Date: May 15, 2026

Peripheral Complaints and Speculative Fresh Evidence Do Not Justify Extending Time to Renew Leave to Appeal Against Conviction

Introduction

In R v Bhayani [2026] EWCA Crim 691, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) (Lord Justice Edis (Vice-President), Mr Justice Cavanagh and Mr Justice Eyre) refused an application to extend time to renew an application for leave to appeal against conviction. The applicant had been convicted by a jury at Cambridge Crown Court (sitting at Peterborough, HH Judge Enright) of causing serious injury by careless driving, contrary to s2C Road Traffic Act 1988.

The case concerned a right turn across oncoming traffic at a junction, followed by collisions involving two oncoming motorcyclists. The applicant’s renewed complaints ranged from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel to alleged misdirection, insufficiency of evidence, and procedural objections (including the presence of a police officer on the jury and the acceptance of a majority verdict). She also sought to adduce “fresh evidence”, including material about accident statistics at or near the junction and the putative evidence of an unidentified local resident.

The central issue for the Court of Appeal was not to re-try the case, but to decide whether there was a realistic prospect of showing the conviction was unsafe and, in that context, whether it was worth granting further time.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court agreed with the single judge’s earlier refusal. It held there was no realistic prospect that the applicant could show the conviction was unsafe. Key features were:

The prosecution case was straightforward: the applicant turned right when it was not safe, into the path of oncoming motorcyclists.
There was direct evidence from the riders as to how the collision occurred, supported by evidence of the applicant’s immediate post-collision remarks about glare and fault.
The “sun glare” point had been ventilated at trial; if visibility was impaired, a careful driver should not commence the manoeuvre.
The applicant’s post-trial points were largely peripheral and unfocused, and did not confront the main evidential problem: the contrast between the prosecution account and the applicant’s inability to give a coherent alternative narrative.
The proposed “fresh evidence” was either speculative (an unidentified witness) or of limited relevance (general accident data).

The application for an extension of time was refused because “there is nothing to be gained” when the appeal has no realistic prospect of success.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment does not cite earlier case authorities by name. The Court’s approach reflects well-established appellate principles: the Court focuses on the safety of the conviction, does not micro-analyse every peripheral complaint, and will not extend time where the proposed appeal is plainly unmeritorious.

Statutory and Doctrinal Framework Applied

Offence: s2C Road Traffic Act 1988 (causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving). The prosecution must prove (i) driving fell below the standard of a careful and competent driver and (ii) it caused serious injury.
Appellate lens: whether the conviction is unsafe. The Court’s reasoning is explicitly framed around the absence of any “realistic prospect” of showing unsafety.
Time limits and extensions: while the judgment does not set out the full procedural code, it applies the common approach that extensions are not granted where the underlying appeal is hopeless—because prolonging proceedings serves no purpose.
Jury procedure: the Court treated majority verdicts as lawful and unremarkable, and accepted that a police officer juror was not, on the facts stated, a proper ground of objection.

How the Court Evaluated the Grounds

(1) “Ineffective assistance of counsel / improper representations”

The Court endorsed the single judge’s conclusion that the applicant was properly represented, had adequate opportunity to give instructions, and that the evidence was tested at trial. The criticism that the possibility of motorcyclist speeding was not pursued was contradicted by the record: speeding was put to at least one rider and the jury were able to assess the response.

Importantly, even if speed had been a live issue, the Court accepted the core proposition that a driver should not commence a turn across the carriageway if visibility is compromised by glare: the “sun in my eyes” explanation did not convert the manoeuvre into careful driving.

(2) “Lack of sufficient evidence”

The Court rejected the submission that there were “no witnesses to the actual events”. While one following driver did not see the moment of impact, the riders themselves gave direct evidence about the collision. The jury could also draw inferences from the applicant’s spontaneous remarks at the scene (in substance: that glare affected her and that she was at fault).

The Court also highlighted what it regarded as the applicant’s “core difficulty”: she did not meet the prosecution case with a stable, coherent counter-account. Her trial evidence, as summarised, involved significant gaps of recall and an inability to reconstruct events—leaving the jury entitled to accept the clearer prosecution narrative.

(3) “Incomplete and incorrect jury instructions”

The Court agreed with the single judge that the directions were “entirely proper and adequate” and that there were “no complex legal issues”. It also noted the applicant received an appropriate good character direction. The renewed application did not identify any specific legal misdirection capable of rendering the conviction unsafe.

(4) Peripheral procedural complaints (police officer juror; majority verdict)

The Court treated these points as immaterial to safety on the facts presented. Majority verdicts are permitted. As to the police officer juror, the single judge’s conclusion—accepted by the Court—was that there was no proper basis for objection merely because of that occupation (particularly where the officer was not described as a traffic specialist or otherwise connected to the case).

(5) Fresh evidence application (unidentified witness; accident statistics)

The applicant sought to rely on an unidentified local resident who allegedly offered an opinion that the collision was an “accident”, and on statistical material about accidents at or near the junction. The Court did not treat this as capable of advancing the safety analysis:

An unidentified witness who did not provide details to police is, in practical terms, not a witness the defence can realistically adduce; in any event, a lay “opinion” that something was an accident is unlikely to engage the legal question of careless driving in a meaningful way.
General accident data may show a location has risk factors, but it does not address the decisive question: whether this driver, on this occasion, drove below the standard of a careful and competent driver and caused serious injury.

Legal Reasoning: The Court’s Core Move

The Court’s reasoning is a disciplined application of an appellate filter:

Focus on safety, not re-litigation: the Court emphasised that neither it nor the single judge needed to answer every detail where the appeal lacks a realistic prospect.
Weight of the prosecution case: direct accounts from the involved riders plus the applicant’s contemporaneous remarks provided a strong evidential basis for conviction.
Glare does not excuse commencing a dangerous manoeuvre: the Court treated glare as a reason to wait, not a reason why turning across oncoming traffic could still be careful.
Jury primacy: the jury saw and evaluated the witnesses; the applicant’s inability to provide a coherent alternative narrative did not create an appellate arguable point.

Impact

Although fact-specific, the decision is a clear reminder of several practical points for criminal appeals, particularly in road traffic cases:

Extensions of time are merit-sensitive: where the proposed appeal is plainly unarguable, the Court will refuse time because further process would be futile.
Appellate courts will not be drawn into peripheral point-by-point rebuttals: applicants must engage with the central evidential and legal foundations of the verdict.
“Sun in my eyes” arguments have limited traction: raised after a right-turn collision, glare may reinforce (rather than undermine) the conclusion that commencing the manoeuvre fell below the required standard.
Fresh evidence must be concrete and case-specific: unidentified witnesses and generic location-risk material are unlikely to displace a jury’s verdict.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Unsafe conviction”: The Court of Appeal will overturn a conviction only if, looking at the case as a whole, it cannot be relied on as safe. It is not enough that the applicant disagrees with the verdict.
Extension of time: Appeals must be brought within strict deadlines. The Court can extend time, but it commonly refuses where the appeal has no realistic chance of success.
Careless driving (as opposed to dangerous driving): Careless driving is driving that falls below the standard of a careful and competent driver. It does not require proof of deliberate risk-taking.
Good character direction: If a defendant has no relevant previous convictions, the judge may direct the jury that this can support credibility and make it less likely they committed the offence—though it is not determinative.
Majority verdict: In some circumstances the jury does not need to be unanimous; the law allows a majority verdict. The mere fact it was not unanimous does not indicate unfairness.

Conclusion

[2026] EWCA Crim 691 illustrates the Court of Appeal’s insistence that renewed applications—especially out of time—must grapple with the decisive issues. Where the prosecution evidence is direct and compelling, where the defence case at trial is incoherent or does not answer that evidence, and where renewed complaints are largely peripheral or speculative, the Court will refuse to extend time because there is no realistic prospect of demonstrating that the conviction is unsafe.