Judicial Review and s.91(14) Children Act: No obligation to issue barred applications; Administrative Court intervenes only for exceptional denial of justice

1. Introduction

In LAU, R (On the Application Of) v The Family Court at Croydon [2026] EWCA Civ 1115, the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (Lady Justice Andrews giving the principal judgment, with Lord Justice Moylan agreeing) refused permission to appeal as totally without merit from an Administrative Court order dismissing a renewed application for permission to bring judicial review.

The applicant (a parent in private-law children proceedings) sought to judicially review what he characterised as HMCTS’s administrative failure to “issue” and progress an application lodged at Croydon Family Court in January 2026. The underlying family litigation had culminated in final child arrangements orders (including a bar on further applications without permission) and multiple unsuccessful permission-to-appeal attempts, each certified totally without merit.

The key legal issues were:

  • Whether the complained-of “inactivity” by court administration could arguably amount to unlawful denial of access to a court or unreasonable delay (Articles 6 and 8 ECHR).
  • Whether HMCTS had any duty to issue/progress a substantive application when a s.91(14) Children Act 1989 bar was in force and no permission application had been made.
  • Whether there was any obligation to issue/progress proceedings that (on a judge’s view) the Family Court had no jurisdiction to entertain.
  • Whether the appeal was academic given subsequent events (notably expiry of the s.91(14) bar).
  • Anonymity and reporting restrictions in judicial review proceedings connected to children cases.

2. Summary of the judgment

The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal as totally without merit. It held, in substance, that:

  • The appeal court’s role was confined to whether any ground of appeal against refusal of permission for judicial review was arguable; it was not a vehicle to revisit the family-court merits or proportionality of the child arrangements orders.
  • On the evidence, the January 2026 filing was not an application for permission under s.91(14); it was an application to set aside final orders—i.e. a collateral attack and, on its face, abusive.
  • While the s.91(14) bar remained in force, the court office was under no obligation to issue a substantive application relating to contact absent permission; “the only type of application” permissible was one for permission under s.91(14), which had not been made.
  • A circuit judge had, by mid-January 2026, considered the filing and indicated that (save in circumstances under FPR 27.5, which did not apply) a circuit judge sitting in the Family Court had no jurisdiction to set aside another circuit judge’s final order; HMCTS staff were entitled to act on that judicial indication, and there was no duty to progress a doomed application.
  • The reliance on MK v Poland and EK (Latvia) did not assist: those Strasbourg authorities concerned materially different scenarios (ongoing proceedings, enforcement failures), whereas the applicant’s family proceedings were effectively concluded.
  • There was no procedural unfairness in the Administrative Court process, no arguable bias (applying Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67; [2002] 2 AC 357), and no misapplication of the “arguability” threshold.
  • No separate reasoning was required for the “totally without merit” certification because the judge’s reasons for refusing permission made the unarguability self-evident.
  • In any event, the s.91(14) order had expired and the case was overtaken by events: granting permission would serve no useful purpose.
  • The Court continued/anew imposed anonymity and reporting restrictions, endorsing interference with open justice as proportionate to protect the child.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents and authorities cited (and their influence)

1) MK v Poland (ECtHR)

The applicant relied on Strasbourg case law about state obligations to ensure effective access to court and timely adjudication in family matters. The Court of Appeal distinguished MK v Poland on the facts: it concerned ongoing family proceedings where a residence application was not even considered for seven months. Here, the applicant’s contact application had been dealt with promptly on an interim basis and determined finally within nine months; the later “delay” related to an attempt to reopen final orders by an improper procedural route.

2) EK (Latvia) (ECtHR)

EK (Latvia) concerned ineffective state action where court orders were being flouted and authorities were insufficiently proactive in securing practical effectiveness. The Court of Appeal held that this line of authority did not translate to a duty to issue or progress an application that was, on its face, jurisdictionally barred/abusive, particularly where the underlying proceedings were effectively over.

3) Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100

The Court deployed the classic abuse-of-process principle as a doctrinal explanation for why the “set aside” application was impermissible: if the allegations about unfairness, bias, guardian issues, and proportionality could have been raised on appeal (or were raised and rejected), they could not be re-litigated through a new procedural device. This reinforced the view that HMCTS (and the Administrative Court) were not required to facilitate a collateral attack.

4) Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67; [2002] 2 AC 357

The applicant alleged apparent bias and “procedural manipulation” because the Administrative Court judge was not the judge he expected and allegedly had a different professional background. The Court of Appeal held that the Porter v Magill test was not even arguably engaged on these facts.

5) “RE B” (Supreme Court proportionality reference)

The applicant asserted a “wholesale failure” to apply proportionality as mandated in “RE B”. The Court treated this as an attack on the merits of family-court decisions and on refusals of permission to appeal—matters outside the proper function of the judicial review being advanced and, in any event, matters for the appellate structure in the family jurisdiction, not for a mandatory order compelling HMCTS to issue an improper application.

6) Administrative Court approach to lower-court matters

The judgment referred to “relevant cases regarding the approach” to judicial review of matters occurring in lower courts, emphasising that only exceptional circumstances (for example, a gross procedural error amounting to denial of a fair hearing) would justify intervention. Although the specific authorities were not named in the transcript, the Court’s analysis applied that established restrictive approach to the administrative actions complained of.

B. Legal reasoning

1) Correct characterisation of what was filed in January 2026

A decisive feature was evidential: the Court required sight of the January 2026 application and concluded it was not a s.91(14) permission request but a substantive attempt to “set aside” final orders. This mattered because the legal duties of HMCTS (and the procedural steps available) depend on what application is actually made, not what it is later re-described to be.

2) Effect of a s.91(14) Children Act 1989 bar on “issuing” applications

The Court stated the operational consequence of a live s.91(14) order in clear terms: while the bar remained in force, the applicant could not make a substantive application relating to contact unless permission was first obtained; accordingly, the court office was under no obligation to issue a substantive application absent such permission. The only permissible application at that time was for leave under s.91(14), and none had been made.

Although the judgment referenced s.91A(4) Children Act (material change of circumstances when determining leave), it did so to show that the statutory scheme presupposes a permission stage. That stage was never properly invoked by the applicant’s filing.

3) No duty to progress proceedings the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain

Independently of s.91(14), a circuit judge had indicated the Family Court’s lack of jurisdiction to set aside another circuit judge’s final order (save within FPR 27.5, which concerns orders made in a party’s absence and was accepted not to apply). The Court held that there is no obligation to issue or progress proceedings where the court lacks jurisdiction; court staff cannot be criticised for acting consistently with a judge’s indication that the application is not entertainable.

4) The “delay” point and the high threshold for judicial review in this context

The Court accepted that unreasonable administrative delay can, in principle, engage Articles 6 and 8. However, it held the facts fell far short of the exceptional denial-of-justice threshold: by the time of the renewed permission hearing, the delay was under four months and, crucially, no longer unexplained because the mid-January communication provided a rational reason (jurisdiction) for not progressing the set-aside application.

5) Misconceived relief and separation of judicial vs administrative functions

The Court treated parts of the pleaded relief as misconceived insofar as they sought, directly or indirectly, to compel judicial case management (for example, directions compelling allocation to particular judges/courts). It reaffirmed the boundary between (i) administrative processing by HMCTS and (ii) listing/allocation decisions as a judicial function. Even where the applicant later sought to reframe his requested remedies, the Court held the Administrative Court must address the claim as pleaded.

6) “Totally without merit” certification

The Court held that a judge need not write a discrete section justifying the totally-without-merit certificate where the reasoning already shows the claim is wholly unarguable (e.g., describing the case as not “remotely close” to circumstances warranting intervention).

7) Anonymity and reporting restrictions

The Court endorsed and extended the Administrative Court’s anonymity/reporting restriction order to the appeal, treating it as a proportionate interference with open justice given the child’s best interests. It relied on the mechanisms used below (CPR 39.2(4), inherent jurisdiction, and section 11 Contempt of Court Act 1981), maintaining ciphers and prohibiting publication of identifying material.

C. Impact

  • Practical guidance on s.91(14) workflow: The decision underscores that where a s.91(14) bar is in force, HMCTS is not obliged to issue a substantive children application absent a properly made permission request. This is likely to be cited in future challenges framed as “administrative obstruction” where the real impediment is statutory leave.
  • Jurisdiction as a complete answer to “delay” JR claims: A credible judicial indication that the lower court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the proposed application can defeat the premise of a JR claim seeking to compel administrative processing.
  • Containment of collateral attacks: The Court’s abuse-of-process analysis (expressly invoking Henderson v Henderson) reinforces finality in private-law children litigation and discourages relitigation through “set aside” routes when the appellate path has been exhausted.
  • Academic relief and utility: Even if arguability existed, the Court signalled that permission may be refused where events have overtaken the claim and no useful purpose would be served—especially common in fast-moving family contexts.
  • Confidentiality in JR connected to children proceedings: The judgment illustrates the readiness of appellate courts to continue anonymity/reporting restrictions in judicial review proceedings where identification risks harm to a child.

4. Complex concepts simplified

s.91(14) Children Act 1989 order
A restriction order preventing a person from making further applications of a specified type (often contact/residence-related) without first obtaining the court’s permission. It is used to prevent repeated, unmeritorious applications and protect the child and other parties from litigation harm.
Judicial review “permission” stage
A filtering step: the claimant must show an arguable case with a realistic prospect of success. If the claim is not arguable, the court refuses permission without a full hearing on the merits.
“Totally without merit” (TWM)
A finding that the application is bound to fail and entirely unarguable. It can limit future repeat applications and is relevant to restraint orders.
FPR 27.5
A Family Procedure Rules mechanism for setting aside certain orders made in a party’s absence. It does not provide a general route to reopen final orders made after attended hearings.
Abuse of process / Henderson v Henderson
A rule preventing parties from re-litigating issues that were, or could and should have been, raised earlier—protecting finality and court resources.
Open justice vs anonymity
Courts generally sit in public, but can restrict reporting or anonymise parties where necessary and proportionate—commonly to protect children in proceedings connected to family life.

5. Conclusion

[2026] EWCA Civ 1115 reaffirms a stringent approach to judicial review claims aimed at family-court administration: absent exceptional circumstances amounting to denial of justice, the Administrative Court will not intervene, particularly where the underlying family proceedings have effectively concluded and the proposed lower-court application is jurisdictionally barred or abusive.

The case’s clearest practical takeaway is that, while a s.91(14) order remains in force, HMCTS is not obliged to issue a substantive application relating to contact unless and until the applicant properly seeks and obtains permission; and where a judge indicates no jurisdiction to entertain the proposed application, there is no public law duty to progress it.