“Groomed Consent” Rarely Justifies a No-Case Ruling; Restraining Orders Must Be Necessary, Noticed, and Reasoned

1. Introduction

This appeal concerned historical sexual offences committed against two complainants, anonymised under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 as C1 and C2. Following a Crown Court trial in Sheffield, multiple defendants were convicted of offences arising from child sexual exploitation in Rotherham.

The Court of Appeal dealt with:

• Yasin: renewed application for leave to appeal conviction (rape counts 18–25 relating to C2), focusing on (i) identification/proof on an Etap/Ibis hotel count and (ii) whether any jury could find absence of consent in a “groomed consent” context.
• Amar: appeal (with leave) against sentence and restraining order (two indecent assaults against C1 involving compelled oral sex).
• Ajaib: appeal against restraining order (sentence appeal withdrawn).
• Saddiq: renewed application for leave to appeal sentence, arguing consecutive structuring to his earlier 2019 sentence and totality.

The key legal issues were: (a) the threshold for withdrawing a case from the jury where the complainant has made statements suggestive of consent but the wider evidence is of grooming and vulnerability; and (b) the proper legal basis and procedure for imposing restraining orders in historical sexual offence cases.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Yasin: leave to appeal conviction refused on both grounds. The Court held there was ample evidence from which a properly directed jury could find lack of “real” consent in context; and there was sufficient evidence to support the hotel count.
• Amar: sentence appeal dismissed (custodial element of 14 years for two indecent assaults held not manifestly excessive given guideline comparators). However, the restraining order was quashed.
• Ajaib: restraining order quashed; sentence appeal withdrawn/dismissed as withdrawn.
• Saddiq: renewed application for leave to appeal sentence refused; the judge’s approach to concurrency and totality was not arguably wrong.

The Court reaffirmed that apparent “consent” in evidence does not end the inquiry where grooming and vulnerability are in play; and that protective orders must be justified by necessity and supported by fair procedure and reasons.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) R v Ali and Ashraf [2015] EWCA Crim 1279 — the leading authority on “groomed” consent

The Court treated R v Ali and Ashraf [2015] EWCA Crim 1279 as the “leading authority” and extracted five propositions that structured its analysis of Yasin’s no-case argument. In substance, those principles did the following work in this appeal:

• High bar for “no case” in consent/capacity disputes: Questions of consent and capacity are “normally” for the jury, with withdrawal limited to “clear cases”. This undercut Yasin’s submission that C2’s statements of consent made the case unfit for a jury.
• Contextual evaluation of “real” consent: Even where a complainant appears to agree, grooming may mean compliance masks lack of true consent. The Court used this to justify leaving the “true consent” question to the jury despite cross-examination answers suggesting consent “on every occasion”.
• No need for overt “I didn’t consent” evidence: The prosecution is not obliged to elicit explicit non-consent if circumstances may distort appreciation. This validated reliance on the wider narrative: vulnerability, care setting, substances, dependency, and “swap and change” hotel sex described in ABE material.
• Grooming does not automatically vitiate consent: But it “starkly raises the possibility” of acquiescence rather than agreement. The Court’s approach was not to deem consent impossible, but to confirm that it is a nuanced fact question suitable for jury evaluation.

(b) Usman [2021] EWCA Crim 502 — “rare cases” and the importance of full jury direction

Yasin relied on Usman [2021] EWCA Crim 502 for the proposition that there is a narrow category where the evidence of genuine consent is so clear that a jury could not properly convict, requiring the judge to stop the case. The Court rejected that characterisation of the evidence, emphasising (in line with Usman) the need to consider consent in its “wider context” and noting that grooming cases require careful jury directions.

Crucially, the Court did not treat Usman as creating an easily-invoked gateway to a no-case ruling; rather, it framed such interventions as exceptional, and found this case fell squarely within the ordinary category demanding jury assessment.

(c) R v Adalat [2022] EWCA Crim 1538 — complainant’s own assessment not determinative

R v Adalat [2022] EWCA Crim 1538 was used alongside Usman to reinforce a central methodological point: a complainant’s description of consent cannot be taken “in isolation” from surrounding circumstances. Here, the Court relied on the ABE extracts summarised by the trial judge to show a textured picture: alcohol and drugs, pressure, vulnerability, and normalisation of exploitation, all capable of undermining “free and informed” agreement.

(d) R v Forbes [2016] EWCA Crim 1388 — sentencing historic offences using modern guideline equivalents

In sentencing Amar (and similarly Ajaib), the trial judge referenced R v Forbes [2016] EWCA Crim 1388 for the approach to historic offences: the court should consider the current Sentencing Council guideline for the equivalent modern offence while respecting the historic statutory maximum for the offence charged (here, indecent assault under the Sexual Offences Act 1956, max 10 years).

The Court of Appeal accepted this as the correct framework and used the guideline comparator (rape of a child under 13 categories) to assess whether Amar’s overall custodial term was manifestly excessive in modern terms while remaining anchored to legality.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Yasin: “groomed consent” and the no-case threshold

The core of Yasin’s argument was that C2 had “accepted in terms” that she consented on every occasion, meaning no jury could be sure of non-consent. The Court’s reasoning proceeded in three steps:

1. Identify the governing test: via R v Ali and Ashraf [2015] EWCA Crim 1279, it is only in “clear cases” that a judge should stop a case; and in grooming/vulnerability contexts, the issue will “usually” be for the jury unless evidence “clearly indicates” proper consent.
2. Refuse a narrow focus on a single strand of testimony: the Court held that C2’s cross-examination concessions could not be treated as determinative, because the law requires the jury to assess whether agreement was “free and informed” in context.
3. Demonstrate sufficiency of contextual evidence: the Court pointed to the judge’s detailed ABE summary showing: early introduction of penetrative sex by an older man; drink/drugs; hotel settings; coercive sexualised environment (“swap and change”); and C2’s later reflection that it was “wrong” and “pressure” was eased by alcohol. On that evidential basis, the Court concluded a jury could properly find absence of real consent.

The Court additionally endorsed the quality of the trial judge’s directions, observing that grooming-consent cases “require careful direction” and that this summing-up was “clear and full”. That mattered because the appellate court’s confidence that the jury could safely decide depended on proper legal framing at trial.

(B) Yasin: proof on the Etap/Ibis count

On the challenged hotel rape count, the Court held the evidence was sufficient for a jury to conclude Yasin was the perpetrator. It relied on: C2’s evidence of sex with Yasin at that hotel on multiple occasions with Bari present; children’s home records of C2 missing on 4–5 January; and a contemporaneous handwritten report that C2 and another girl were at the Etap with two men and engaged in sexual activity, with the other girl naming Bari. The Court treated the defence “Imran” hypothesis as a matter for jury evaluation rather than a deficiency eliminating a case to answer.

(C) Amar: manifest excessiveness and totality

Amar’s principal complaint was that the judge effectively “doubled” sentence by making the two terms consecutive and thereby reached a manifestly excessive total. The Court approached the issue as one of overall total, stressing that appellate review focuses on the end result rather than the precise route taken, unless the route reveals a misstep causing excess.

The Court held the custodial element of 14 years was not excessive given the guideline comparator: category A2 (starting point 13; range 11–17) and category B2 (starting point 10; range 8–13) for the equivalent modern offence. Two serious indecent assaults involving compelled oral sex against an 11-year-old were capable of justifying a total term at that level.

(D) Restraining orders: necessity, proportionality, notice, and reasons

The most practically significant part of the judgment for day-to-day sentencing practice is the quashing of restraining orders for Amar and Ajaib. The Court reaffirmed that:

• Restraining orders “can only be made where necessary” to protect the victim from future harm, and must be proportionate.
• Procedural fairness matters: where orders are not identified in advance, defence counsel may be deprived of the ability to respond.
• Reasons matter: the absence of explanation for why the order was necessary weighed heavily against it.

On the material before the Court—historic offending and lack of clear evidential basis demonstrating present necessity—there was “some force” in the submission that the orders were unnecessary. The Court was “not persuaded” of necessity and quashed both. Notably, it drew attention to the fact that the prosecution sentencing note did not mention restraining orders and that the judge did not explain his basis.

(E) Saddiq: concurrency, totality, and appellate restraint

Saddiq’s argument—that the new sentence should have been consecutive to the earlier 2019 sentence and then reduced for totality—was rejected as unarguable. The single judge’s refusal (endorsed by the Court) emphasised that the Totality guideline says “generally” consecutive for unrelated incidents, but that leaves discretion. The sentencing judge expressly considered totality and took an “unusual” but permissible course by effectively overlapping the new sentence with the balance of the 2019 term. The Court observed that Saddiq may have benefited from this approach.

3.3 Impact

(1) Trials involving child sexual exploitation: resisting “consent-by-quotation” arguments

The decision consolidates a practical message for trial courts: where there is evidence capable of supporting grooming and vulnerability, apparent admissions of “consent” do not, without more, make the case unsuitable for a jury. Defendants will face a high bar in persuading a judge that such a case is one of the “rare” exceptions where no properly directed jury could convict.

(2) Prosecution and defence case preparation: the centrality of context evidence

The Court’s reliance on ABE interview material highlights the evidential architecture likely to decide these cases: care status, missing episodes, substance use, inducements, dependency, and the complainant’s evolving understanding. For prosecutors, the judgment confirms that they are not required to elicit an express “I did not consent” statement if the circumstances can logically support distorted understanding or acquiescence. For defence teams, it signals that successful challenges will need to engage with the whole evidential picture, not only isolated concessions.

(3) Sentencing for historic sexual offences: guideline equivalence with statutory maxima

The Court’s treatment of Amar confirms the continuing practical importance of the R v Forbes [2016] EWCA Crim 1388 approach: modern guideline categories can calibrate seriousness, but the sentence must remain legally faithful to the historic offence’s maximum. The Court’s focus on the total custodial term, rather than the concurrency/consecutivity “route”, is also a reminder that appeals framed purely as structural complaints may fail if the overall outcome is defensible.

(4) Protective orders: the judgment as a procedural and evidential warning

The quashing of restraining orders is likely to have immediate operational consequences: applications should be clearly flagged in advance (ideally in sentencing notes), supported by an evidential basis demonstrating present risk, and met with explicit judicial reasoning addressing necessity and proportionality. Historic offending alone will not automatically justify an indefinite order.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Groomed consent”: a situation where a victim may appear to “agree” to sexual activity, but the agreement may be the product of manipulation, dependency, inducements (gifts, alcohol, drugs), fear, or immaturity—so what looks like consent may be mere acquiescence.
• No case to answer: a legal submission that the prosecution evidence is insufficient in law for any reasonable jury to convict. In grooming/consent cases, the appellate authorities make this an exceptional outcome.
• ABE interviews (“Achieving Best Evidence”): structured police interviews used particularly with vulnerable witnesses, often video-recorded, aiming to capture an account reliably and reduce the need for repeated retelling.
• Specimen counts: charges drafted to represent repeated conduct over a period when victims cannot particularise every incident by date/time; they allow the jury to decide whether offending occurred on at least one occasion within that window.
• “Offender of particular concern” and extended licence: for specified sexual/violent offences, the court may impose a custodial term plus an extension period on licence, reflecting heightened public protection concerns.
• Totality: the principle that when sentencing for multiple offences (or when imposing a new sentence on someone already serving one), the overall sentence must be just and proportionate to the total criminality—neither artificially low nor crushing.
• Restraining order: a protective order (often “no contact”) that can be made at sentence, but only if necessary to protect a victim from future harm and proportionate in scope and duration; it must be properly raised and reasoned.
• Slip rule: a mechanism to correct accidental errors in orders/sentences without changing the substance of the judge’s intended decision.

5. Conclusion

Yasin & Ors, R. v [2026] EWCA Crim 68 strengthens two practical propositions. First, in alleged child sexual exploitation, the presence of statements suggesting “consent” rarely warrants withdrawing the case from the jury: the legal inquiry is whether consent was free and informed in the whole context, and grooming evidence typically makes that a jury question. Second, restraining orders are not routine add-ons; they require advance identification, an evidential basis demonstrating necessity, and clear judicial reasons. The Court’s willingness to quash the orders underscores that protective measures must be both substantively justified and procedurally fair.