“Particularly Serious” Multiple Sexual Offending Justifies a Notional Determinate Term Above 30 Years When Setting Life Minimum Terms

1) Introduction

In R v Sala, R. [2026] EWCA Crim 482, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) (Edis LJ (Vice President), Whipple LJ and HHJ Conrad KC) determined an Attorney General’s Reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 concerning alleged undue leniency in the minimum terms attached to multiple concurrent life sentences for serious sexual offending.

The offender had been convicted (after trial) of numerous rapes and offences of encouraging or assisting rape, committed against three victims between 2019–2020, and had previously (in 2023) received an extended determinate sentence for further grave sexual offences against a fourth victim in 2022. At a later sentencing hearing in 2025, the Crown Court imposed seven concurrent life sentences with a minimum term calculated by adopting a notional determinate sentence of 30 years, adjusting for release provisions and crediting time already spent in custody.

The sole issue on the Reference was narrow but important: whether a 30-year notional determinate figure appropriately reflected the totality and seriousness of the offending, given appellate guidance that totals above 30 years will be “comparatively rare” and reserved for “particularly serious” cases.

2) Summary of the Judgment

  • Leave to refer was granted.
  • The Court held the minimum term derived from a 30-year notional determinate sentence was unduly lenient.
  • Applying the guidance in R v AYO [2022] EWCA Crim 1271; [2023] 1 Cr App R(S) 2024, the Court categorised this as a “comparatively rare” and particularly serious case warranting a notional determinate sentence above 30 years.
  • The Court substituted a 38-year notional determinate sentence for each life count, reduced by one-third to reflect release provisions, producing a minimum term of 25 years and 4 months (concurrent).
  • It then deducted 1,323 days (time on remand/serving the earlier sentence), resulting in a minimum term to serve of 21 years and 258 days.
  • All other sentences and orders were left undisturbed.

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Court’s reasoning centred on the framework articulated in R v AYO [2022] EWCA Crim 1271; [2023] 1 Cr App R(S) 2024, which reviewed earlier authorities and clarified how exceptionally high total terms should be approached in multiple sexual offence cases.

R v AYO [2022] EWCA Crim 1271; [2023] 1 Cr App R(S) 2024

The Court treated AYO as the decisive lens through which the “30-year” figure should be tested. It emphasised two propositions drawn from AYO:

  1. It will be “comparatively rare” for the total custodial term for multiple sexual offences to exceed about 30 years after a trial; longer totals are reserved for “particularly serious offending”.
  2. Earlier very high-end cases were not intended to set a new general benchmark; they illustrate the upper end for exceptionally grave facts.

The present Court considered it unnecessary to restate AYO further, instead applying its “particularly serious” gateway directly to the facts.

Attorney General's Reference (R v JRM) [2021] EWCA Crim 524 and Attorney General's Reference (R v Wilson) [2021] EWCA Crim 839

These cases featured in the AYO discussion as examples where exceptionally high notional determinate sentences (up to around 60 years) were deployed for offending at an “exceptional seriousness” level. In the present appeal, they functioned as:

  • Upper-end comparators demonstrating when totals far above 30 years are justified; and
  • A caution (via AYO) that such cases should not be treated as raising baseline sentencing across the board.

McCann and Sinaga (as referenced through AYO)

Although not elaborated in this judgment, these authorities were treated (again via AYO) as exemplars of extreme seriousness. The Court expressly located the present case below that bracket, even while concluding it clearly exceeded the “about 30 years” norm.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The Attorney General’s Reference and the “unduly lenient” threshold

The Court proceeded on the conventional constraint that a sentence is not interfered with merely because it is arguably low; it must fall outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge. The Reference was tightly focused: the Solicitor General accepted the Crown Court’s overall methodology except for the selection of 30 years as the notional determinate foundation.

(b) Notional determinate sentence as the foundation for life minimum terms

Where multiple life sentences are imposed concurrently, the court commonly uses a notional determinate sentence as a structured proxy for overall seriousness. This is not a mechanistic “sum” of guideline figures. The sentencing judge had correctly:

  • categorised each offence under the rape guideline (acknowledging the exercise can be artificial in such multi-count cases);
  • found no mitigation and assessed dangerousness; and
  • applied totality to arrive at a single overall minimum term.

The appellate criticism was not about process but about calibration: whether the chosen notional figure adequately expressed totality.

(c) Totality across four victims and sequencing fairness

A notable feature was the split prosecution pathway: the 2022 offending (against a fourth victim) was tried and sentenced before the earlier 2019–2020 offending. By 2025, the Crown Court aimed to avoid unfairness by ensuring the new life minimum terms reflected the whole course of conduct (including the earlier extended determinate sentence), crediting time spent in custody so the later life sentence did not in effect “double count” custody arising from the earlier case management sequence.

The Court of Appeal endorsed that fairness-driven approach. The only adjustment required was a higher notional determinate starting point.

(d) Why this case crossed the AYO “particularly serious” threshold

The Court concluded “without hesitation” that the facts met AYO’s gateway for going beyond 30 years. The judgment highlights features that collectively made the offending “particularly serious”, including:

  • multiple victims exploited through coercive “relationship” dynamics and vulnerability;
  • repeated rapes, including anal rapes, and controlling, degrading treatment;
  • the orchestration of third-party rapes (encouraging/assisting rape) and scenarios involving multiple men;
  • serious violence used to compel submission;
  • a sustained pattern over time, and continuation into 2022 offending after earlier conduct.

While “particularly serious”, it was still assessed as not reaching the “exceptional seriousness” exemplified by the highest-end comparator cases (McCann, Sinaga and AG's Reference, JRM), thereby justifying an uplift beyond 30 years but not into the 40+ year bracket.

(e) The substituted figure: 38 years

The Court selected 38 years as the appropriate notional determinate sentence for each life count (concurrent), reflecting the case’s placement above the ordinary 30-year ceiling but below the most extreme authorities. It then:

  • reduced by one third to reflect release provisions (producing 25 years and 4 months); and
  • credited 1,323 days for time already spent in custody connected to remand and the earlier 2023 sentence.

3.3 Impact

The decision reinforces a structured, precedent-anchored approach to very high minimum terms for concurrent life sentences in multiple-victim sexual offending:

  • AYO is treated as the controlling yardstick for whether a case can properly exceed an “about 30 years” total after trial.
  • Courts must be prepared to go above 30 years where the facts are “particularly serious”, even if they fall short of the most exceptional cases.
  • In split-prosecution scenarios, sentencing courts may (and should) craft a minimum term that fairly reflects all offending, including earlier sentences, but that fairness objective does not justify understating seriousness.
  • The judgment illustrates an appellate “banding” intuition: 30+ years for particularly serious; 40+ for exceptional; with careful explanation required to show where on that spectrum the facts lie.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

Attorney General’s Reference (Unduly Lenient Sentence)
A mechanism allowing the Attorney General (or Solicitor General) to ask the Court of Appeal to increase certain sentences if they are not just low, but outside the range a judge could reasonably impose.
Life sentence “minimum term”
The minimum period the offender must serve before being eligible to be considered for release on licence by the Parole Board. It is not a guarantee of release.
Notional determinate sentence
A conceptual tool: the court asks “if this overall criminality were sentenced as a single determinate term, what would it be?” That figure helps set a proportionate minimum term for a life sentence where there are many counts and victims.
Totality
The principle that the final sentence must be proportionate to the overall offending, not a mechanical addition of individual sentences.
Dangerousness
A statutory assessment (in relevant cases) of whether the offender poses a significant risk of serious harm, which can justify life or extended sentences.
Credit for time spent on remand
Time already spent in custody can be deducted so the offender is not effectively punished twice for the same custody period.
Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 anonymity
A lifelong prohibition on publishing information likely to identify complainants in sexual offence cases.

5) Conclusion

[2026] EWCA Crim 482 is a clear application of R v AYO: while totals above about 30 years after trial are “comparatively rare”, they are required where the aggregate offending is “particularly serious”. Here, the sustained, multi-victim pattern of coercive, violent, orchestrated sexual offending crossed that threshold, making the original 30-year notional determinate foundation unduly lenient. The Court’s substitution of a 38-year notional figure (yielding a 25 years 4 months minimum term before custody credit) underscores that totality must reflect the true gravity of repeated and organised sexual exploitation, even where proceedings have been fragmented across multiple trials.