Marley, R. v — Renewed Leave to Appeal Against Sentence: High Threshold for Disparity, Late Evidence, and Extensions of Time in “Level 1” Kidnap/Extortion Cases

1. Introduction

Marley, R. v ([2026] EWCA Crim 173, 3 February 2026) concerns a renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence in the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), following refusal by the single judge. The applicant, aged 31 and unrepresented, sought (i) leave to appeal his sentence and (ii) an extension of time of 271 days.

The applicant had been convicted after trial at Cardiff Crown Court of two counts of kidnapping, three counts of false imprisonment, and one count of blackmail arising from an incident on 11–12 December 2020 (Operation Arbus), in which multiple defendants were convicted.

On 27 October 2023, he received an extended sentence under section 279 of the Sentencing Act 2020: a total of 19 years, comprising a 15-year custodial term and a 4-year extended licence. Separately, on 14 February 2025, a Serious Crime Prevention Order (SCPO) was imposed for five years post-release; however, the Court treated any complaint about the SCPO as falling away because there was no standalone challenge to it.

The central issues were whether the custodial term was arguably manifestly excessive or otherwise wrong in law, whether any comparison with co-defendants revealed an arguable disparity, and whether delay could be excused. Procedurally, the Court also addressed (a) refusal of a late request to attend by video link and address the Court, and (b) refusal of an eleventh-hour adjournment request made by a non-solicitor “legal consultancy”.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal refused:

  • Leave to appeal against sentence, holding there was no arguable error and endorsing the single judge’s reasons.
  • The extension of time, citing both the lack of good reason for substantial delay and the lack of merit.
  • The adjournment application, made extremely late (the morning of the hearing) and after the Court had effectively reached and delivered the substance of its decision.

In substance, the Court accepted the sentencing judge’s assessment that the applicant played a leading role in a sophisticated, organised group engaged in kidnap/extortion/blackmail, and was properly treated as a “level 1” offender. A disparity argument based on co-defendants’ sentences was rejected as unarguable.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) Stephens [2010] EWCA Crim 911

The single judge (whose reasoning the full court approved) treated Stephens [2010] EWCA Crim 911 as providing the relevant framework for identifying the gravity of kidnap-related offending and selecting a starting point. On that approach, the applicant’s offending was properly categorised as “level 1”, with a starting point stated as 16–18 years. Against that benchmark, the imposed custodial term of 15 years was not even arguably outside the proper range.

The precedent’s influence here was not merely citation: it supplied the yardstick against which “manifest excess” was assessed. Once the Court accepted the “level 1” classification, the applicant’s arguments (no injuries, personal mitigation, caring responsibilities) were necessarily measured against an established high starting point for serious kidnap/extortion conduct.

(b) R v Anandarajah (Jabinthan) [2012] EWCA Crim 1689

The Court relied on R v Anandarajah (Jabinthan) [2012] EWCA Crim 1689 (specifically referenced at [16]) for the proposition that disparity arguments are “always difficult to maintain”. The Court used this principle to neutralise the applicant’s contention that his sentence was unfair compared with co-defendants.

Importantly, the Court did not treat disparity as irrelevant, but as a high-threshold complaint: differences in sentence will commonly be justified by differences in role, culpability, dangerousness, and case management realities. Here, the sentencing judge’s finding that the applicant was involved “from start to finish”, arranged an address for offending, and led intimidation (including threats with a gun and a knife and threats to kill) provided a rational basis to distinguish him from others.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Renewed leave to appeal: the “arguable error” gateway

The renewed application was assessed through the lens of whether any ground disclosed an arguable basis to say the sentence was manifestly excessive or otherwise wrong in law. The Court’s reasoning was anchored in:

  • Role and culpability: the applicant was a leader in organised offending and the lead intimidator of victims.
  • Dangerousness: the pre-sentence report assessed a high risk of serious harm, linked to gang associations and reoffending; there was “rightly” no challenge to dangerousness.
  • Sentencing framework: the “level 1” classification (Stephens) made a 15-year custodial term readily defensible.
  • Mitigation considered but limited: neurodevelopmental conditions (ADHD/autism) and caring responsibilities were before the sentencing judge in a “full and very well presented” bundle and were taken into account, but could only carry limited weight given the seriousness and length of inevitable custody.
  • Criminal record relevance: the Court rejected the applicant’s attempt to minimise prior convictions, and treated them as relevant to risk and sentencing evaluation.

(b) Treatment of “new” post-single-judge submissions

The Court noted that it would be an “exceptional course” to entertain supplemental submissions filed after refusal by the single judge, and held that even if it did so, nothing disclosed an arguable error. This approach underscores a practical procedural principle: renewed applications are not an open-ended opportunity for iterative grounds without compelling justification and substance.

(c) Disparity with co-defendants

Applying R v Anandarajah (Jabinthan) [2012] EWCA Crim 1689, the Court treated disparity as a difficult ground and rejected it because the applicant’s leading role materially distinguished him. The sentencing judge’s vantage point (having heard the trial evidence) was emphasised: he was “fully entitled” to reach the level and role findings underpinning sentence.

(d) Extension of time

The Court refused the 271-day extension because there was no good reason for the significant delay and, critically, because the application was meritless. This reflects the conventional two-limbed approach: delay is harder to excuse where proposed grounds are weak; conversely, strong merits can sometimes justify indulgence. Here, neither limb assisted the applicant.

(e) Attendance, rights of audience, and refusal of video link

The Court refused the applicant’s request to attend by video link and address the Court, noting:

  • As a prisoner, he was not entitled to attend without leave.
  • He had no rights of audience unless granted by the Court.
  • He had declined the opportunity to seek legal representation.
  • He had already filed detailed written submissions and identified no new matter requiring oral amplification.

The reasoning is case-management driven: oral attendance is not automatic where it would add nothing to written materials and where the applicant has opted to proceed without representation.

(f) Adjournment refused as “too late”

An adjournment request arrived on the morning of the hearing from “True Matrix Limited”, described as a legal consultancy (not a firm of solicitors). The Court refused it because it was “extremely late—indeed too late”, and because the applicant had already demonstrated he could make timely applications (he applied on 28 January to represent himself at the hearing). Additionally, the Court had already delivered the substance of its decision before the adjournment letter reached judicial attention.

Note: the judgment records the adjournment letter as dated “3 February 2025”, although the hearing date is 3 February 2026; this appears to be a typographical inconsistency and did not affect the outcome.

3.3 Impact

The decision is likely to be cited (at least persuasively) for several practical propositions in criminal appellate practice:

  • “Level 1” kidnap/extortion cases: where the sentencing judge properly classifies offending at the most serious level under established authority (here, Stephens), it will be difficult to mount a credible “manifestly excessive” challenge absent a clear error.
  • Disparity arguments remain a high bar: co-defendant comparisons will rarely succeed where role, culpability, and dangerousness findings rationally explain differences.
  • Renewed leave applications are not iterative appeals: supplemental grounds after single-judge refusal will be treated as exceptional and must identify real arguable error, not re-argument.
  • Extensions of time track merits: large delays require compelling explanation; absent merit, extensions will be refused.
  • Robust case management: extremely late adjournment requests—particularly where the applicant had earlier opportunity to apply—are unlikely to succeed, especially where the hearing can fairly proceed on papers.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Leave to appeal (against sentence)
Permission to bring an appeal. Without leave, the appeal cannot proceed. A renewed application is a second attempt after a single judge refuses.
Manifestly excessive
A high threshold: the sentence must be outside the range of sentences reasonably available to the sentencing judge, not merely “harsh”.
Extended sentence / Extended Determinate Sentence (section 279, Sentencing Act 2020)
A sentence imposed where the offender is found “dangerous”: it combines a custodial term with an additional “extended” licence period to protect the public.
Dangerousness
A statutory assessment that the offender poses a significant risk of serious harm. It can justify extended sentences and affects release and supervision.
Disparity
A complaint that one defendant’s sentence is unfairly higher than co-defendants’. Courts generally allow differences where justified by role, culpability, or record.
Extension of time
Permission to appeal out of time. The applicant must usually show a good reason for delay and at least an arguable basis for the appeal.
Rights of audience
The right to address the court orally. Unrepresented defendants may not automatically have this in every appellate listing; permission may be required.
SCPO (Serious Crime Prevention Order)
A civil preventative order restricting conduct to prevent serious crime. In this case, it was not substantively appealed, so the Court did not determine its proportionality.

5. Conclusion

Marley, R. v [2026] EWCA Crim 173 reaffirms that renewed applications for leave to appeal against sentence will fail where they do not disclose an arguable sentencing error, particularly in serious organised kidnap/blackmail cases properly treated as “level 1” under Stephens [2010] EWCA Crim 911. It underscores the difficulty of disparity challenges (per R v Anandarajah (Jabinthan) [2012] EWCA Crim 1689), especially where a defendant’s leading role and dangerousness justify differentiation.

Procedurally, the case illustrates the Court’s firm approach to (i) substantial delay without good reason, (ii) late-stage attempts to reshape arguments after single-judge refusal, and (iii) last-minute adjournment requests that would undermine orderly appellate case management.