Kennedy, R. v — Dangerousness under s.308 Sentencing Code may be founded on organised-crime sophistication and role in planned violence, despite limited prior violence and an acquittal of murder

1. Introduction

Kennedy, R. v ([2026] EWCA Crim 65, 21 January 2026) is a renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). The applicant, Mr Kennedy, had been convicted at the Central Criminal Court of two counts of kidnapping, two counts of false imprisonment, and manslaughter (as an alternative to murder). He received concurrent determinate sentences on the kidnapping and false imprisonment counts, and an extended sentence on the manslaughter count of 20 years (custodial term 18 years plus 2-year extension).

The renewed application originally advanced (i) a challenge to the finding of dangerousness (under the dangerous offender provisions) and (ii) alleged disparity with a co-defendant’s sentence; the disparity ground was withdrawn. The sole live issue was therefore whether the judge was wrong to conclude that Mr Kennedy posed a significant risk of serious harm for the purposes of section 308 of the Sentencing Code, such that an extended sentence was justified.

Key facts (in brief)

Two victims, Mehmet Koray Alpergin and Gozde Dalbudak, were abducted in Enfield after a coordinated ambush involving multiple offenders, disguise, tracking of the victim’s vehicle, and use of multiple vehicles. Mr Alpergin was taken to premises in Tottenham (the “Stadium Lounge”) where he was tortured and killed; the post-mortem recorded 94 separate injuries. Ms Dalbudak was falsely imprisoned for nearly two days before release.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal against sentence. It held that the sentencing judge’s conclusion that Mr Kennedy met the statutory criteria for dangerousness under section 308 was plainly open to her on the evidence. The Court found no misdirection, no misapplication of principle, and no reliance on irrelevant matters. The custodial term of 18 years was not argued to be manifestly excessive; the challenge was directed to the extended aspect, but the Court upheld it.

Central to the Court’s reasoning was that dangerousness is a personal assessment, and that sophisticated, organised, high-risk offending—combined with the applicant’s role, planning indicators, and embedded criminal associations—could justify a finding of significant future risk. The Court also stressed appellate restraint in interfering with trial judges’ dangerousness assessments.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) R v Lang [2006] 2 Cr App R Cr App R(S) 3

The applicant relied on R v Lang [2006] 2 Cr App R Cr App R(S) 3 to argue that dangerousness must be assessed by reference to the risk posed at the time of release, and that the statutory threshold of “significant risk” had not been crossed given his limited violent antecedents.

The Court treated Lang as identifying the relevant factors for a dangerousness assessment—namely the nature and circumstances of the index offences, antecedents, and evidence of association with high-risk criminal activity, planning and preparation. Crucially, the Court concluded that the sentencing judge explicitly considered the relevant factors identified in Lang, including the organised nature of the offending and the evidence of preparation (disguise, temporary phone, tracker, coordinated abduction), and therefore did not misapply the Lang approach.

2) R v Pedley [2009] EWCA Crim 840

R v Pedley [2009] EWCA Crim 840 was invoked to support the submission that dangerousness should be evaluated with an eye to risk at release following a determinate sentence, and that age at release (here, anticipated release in his 50s) reduced the realistic prospect of further serious offending.

While the judgment does not undertake an extended exposition of Pedley, it clearly rejects the applicant’s attempt to treat age as materially undermining dangerousness on these facts. The Court held that the judge was entitled to conclude that risk would remain at the point of release and that age does not preclude future dangerousness, particularly where the offending suggests entrenched criminal behaviour and connection to organised groups. In effect, the Court’s treatment aligns Pedley-type submissions with a fact-sensitive assessment, not a presumption that age neutralises risk.

3) R v Howlett [2019] EWCA Crim 1224

The Court relied on R v Howlett [2019] EWCA Crim 1224 for a principle of appellate restraint: “It will be a rare case in which an appellate court, which has not conducted the trial and seen the offender, would overturn on sentence an exercise of judicial discretion in relation to an assessment of dangerousness.”

This citation performed important work in the Court’s reasoning. It framed dangerousness as an evaluative judgment grounded in the trial judge’s privileged position—having heard evidence, seen the defendant, and assessed the context. The Court reinforced that, absent clear error of principle, it will not readily substitute its view for the sentencing judge’s.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The statutory test and the focus on “significant risk”

The argument turned on whether Mr Kennedy presented a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission of further specified offences (the statutory language referenced via section 308 of the Sentencing Code). The applicant emphasised the relative lack of violent convictions and the murder acquittal.

The Court upheld the judge’s reasoning that dangerousness could properly be inferred not only from past convictions but from:

  • the organised and carefully planned nature of the criminal operation (multiple offenders, trackers, multiple vehicles, pre-arranged premises);
  • the applicant’s role from an early stage in planning and execution;
  • steps to avoid identification (changing clothes, mask, leaving phone at home, using and discarding a temporary handset);
  • direct involvement in violent abduction and prolonged false imprisonment;
  • acknowledged drug supply in the context of offences appearing related to drugs.

Importantly, the Court characterised these features as demonstrating criminal sophistication and a willingness to engage in high-risk offending, which were “all relevant to the dangerousness assessment.”

2) Reconciling the murder acquittal with dangerousness

A central defence submission was that because the jury acquitted Mr Kennedy of murder, the judge could not rely on the horrific fatal injuries to establish dangerousness, nor infer intent to cause really serious harm.

The Court’s answer was careful: it held the judge did not equate the applicant’s involvement with infliction of the fatal injuries. Instead, the judge treated his participation, planning role, and demonstrated readiness to participate in organised violence as evidencing a propensity to engage in serious organised violence. The Court endorsed that as a legitimate basis for assessing future risk.

This is a significant point of principle: an acquittal on the most serious count does not prevent a sentencing court from finding dangerousness if other evidence properly supports a significant future risk—provided the judge does not sentence on the basis of facts inconsistent with the verdict.

3) The role of antecedents and the wider “trial picture”

The applicant argued the judge contradicted herself by noting antecedents were not “significantly aggravating” but still using them for dangerousness. The Court implicitly accepted the distinction:

  • Antecedents may not add much to culpability or the starting point for the index offence;
  • But they may remain relevant to risk, particularly where they demonstrate sustained criminality or embedded criminal lifestyle.

The Court also approved the judge’s reliance on “what I heard … during the trial”, i.e., the broader evidential context (including the applicant’s conduct, associations, and operational sophistication), not merely the formal record of convictions.

4) Co-defendants and disparity arguments: personal assessment of risk

Even though the explicit disparity ground was withdrawn, the applicant’s submissions still leaned on a comparative point: that other participants were not found dangerous, and his conduct was “no different.”

The Court responded with a clear statement of approach: dangerousness is a personal assessment. The absence of a dangerousness finding for others does not undermine the finding for a particular defendant where his conduct and background “differed materially.” The Court endorsed the judge’s view that Mr Kennedy had a more embedded connection with criminality, including drugs supply, and that his concealment steps could be treated as indicative of risk.

5) Age at release

The applicant argued release in his 50s significantly reduced risk. The Court rejected any generalisation: age is a factor, but does not preclude dangerousness, especially where the offence shows entrenched links to organised criminality and demonstrated capacity for serious, planned violence.

C. Impact

Although the case is a refusal of leave rather than a full merits appeal, it meaningfully restates and applies principles that will matter in future sentencing and sentence appeals:

  • Organised-crime indicators can be central to dangerousness: planning, coordination, concealment, use of trackers/temporary phones, and controlled premises may evidence sophistication and future risk even where prior violence is limited.
  • Acquittal on murder does not immunise against a dangerousness finding: sentencing courts may still assess risk from the proven role and surrounding evidence, so long as they do not sentence on a factual basis inconsistent with the verdict.
  • Comparisons with co-defendants have limited purchase: dangerousness is individualised; different outcomes for co-defendants do not themselves show error.
  • Appellate restraint is reinforced: relying on R v Howlett [2019] EWCA Crim 1224, the Court signals that challenges to dangerousness findings face a steep hurdle absent clear misdirection or perversity.
  • Age at release is not determinative: the Court resists treating age as a presumptive risk-reducer where there is evidence of entrenched criminal lifestyle and organisational capability.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Extended sentence
A sentence structure used for certain serious offences where the court finds the offender is “dangerous.” It combines (i) a custodial term and (ii) an additional “extension period” during which the offender remains on licence and can be recalled, aimed at public protection.
Dangerousness / “significant risk of serious harm”
A forward-looking assessment of whether the offender presents a significant risk that, in the future, they will commit further relevant offences that cause serious harm. It is not purely about how bad the current offence was; it is about the likelihood and gravity of future harm, based on the whole evidential picture.
Personal assessment
The idea that dangerousness is assessed individually, not by comparing offenders as a group. Two people involved in the same incident may legitimately receive different dangerousness findings if their histories, roles, and indicators of future risk differ.
Sentencing consistent with the verdict
A judge must not sentence on the basis that the defendant committed a more serious offence than the jury found. However, the judge may still rely on facts consistent with the convictions (and the evidence) to assess risk and impose a lawful sentence.

5. Conclusion

Kennedy, R. v [2026] EWCA Crim 65 confirms that a dangerousness finding under section 308 of the Sentencing Code can be soundly grounded in the offender’s demonstrated capacity for and role in organised, planned, high-risk violence, even where prior violent convictions are limited and the defendant has been acquitted of murder. The decision underscores that dangerousness is individualised, that judges may draw on the full trial evidence to assess future risk, and that appellate courts will rarely interfere with such assessments absent clear error—reflecting the restraint articulated in R v Howlett [2019] EWCA Crim 1224.