Inherent Jurisdiction to Restrain Abusive Litigation Communications Interfering with Proceedings (No Cause of Action Required), Subject to Article 10, Litigation Immunity and Tailoring

1) Introduction

Case: Titan Wealth Holdings Ltd & Ors v Okunola [2026] EWCA Civ 138
Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Date: 20 February 2026

The appeal arose out of unusually hostile litigation conduct by the defendant, Ms Okunola, a former consultant/employee engaged in CASS-related work. After multiple unsuccessful Employment Tribunal claims, she embarked on what the trial judge found to be a “plan for vengeance”, including sending large volumes of abusive communications. Titan had already obtained injunctive relief restraining harassment of two employees and had pursued enforcement for breaches.

The specific dispute on appeal concerned Titan’s attempt (by application within the proceedings) to obtain an injunction restraining Ms Okunola from sending abusive, demeaning, profane or grossly offensive communications to or about Titan’s lawyers (Quinn Emanuel), on the basis that the abuse was disrupting the conduct of the litigation. Mrs Justice Hill dismissed that application for lack of a “sound jurisdictional basis”, reasoning that an injunction required a claimant to have a cause of action, and that any harassment claim would belong to the lawyers rather than Titan.

Key issues: (i) whether the “cause of action rule” bars such an injunction; (ii) whether and how the court’s inherent jurisdiction to protect its process can be used; (iii) the role of contempt thresholds; (iv) the constraints of Article 10 ECHR and section 12 Human Rights Act 1998; (v) the effect of litigation immunity/absolute privilege; (vi) procedure (CPR Part 23 and interim/final character); and (vii) discretion, scope and duration of any order.

2) Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal held that the judge was wrong in law to conclude that there was no jurisdiction to grant the injunction. The “cause of action rule” derived from Siskina (Owners of cargo lately laden on board) v. Distos Cia Naviera SA [1979] AC 210 did not survive the modern authorities (Convoy Collateral Ltd v. Broad Idea International Ltd [2023] AC 389 and Wolverhampton County Council v. London Gypsies and Travellers [2023] UKSC 47, [2024] AC 983).

The Court confirmed that, in principle, the High Court has an inherent common law jurisdiction to grant an injunction against a party to litigation to protect the integrity of its process and proceedings in the interests of justice (drawing in particular on PMC v. Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Health Board [2025] EWCA Civ 1126, [2025] 3 WLR 887).

However, despite the existence of jurisdiction, the appeal was dismissed and no injunction was granted (including the narrower order proposed on appeal). The Court held that, as a matter of discretion and on the evidence, no current material risk to ongoing proceedings was shown (the abusive conduct had not continued after imprisonment and there were no ongoing proceedings requiring protection). The Court also emphasised breadth, tailoring, Article 10/section 12, litigation immunity, and the availability of alternative remedies (notably proceedings by the lawyers under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997).

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • Siskina (Owners of cargo lately laden on board) v. Distos Cia Naviera SA [1979] AC 210 (The Siskina)
    The judge treated The Siskina as establishing an “overriding requirement” that an injunction must be anchored to a cause of action. The Court of Appeal held that this approach was overtaken: while historically influential, The Siskina no longer states a universal condition for injunctive relief in light of subsequent developments.
  • Convoy Collateral Ltd v. Broad Idea International Ltd [2023] AC 389 (Convoy Collateral)
    Central to the Court’s correction of the judge’s jurisdictional analysis. The Court relied on Convoy Collateral as rejecting the rigid “cause of action rule” (at least in relation to equitable injunctions), thereby opening space for injunctive relief where justice requires it, including in contexts not tied to a conventional substantive claim.
  • Wolverhampton County Council v. London Gypsies and Travellers [2023] UKSC 47, [2024] AC 983 (Wolverhampton)
    Treated as confirming English law that injunctive relief is “not always conditional on the existence of a cause of action”. The Court used Wolverhampton to show the judge’s “cause of action” premise was legally incorrect.
  • PMC v. Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Health Board [2025] EWCA Civ 1126, [2025] 3 WLR 887 (PMC)
    The principal domestic authority relied on for the proposition that courts have an inherent common law power to protect the integrity of their proceedings in the interests of justice, including by making orders strictly necessary to that end. The Court analogised the “integrity of proceedings” rationale (seen in anonymity/reporting restriction contexts) to restraining serious interference with litigation by abusive conduct.
  • Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254
    Titan relied on Lord Morris’s statement of inherent powers necessary for a court to act effectively and suppress abuse of process. The Court accepted the general principle but grounded its analysis more specifically in modern civil authorities about inherent jurisdiction and the integrity of proceedings.
  • Rex v. Jordan [2024] EWCA Crim 229, [2024] 4 WLR 30 (Jordan)
    Used to articulate (i) the seriousness threshold for criminal contempt (“serious interference with the administration of justice”) and (ii) to inform the civil/inherent-jurisdiction threshold as “material risk of interference with the integrity of the court’s process or proceedings”. Jordan was pivotal in framing when court intervention is justified and in explaining why contempt, if established, can simplify Article 10 proportionality analysis.
  • Rex v. Casserly [2024] EWCA Crim 25, [2024] 1 WLR 2760 (Casserly)
    Relied on to explain that some communications may fall outside Article 10 protection because they amount to “no more than vulgar abuse” and convey no ideas or meaningful information. The Court used Casserly to show that Article 10 analysis may vary depending on whether the abusive communication is pure abuse or mixed with litigation-relevant content.
  • Abbasi v. Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2025] UKSC 15, [2025] 2 WLR 815 (Abbasi)
    Used for two connected propositions: (i) the structured approach to Convention rights (including Article 10) is applied starting from domestic law; and (ii) injunctions can be granted under inherent jurisdiction to protect the integrity of proceedings, but Article 10 (and Article 8 in that case) require careful structured assessment. The Court drew methodological guidance from Abbasi for evaluating interference with expression.
  • Iqbal v. Dean Manson Solicitors [2011] EWCA Civ 123, [2011] IRLR 428 (CA) (Iqbal (1)), Iqbal v. Dean Manson Solicitors [2013] EWCA Civ 149 (CA) (Iqbal (2)), Iqbal v. Dean Manson Solicitors [2014] EWHC 2418 (QB) (Warby J) (Iqbal (3))
    These authorities anchored the Court’s discussion of absolute privilege/“immunity from proceedings” for statements made in the course of litigation, including litigation correspondence. The Court treated immunity as a significant constraint on the design of any injunction restraining a litigant’s communications: if the communications are properly within privilege (i.e., related to the subject matter and not wholly extraneous), restraining them risks cutting across a core policy of enabling free expression in litigation, leaving contempt/criminal law as the sanction for truly abusive participation.
  • Munster v. Lamb (1883) 11 QBD 588
    Appeared in two roles: (i) as part of the historical foundation of litigation privilege policy; and (ii) as relied on by Titan to suggest courts can “check improper conduct”. The Court accepted courts can intervene, but insisted the intervention must respect modern privilege doctrine and Article 10 constraints unless contempt is in play.
  • Lincoln v. Daniels [1962] QB 237 and Smeaton v. Butcher [2000] EMLR 985 (Court of Appeal)
    Cited through Iqbal (3) to define the scope of absolute privilege: immunity applies unless statements have “no reference at all to the subject matter of the proceedings”, with doubts resolved in favour of privilege. This influenced the Court’s warning that “mixed” communications (abuse plus litigation content) may attract privilege and therefore cannot simply be injuncted without careful analysis.
  • Arthur JS Hall & Co v. Simons [2002] 1 AC 615 (Hall v. Simons) and Roy v. Prior [1971] AC 470
    Cited in Iqbal (3) (and referenced by the Court) for the public-policy rationale: participants in litigation must speak freely without fear of civil suit; the control mechanism is contempt/criminal law rather than civil liability for what is said in the course of proceedings.
  • Taylor v. Director of the Serious Fraud Office [1999] 2 AC 177
    Cited via Iqbal (2) for the “wholly extraneous / irrelevant and gratuitous libels” boundary to privilege.
  • Director of the Serious Fraud Office v O'Brien [2014] AC 1246 and Attorney General v Crosland (No 1) [2021] UKSC 15, [2021] 4 WLR 103
    Cited via Jordan to support the “serious interference with the administration of justice” description of criminal contempt and to underline that “there is no such thing as a justifiable contempt of court”.
  • Attorney General v English [1983] AC 116 (and the statutory strict-liability publication test in Contempt of Court Act 1981, section 2(2))
    Used to reinforce that “serious” is an ordinary evaluative threshold, relevant by analogy when deciding whether threatened misconduct is sufficiently grave to justify injunctive restraint to protect proceedings.
  • Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273
    Cited via Jordan to express the classic proportionality idea: free speech should not be limited beyond what is necessary to prevent real prejudice to the administration of justice—an idea mirrored in this case’s insistence on tailoring.
  • In re Abortion Services (Safe Access Zones) (Northern Ireland) Bill [2022] UKSC 32; [2023] AC 505
    Cited (through Jordan) for the proposition that, for some offences, proof of elements may be sufficient for proportionality—supporting the Court’s point that contempt findings can obviate granular proportionality exercises that would otherwise be required under Article 10.
  • Cuadrilla Bowland Ltd v. Persons Unknown [2020] EWCA Civ 9 (Cuadrilla) and Smith v. Backhouse [2023] EWCA Civ 874, [2024] 1 WLR 794
    Used for the principle that injunctive relief must be workable and tightly tailored: restrain only what is necessary and avoid undue interference with lawful activity (here, the defendant’s ability to conduct litigation).
  • WFZ v. BBC [2023] EWHC 1618 (KB) (WFZ)
    Cited on the procedural/proof point: contempt must be proved to the criminal standard, relevant to whether a court can treat abusive communications as contempt without fair notice, pleadings, and evidential analysis.
  • Linemile Properties Limited v. Plater [2023] EWHC 810 (Ch), [2023] PNLR 22
    Cited to illustrate a more extreme factual matrix (a death threat) where injunctive relief was justified; the Court contrasted it to stress proportionality and the discretionary nature of relief here.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Jurisdiction: the “cause of action rule” is not a universal barrier

The Court’s core corrective holding is that the judge treated an outdated premise as decisive: that injunctive relief always requires a cause of action. Drawing on Convoy Collateral and Wolverhampton, the Court held that modern English law recognises injunctions may be granted without a free-standing cause of action where justified by established heads of power—here, the inherent common law jurisdiction to protect the court’s process and proceedings.

(b) Source and limits of power: inherent jurisdiction to protect the integrity of proceedings

The Court located the relevant power in the court’s inherent common law jurisdiction “to protect the integrity of its process and its proceedings in the interests of justice” (supported by PMC and the general principle articulated in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions). It declined to decide whether equity or section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 added anything on these facts.

Importantly, the Court rejected the Advocate’s proposed limitation that such injunctions are only available where the threatened conduct would amount to criminal contempt. The jurisdiction is broader in principle: it can restrain serious conduct threatening the integrity of proceedings even if it falls short of contempt. But as a matter of practical reality, the more the conduct threatens the integrity of the process, the more likely it is to approach the contempt threshold.

(c) Threshold: material risk of serious interference with the integrity of proceedings

The Court’s guidance is functional rather than formulaic. It held that, where an injunction is sought to restrain misconduct within proceedings, the applicant must show a threat or real prospect of serious misconduct creating a material risk of interference with the integrity of the court’s process or proceedings, drawing on Jordan’s discussion of seriousness in the contempt context.

(d) Contempt as a “simplifier” (but not pleaded here)

The Court emphasised that a properly pleaded and proved contempt allegation could have simplified the analysis: if the conduct is contempt (proved to the criminal standard), Article 10 would not protect it (or would be readily justified under Article 10(2)), and privilege would not bar contempt proceedings (consistent with Iqbal (2)).

But the Court refused to determine contempt because: it was not pleaded; the defendant lacked an opportunity to meet it; and it would require detailed evidential findings about impact and mens rea.

(e) Article 10 and section 12 Human Rights Act 1998

Because the proposed order would restrain communications/publication, the Court treated section 12 as engaged. A key procedural re-characterisation followed: although Titan labelled the relief “final”, the Court considered it was, in substance, interim protection of the conduct of existing proceedings. That meant section 12(3)’s “likely to establish” threshold could be engaged “before trial”, unless the case were really one of contempt.

The Court also highlighted a content-based complexity drawn from Casserly: some speech may be “pure vulgar abuse” (potentially outside Article 10), while other communications are “mixed” (abuse plus litigation-relevant assertions) and therefore more likely to remain within Article 10’s scope, requiring careful justification under Article 10(2).

(f) Litigation immunity/absolute privilege

The Court treated absolute privilege as a significant constraint on any injunctive restraint of “in-the-litigation” communications. Under Iqbal (3) (and its foundations in Lincoln v. Daniels and Smeaton v. Butcher), privilege covers litigation documents and correspondence unless they have “no reference at all” to the subject matter; and “irrelevant” is not enough—only wholly extraneous statements fall outside.

This mattered because many abusive emails were not wholly unrelated to the litigation; some included case-related assertions. If communications are privileged, the Court indicated that an inherent-jurisdiction injunction to restrain them would generally be impermissible, because the court must “respect the immunity for the future” and such immune communications cannot straightforwardly be characterised as interference with justice warranting restraint (short of contempt).

(g) Discretion: breadth, tailoring, alternatives, timing, utility

Even where jurisdiction exists and a threshold is met, relief is discretionary. The Court endorsed strict tailoring (per Cuadrilla and Smith v. Backhouse). It accepted the judge was entitled to consider the availability of an alternative remedy: Quinn Emanuel (or individuals) could bring a targeted claim under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, avoiding many complexities.

The Court also considered litigation-stage pragmatics: proceedings were nearing conclusion; Quinn Emanuel had operational measures to mitigate impact; an earlier injunction had not stopped misconduct; and there were signs the application formed part of a broader litigation strategy. These factors supported refusing relief as sought.

3.3 Impact

  • Clarifies jurisdiction post-Convoy: The decision is a direct appellate correction of first-instance uncertainty caused by rapid doctrinal change. It confirms that the High Court is not jurisdictionally paralysed merely because the applicant lacks a conventional cause of action, when the order is sought to protect the integrity of ongoing proceedings.
  • Creates a structured “gatekeeping” approach: Although the Court declined to impose a single universal test, it supplies a practical pathway: establish a real prospect of serious misconduct causing a material risk to proceedings; then grapple with Article 10/section 12 and litigation immunity; then tailor and justify relief in discretion.
  • Reinforces limits and cautions: The judgment simultaneously warns that (i) contempt should be pleaded if relied on; (ii) “mixed” communications complicate Article 10 and privilege; (iii) CPR Part 23 applications framed as “final” may in substance be interim and attract section 12(3); and (iv) relief should rarely outlast the proceedings it protects (absent enforcement-related justification).
  • Practical effect on future applications: Parties (and courts) are likely to prefer: (i) targeted harassment proceedings by the affected recipients (e.g., solicitors) under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997; or (ii) properly pleaded contempt routes where conduct truly crosses the “serious interference” threshold—rather than broad speech-restraining injunctions within existing proceedings.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Inherent jurisdiction: A court’s built-in power (not necessarily written in a statute) to do what is necessary to run proceedings fairly and protect its process from being undermined.
  • Cause of action rule: The older idea that you only get an injunction if you have (or will have) a substantive legal claim (like breach of contract). This case confirms that, in some settings, injunctions can be granted without that, especially to protect the court’s own process.
  • Contempt of court: Serious conduct that interferes with justice (for example, disrupting a trial or intimidating participants). If contempt is proved, speech/privilege objections usually carry much less weight because protecting justice is paramount.
  • Article 10 and section 12 HRA 1998: Article 10 protects freedom of expression. Section 12 adds safeguards when courts are asked to restrain publication, especially before a full trial—often requiring the applicant to show they are “likely to establish” the restraint is justified.
  • Litigation immunity / absolute privilege: A strong protection preventing civil suits (and often civil consequences) based on statements made in the course of litigation, so participants can speak freely. It is very broad: statements remain protected unless they have “no reference at all” to the case. Contempt and certain criminal processes remain available as controls.
  • Tailoring: Even if an injunction is justified, it must be limited to what is necessary—narrowly framed, workable, and not restraining legitimate litigation conduct more than required.

5) Conclusion

Titan Wealth Holdings Ltd & Ors v Okunola establishes (and clarifies post-Convoy Collateral/Wolverhampton) that the High Court has an inherent common law jurisdiction to restrain a litigant’s serious misconduct where it threatens the integrity of the court’s process and proceedings, even absent a separate cause of action and even where contempt is not pleaded.

But the judgment is equally a cautionary guide: unless contempt is properly alleged and proved, courts must carefully account for Article 10 and section 12, and must respect litigation immunity/absolute privilege—particularly where abusive communications are intertwined with litigation content. Relief must be tightly tailored, usually time-limited to the life of the proceedings it protects, and granted only where it serves a real and current protective purpose. On the facts, despite jurisdiction existing, discretion was rightly exercised to refuse an injunction—both at trial and on appeal.