Intermediaries and Jury Requests to Revisit ABE Evidence: Arguable “Unsafety” as the Gatekeeper for Leave to Appeal

Case: WG, R. v [2026] EWCA Crim 1086 (CA (Crim Div))
Date: 26 March 2026
Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), sitting at Mold Crown Court
Judges: Lewis LJ, Stacey J, Heather Williams J
Key statutes: Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992; Criminal Appeal Act 1968

1. Introduction

This was a renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction following a jury’s majority verdict convicting the applicant of multiple sexual offences against his stepdaughter (a child at the time of the allegations), including rape, attempted rape, assault by penetration, and offences involving incitement and sexual activity with a child family member.

The applicant advanced numerous complaints—initially organised in “boxes” (1–7), and later supplemented—principally alleging (i) unfairness arising from claimed neurodivergent conditions and the asserted need for an intermediary, (ii) error in the trial judge’s response to a jury request to revisit the complainant’s recorded interview, and (iii) impropriety by trial counsel. He also sought an extension of time to appeal.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal refused:

  • the renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction; and
  • the application for an extension of time.

Applying the statutory test, the Court held there was no arguable basis to suggest the convictions were unsafe. In particular:

  • The neurodivergence/intermediary point did not arguably show necessity for an intermediary or any resulting risk of unsafety.
  • The judge’s choice to summarise the complainant’s evidence for the jury (rather than replaying the video interview) was a proper method of addressing the jury’s request and did not arguably render the verdict unsafe.
  • Allegations that counsel lied on oath/perverted the course of justice had no proper evidential foundation.

Since none of the proposed grounds had merit, granting extra time would be “pointless,” and was refused.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

No prior judicial authorities were cited in the transcript. Instead, the Court’s approach was driven by the statutory framework and settled appellate principles implicit in it.

3.2 Statutory Framework Applied

(a) Criminal Appeal Act 1968: leave and “unsafe” convictions

The Court emphasised two linked statutory steps:

  • Section 1 (Criminal Appeal Act 1968): an appeal lies only with leave (permission).
  • Section 2: on an appeal, the court must allow it if the conviction is unsafe, otherwise dismiss it.

At the leave stage, the question was practical and threshold-based: is it arguable that something occurred which might make the conviction unsafe? If not arguable, leave is refused without a full appeal hearing.

(b) Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992: lifelong anonymity

The Court began by confirming that the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 applied: where a sexual offence is alleged against a person, no matter likely to identify them as the victim may be published during their lifetime, unless waived or lifted under section 3. This sets the reporting context for the proceedings.

3.3 Legal Reasoning

(a) The Court’s method: paper scrutiny and what matters for “unsafety”

The Court reviewed extensive written material: the applicant’s initial “boxes,” subsequent “new grounds,” comments on the single judge’s refusal, and multiple supporting statements from family members. Although the applicant sought the Court to listen to audio recordings, the Court concluded it was unnecessary because the decisive issue was “what was said,” which was adequately apparent from the documents.

This illustrates a recurring appellate reality: at the leave stage, the Court is not re-trying the case, but screening for a properly evidenced, legally coherent route to “unsafety.”

(b) Neurodivergence and intermediaries: evidence of necessity is central

The applicant contended that neurodivergent conditions (including dyslexia and dyspraxia) impaired his ability to give evidence over three days and that he should have been provided with an intermediary.

The Court addressed a specific factual complaint: although the single judge had stated there was no expert evidence, there was in fact an expert report from a university regarding dyslexia (albeit described as “old evidence”). However, correcting that factual nuance did not change the outcome: the Court held the material did not even arguably demonstrate that an intermediary was necessary to enable the applicant to give evidence, nor that the manner in which he gave evidence created any arguable risk that the convictions were unsafe.

The practical principle emerging is not that dyslexia/dyspraxia can never justify special measures; rather, an applicant must show (with cogent material) a concrete link between the condition, the need for an intermediary, and a real risk to trial fairness sufficient to make the conviction arguably unsafe.

(c) Jury request to revisit the complainant’s interview: summary vs replay

A further “new ground” attacked the trial judge’s handling of the jury’s request to see the complainant’s recorded interview (commonly an ABE-style recording). The judge responded by summarising the complainant’s evidence instead of replaying the interview.

The Court of Appeal held this was “a perfectly proper way” to deal with the request and did not arguably create unsafety. The Court’s reasoning implies:

  • Trial judges retain discretion as to how to assist a deliberating jury’s recall of evidence; and
  • A refusal to replay a recording is not, without more, indicative of unfairness—particularly where a summary is provided and no specific prejudice is shown.

(d) Allegations against counsel: evidential foundation required

The applicant alleged that trial counsel lied on oath or perverted the course of justice. The Court rejected this outright for want of any “proper evidential basis.” The decision underscores that serious allegations of professional or criminal misconduct by advocates cannot operate as appellate grounds unless supported by credible, relevant evidence and a demonstrable pathway to “unsafety.”

(e) Extension of time: merits drive discretion

The Court stated that if any ground had merit, it would have extended time. Because none did, an extension would be futile. This shows the tight linkage between (i) procedural indulgence (time extensions) and (ii) the substantive plausibility of the appeal.

3.4 Impact

Although the decision does not develop doctrine through citation of earlier authorities, it is likely to be relied upon as a clear illustration of how the Court will manage common post-conviction themes at the leave stage:

  • Neurodivergence and intermediaries: applicants must demonstrate necessity and trial unfairness with specific, persuasive material—general assertions or retrospective dissatisfaction will not suffice.
  • Revisiting recorded evidence: a judicial summary in response to a jury request may be an acceptable alternative to replaying a video interview, absent demonstrated prejudice.
  • Allegations against counsel: the Court will require proper evidential foundations and will not allow grave accusations to substitute for arguable legal error.
  • Case management at leave: the Court may decline additional steps (such as listening to audio) where the written record sufficiently addresses what matters for the arguability of unsafety.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Leave to appeal”: permission to appeal. Without it, the appeal does not proceed to a full hearing.
  • “Unsafe conviction”: the statutory test. It does not require proof of innocence; it asks whether something about the trial or verdict makes the conviction unreliable or unfair enough that it cannot stand.
  • “Intermediary”: a communication specialist sometimes used to help a witness (including, in some cases, a defendant) understand questions and give answers. The key issue is necessity for effective participation and fairness.
  • Reporting restrictions (Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992): lifelong anonymity for alleged victims of sexual offences, preventing publication of identifying details unless properly lifted or waived under the Act.
  • Extension of time: permission to file an appeal late. Often granted only where there is a good reason for delay and a potentially meritorious appeal.

5. Conclusion

In WG, R. v [2026] EWCA Crim 1086, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the leave-stage discipline imposed by the Criminal Appeal Act 1968: the applicant must show an arguable route to “unsafety,” grounded in evidence. The Court rejected claims that neurodivergence required an intermediary, upheld the propriety of a trial judge summarising a complainant’s evidence in response to a jury request rather than replaying a video interview, and dismissed unsupported allegations of counsel misconduct. With no arguable merit, both leave and an extension of time were refused.