Jury Irregularities: Discretion to Discharge a Threatening Juror Without Derailing the Trial (Crim PD 8.7)

1. Introduction

This appeal concerned whether the appellant’s convictions were unsafe because the trial judge’s handling of serious friction between jurors (including abusive language and threats) failed to comply with the approach required by Criminal Practice Directions (Crim PD) 8.7 on “jury irregularities”.

The appellant had been convicted at Snaresbrook Crown Court of multiple offences including rape and related sexual offences, threats to kill, and firearms offences. During deliberations, a juror complained of being verbally abused and threatened by another juror (identified in the proceedings as “juror number 3”). The trial judge ultimately discharged juror number 3, and the remaining 11 jurors continued, returning further verdicts.

The appeal did not require the Court of Appeal to revisit the evidence on the substantive counts. Instead, it focused on whether the jury’s deliberative integrity and impartiality were compromised by the incident and the way the court responded.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It held that:

• The judge’s initial response to the first altercation (sending the jury home, obtaining written notes from court staff, and raising the issue with counsel) was consistent with Crim PD 8.7.
• It was within the judge’s discretion to give the jury guidance about calm and respectful deliberation and to allow deliberations to continue without first questioning jurors in open court in the manner proposed by counsel.
• When further threats were reported, the judge adequately established the basic facts by engaging the jury and obtaining a clear indication that the remaining jurors considered they could deliberate safely only without juror number 3.
• Discharging the disruptive juror (rather than the entire jury) was a proportionate response that did not render the convictions unsafe.

3. Analysis

3.1 The legal framework: Crim PD 8.7 and “jury irregularity”

Crim PD 8.7 defines a “jury irregularity” broadly as anything that may prevent jurors from remaining faithful to their oath. It instructs judges to prioritise the impact on the trial and sets out a seven-step structure, including:

• considering isolation of jurors;
• consulting advocates;
• taking provisional measures;
• establishing basic facts (including, for internal friction, questioning the whole jury in open court as to capacity to continue);
• further consultation; and
• deciding whether to continue, discharge a juror, or discharge the whole jury.

In this case, the alleged irregularity was not external interference (e.g., juror tampering), but internal intimidation and friction during deliberations.

3.2 Precedents cited and how they shaped the decision

Shawn Runakl Delecia [2026] EWCA Crim 42

This underpinned the Court’s reluctance to second-guess operational trial management where the judge had engaged with the problem, consulted counsel, and made a reasoned choice between the available options.

KK [2019] EWCA Crim 1634

The appellant’s case was framed as a step-by-step failure to comply with Crim PD 8.7 (including failure to isolate jurors, inadequate enquiries, and insufficient consultation). KK supplied the evaluative lens: whether, given the particular facts and stage of trial, the judge’s handling maintained prime regard for trial fairness—rather than whether each procedural “step” was ticked in a rigid manner.

3.3 The Court’s reasoning on the alleged procedural failures

(a) The initial incident (16–17 August): fact-finding and judicial choice

Once the altercation occurred shortly after deliberations began, court staff intervened (including isolating the juror who appeared central to the dispute), stopped deliberations, and the judge sent the jury home. The judge then obtained written notes from the usher and clerk and disclosed them to counsel the next morning. The Court of Appeal treated this as aligned with Crim PD 8.7’s early steps: prompt notification, written record, and consultation.

The following morning a juror note described abusive language and threats. Although counsel proposed questions (based on Archbold) to ask the jury, the judge declined and instead delivered a broad, cautionary address about respectful deliberations and continuing the process.

The Court of Appeal held this was within the judge’s discretion. Key considerations were:

• The trial had lasted weeks; a retrial would be a serious outcome for all participants (including young complainants).
• The judge could reasonably regard the written notes as sufficiently establishing the basic nature of the problem at that stage.
• There was no indication the dispute arose from prejudgment or inability to evaluate evidence; it could plausibly dissipate after an overnight break.

The Court did note that it “might have been better” to read the juror note’s exact text to counsel before addressing the jury, but concluded counsel had the “gist” and could make submissions; the shortcoming did not undermine safety.

(b) The escalation (late 17 August): discharge of juror number 3

After the jury returned unanimous guilty verdicts on several counts, a further note alleged renewed threats, including threats of violence outside court. The judge proposed discharging juror number 3 and consulted counsel. Defence submissions cautioned against removing a juror simply because they might hold a minority view on the evidence.

The judge distinguished that risk by characterising the issue as “entirely personality” and intimidation, not evidence disagreement. The judge then brought the jury into open court and asked whether it could continue and whether proceeding as 11 would assist, indicating she suspected juror number 3 would be discharged. A subsequent jury note stated that all 11 remaining jurors felt they could deliberate “in a much more safe and secure environment” without juror number 3. The judge then discharged that juror.

The Court of Appeal held this sequence adequately established the basic facts and supported the judge’s conclusion that:

• the threat problem was attributable to one juror’s behaviour;
• there was no reason to think the rest of the jury was compromised by bias; and
• it was proportionate to remove the disruptive juror rather than abort the whole trial.

(c) Why the returned unanimous verdicts mattered

The Court treated the existence of unanimous verdicts (returned while juror number 3 was still on the jury) as supportive of the judge’s conclusion that this was not a “minority view” problem or evidence-based stalemate. It pointed towards the dispute being behavioural and present from the outset of deliberations, rather than emerging only when jurors divided on guilt.

3.4 Impact and significance

This decision is likely to be cited for practical propositions in jury-management appeals:

• Appellate restraint: where the judge identifies the issue, consults counsel, and takes a reasoned, proportionate step to protect the deliberative process, the Court of Appeal will be slow to find unsafety merely because additional enquiries could have been made.
• Targeted remedy: discharging a threatening juror can be the correct fairness-preserving response, particularly where the remaining jurors express safety concerns and the judge can reasonably exclude evidence-based “minority juror” concerns.
• Operational realities: late-in-the-day decisions (including deciding not to adjourn) will not automatically be criticised where delay risks further harm to the process or to juror welfare and the judge has obtained a clear position from the jury.

At the same time, the judgment implicitly reinforces best practice: disclosure of relevant notes to counsel promptly and clearly, and careful phrasing when questioning the jury to avoid intruding into the substance of deliberations.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 “Jury irregularity”

A “jury irregularity” is not limited to corruption or outside interference. It includes any situation that could stop jurors doing their job impartially and properly—such as intimidation, bullying, or inability to deliberate without fear.

4.2 Why courts avoid probing “deliberations”

Jury deliberations are confidential. Judges may ask about capacity to continue (e.g., whether jurors feel safe or able to remain faithful to their oath) but must avoid questions that reveal how jurors are voting or what they think of the evidence.

4.3 “Discretion” in this context

“Discretion” does not mean “anything goes”. It means the judge must make a careful, context-sensitive judgment—balancing juror welfare, trial fairness, and the integrity of the verdict—guided (but not mechanically dictated) by Crim PD 8.7.

5. Conclusion

In R v Boyce [2026] EWCA Crim 693, the Court of Appeal upheld convictions despite serious juror conflict and threats because the trial judge’s response was a proportionate, fairness-focused exercise of discretion under Crim PD 8.7. The Court reaffirmed that the Practice Direction is a structured guide rather than a rigid checklist and accepted that, where intimidation is attributable to one juror, discharging that juror—after sufficient fact-finding and consultation—can protect the trial’s integrity without the drastic step of discharging the entire jury.