferences”

Circumstantial evidence proves a fact indirectly (e.g., knowledge inferred from conduct before/after an event). An “adverse inference” here means an inference against the defendant’s position (e.g., “RB knew of the knife”). The court’s role at half-time is not to choose the best inference, but to decide whether a reasonable jury could choose the prosecution inference.

4.4 Why “knowledge of the knife” mattered to murder vs manslaughter

On the case as framed, if RB knew the co-accused carried the knife to the confrontation, the jury could consider whether she intentionally assisted or encouraged violence at a level consistent with murder liability. Without such knowledge, her culpability might be limited to participation in a lesser unlawful confrontation (capable of supporting manslaughter), but not murder on the prosecution’s theory.

5. Conclusion

Belfon, R. v [2026] EWCA Crim 612 is a pointed reminder that half-time no-case decisions in circumstantial, inferential prosecutions must be made by surveying the whole evidential landscape. A trial judge should not treat the absence of a weapon’s visibility on CCTV as determinative where a broader body of evidence could allow a reasonable jury to infer prior knowledge and thereby sustain an accessorial murder count. The Court of Appeal’s intervention underscores both the resilience of circumstantial cases at the no-case stage and the appellate willingness to characterise overly narrow evidential focus as an “unreasonable” ruling within the statutory appeal framework.